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SUMMARY
This study examines the works of Kurt Tucholsky 
(^1890-1935). Tucholsky was well-known in Germany during the 
nineteen-twenties and early nineteen-thirties as a poet, reviewer, 
essayist and satirist. However, his most significant work was in 
the field of political journalism, and it is this aspect of his 
writings which is analysed in this thesis.
The first six chapters of this study examine the 
development of Tucholsky*s political opinions. His short articles 
in the Social Democratic newspaper VorwcSrts indicated an early 
scepticism about the moral standards and political institutions of 
Wilhelminian society. From 1914 the existence of censorship temporarily 
restrained his social criticism, but his experience of military service 
on Germany’s Eastern Front transformed him into a pacifist and a bitter 
opponent of German militarism.
Tucholsky greeted the Revolution of November 1918 with 
enthusiasm, since it premised to sweep away the Wilhelminian system.
Along with other left-wing writers, he supported the ideal of intellectual 
engagement and Die Weltbiihne, the weekly journal to which he contributed, 
was to become the leading organ of independent, progressive writers 
throughout the Weimar Republic. Tucholsky believed that his country 
required a period of peaceful consolidation. He opposed the violence of 
the revolutionary left almost as fiercely as he attacked the conservatives 
who had formerly ruled Germany; and in Ulk he gave cautious support to the 
Democratic Party* However, he soon began to recognise that the new 
government, led by the Social Democrats, was corprcmising with the officers, 
judges and civil servants of the old regime. Tucholsky pointed out rightly
(ii)
that such tactics would endanger the Republic. In March 1920 he 
emphasised his concern for the future of Germany by joining the 
USPD and contributing to its newspaper, Die Freiheit. Until 1922 
he regularly warned his country's politicians against the threat 
from the right, but he became frustrated as his prophecies were 
ignored and his advice was rejected. During the crisis of 1923 
he lapsed into a despairing silence, but his appointment as the 
Paris correspondent of the Weltbuhne restored his enthusiasm for 
literary work.
By the mid-1920,s Tucholsky1 s political views had undergone 
a gradual change. He no longer believed that the Republic might 
provide a framework for democratic reform. On the contrary, Weimar 
democracy now seemed to be a mere facade, concealing the fact that 
power remained with the bourgeoisie and the army. Tucholsky*s 
opinion was reinforced when Fieldmarshal Hindenburg was elected 
as the second President of the Republic in 1925. Tucholsky rightly 
feared the anti-Republican plans of Hindenburg*s advisers, and he 
recognised the danger that Germany might prepare for war in order 
to avenge the defeat of 1918. In order to resist this development, 
and also to put into practice the Marxist principles which he new 
held, Tucholsky sought an alliance of left-wing forces and 
advocated a second revolution, more radical than that of 1918.
During the late 1920's Tucholsky adopted a radically left- 
wing position. He accepted the revolutionary tenets of Marxism, 
sympathised with the KPD and wrote regularly for Ocranunist news­
papers. However, the KPD leaders did not respond to his offers
(iii)
of encouragement and his constructive criticism; they were not 
^interested in discussing with the intellectual left, but only 
in compelling the latter to join the party and obey its 
unquestioning discipline. Tucholsky refused to do so, partly 
because he wished to preserve his artistic integrity and partly 
because he was beginning to suspect that the KPD was being 
exploited by Stalin as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy.
Tucholsky had lost much of his interest in political 
polemic by the time of the National Social 1st electoral victories 
in the early 1930's. He opposed the advance of Fascism in Germany 
in a number of satirical poems and prose articles ; but he regarded 
Fascism merely as a new variant of Wilhelminian Conservatism, and 
underestimated the persuasive powers of its leader. Recognising 
that the progressive cause was facing inevitable defeat, Tucholsky 
wrote his last political articles in the spring of 1932 and 
committed suicide in his Swedish exile three years later.
In the latter part of this study Tucholsky's significance 
as a political writer is assessed through a detailed analysis of 
the important themes in his work. Ihe relationship of the intellectual 
and polemicist with the leading Realpolitiker of the Weimar era,
Ebert, NOske and Stresemann, is studied in Chapter 7. This is 
followed by an examination of his attitude to the German officers 
and the Prussian militarism which they represented. His comments 
on the judiciary, the educational system, the press and the middle 
classes are considered in Chapter 9.
Tucholsky was an intellectual, a man of integrity who 
refused to betray his idealistic, humanitarian convictions in
Vi
slavish obedience to the doctrine of any political group. Never­
theless, even as a young man he was aware of the value of solidarity 
with progressive organisations. His oommitment to the left-wing 
cause after the war led him to give temporary support to the DOP, 
the USPD, the Pacifist Movement and the KPD. However, none of these 
groups retained his allegiance, and he finally abandoned politics 
in despair. Tucholsky has been criticised frcm the right for 
Utopian radicalism and from the left for bourgeois individualism. 
Ihis study concludes that he was prepared to make concessions to 
the Social Democrats in the early years of the Republic, and to the 
Ocraraunists in the late 1920's; but neither party listened to his 
pleas that they should change their policies. Their failure to 
retain Tucholsky' s support was partially due to his intellectual 
idealism, but largely caused by their own lack of perception and 
political errors.
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CHAPTER 1
Kurt Tucholsky, the eldest son of a prosperous 
Jewish family, was bom in Berlin on January 11th, 1890. He 
attended two of the best-known grammar schools in the city, 
studied law at the universities of Berlin and Geneva and 
gained his doctorate in 1915. However, he gave only brief 
consideration to a legal career; his vocation lay elsewhere.
As a seventeen-year-old schoolboy he wrote the first of his 
newspaper articles bo be published. In the next twenty-five 
years it was follovred by a further 2500 journalistic and literary 
works, ranging from lyric poetry to political polemic, from 
witty feui lie tons to speculations on the after-life. In the 
1920*s he became one of his country's foremost satirists, and 
a controversial figure whose writings aroused enthusiasm on the 
left and indignation on the right. Tucholsky strove to influence 
events in Germany in his own time, and his books abound in 
references to contemporary politics; yet forty years after his 
death his works are more widely read than during his life-time.
The young Tucholsky began his journalistic career in 
1907, with a Marchen (1) which satirised Wilhelm II, who had 
controlled Germany since Bismarck's resignation in 1890. The 
Emperor enjoyed considerable popularity among the middle and 
upper classes, who regarded him as the symbol of Germany's 
increasing strength and prestige, and a guarantee that the existing 
social order would be preserved. A significant minority, led by
(1) Marchen, Ulk, 22/11/07, Gesairmelte Werke, Vol.l, p. 13.
the Social Democrats and sane progressive Liberals, recognised 
the Enpenor's weaknesses : his penchant for theatrical poses 
and resounding cliches, and his belief in the Divine Right of 
the Hohenzollems. Wilhelm's most formidable opponent was 
Maximilian Harden, who in the pages of his magazine Die Zukunft 
for years exposed corruption among the Emperor's advisers. (2) 
Wilhelm's blunders were also frequently satirised in the magazine 
Siroplicissimus, which was founded in Munich in 1896 and soon 
became, in Tucholsky's words:
„das A und 0 der politischen deutschen Satire" . (3)
The young author of Marchen joined the number of writers 
on the Liberal left who were sceptical about the Emperor's ability. 
Tucholsky was to become a bitter critic of Wilhelm's domestic 
and foreign policy, but for the time being he chose a different 
target. Wilhelm was wont to apply his dogmtic attitude in the 
artistic field, with a naivete^  equalled only by his political 
dilettantism He enjoyed the stilted plays of Lauff and Wilden- 
bruch and the pompous sculpture of the Siegesallee and dismissed 
contemptuously the works of modernists such as Wedekind or Zille. 
Tucholsky's fairy-tale in turn ridiculed Wilhelm's aesthetic 
tastes. The schoolboy's lack of respect for traditional authorities 
was to remain an important weapon of the adult s'atirist. However, 
the significance of this early article should not be over-estimated. 
Tucholsky did not begin to write regularly until the summer of 
1911.
(2) Cf. Arthur Rosenberg, Die Entstehung der Weimarer Republlk, 
Frankfurt, Europaische Verlagsanstalt, 1961, p.41.
(3) Die modeme politische Satire in der Literatur, Dresdener 
Volkszeitung, 14/5/12.
Marchen is the first work in the authorised West 
German edition of Tucholsky1 s writings, prepared by his widow, 
Mary Tucholsky, and by F. J. Raddatz. The three volumes, 
vhich first appeared in 1961, are entitled Gesammelte Werke (4), 
since they contain only some three-quarters of Tucholsky1 s 
literary output. Most of the pre-war articles contained in 
the first 200 pages of Volume 1 were originally published in 
the periodical Die Schanbuhne, a weekly theatrical review with 
which Tucholsky began a long and fruitful collaboration in 
January 1913. Since the editor of Die Schaubuhne, Siegfried 
Jaocfosohn, was primarily interested in cultural rather than 
political matters, Tucholsky contributed to his journal up to 
1914 only a few articles which are relevant to this survey.
However, the impression that Tucholsky was not 
concerned about political questions in his youth can new be 
shown to be false. Even before joining Jacobsohn, Tucholsky 
had occasionally written for newspapers owned by the Social 
Democrats. The number and significance of these early writings 
has only recently been revealed, as a result of research in the 
Institute for Social History in Amsterdam. Sane sixty poems 
and short prose articles by Tucholsky were published in Vorwarts 
in the three years between the summer of 1911 and the outbreak of 
war.
Although Tucholsky's father had died in 1905, the young 
student was by no means impoverished. He may have wished to 
supplement his income, but he was drawn to journalism mainly by 
personal interest and by the desire to test his cwn ability . The
(4)Gesairmelte Werke, Vols.I-III, Kowohlt, Reinbek, 1961.
- 4-
decision to write for Vorwarts is nevertheless remarkable.
The newspaper had been edited by prominent intellectuals from 
a middle-class background such as Wilhelm Liebknecht and Kurt 
Eisner. However, the pre-war SPD still consisted largely of 
manual workers and was devoted to serving their interests, rather 
than those of society as a whole. The Social Democrats were 
hated and feared as revolutionaries, by the upper and middle 
classes alike. It is therefore important to analyse why 
Tucholsky committed himself to politics in general, and, still 
more significantly, why he chose to ally himself with the despised 
"Reds".
Political engagement was common among German intellectuals 
of this period. By the end of the nineteenth century, they had 
acquired an important role in society, but this improvement in 
their status was accompanied by the realisation of their political 
impotence. Excluded from responsibility, they became hostile to 
the holders of power and joined in a movement known as Aktivismus.
The aims of the Aktivisten were first expressed in 1910 
by Heinrich Ifenn in the essay Geist und Tat (5). Mann pointed to 
the gulf between the advanced nature of German intellectual 
thought and the reaction and corruption of the political system. 
Instead of confining themselves to abstract speculation, intellectuals 
had a duty to become agitators and put their superior insight into 
the service of the people in its fight against authority. After 
the war Tucholsky wrote an enthusiastic review of the volume Macht 
und Mensch, in which this essay had been published (6). Similar
(5) Cf. Heinrich Mann, in Macht und Mensch, Munich 1919, pp.6-9.
(6) Macht und Mensch, (review by Tucholsky) WB 17/6/20, GW 1, pp. 679-81.
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ideas were put forward by Franz Pfemfert's weekly Die Aktion, 
and they were to be developed during the war by Kurt Hiller in 
Das Ziel.
In an essay published in the Schaubuhne in 1913, (7) 
Tucholsky demonstrated his awareness of this discussion by 
praising Ibsen as an example of the oaimitted intellectual.
He returned to the theme in the article Vormarz, in which he 
lamented the over-indulgence in reflection by seme of his 
fellcw-intellectuals and their reluctance to seek political 
remedies for Germany's problems:
„Es geht uns nicht gut. Wir haben hundert Dogmen 
der Reflexion, aber kaum eins des Handelns. Wir 
gleichen dean Tausendfiifiler, der vor lauter tlber- 
legung nicht mehr weiB, welches Bein er zuerst 
heben soli und demgemaB stehen bleibt. Macht und 
Geist sind zwei Faktoren, die einander femer sind 
denn je".(8)
Tucholsky's political campaign may be seen as an endeavour to 
bridge this gap by offering his insight to those in a position 
to put his ideas into practice. This explains why, unlike 
Heinrich Mann, he was at first uninterested in writing for his 
fellow-intellectuals, and why he rejected an esoteric philosoph­
ical platform such as that found by Ossietzky in Das Freie Volk. 
In order to gain influence it was necessary to appeal to a larger 
audience. The Social Democratic workers fulfilled this condition, 
being both numerous and well organised.
(7) Wenn Ibsen wiederkame, Schaubuhne, 28/8/13, ibid. pp.79-81.
(8) SB 2/4/14, GW 1, p.169.
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Tucholsky's own dislike not only of the Emperor but
also of the political system as a whole provided a second
* -
reason for supporting the SPD. Only they could give effective 
resistance to Chancellor Bethmann and the General Staff. Only 
the workers, demonstrating in favour of an extension of the 
franchise, could ignore with impunity the outbursts of the 
Berlin Police President, Jagcw (9).
Bethmann and Jagow were typical representatives of a
political system in which the Cabinet and civil service were
responsible to the Emperor rather than to the Reichstag.
Prussian authoritarianism, based on the traditional alliance
of „Thron, Altar und Militar" had triurrphantly unified Germany,
and thanks to the political skill of Bismarck, the old Prussian
leaders had maintained their supremacy. The estate owners from
east of the Elbe had a self-confidence which drew Tucholsky's
reluctant admiration:
„Ostelbien ist... ein Fundus, auf dem man seinen 
breitbeinigen Standpunkt haben kann. Die Arme 
solcher Kerle haben Bewegungsfreiheit". (10)
Yet Tucholsky and other progressive writers recognised that energy
and strength of will and previous services to the Hchenzollems
were insufficient qualifications for the leadership of Germany
in an age of rapid industrialisation. The Junker whom Tucholsky
satirised in the poem Bund der Landwirte(ll) had never been noted
for their intellectual gifts, and the economic strength which they
had previously derived from their large estates was on the wane.
(9) Cf. Tucholsky's attack on Jagow as Napolium vom Alexander^ - 
platze 'in the poem Spiele nicht mit SchieBgewehrI (Vorwarts, 
8/8/11).
(10) Vormarz. GW 1, p.169.
(11) SB 26/2/14, Ibid. p. 154.
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In common with many young writers in pre-war Germany, 
Tucholsky considered that political cranmitment was morally 
necessary, and he strongly opposed the existing regime as being 
outmoded. However, this does not explain his unwillingness to 
support the claims of his own class to assume responsibility 
for the state.
The reason for the omission lay in the attitude of the 
German Burgertum. With the exception of such convinced democrats 
as Naumann and von Gerlach, few middle-class politicians had any 
anbition to change the Wilhelminian system. The National! i heralen 
had become the government's most loyal supporters, since it 
ccnpensated them for their political irrpotence with a pre-eminent 
position in carmerce and industry. Tucholsky rejected this 
subservient attitude; economic advantages were no substitute for 
democracy.
Tucholsky was not the only German writer repelled by the 
passive conservatism of his own class. In the same pre-war period, 
Heinrich Mann was describing the career of Diederich HeBling, the 
classic Untertan. (12) Further evidence that such ideas were 
common on the intellectual left may be found in the early writings 
of Carl von Ossietzky. (13) However, Tucholsky*s reasoning for 
the time being went further than that of Heinrich Mann or Ossietzky. 
The Burgertum refused to recognise the need for the introduction of 
democracy into Germany, or to perceive the weapon with which that 
change could be accomplished: organisation and solidarity. The
(12) Mann's Der Untertan was not published until 1918.
(13) Cf. Raimund koplin, Carl von Ossietzky als politischer 
Publizist, Berlin, Leber Verlag, 1964, p. 15.
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middle-class intellectual Tucholsky was prepared to learn from the 
workers vho were fighting together against the Imperial system. (14) 
This recognition that the working-class movement offered the best 
chance of inproving the German political system was probably the 
decisive factor in persuading Tucholsky to write for Vorwarts.
After the revocation of Bismarck's anti-Socialist law in 
1890f the rise of the SPD had been rapid. The party increased 
its share of the vote at successive elections, encouraging the 
belief that it must eventually gain an absolute majority. The 
psychological effect on new adherents such as Tucholsky of the 
SPD's electoral triumph in 1912 was considerable. (15) The party 
gained a third of all votes cast and, with its 110 deputies, it 
became the strongest group in the Reichstag. The set-back for the 
right-wing parties and the Chancellor delighted Tucholsky, and in 
a satirical poem he demanded Bethmann's resignation. (16)
Tucholsky's hopes for reform were disappointed. The Social 
Democrats still had few allies in the Reichstag, and in any case 
that institution had little influence. The composition of the 
Prussian Landtag was even more conservative, since its members 
were chosen by the notorious Dreiklassenwahlrecht, which severely 
restricted the SPD representation. Tucholsky might invite the 
voters to overturn the regime:
Die Schlotbarone urd die Landgendarmen -
„blast sife doch urn! ! (17)
But there was little chance of such a revolutionary turn of events.
(14) Biirger-Solidaritat, Vorwarts, 16/8/13.
(15) Cf. VergeBlichkeit, Vorw. 31/1/12.
(16) Wer in der WilhelmstraBe singt, Vorw. 13/1/12
(17) Landtagswahl, Vorw. 16/5/13.
Still more worrying was the fact that the Social 
Democrats were losing in revolutionary zeal what they had 
gained in electoral popularity. (18) Iheir leaders Ebert and 
Scheidemann were evolutionary reformists without plans for 
radical social change. This gradual acceptance of the existing 
state by the SPD was the background to Tucholsky*s conclusion of 
1914:
„Die politische Opposition, und vor alien) die 
Sozialdemokratie, haben sich griindlich diskreditiert". (19)
His criticism of the Weimar SPD for over-indulgence in compromise
was foreshadowed in the additional Garment:
„Unsere Radikalen mogen wir ja nur deshalb nicht, 
weil sie keine sind". (20)
Uius the SPD's influence as a progressive force, which had 
originally attracted Tucholsky, proved more apparent than real. 
Tucholsky1 s decision to publish in an SPD newspaper had represented 
a Zweckbundnis, and if the hollow Wilhelminian culture and 
antiquated political system could not be destroyed by the party, 
he felt justified in reducing- the number of his contributions to 
Vorwarts.
Tucholsky*s middle-class upbringing likewise encouraged 
him to seek an alternative literary outlet. Although he undoubtedly 
admired the discipline and spirit of the workers, he knew little of 
their daily lives. Only twice before the war did he discuss their 
every-day problems, in the essay Doping (21) and the poem Die
(18) On the SPD during this period, cf. Carl E. Schorske: German 
Social Democracy, 1905-17, Harvard 1955.
(19) GW 1, p.169.
(20) ibid.
(21) Vorw. ll/8//12
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Sonne^ (22) The latter demonstrated Tucholsky's sympathy for 
their suffering, but he confined himself to externals such as the 
contrast between Prussian patriots, boasting about thsir country’s 
position as a world power, and a worker talking to his son of 
the miserable life which hie too would have to face. This poem 
could hardly be said to foreshadow Tucholsky's subsequent develop­
ment as a writer of propaganda verse, and its message amounted to 
resignation rather than revolution.
Tucholsky's articles in Vorwarts demonstrate that even at 
this early stage in his career he was as interested in the 
specifically political development of Germany as in its cultural 
affairs. Youthful cver-optimism was evident in the belief that 
the SPD could, or indeed wished to, undertake fundamental reforms 
of German society. Just as the content of his writing was 
progressive in intent but often superficial, so the artistic form 
of his propaganda verses shewed that in spite of his natural talent 
he still had much to learn.
In January 1913 Tucholsky discovered the literary outlet 
which he had been seeking since his gradual disillusionment with 
Vtorwarts. He joined Siegfried Jaoobsohn's weekly review Die 
Schaubuhne, which under the new name Die Weltbuhne was to remain 
his most inportant forum until the end of his journalistic career 
nineteen years later.
In his contributions to Vorwarts, Tucholsky had enjoyed 
access to a large readership. When he joined Die Schaubuhne, 
that journal had a circulation of only a thousand; it dealt almost 
exclusively with the theatres and music halls of Berlin and had 
little or no political content. Even in the late 1920's, during
(22) Simplicissimus, 1914.
the editorship of the controversial Ossietzky, its circulation 
did not rise much above 16000. Tucholsky was able to use the 
3°umal to speak to a small band of devotees, well-educated 
and independent-minded left-wingers. In order to continue reaching 
the masses, he still occasionally contributed to Vorwarts, thus 
practising a journal is tic double allegiance which he was to copy 
in the 1920's. (23)
His work for Die Schaubuhne provided Tucholsky with several
advantages. The positive qualities of the journal stsnmed from
the character of its editor. Jacobsohn allowed his contributors
to express themselves without fear of editorial censorship.
TXicholsky soon respected him not only as a friend but also as an
intellectual and stylistic mentor, who assisted him in developing
his talent. The mutual benefits derived from Tucholsky's association
with the journal have been expressed by Schulz:
„Tucholsky braucht das Organ, urn seine unerhorte 
Vielseitigkeit hier behutsam ausreifen zu las sen; 
das Organ braucht Tucholsky, urn Jahr fur Jahr 
durch seine nimnrermude Schaffenskraft an Weite 
und Originalitat zu gewinnen". (24)
Gradually Die Schaubuhne changed its character, as Jacobsohn 
recognised that the shallow, pompous Wilhelminian culture reflected 
failings in the political sphere. In 1913 he opened its pages to 
the analysis of events in the Berlin Stock Exchange by Vindex, and 
in the following year he published Tucholsky's openly political 
essay, Vormarz.
(23) As well as writing for the Weltbuhne in the 1920's, Tucholsky 
contributed to the Berliner Tageblatt, Die Frelheit, Vossische 
Ze't tnng und Arbeiter Illustrierte Zeitung.
(24) Cf. Klaus-Peter Schulz, Tucholsky, Reiribek, Rororo-Bild- 
monographie 1959, p.38.
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Tucholsky's work for Die Schaubuhne provided the external 
stimulus for the creation of his pseudonyms, those "hanunculi", 
each of which reflected one aspect of his personality and literary 
activity. Tucholsky did not wish the small weekly which published 
so many of his early articles to appear dominated by one man. A 
more important reason for the adoption of the pseudonyms lay in 
the very diversity of his talents, which, he claimed, might have 
given rise to suspicion in an age of specialisation. (25) Whatever 
the characteristics of the individual personae, clarity of style, 
combined with personal and political integrity pointed to the 
ocranon origin of their work. Peter Pan ter specialised in non­
political book reviews, while Theobald Tiger wrote poems which 
ranged from the sentimental to the highly political in nature, and 
he also provided one of the mainstays of the Berlin cabaret. Kaspar 
Hauser, created as an alter ego of Tiger when the latter was seconded 
to Ulk in December 1918, subsequently produced the Wendriner sketches 
and the Nachher series, among Tucholsky's deepest reflections on the 
human condition. Ignaz Wrobel, the unccmprcmising polemicist, is the 
most iirportant of the pseudonyms for this study. Tucholsky also 
published under his own name, when he considered the article to be 
of fundamental importance.(26)
In 1914, Tucholsky contributed regularly to the Schaubuhne 
and less frequently to Vorwarts. By continuing to publish in the 
latter, he could comment on the position of the military in 
Germany and on the threat of war. Since the days of Frederick
(25) Mit 5PS, Preface, GW 2, p. 1004: „Eine kleine Wodhenschrift 
mag nicht viermal denseIben Mann in einer Nurrmer haben.. Und 
es war auch niitzlich, fiinfmal vorhanden zu sein - denn wer 
glaubt in Deutschland einem politischen Schriftsteller Humor? 
dem Satiriker Ernst? dem Ver spiel ten Kenntnis des Strafgesetz- 
buches? dem Stadteschilderer lustige Verse?"
(26) Such an article was Wir Negativen, WB 13/3/19, GW I, pp.372-77.
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the Great, the Prussian army had been noted for its strength 
and efficiency, and the victories of Koniggratz and Sedan had 
increased its social prestige. Military service was canpulsory 
throughout the Empire, but officers were drawn mainly from the 
aristocracy. They regarded themselves as a class apart, infinitely 
superior to mere civilians. This attitude caused resentment on 
the left, particularly when in 1913 sane demonstrators in the town 
of Zabem in Alsace were arrested and tsnporarily inprisoned by the 
ccranander of the local garrison. The affair was discussed in the 
Reichstag, where Bethmann defended the officers involved. (27) Ihe 
Chancellor's clumsy excuses irritated his opponents further, and 
a vote of censure was passed by a large majority. Tucholsky 
was therefore speaking for left-wing opinion when he demanded of 
Bethmann:
„Schieb ab, schieb ab, du sollst dich nicht mehr qualen- 
Man sagt mir doch, du seist Major? 
und kannst den jiingsten Leutnant nicht befehlen?- 
Schieb, schieb ab! Und laJ3 'nen neuen vor!— " (28)
Although Tucholsky had much to learn about the writing of propaganda
verses, his description of Bethmann's inability to restrain the
military was correct. Nevertheless the Chancellor refused to
resign, and the position of the army in the state remained unshaken.
Ihe final significant thane of Tucholsky's early social 
criticism was Ms opposition to war. In the tense political 
atmosphere of the years from 1911 to 1914, with the European 
military blocs engaging thenselves in potentially catastrophic 
adventures in North Africa and the Balkans, it was natural for
(27) Cf. Rasenberg: Entstehung, p. 54.
(28) Abzugl, Vorwarts, 10/12/13.
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Tucholsky to give sane thought to the causes of modem war.
His most important article on this theme m s  Der Sadist der 
Landwehr, (29) published in July 1914, a week after the 
assassination of the Austrian Crown Prince in Sarajevo.
Tucholsky' s polemical refutation of a bellicose brochure by 
a retired Stabsarzt represented a timely warning to his 
compatriots. The Stabsarzt had expressed opinions which were 
to be uncritically echoed by a majority of German journalists 
when war broke out less than a month later: the demand that 
German troops be instilled with hatred of the enemy as an 
antidote to any scruples which they might have against war 
service.
Such propaganda naturally roused Tucholsky1 s humanitarian
instincts. However, his opposition should not be equated with
the unconditional pacifism which he supported after the mass
slaughter of the World War. Far from claiming that there could
be no such thing as a just war, he explicitly incorporated an
escape clause:
„DaB einmal ein ganzes Volk in berechtigtem HaB 
gegen ein andres aufflammt und zu den Waffen 
greift, ist richtig und erklarlich". (30)
This was the situation which most Germans believed to exist a
month later. However, he rejected the modem Volkskrieg and gave
a radical interpretation of its political causes:
„Man muB nicht vergessen, daB modeme Kriege wesentlich 
auf kapitalistischen Grvinden beruhen, und daB alles
(29) Vorw. 6/7/14, GW 1, pp.211-13.
(30) ibid. p. 213.
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andere ein wohl angelegter Schwindel 1st: 
die VoXksbegeisterung und die flatternden 
Fahnen und die Qrden und alles das". (31)
This argument at first recalls the anti-militarist criticism
of Karl Liebknecht. However, this Marxist interpretation of
the causes of war appeared nowhere else in Tucholsky's articles
in Vorwarts; nor did he attempt to demonstrate in any detail
the alleged responsibility of the capitalist system for war
between nations.
The most inpressive feature of the article was Tucholsky' s 
clear-sighted rejection of the devices used by the authorities 
to make war palatable to the public: the creation of an atmos­
phere of war hysteria, and the maintenance of enthusiasm by means 
of patriotic symbols bearing little resemblance to reality. As 
the crisis grew more serious and the SPD reaffirmed its desire 
for peace, Tucholsky suggested in a satirical article for Vorwarts (32) 
that those demonstrating in favour of war were romantic children, 
men exerpted from active service or agents provocateurs. Tucholsky1 s 
obvious opposition to war was that of a perspicacious observer, 
suspicious of official Wilhelminian propaganda, and of a humanitarian 
idealist, who abhorred the " tierischen Instinkte" (33) which that war 
would unleash.
(31) ibid.
(32) Dgnonstranten-Briefe, Vorw. 27/7/14, published in the East 
German edition of Tucholsky1 s works by Roland and Christa 
Links, East Berlin, Verlag Volk und Welt, 1972, Vol.l, pp.
310-313.
(33) GW 1, p.213.
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When war did break out in August 1914, Tucholsky's 
actions proved that he was as unimpressed by the scenes of 
patriotic jubilation as he had inplied a month earlier. He 
had no desire to enlist at once in the ranks of the national 
crusade, to be in Paris in six weeks, as many volunteers 
believed. But he shared the general conviction that his country 
must be defended. This evidently appeared to him one of the 
"just wars" described in Der Sadist der Landwehr, and so he did 
not object on conscientious grounds to all military service. He 
therefore ccnpranised, by ccnpleting his Dr.juris before complying 
with the call-up in 1915.
Hie personal circumstances of Tucholsky's war service 
contributed to his later unconditional pacifism, but they do 
not provide a complete explanation. He spent the war far from 
the mass slaughter in France and Flanders. Tucholsky served 
instead on the Eastern Front: until the suirmer of 1916 in a 
sappers' batallion,then as squadron librarian in Kurland, and 
finally for seme months as a military police administrator in 
occupied Rumania.
Life in the Etappe did not place Tucholsky's humanitarisnisn 
under the strain of having to kill any of the enemy. Lice and 
fleas, rather than the Russians, ware the main problem. Neverthe­
less, Tucholsky was hopelessly out of his element in uniform, as 
was shown in his letters to Dr. H. E. Blaich, to whem he could 
express his feelings without fear of censorship or court-martial. (34)
(34) Letter of 4/3/16, in Ausgewahlte Briefe, Reinbek, Kowohlt, 
1966, p. 30.
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Unsatisfied by the mechanical performance of menial tasks 
and by the lew cultural level of his companions, he sought 
&  refuge in a personal island of culture, populated by his
favourite authors: Schopenhauer, Christian Wagner, Raabe and 
Busch. If Tucholsky as a cultured intellectual was bored by 
the narrowness of arny life, as a liberal humanitarian he 
found his domineering superiors intolerable (35). Life became 
more bearable, thanks first to his meeting his future wife,
Mary Gerold, in November 1917, and then to the improved conditions 
of his service in Rumania: his highest tribute to duty there 
was to describe it as "angenehm und zivil". (36) But he had 
little ambition to become a career civil servant and when Theodor 
Wolff, of Mosse's Berliner Tageblatt, offered him the editorship 
of the paper's satirical supplement, Ulk, shortly before the end 
of the war, the enthusiasm with which he accepted revealed the 
journalist returning to his vocation.
Tucholsky's public literary response to the war poses 
problems of interpretation absent from the letters to Blaich or Mary 
Gerold. His initial reaction was to refuse to compromise his 
convictions by glorifying war. Such coolness and self-possession 
were an achievement, at a time when fellow-poets far from the 
front line were hailing war as the liquidator of the hollow 
Wilhelminian epoch, and as a Stahl bad which provided life with its
(35) Letter to Blaich, 6/8/17, ibid. p. 51.
(36) Letter to Blaich, 15/6/18, ibid. p.49.
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ultimate meaning. On the other hand, Tucholsky felt no 
desire to defy the rigid censorship. Officially its juris­
diction was limited to military matters, but in practice the 
censor also intervened against political writers hostile to 
the government, under the pretext that they were undermining 
national morale. One such victim was Franz Pfemfert, who was 
forbidden to publish any political articles in Die Aktion.
These events hardly encouraged Tucholsky to criticise the war 
openly. As a middle course he adopted, knowingly or not, the 
policy followed by the famous Viennese journalist Karl Kraus, 
of a silence about the war which amounted to tacit dissent. (37) 
Against a background of war hysteria, Kraus had reasoned that 
if such a well-known figure refrained from all ccmment on the 
war, this would be implicit condemnation of it. Tucholsky himself 
published hardly any articles between August 1914 and October 1916. 
Looking back two years later he justified his own silence by 
disclaiming any capacity for the martyrdom which active opposition 
might have entailed, and adding:
„Es gibt fiir einen anstandigen I^rl nur ein Ent&eder- 
Oder bei diesen Dingen: entweder er widersetzt sich, 
das kann man auch schwsigend, Oder er macht mit, er.. 
reimt das Blut der andem auf sein eigenes Gut.. und 
begrundet die Notwendigkeit des Krieges kosmogenetisch.
Und das Blut flieBt, flieBt.."(38)
However much respect may be felt for Tucholsky's refusal 
to join in the orgy of patriotic literature during the autumn of 
1914, it should be pointed out that his retrospective explanation 
was incomplete. Hie desire to preserve his personal integrity
(37) In the essay In dieser groBen Zeit, published in Die 
Fackel during December 1914, Kraus demanded: „Wer etwas
zu sagen hat, trete vor und schweige".
(38) An Theobald Tiger, WB 18/7/18, GW 1, p.286.
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was only one reason for Tucholsky1 s silence. External factors 
also played a role in his decision: first the need to concentrate 
on his doctorate, then the atmosphere of the Armierungsbatallion, 
which was hardly conducive to literary production. Significantly, 
he published his first series of war-time articles in the 
Schaubuhne just after his transfer to Kurland, where less onerous 
duties gave him time and restored his inclination to write.
A journalist's natural desire to practise his trade free 
from interference dictated that in 1916 Tucholsky should concentrate 
on non-political writing. Witty feuilletons such as Die letzte 
Seite(39), and book reviews like Das Geheimnis des gelben Zimmers (40), 
were typical of this phase of his career; the satirical Marchen 
later published in book form as Traumeneien an preufiischen Kaminen(41) 
represented his major literary achievement. When he did describe 
his. war experiences, in Unterwegs 1915(42), his sympathy for the 
carmen, soldier was evident, but the article had no pacifist or 
revolutionary overtones.
However, the opposition to authority evident in Tucholsky's 
letters to Blaich is not entirely absent from his published work. 
Careful examination of several essays and poems written in 1916-17 
reveals that, however unwilling Tucholsky was to challenge the 
censor regularly and directly, he often succeeded in outwitting 
him. One tactic which he esrplcyed involved an apparent profession 
of loyalty which was oaribined with an ambiguity designed bo alert
(39) SB 23/11/16, GW 1, pp.229-31.
(40) SB 29/3/17, ibid., pp.241-44.
(41) The Traunereien were published by the Felix Lehmann Verlag,
Charlottenburg, in 1920.
(42) SB 31/8/17, GW 1, pp.248-53.
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the reader. Germany’s leaders were cxxitinually asking the
population to "hold out" and "see it through"; their slogan
was "EUrchhaltenJ" On one occasion Tucholsky appeared to
support them by echoing their motto:
„Ihr mahnt den Jungling, tapfer durchzuhalten.
GeviB, das scheint ja seine Pflicht-" (43)
but the use of the non-ocmnittal "scheint" rather than "ist"
appears more than coincidental fran a soldier who was himself
considering deserting to Sweden (44). Another device used by
Tucholsky to criticise authority was to attack unpleasant
manifestations of capital ism on the Hone Front, with its
profiteers, swindlers and bellicose propagandists exempted from
active service. The censor could not deny the existence of such
abuses, but the accusations in Per Kriegslieferant(45) and An einen
gamisonsdienstfahigen Dichter(46) by implication raised the
question of whether support was being given to those involved
through official channels. Finally, the traditional device of
writers critical of a suspicious authority, the allegory, was
enplcyed in Die Katze spielt mit der Maus, which concluded:
..Natiirlich ist die Katze ein Tier wie andre auch.
Und sie ist starker als die Jtous, und das hat sie 
ausgenutzt, weit uber die Nahrungsfrage hinaus.
Sie hatte die Kraft. Und die Maus litt.
Und dieser Schnitt klafft durch alles, dieser RiB 
spaltet alles - da gibt es keine Briicke. Irrmer 
werden sich die zwei gegenuberstehen: die Katze 
und die *tous".(47)
(43) Memento, SB 3/10/16, ibid., p.221.
(44) Letter to Blaich, 28/6/17, Briefe, p.49.
(45) SB 14/12/16, GW 1, p.233.
(46) SB 21/6/17, ibid. pp. 244-5.
(47) Interpretations of these lines vary. The East German critic 
Eichenberg (Thesis, Tucholsky, der Marxismus und die deutsche 
Arbeiterbewegung, Potsdam, 1962, p. 12) sees then as "Kritik 
an den Besitzverhaltnissen der kapitalistischen Gesellschafts- 
ordnung". Marianne Doerfel: Kurt Tucholsky als Politiker, Mainz, 
1971, p. 51, regards them with more likelihood as a confirmation of
the influence on Tucholsky of Schopenhauer’s pessimistic view of 
human nature. The allegory was published in the Schaubuhne,9/11/16,
rr»r i o o c — Q
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ftiis article may be interpreted as a veiled attack on the
relationship between officers and men in the German army. Ihe
need for an indirect treatment of this theme is obvious, but
it was in Tucholsky1 s mind at this period. He revealed himself
more directly to Blaich:
„Der Kriegsschauplatz zerfallt nach wie vor in zwei 
Teile. Nicht etwa Russen und Deutsche, sondem in 
Vorgesetzte und Mannschaften. 'Die Vorgesetzten1 hat 
hier neulich einer gesagt, 'sind der Krebsschaden der 
Armeef. Ein wahres Wort". (48)
Nevertheless, the anti-militarism and aversion to his 
superiors which emerges from the "cat and mouse" analogy does not 
in itself indicate political maturity on Tucholsky1 s part. Two 
products of his war-time writing testify instead to continued 
inexperience and inconsistency: his contributions to the regimental 
magazine Der Flieger and the so-called Kriegsanleihegedicht.
Tucholsky1 s creation of, and contributions to, the squadron 
newspaper have been exhaustively analysed by Doerfel (49). At first 
sight it appears strange that he agreed to edit a Feldzeitung.
Doerfel*s explanation is probably correct: that Tucholsky found the 
activity provided him with a degree of freedom from other, more 
directly military tasks, and with the opportunity to keep in training. 
She points out that Tucholsky must have regarded his work for Der 
Flieger as "eine recht laSliche Sunde't50), but she herself treats it 
more seriously. It is unfortunate that Tucholsky, who was later to 
apply rigorous standards to the war-time activities of other writers, 
should have lent his pen to the venture.
(48) Letter of July 1916, Briefe, p.34.
(49) Doerfel, op.cit., pp.39-49.
(50) ibid., p.49.
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Hcwever, his distaste for the paper rapidly became evident.
After only three months as editor he wrote to Blaich:
fe* „tlber den Flieger sind wir uns doch einig;
ich arbeite nur noch mit dem groBten Wider^ - 
willen daran; es ist nicht moglich, mit Behorden 
etwas Gescheites zu machen, und ich verspdne 
keine Lust, mich etwa zum I^rtyrer einer Sache 
aufzuwerfen, die mich' nichts angeht". (51)
He had discovered that Lieutenants Hartmann and Milch were not
merely nominally responsible for the paper, bat also controlled its
editorial policy, which was summed up in the nationalistic slogan:
"Michel, werde hart.'" In view of Tucholsky*s lack of influence, the
significance of his contributions to Der Flieger should not be
exaggerated.
- Inexperience, combined with a misplaced sense of humour,
likewise explains the Kriegsanleihegedicht. Tucholsky read in the
Frankfurter Zeitung of a competition for poetry, inviting the public
to subscribe to the Ninth War Loan. Tucholsky's poan, apparently
not awarded a prize, concluded:
„Sei*s eine Mark, sei*s der gebraunte 
Und heitere S chein-bemuh dich mali 
Bei Beethoven war's auch die Neunte- 
Trotz alledem - sei klug und zahl!1 (52)
Tucholsky regarded the competition as a way of passing the time, as
other readers might have looked on the crossword, and gave no thought
to its further implications. He was far from being the enthusiastic
supporter of the war that the poem might suggest; in fact he loathed
the slaughter:
(51) Letter of 6/8/17, Briefe, p.50.
(52) Quoted by Hans Prescher: Tucholsky, Berlin, Golloquium- 
Verlag, 1959, p.15.
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„Die Menschheit hackt sich durch Fleisch und 
Blut einen Weg der "Idee", durch lebendige 
Menschen - in den Fibeln liest sich das 
nachher recht hiibsch, man darf nur rUcht 
dabeisein". (53)
Der Flieger and the Kriegsanleihegedicht do represent blemishes 
on Tucholsky's record, but comparatively minor ones. Their real 
significance is in shedding light on the stages of his development: 
the consistency which characterised his post-war pacifism had not 
yet triumphed over his iirmaturity.
The final phase of Tucholsky's war-time literary production 
began in the Sumner of 1918. Tucholsky recognised that the censor, 
discredited by unfavourable military developments, was loosening 
his grip over the public expression of opinion, and that he could 
new risk open criticism of authority. Jaoobsohn, who had himself 
been occupied since April in widening the scope of the former 
Schaubuhne to correspond to its new format as Die Weltbuhne, 
Zeitschrift fur Politik, Kunst, Wirtschaft, welcomed Tucholsky' s 
aggression as a counter-balance to the moderation of his leader- 
writer, Robert Breuer.
The striking feature of Tucholsky' s return to direct social 
criticism in 1918 was the contrast between the devastating attacks 
on the old regime, which appeared to imply an unreserved welcaning of 
fundamental political change, and his comparative uncertainty about 
the positive aims to be pursued by the progressive forces. He began 
with a lampoon against censorship. (54) This m s  followed by a 
satirical attack on the Vaterlandspartei, which had pressed for German
(53) Letter to Blaich, 6/8/17, Briefe, p.47.
(54) Zensurdebatte, WB 10/6/18, Gtf 1, p.280.
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annexations frcm Belgium to the Baltic states and supported
the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the defeated Russians:
„Alt-Deutschland macht in Politik 
und zieht Bilanz aus diesem Krieg:
Indien muB badisch werden.1 
Agypten her! Die Ostsee auch!
Wir treten alle vor den Bauch 
mit sieghaften Gebarden!" (55)
Bor the future of Germany and of Europe as a whole, Tucholsky
evidently preferred the idea of a Verstandigungsfrieden, and in
August 1918 he denounced the war and its propagandists in Zum
ersten August. (56) But as the military situation worsened,
Ticholsky's hopes that Germany could still reach an understanding
with the Entente were to prove as ill-founded as the anticipation
of victory by the German right.
The climax of Tucholsky*s attack on his country’s traditional
rulers was the poem Landratsdammerung. (57) The old local government
administrators who had owed their loyalty to the Emperor and his
appointed ministers were now being forced bo transfer their support
bo a parliamentary government which included the Social Democrat,
Scheidemann and the progressive Catholic leader, Erzberger. Tucholsky
greeted this change of government with seme enthusiasm, but seems
bo have considered that it did not go far enough. Where Max von
Baden's coalition accepted the pledges of support given by the Land-
rate, Tucholsky responded more radically. The old Prussia had ceased
to exist, and its representatives should accept the consequences by
resigning before they were dismissed:
„Deine Welt geht under. Eine andre auf.
Pack ein, als K5nig der Klitsche.
(55) Wdnsche, WB 4/7/18, ibid., p.255.
(56) WB 10/8/18, ibid., pp.289-90.
(57) WB 24/10/18.
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Der Kraftige schwingt sich zum Sattel hinauf.
Du warst doch sexist so fur Nietzsche!
Hor an: Im Kreise kein Antokrat, 
nur Burger mit Obliegeriheiten.
Das war dein gesegneter Krieg, der das tat.
Pack ein!.."
In his progressive criticism, however, Tucholsky was
hampered by his continued absence frcm Germany. In his
Feldpolizeistelle in Tum-Severin he could base his judgments
neither on personal observation nor on up-to-date information on
events at hone. The resultant uncertainty provides a partial
explanation for his vagueness about possible goals for the reformers.
As the old Landrat lost influence, Tucholsky proclaimed:
„Wir emten die junge Saat,
Herr Landrat, und neue Zeiten!" (58)
The political characteristics of this new time and the identity of
its leaders were left to his readers1 imagination. His battle-cry
"Links ran!" (59) gave no additional information, and the warning
nDie Zeit ist aus. Jetzt kommen wir:
Die andem! Die andem! '(60)
left considerable doubt as to what "the others" would do when they
took over.
However, his temporary political vagueness, sprang also from 
his concern with cultural developments. A brief period Of leave in 
April 1918 had convinced him that even the superficiality of pre-war 
Berlin had been preferable to the downright corruption of four years 
later, in which the tone was set by profiteers and prostitutes. (61)
(58) ibid.
(59) Kolcmne, Berliner Tageblatt, 14/10/18, GW 1, p.306.
(60) Nationale Verteidigunq, WB 31/10/18, ibid. p.315.
(61) Cf. letters to Mary Gerold of 29/4/18, and 6/5/18, Briefe, 
pp. 357-60.
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Tucholsky foresaw that these groups would exert a pernicious 
influence on social and cultural standards in the post-war 
period. In addition, he was instinctively aware of the extent of • 
the economic problems which would face a defeated Germany. (62)
The combination of these social and economic factors explains 
Tucholsky' s apocalyptic view that German culture could look forward 
to a period of Geistlosigkeit similar to that after the Thirty Years 
War/63) Since he believed that any impending cultural change would 
be for the worse, a degree of ambiguity in his response to political 
change could hardly be avoided. Furthermore, Tucholsky's lack of 
interest in political theory (64) prevented him from appreciating the 
significance of the German Revolution on his return to Berlin in . 
November 1918. Not until the spring of 1919 did Tucholsky formulate 
a positive political aim: that democrat!sation of individual 
consciousness which he described as "die geistige Revolution",(65)
Tucholsky1 s writings during the war fall into three main 
periods. In the first, lasting from the outbreak of war to his 
transfer to Kurland, he published 1 ittle,partly out of unwillingness 
to join in the officially encouraged glorification of war and partly 
due to external pressures. Though he was aware that his lot in the 
Amierungsbataillon was preferable to trench warfare, his letters 
to Blaich testified to the boredom of an intellectual in an alien 
environment, and the disgust of a humanitarian who did not measure
(62) Letter to Mary Gerold, 26/7/18, ibid., p.387.
(63) ibid.
(64) Doerfel, op.cit., p.53, points out the absence frcm his 
letters of any oonsideration of the Russian Revolution.
(65) Zur Erinnerung an den ersten August 1914, WB 14/8/19, GW 1, 
p.358.
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a man's value by the number of his epaulettes. The increased 
leisure which acccnpanied his office work in Kurland gave him the 
opportunity to resume his journalistic activity. He still had to 
fear the censor, and though he occasionally attempted to deceive 
the authorities, most of his articles were innocuous reviews and 
feuilletons. His political iirmaturity was evident in his work for 
Der Flieger and in the Kriegsanleihegedicht. Finally he took 
advantage of the gradual relaxation of censorship to attack the old 
regime, though his welcome for change was tanpered by regret about 
his country's inevitable cultural decline. Still no political 
theorist, he took some time before deciding on a positive goal for 
his canpaign for reform.
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CHAPTER 2
The Germany to which Tucholsky returned in December 1918
had recently undergone far-reaching changes. In September the
dictator Ludendorff had belatedly recognised that the war was lost;
the most fervent supporter of a Siegfrieden had compelled his
negotiators to arrange an inmediate truce in order to prevent complete
collapse. The German people, which had for years been deceived by
official announcements of victories, suddenly discovered that its
optimism had been ill-founded and its sacrifices in vain. Tucholsky*s
initial bewilderment, though accentuated by the inadequacies of his
sources of information, typified the response of his conpatriots.
By mid-October he was able to assess his country's position realistically:
„Sie schreien zwar zu Hause furchtbar, sie wollen sich 
von Amerika nichts gefalien las sen - aber ich furchte, 
ich furchte sie werden's mussenVl)
All of President Woodrow Wilson's demands, whether for disarmament,
the introduction of democratic goverrment, or the abdication of the
Emperor, were to be accepted unconditionally by Germany within the
following three weeks.
Ludendorff1 s abrupt retirement was accompanied by an 
attempt to shift the blame for defeat on to the civilian politicians. 
Wilson was not alone in pressing for democratic reform in Germany; 
he was merely echoing the traditional danand of Social Democrats, 
left-wing Liberals and Zentrum members for governmental responsibility.
In October 1918 Ludendorff granted their wish, at a time when 
unpopular decisions could no longer be avoided. The new Chancellor,
Prince Max of Baden, held liberal views, and he brought Social 
Democrats into the government for the first time. Nevertheless, he
(1) Letter to flfory Gerold, 19/10/18, Briefe, pp.410-11.
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had no political experience, and his main supporters, the SPD, 
were in a difficult situation. The party leaders Ebert and 
Scheidemann wished to prevent a violent revolution, since they 
feared that it would further jeopardise Germany's international 
position. In addition, they had obtained from Prince Max the 
promise of important democratic reforms, the implementation of 
which depended on his continuing in office. However, Ebert had 
to contend with the impatience of his own radical supporters.
By the beginning of November it became clear that the armed forces 
were unwilling to risk their lives for a lost cause, and that the 
Berlin metal workers, stimulated by their revolutionary shop 
stewards, oould not be restrained much longer. As the leader of the 
only intact political force, Ebert was compelled to abandon the new 
constitutional monarchy and to succeed Prince Max as Chancellor.
With the old dynasties collapsing around him, the new Chancellor 
hastily agreed to lead a coalition government of three moderate 
Social Democrats and three left-wing Independents. This prompt 
action temporarily averted bloodshed, but the political truce was 
to be brief.
This was the situation viiich Tucholsky discovered on his 
return from Rumania. As he had long hoped, the authoritarian Empire 
had fallen, but neither the Emperor's enforced abdication nor 
Scheidemann's proclamation of the Republic on November 9th in 
themselves decided Germany's future. Scheidemann was a reluctant 
revolutionary, mainly concerned to forestall a similar announcement 
by the more radical Karl Liebknecht. In the ensuing months the 
character of the new Republic was determined: on the one hand by the
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defeat of the revolutionary left, and the murder of its leaders; 
on the other hand by the failure of the Social Democrats to create 
and stabilise democratic institutions during their short period 
of governing alone, and to win the expected majority at the elections 
to the National, Asseirbly in January 1919. In order to retain power 
they entered a coalition with the middle-class parties, which 
involved further carprcmises of their Socialist principles. The 
opportunity for fundamental change was not to recur.
The reaction of Tucholsky to events during the weeks of 
revolutionary upheaval was at first superficial. He wrote to Mary 
Gerold in mid-December that his fellow-Berliners seemed over-excited:
*Sie arbeiten nicht mehr, sondem halten 
Versammlungen ab und toben herum". (2)
After four years of bloodshed Tucholsky was convinced that Germany
needed peace in domestic as well as foreign affairs. He therefore
opposed any threat of disorder, whether from the revolutionary left
or the Social Democratic government and its new troops. The violence
vhich he had feared broke out in the Spartacus Rising of January
1919. Events were moving too swiftly for Tucholsky to develop a
coherent programme for reform. His general political views during
this period can best be assessed from his comments on the left-wing
groups which were carpeting for his allegiance: the Spartacists,
Majority Socialists and Democrats.
The Spartakusbund, renamed in January 1919 the Kcannunistische 
Partei Deutschlands, was the most radical of the left-wing parties.
It was led by Rosa Luxemburg, a persistent critic of the pre-war SPD 
for its oanprcmises with reaction. She was supported by Karl 
Liebknecht, who since his release from prison in October 1918 had 
been making plans for a seizure of power by the workers. Both were
(2) Letter of 19/12/18, ibid. p.415.
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aware that such a Socialist revolution went far beyond the 
establishment of a parliamentary system, as desi red by the 
M3PD and the majority of the population, and Rosa Luxemburg 
rightly warned against over-optimism and prenature radicalism. 
However, the majority of the delegates to the first Congress of 
the KPD ignored her plea, voted for non-participation in the 
elections and for an armed uprising to bring about the dictator­
ship of the proletariat.
The support for the Spartacists which existed among
the German public was generally based on a misunderstanding of
their aims. Many workers admired Liebknecht as a fighter for peace
rather than a revolutionary Socialist. Such approval as Tucholsky
bestowed on the Spartacist leaders was based on an analogous
misconception; their willingness to turn intellectual insight into
political action made them symbols of the engagement which he had
long advocated:
„Sie pack ten zu und sie setzten sich ein,
Sie wollten nicht nur Theoretiker sein". (3)
Liebknecht's energy likewise won his respect, since it contrasted
with the apparent dilatoriness of the government. (4) Nevertheless,
the outlets which this energy found, the organising of mass
demonstrations, led Tucholsky to describe the impulsive orator as
"ein Wirrkppf von mittleren Malen". (5) The self-sacrifice and
steadfast devotion to the cause shown by Rosa Luxemburg won his
approval to a much greater extent. In an obituary for the two he
wrote:
„Sie hatte die sturkste Manneskraft". (6)
(3) Zwei Erschlagene, WB 23/1/19, GW 1, p.361.
(4) Berliner Kampfe, WB 16/1 19, ibid., p.360.
(5) ibid., p.361.
(6) ibid.
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Hbwever, it should be pointed out that Tucholsky was
responsible for the expression of somewhat different opinions
in Ulk. A series of unfriendly references to Liebknecht culminated
in the article Die Revolution in der Schule(7) in which Berlin
school-children wrote disparagingly of the revolutionaries:
..Liebknecht war der anf iihrer der streiker, 
seine Frau hieS Rosa von Lukzeriburg, 
ich kann ihn nicht leiden den er sieht aus 
wie ein straudieb..." (sic)
Although almost certainly Tucholsky did not write the piece himself,
Kurt Hiller was correct to point out in 1930 that such criticism
represented a lapse in taste on his part as verantwortlicher Chef-
redakteur. (8) Hovrever, this attack was made at a time when the
Spartacist leaders were being treated as objects of execration in
the press. The January uprising had begun as a series of
demonstrations organised by the left wing of the Independent
Socialists to protest against the dismissal of one of their number:
Emil Eichhom, the Police President of Berlin. But Luxemburg had
consistently advocated the overthrow of Ebert in Die rote Fahne,
and Liebknecht was the best-known member of the Revolutionary
Ocmmittee: it was therefore not surprising that the KPD as a whole
was blamed for the disorder which ensued. Right-wing newspapers
even incited their readers to assassinate Liebknecht and Luxemburg.
In comparison, Tucholsky1 s comments were mild. In addition, it
could be said in Tucholsky1 s defence that he was still uncertain
about his new role as editor; he told a subsequent Gcmriunist critic,
(7) Ulk, 17/1/19.
(8) On behalf of the Executive committee of the Bund revolutionirer 
Pazifisten, Hiller surrmed up the affair in a statement of 17th 
March 1930: "Die Satire von 1918 ist zwar, unter der Perspektive 
von 1930, unerfreulich aber nicht bosartig". (Cf. Tucholsky*s 
scrap-book in the Tucholsky-Archiv, Rottach).
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Franz Ieschmtzer, that it was seme times difficult to know where
to draw the line. (9) In any case, the article did not compare
in importance with the testimony of Zwei Erschlagene;
„Wie man sich selber die Treue halt,
wie man gegen eine feindliche Welt
roit reinem Schilde streiten kann,
das vergiBt den beiden kein ehrlicher Nfcnn!" (10)
The qualified approval of Tucholsky for the Spartacist 
leaders as individuals was based on the half-truth that they 
embodied his ideal of intellectual craimitment, and on sympathy 
for them after their murder by Freikorps officers. This approval 
did not imply understanding of their Marxist aims or acceptance 
of their violent methods. When he claimed at the end of the 
obituary:
„Wir sind, weiS Gott, keine Spartakiden". (11) 
he spoke the truth.
Tucholsky did not begin to comment on JV&rxist theory until 
the spring of 1919, and his opinions are dealt with later in this 
chapter. During the Revolution itself he discussed the Spartacists' 
political aim, the establishment of the Ratesystem in place of 
parliamentary democracy, and commented on their tactics of violence 
and strikes.
Tucholsky*s support for a new Germany was not equivalent 
to approval for the Rite system as a prelude to the dictatorship of 
the proletariat. For this form of government, based not on 
parliamentary strength but on influence within the Workers' and
(9) Cf. Franz Leschnitzer: Von Borne bis Leonhard,Rudolstadt, VEB 
Greifenverlag, 1966, p. 184, and Tucholsky's scrap-book.
(10) Zwei Erschlagene, ibid., p.362.
(11) ibid.
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Soldiers1 Councils, Tucholsky felt no enthusiasm. The Russian 
Soviet model seemed unsuitable for Germany, since try excluding 
important sections of the population from power, it would destroy 
the new democracy which Tucholsky supported. He objected to the 
Councils on practical grounds also. The Ratekoncrre3 of December 
1918 roused him to satirise what appeared a new form of bureau­
cracy:
mA und S - eine liebe Erscheinung!
Von jeher war das meins Meinung.
Wir haben zu wenig Beamte im Haus.
A und S. Vielleicht heifit das "aus"?" (12)
This attitude was short-sighted. Tucholsky failed to recognise
that the Councils, if given governmental encouragement, might have
performed a useful function in supervising the anti-democratic
i
officers and administrators whan the Revolution had left in their 
old posts. (13) Nevertheless, Tucholsky*s miscalculation was less 
serious than that of the Spartacist leaders themselves. With 
their lengthy experience, Liebknecht and Luxemburg should have 
recognised that they possessed comparatively few supporters among 
the Councils; this was clearly demonstrated by their failure to 
be elected as delegates to the Ratekongrefl, and by the domination 
of that Congress by Ebert and the M3PD. (14) The expectation of 
the KPD leaders that a revolutionary system successful in Russia a 
year before could be copied in Berlin contributed to their defeat.
Tucholsky's denunciation of Spartacist tactics was equally 
explicit. His disapproval of the use of force was evident even in 
the synpathetic obituary for Liebknecht. He repudiated Liebknecht's
(12) Weihnachten, Ulk, 20/12/18.
(13) Cf. Eberhard Kolb, Die Arbeiterrate in der deutschen 
Innenpolitik, 1918-19, Diisseldorf, Droste, 1962, p.360.
(14) ibid., p.145.
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willingness to take the political struggle into the streets
and pointed out that he had been leading many anarchists and
criminals over whan he had had little control. The irresponsible
tactics of Liebknecht had caused his own downfall:
„Den Meergott verschlangen die eigenen Wbgen". (15)
In rejecting violence, Tucholsky danonstrated his moral idealism.
The cause of human dignity could not be served by armed conflict,
as he later asserted in an attack on the Bolshevist doctrine,
vhich he summarised as
„Nieder mit der Gewalt! Darum nur noch einmal 
Gewalt!n(16)
This objection of principle was accompanied by one of
practice. Premature revolutionary activities by the left were
likely to strengthen the appeal of the right-wing forces at the
elections. This explained Tucholsky*s criticism:
„.. .Karl Liebknecht, wie bist du rein und fanatisch, 
auf die Dauer wirkst du doch unsympathisch; 
du bestarkst den Radau, treibst den Rechten die Mdhlen - 
ich glaube, du sitzst grade zwischen zwei Stiihlen..." (17)
Such internecine struggles could only weaken the progressive left
at a time when solidarity was necessary against an enemy whose
defeat had been only temporary:
„Spartakus! Deutsche! So offnet die Augen!
Sie war ten, euch Blut aus den M e m  zu saugen - 
Der Feird steht rechts!" (18)
Since counter-revolutionary Freikorps units were being formed as
TUcholsky wrote this poem, his assessment of the situation was
justified. He deduced that the duty of the independent radical
(15) GW 1, p.361.
(16) Cf. Otto Flake, WB 27/10/21, ibid., p.847.
(17) Weihnachten, Ulk, 20/12/18.
(18) Achtundvierzig, WB 12/1/19, GW 1, p.328.
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to endeavour to separate the fraternal combatants. This 
position was neither unocrmon nor inconsistent. The great 
majority of the Berlin workers rejected both the Spartacist 
rising and the SPD's restoration of the old authorities; they 
supported the efforts of the USPD to mediate between the 
contending parties and avoid a bloodbath. (19)
It was probably the government's unwillingness to
compromise which led Tucholsky to change the emphasis of his
criticism. Noske, the new Minister for Military Affairs, was
formally justified in breaking off negotiations with the rebels
and insisting on unconditional surrender, but his tactics
alienated a large number of workers who shared Tucholsky's
view. (20) Tucholsky' s new position was evident in the poem
Berliner Kampfe(21), written during the rising. The actions of
the Spartacists, however misguided, now seoned to bear favourable
comparison with the panic of the typical Burger, who regarded
politics as "geschaftliche Storung". Tucholsky suggested that
the government was at fault in trying to meet force with force,
and he defended the rebels:
„Ist Ruhe die erste Burgerpflicht, 
die vcn Emporem ist es nicht".
This change of opinion about Spartacist violence was nevertheless
unrepresentative of Tucholsky's general attitude at this date; by
March he had returned to a rejection of force, whatever its source!22)
Tucholsky likewise had little sympathy when the 
Ocmnunists appeared to be employing the syndicalist weapon: the
(19) Cf. Kolb, pp.cit. ,p.233.
(20) ibid., p.239.
(21) WB 16/1/19, GW 1, p.361.
(22) Gegen rechts und gegen links, Ulk, 21/3/19.
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attempt to bring down the government by means of strikes in
important industries. (23) His comparison of the coercion
employed formerly by industrialists to prevent strikes and
that now onplcyed by the Rate to bring them about revealed
the instinctive rather than rational basis of his opinions:
„Stinnes im Krieg: Wer streikt oder muckt 
fliegt in den Schutzengraben!
Und die lessen schweigen gequalt und geduckt 
um das Leben, das Leben zu haben.
Die Rate heute : Der Burger mag 
krepieren, und wir sind oben!
Verloren -ist jeder Arbeitstag 
Die Terroristen toben..." (24)
Instead of examining the background to the industrial disputes,
such as poor pay and working conditions and rising prices,
Tucholsky merely condanned the leaders of the strike as Affen.
Ebert himself, a persistent advocate of hard work and increased
productivity as the only method for Germany to achieve economic
recovery, could hardly have opposed the strikers more emphatically.
In spite of his personal respect for the Spartacist 
leaders, Tucholsky rejected their aims and methods. His sympathies 
lay with parliamentary government rather than proletarian dictator­
ship. Even a year later the most bitter accusation which he made 
to Noske and his colleagues was
„Die 9ozialdemokratischen Parteifunktionare... 
treiben die Masse dem Bolschewismus in die Arme.." (25)
a prospect which he still regarded with horror. Nevertheless, this
quotation reveals Tucholsky1 s growing hostility towards the Social
Danocrats, an attitude which was only beginning to emerge during
the Revolution itself.
(23) The Spartacists were not the only, or indeed the leading, 
political force among the strikers, but most of the press 
blamed the disorder on the KPD.
(24) Generalstreik, Ulk, 7/3/19.
(25) Militaria, ViB 22/1/20, GW 1, p.59^..
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Fron November 1918 to February 1919, the threat of a 
revolutionary seizure of power by the Spartacists drew more 
nunerous carments fran Tucholsky than the SPD's defensive 
strategy. Ihou^ i sane reference to the Social Democratic 
performance in government is necessary in view of Tucholsky's 
later claim that they missed the opportunity for social change, 
his mature judgment had not yet been formed. For this reason 
only a brief outline of SPD policy and Tucholsky »s iirmediate 
reaction to it is given in this chapter; his later polonic, 
made with the benefit of hindsight, is examined in Chapter 7.
An important factor in the German Revolution was the 
discrepancy between the SPD's radical slogans and its conservative 
passivity in government. Such a combination of boldness and 
caution might have seemed likely to win Tucholsky's support, 
for although he advocated far-reaching reforms, he opposed 
violence and dictatorship. However, the SPD's attitude to reform 
vas in practice less enthusiastic than the rhetoric with which the 
party leaders sought to pacify their inpatient supporters. After 
the defeat of the Spartacists, Tucholsky expected action rather 
than aarpranises with the old regime. The political reconstruction 
of Germany vas necessary, but it should be on a different, democratic 
basis. Tucholsky's danand for government action was vague : he 
advocated a policy of "schlagen, brennen, stiirzen". (26) But his 
dislike of the SPD's procrastination was clear. Ebert, who 
preferred continuity to innovation, ignored the warnings of Tucholsky 
as he had those of his Independent colleagues. Once it became 
obvious that the foundations of the old system remained intact,
(26) Das Lied van Kanpramifl, WB 13/3/19, ibid., p.378.
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Tucholsky realised bitterly that no new democratic spirit was 
likely to emerge:
„Wenn Revolution nur Zusanroenbruch bedeutet, 
dann war das eine; aber man darf nicht erwarten, 
dafl die Trimmer anders aussehen als das alte 
Gebaude". (27)
Tucholsky also criticised the SPD out of an instinctive 
distrust of unimaginative Realpolitiker. He was temperamentally 
far removed from the "braven Leisetreter" (28) who sought to exclude 
idealism from the conduct of politics, and who lacked the ability 
to inspire the exhausted German people to fresh efforts.
By March 1919 Tucholsky had recognised that he and Ebert 
were politically inocmpatible. The SPD had abandoned its 
revolutionary ideals, and Tucholsky regarded the party with as 
little enthusiasm as he did the Spartacists. Neither excessive 
radical zeal nor over-indulgence in ccsnprcmise seaned likely to 
encourage the democratic attitudes which Tucholsky desired as the 
characteristic feature of the new Germany.
The SPD was not the only organisation which disappointed 
Tucholsky by its conservatism. His interest in the progressive, 
middle-class Deutsche Demokratische Partei proved equally short­
lived. Its founders, the university professors Max and Alfred 
Weber, and Theodor Wolff, editor of the Berliner Tageblatt, wished 
to break away from the traditions of the liberal parties of the 
Empire. They intended to assist the Social Democrats in the 
re-shaping of Germany. (29) This determination to make a new start
(27) Wir Negativen, ibid., p.372.
(28) Eisner, WB 27/2/19, ibid., p.380.
(29) Cf. Lothar Albertin: Liberalisms und Danokratie am Anfang 
der Weimarer Republik, Dusseldorf, Droste, 1972, p.410.
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met with Tucholsky's approval, especially as he had begun his 
work as editor of Ulk and had access to the same broad middle- 
class public vrtiich Wolff was attenpting to win over for democracy 
and the Republic.
Tucholsky shared Wolff's concern about the German
Burgertum to which they both belonged. The young satirist was
alarmed by an apparent moral decline among this group. The
gamblers and speculators of post-war Berlin met with his distaste,
and in the democratic Berliner Volkszeitung he reflected nostalgically:
nWo ist die gesunde Mitte geblieben?
Wo ist der aufrechte Burgerstand?
Der fehlt uns so sehr im deutschen Land". (30)
His first solution to the problem was to advocate that two or
three respected middle-class families should demonstrate their
disapproval of the Schieber by ostracising than. This example of
good taste and strong will would be followed by others, and in time
the social position of the nouveaux-riches would be undermined. (31)
This naively elitist plan did not recur in Tucholsky *s writings
after the Revolution.
Tucholsky' s articles in Ulk complicate rather than clarify
his political position. He was compelled by the pressures of work
for the mass-circulation Berliner Tageblatt to moderate the views
expressed in Tiger's weekly Leitgedicht:
„Bei Mosse sind einem die Ellenbogen geschnurt, 
und in .. der Weltbiihne kann ich koppheistem, 
wie ich mag..."(32)
In Ulk he published his critical reaction to the Spartacists, to
strikes and unrest, while the Weltbiihne provided his main platform
(30) Spaziergange in Berlin, BVZ, 24/2/19.
(31) Krankheit und Besserung, BT 3/11/19.
(32) Letter to Blaich, 16/3/19, Briefe, p.68.
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for attacking the restoration of the old order. A further 
indication that Tucholsky felt restricted in Ulk lies in the 
literary superiority of his Weltbiihne articles. Only one of 
his poems in Ulk, Krieg dem Kriege(33) compares in polemical 
sharpness with his best contributions to the Weltbiihne.
The simultaneous rejection by Tucholsky of Junker
reaction, Spartacist violence and Social Democratic ccmprcmises
led him to give sane support to the DIP in the January elections,
by having the brief and unsigned poem Wahl (34) published in Ulk.
In the Weltbiihne his reservations were demonstrated by his refusal
to allude to the elections, let alone endorse any party. However,
the support for progressive democracy which motivated his
temporary aligrment with the HP was again evident in the
irrportant poem Gegen rechts und gegen links (35), published in
March 1919:
„Und rechts und links die Ternoristen 
und jeder, der Gewalt verehrt,
Die Reventlows, die Spartakisten,
Und wer von Unterdriickung zehrt - 
Ihr sollt nicht raten und nicht taten 
Denn gegen jene Unterschicht 
Da helfen wahre Demokraten 
Ihr nicht!"
Unfortunately for Tucholsky, "wahre Demokraten", even within the
DDP, were few, and his efforts to encourage them proved unsuccessful.
The black, red and gold colours of the burgerliche Revolution of
1848 had been selected for the flag of the new Republic, and Tucholsky
attempted to popularise this symbol:
„Schwarz ist der Stahl, 
rot ist das Blut.
Golden flackert die Flamme! " (36)
(33) Ulk, 13/6/19, GW 1, pp.423-33.
(34) Ulk, 17/1/19.
(35) Ulk, 21/3/19.
(36) Schwarzrotqold, Ulk, 15/4/19.
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But the contenporary German Burger had little interest in 
democratic slogans. His main concern was money and he had 
supported the DDP to prevent a Socialist majority rather than 
to ensure a coalition with the SPD. The increasing influence 
of such conservative attitudes within the party made it obvious 
to Tucholsky that the EDP would not persuade the German people 
to reject the old hierarchical society which he detested.
Tucholsky1 s political position during the weeks of 
revolutionary upheaval seems at first inconsistent. He supported 
far-reaching reforms, yet rejected the Spartacists who were 
pledged to introduce such changes. He opposed the violence of 
the left-wing revolutionaries, and also that of the government 
troops vho crushed the rising. His editorship of Ulk was a 
further source of contradiction, since it led him to seek a 
position equally distant from Junker reaction and Ocmmunist 
revolution. He abandoned this position only when he recognised 
that the DDP and its middle-class supporters opposed reform.
However, at this early period the occasional inconsistency 
in Tucholsky's attitude was inevitable, on account of his 
inexperience and of the complicated political situation. It 
was paradoxical that Ebert, the leader of a traditionally Marxist 
party, should be violently opposed to the spread of revolution, 
and that Liebknecht, Germany^ 's best-known pacifist, should be 
leading criminals as well as discontented Socialists into battle.
It is therefore not surprising that Tucholsky took until March 
1919 to formulate the political programme of the Negativen.
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'Ihe positive standard which Tacholsky required for the 
assessment of events was provided by a belief in man's innate 
humanity:
„Wir lieben in den Menschen den Gedanken 
an die Menschheit". (37)
This explained his opposition to violence and war. He approached 
political questions from an ethical stand-point, since he was 
beginning to recognise that, to a certain extent, inhumanity and 
moral evil vere the result of the social system. A society 
dominated by the Prussian spirit of unquestioning obedience 
allowad no freedom for moral choice or humane principles. The 
acceptance of the rigid discipline imposed by one's superiors in 
return for the opportunity to enforce a similar discipline on one's 
subordinates bred not responsible men but Untertanen, obsequious 
or tyrannical depending on the situation. (38) In view of this inter­
dependence of moral and social evils, it was logical for Tucholsky 
to attack than simultaneously. (39)
The close relationship of moral and social factors in
Tucholsky' s early post-war writings was manifested not only in the
ethical motivation of his campaign. Moral idealisn also characterised
the method by which he believed that German society should be
transformed:
„Wir werden dafur zu sorgen haben, da3 ohne 
zerschlagene Fensterscheiben und ohne politische 
Morde in den Kopfen unsrer Volksgenossen eine 
geistige Revolution entsteht, wie sie bisher 
gefehlt hat". (40)
(37) Wir Negativen, GW 1, p.377.
(38) Per Untertan, WB 20/3/19, ibid., p.385.
(39) Unser MilitarlWB 20/2/19, ibid., p.347.
(40) Zur Erinnerung an den ersten August 1914, WB 14/8/19, ibid.,p. 358.
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He therefore attacked conservative institutions 
compromised during and after the war, such as the array and 
the judiciary. However, he did not devote himself solely to 
negative criticisn, but endeavoured also bo put forward constr­
uctive proposals for reform. His abstract, moralising approach 
bo reform, which concentrated on changing the attitudes of his 
ocrnpatriots, points to another fact: that he was an intellectual 
rather than a political theorist. His relationship with other 
left-wing intellectuals will be examined, with particular regard 
bo the parallel between Tucholsky and Kurt Eisner. Finally, the 
question is raised of Tucholsky's theoretical attitude bo politics 
during this period. His opinion of the Marxist doctrines which 
had been at least nominally accepted by the Social Dsnocrats since 
the Erfurt Programme of 1891 is especially significant.
The progressive stance of Tucholsky found immediate
expression in the demand that the new Republican rulers should
sweep away the outworn institutions of the old regime:
„Es soli mit eisemem Besen jetzt,
grade jetzt und heute ausgekehrt warden,
was in Deutschland faul und vcm libel war und ist". (41)
He therefore criticised the anry, (42) the judiciary, (43) and the
civil service.(44)
This criticisn gave rise to the belief that Tucholsky and 
other left-wing intellectuals were strong in their negations but
(41) Wir Negativen, ibid., p.376.
(42) Cf. Helm ab! WB 28/11/18, ibid., p.319-320, and the 
Militaria series.
(43) Spartakus in Mcabit, WB 13/2/19, ibid., p.370.
(44) Cf. Per Apparat, Berliner Tageblatt, 21/10/18, ibid., 
pp.310-312, and Wir Negativen, p.373.
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weak in suggesting positive alternatives; that their work amounted 
to mere zersetzende Kritik. Tucholsky was a self-proclaimed 
Negativer, but it should be pointed out that his criticism was far 
fran being solely or even primarily destructive in intent. Through­
out his career he could justifiably claim that his polemics were 
manifestations of underlying idealism:
„Wir kampfen mit HaB aus Liebe" (45) 
he declared. Hatred of the oppressors was the logical corollary of 
a determination to assist the oppressed. At this early stage in 
Tucholsky's career/ his polonies had an additional "positive" 
purpose: by holding the old evils up to scorn, he could help his 
compatriots to learn fran previous mistakes. One example of 
apparently negative criticism which had an important positive aim 
was his attack on the German officers for abusing their positions 
of power during the war: his purpose in recalling their activities 
was to prevent a recurrence of such abuses in the new Republican 
anry. (46)
This constructive stance by Tucholsky in the immediate 
post-revolutionary period has not received from critics the attention 
which it merits. A willingness to make positive proposals which 
was frustrated by the persistent refusal of Germany 's leaders to 
put such suggestions into effect was characteristic of Tucholsky's 
canpaign. If he had been preoccupied with zersetzende Kritik, his 
detailed examination of the Imperial German army would not have 
culminated in the advocacy of a new spirit, of the officer's function
(45) ibid., p.373.
(46) ibid.
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as "ein befehlender Kamerad". (47) His later rejection of the 
Reichswehr stermed not from doctrinaire pacifism but fran a 
recognition of its counter-revolutionary aims, revealed in the 
brutality with which Noske1 s Fceikorps suppressed disorder in 
Berlin.
His positive attitude was also evident in the first of
his post-war articles on the judiciary. Justitia(48) was a
reasoned appraisal of the problems faced by judges in passing
sentence, and Tucholsky admitted his agreement with the conventional
view that the state had the right to punish wrong-doers:
„Es ist wichtiger, daB einer boBt, damit Tausende 
die Gesellschaft verschonen". (49)
He pointed out correctly that sentences often appeared inconsistent,
but his criticism was made to stimulate reform:
„Was wir vermissen, ist der einheitliche Zug, 
die bewuBten Grundsatze, die durch die deutsche 
Rechtsprechung gehen soil ten". (50)
He did not denounce the judges, or claim that their background
prevented than from administering justice impartially. His
moderation may be explained by the fact that the judges had had
little opportunity to demonstrate their conservatism. He took up
his more radical stance in response to the heavy sentences imposed
an captured Spartacists, and even then he demanded not universal
pardons but merely discrimination in assessing the motives and
magnitude of each offence:
(47) Unser Militari ibid., p.347.
(48) Berliner Tageblatt, 14/1/19.
(49) ibid.
(50) ibid.
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„Straf du (Justitia) die Lumpe bei den Spartak is ten.
Steck die ins Zuehthaus, die beim Kampf geklaut.
Vergreif dich nicht an die Idealisteni" (51)
1-
Tucholsky' s criticism of the army and the judiciary began 
with an attanpt to advocate constructive policies. Only after it 
became clear that his suggestions had been ignored, that under the 
new regime the reactionary forces were continuing to flourish, did 
his "negative" polenic come to the fore.
The attack on the military made by Tucholsky immediately 
after the war is discussed in detail in Chapter 8. Significant 
in the present context is its moral rather than directly political 
motivation. He was outraged by the officers' abuse of power 
because it revealed a spirit which fell far short of his own 
humane values. He did not wish to expose individual offences 
but to attack the army's self-centred, elitist ethos, which had 
dominated Wilhelminian society. His targets were therefore the 
spirit of Prussian!sm, that
„Knechtsgeist, der nicht gehorchen kennt, ohne zu kuschen-
der keine sachliche Unterordnung will, sondem nur blinde
Unterwarfung" (52)
and its corollary, the servile Untertan-mentality.
Since Tucholsky saw the main enemy of progress in the realm 
of abstract attitudes, his solution was sought in the transformation 
not of political institutions, but of the manner in which they were 
administered:
„Die Ref omen, die wir meinen, sind nicht mit Vorschriften
zu erfiillen und auch nicht mit neuen Reichsamtem...
Was wir brauchen, ist eine anstandige Gesinnung". (53)
(51) Spartakus in Maabit, GW 1, p.370.
(52) Qffizier und Mann, WB 9/1/19, ibid., p.331.
(53) Wir Negativen, ibid., pp.375-6.
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Such progress towards democracy was not to ocme fran above, 
since Tucholsky had little confidence in the ability of the old 
institutions to reform themselves, or in the dilatory govern­
ment of the Weimar Coalition. Instead he envisaged that it would 
cane fran below, fran his oppressed canpatriots, whan he exhorted 
to tolerate their servitude no longer. The change of attitudes 
demanded by Tucholsky was necessary, as had been recognised by a 
recent historian. (54) However, this approach to reform was narrow, 
and in seeking the intangible objective of the "geistige Revolution", 
Tucholsky achieved mixed results. It led him, reasonably enough, 
to oppose Realpolitiker in the Ebert mould, but also led him into 
neglecting practical proposals for reform. The Hamburg Points on 
army discipline were left unmentioned in Tucholsky1 s articles on 
the military, and economic reform did not seem important either.
For the time being it was easier to proclaim such abstract ideas as
„Wir wollen den deutschen Sinn reformieren!" (55) 
than to analyse in detail the arguments for or against large-scale 
nationalisation. Tucholsky1 s vision of the new Germany as a realm 
of Sachlichkeit and anstandige Gesinnung owed much to his humanitarian 
idealisn, but also revealed his inability to recognise the need for 
political and economic action.
Tucholsky*s approach to reform was influenced less by 
political considerations than by his status as an intellectual. The 
alienation of German intellectuals and their increasing opposition 
to the holders of power was, as has been pointed out, (56) a feature 
of pre-war Germany. EXiring the war Heinrich .Mann, Ludwig Rubiner 
and Gustav Landauer were driven together in the Aktivisrnus movanent
(54) Reinhard Riirup, Problons of the German Revolution, in Journal
of Contemporary History, Vol.3, No. 4.,p.116.
(55) Pile Kamellen, WB 6/2/19, 1, p.366.
(56) Cf. Chapter 1.
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J  by their canton pacifism. The political aims of the movement's 
leading exponent, Kurt Hiller, were vague and expressed in 
emotional terms; his assertion
„Wir wollen, bei lebendigem Leibe, ins Paradies" (57) 
was characteristic. However, the tactics which Hiller advocated 
were clear; the German intelligentsia was to organise itself and 
win for its superior insight a position of power. (58)
Nevertheless, when the Revolution did cone, the Berlin 
intellectuals failed to justify Hiller's optimism. As a social 
group composed of individualists, they proved impossible to 
organise into a united "Partei des deutschen Geistes". Hiller's 
own Rat der geistigen Arbeiter published its radical programme 
in the Weltbiihne, (59) but it soon lost Jacobsohn's support and 
disintegrated amid the recriminations of its members. The 
intellectuals in Munich were for a time more successful, but the 
efforts of Eisner, Toller and Landauer to reconcile the concepts 
of Geist and Macht were ultimately frustrated by the counter­
revolutionaries.
Tucholsky was not himself an active member of this movement, 
as has been explained by Hiller. The latter also denied that 
Tucholsky had been significantly influenced by the Aktivisten: 
Tucholsky was considerably younger than Heinrich Mann, Landauer 
and Hiller himself, and had reached his opinions independently.
(57) In Das Ziel, Jahrbuch fur tatigen Geist, Vol.l, 1915, quoted 
by Paul Portner in Literatur und Revolution 1910-25, Vol.2:
Zur Begriffsbestimmung der Ismen, Neuwied, Luchterhand, 1961, 
p. 404.
(58) ibid.: "Angehorige der Partei des deutschen Geistes! Nun oder 
nie wird euch zufalien, was ihr so lange erstrebtet: die Macht..1
(59) WB 21/11/18.
(60) Hiller's letter to Horst Gunther Weise is quoted in the lather's 
thesis, Tucholsky als Literaturkritiker, Harvard, 1962, p.360.
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This assessment of Tucholsky as an independent thinker is
probably correct, since his views often differed fran Hiller's
own. At this stage in his career Tucholsky would never have
described himself as a Socialist, as Hiller did. He also
disagreed with the disappointed Hiller's denunciation of democracy
as mere "Piefkewirtschaft! Philistrokratie!" in the spring of
1919. (61) However, the moral rather than aesthetic motivation
of Hiller and Tucholsky was identical. Even before the war,
Tucholsky had sympathised with the idea that intellectuals had a
duty to involve themselves in political affairs. (62) In the
programme of the Negativen he formulated this sentiment as strongly
as Hiller himself:
nWbzu fiihren denn letzten Endes die Erkenntnisse 
des Geistes, wenn man nicht ein Mai von den Hohen 
der Weisheit herunterklettert, ihre Ergebnisse auf 
das tagliche Leben anwendet und das zu formen 
versucht nach seinem Ebenbilde?" (63)
The idealistic, unpolitical nature of Tucholsky's demand for a
"geistige Revolution" also reflected the attitude of many German
intellectuals, such as Hiller and Ossietzky. (64) Tucholsky made
a further concession to the principles of the Aktivisten when he
asserted in Wir Negativen:
(61) Hiller, Ein Minis ter ium der Kopfe, in Geist werde Herr,
Berlin, Erich ReiB-Verlag, 1920, p. 129.
(62) Gf. Chapter 1.
(63) Wir Negativen, GW 1, p.374.
(64) Hiller recognised in late 1918 that political revolution should 
be followed by a change in attitudes, in the speech Wer sind wir? 
Was wollen wir?, Geist werde Herr, p.73:... "wahre Revolution 
ist erst da, wo die kulturelle Revolution gelang. Eine tief 
durchgreifende, um- und umwuhlende Erziehung des Volkes zum 
Geist, sie erst ermoglicht die Sicherung der geringen revolution- 
aren Errungenschaften von gestem und heute.." Ossietzky 
expressed similar opinions in a passage recalling the spirit of 
Wir Negativen, quoted by Koplin, op.cit:p.30: "Es muS ausgesprochen 
warden, daB uns nichts mehr an die Tradition bindet, daO es 
zwecklos ist, Halbheiten durchzumogeln, daB endlich jene geist­
ige Emeuerung durchgefuhrt werden mu3, die der deutsche Michel
jahrhundertelang versaumt hat".
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„Der unbedingten Solidaritat aller Geldverdiener imi3 
die ebenso unbedingte Solidaritat der Geistigen 
gegenuberstehen”.(65)
Such similarities of opinion suggest that Hiller was correct in claiming
that even if Tucholsky did not belong to any Aktivist organisation, he was
in sympathy with the basic aims of its manbers.
The most informative parallel between Tucholsky and an Aktivist
leader has so far been ignored by critics, although the comparison
between Tucholsky and the Bavarian premier, Kurt Eisner, merits as much
analysis as Tucholsky1 s relations with Hiller. Since Tucholsky praised
intellectual engagement, even when he disagreed with its political goal,
his attitude to the idealist described by Heinrich Mann as
„Der erste wahrhaft geistige Mensch an der Spitze eines 
deutschen Staates"(66)
deserves study.
Although Tucholsky distrusted Eisner's apparent Bavarian separat­
ism (67) and seldom carmen ted directly on his career, the parallel between 
their views is striking. Eisner, like Tucholsky, was a left-wing 
intellectual and writer from a middle-class Jewish family in Berlin . (68) 
Eisner also emphasised the need for a revolutionary change in social 
attitudes towards the acceptance of democracy. (69) He found the old, 
hierarchical society intolerable for ethical rather than directly political 
reasons, since its lack of freedom restricted moral choice and was contrary 
to human dignity.
N
~  - .I ■ in i —  .    ~ ■■ —  ^ .t ■ ■ ■ ■  ■ — —  ■ i 1.1 —  i
(65) Wir Negativen, op.cit,, p.375.
(66) Heinrich Mann: Kurt Eisner, eine Gedenkrede, in Macht und Mensch, p. 170.
(67) Tucholsky allowed a cartoon to appear in Ulk on 13/12/18, showing 
Eisner as the *Elefant im Munchener Porzellanladen.
(68) The summary of Eisner's views is based on the articles by Paul Portner: 
The Writers' Revolution, in Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.3,
No,4(1968), pp.137-51.
(69) ibid,: "What we want is denocracy, not the travesty of democracy which 
goes with ballot paper and parties, but true democracy, rooted in the 
will of the people, in which every individual is democratic, thinks 
democratically, acts democratically". (Eisner in a speech at Basle, 
10/2/19)•
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Eisner's career as a revolutionary leader met most of the 
criteria advanced by Tucholsky in Wir Negativen. He recognised the 
need for the intellectual to bring his insight to bear in practical 
affairs; and the energy with which he forced his way to power provided 
a good example of "konkret gewordene Geistigkeit", (70) Tucholsky' s 
ccnments on the need to destroy the old before attempting to build 
the new Germany might have been written about Eisner's bloodless victory 
over the Wittelsbach monarchy,
Eisner is now remembered as a pacifist and anti-militarist. It 
was a danonstration in favour of an immediate cease-fire which led to 
his seizure of power on November 8th. Both his coup d'etat and his 
apparent separatism stormed frcm the belief that a Bavarian state led by 
an opponent of the war would receive better terms frcm the idealistic 
President Wilson than weuld the Empire of Wilhelm II, Eisner was hated 
on the right mainly on account of his publication of documents purporting 
to prove the responsibility of the Imperial regime for the outbreak of 
war. Such tactics might have freed the Republican government frcm the 
burden of guilt inflicted on the country by its predecessor. This process 
of Volksaufkl-irung was carried on in later years by Tucholsky himself.
Like the Bavarian premier, he was accused of Nestbeschmutzung on this 
issue. Tucholsky was able to rebut the charge in Wir Negativen/71) but 
no such opportunity was granted to Eisner; he was murdered by a young 
lieutenant on February 21st, 1919, The ability to mediate successfully 
between the different left-wing forces in Bavaria had been one of Eisner's 
greatest achievements. This success had corresponded to Tucholsky's demands
(70) Wir Negativen, GW 1, p.374,
(71) GW 1, p.375.
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for unity among the progressive groups. But after Eisner's death 
the pattern of left-wing riots and reactionary repression was repeated 
in Munich.
The parallel between Tucholsky' s theoretical demands and the 
aims and actions of Eisner during the Bavarian Revolution covers the 
major points in Tucholsky's programme, Eisner demonstrated both the 
possibility and the value of intellectual engagement in politics. An 
ardent supporter of genuine democracy, Eisner, like Tucholsky, regarded 
moral criteria such as human dignity as essential features of the new 
Germany. Both were Jewish Literaten,opposed to violence, militarism 
and war, and as a result both were accused of anti-German activities when 
they sought the future good of their country.
It is, however, impossible to state definitely that Tucholsky's 
development was influenced Ey Eisner' s example. Certainly his obituary 
for Eisner left no doubt of his awareness that the latest victim of the 
Nationalists had shared many of his own aims: progressive engagement, 
idealist! and pacifism. (72) On two other occasions Tucholsky singled out
i
Eisner from among the victims of right-wing terrorism, in the satirical 
article Per Preu^ enhimmel (73) and in Der selige Noske. (74) Even the 
relative scarcity of such references to Eisner in Tucholsky' s early years 
might be attributed to his writing for a Berlin public to whcm the 
Spartacist riots vrere more familiar and exciting reading than Eisner's 
premiership in distant Munich.
(72) Cf. Eisner, ibid., pp.379-80:
„Es starb Jaures, Karl Liebknecht, Luxanburg,
Kurt Eisner..."
\\ The pacifism, not explicitly expressed, is the only quality
which links the four victims.
(73) Freie Welt, January 1920, ibid., pp.577-79,
(74) WB 2/2/22, ibid., p.902.
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Hcwever, the evidence that Eisner influenced Tucholsky's 
thought is inconclusive. Nothing in Tucholsky's writings proves that 
he was aware how close were their respective positions on such issues 
as the need to encourage democratic attitudes, among the German people, 
let alone that Tucholsky took up his position because of Eisner's 
example. The best explanation for the similarity of view is that both 
men independently reached the same conclusions due to their ccxmoi 
avmreness of ideas current among the Aktivisten. As a result, Eisner 
came closer than any Weimar politician to Tucholsky.'s own ideal.
It has been established that Tucholsky' s involvement in current 
affairs immediately after the war owed more to idealism than to a firm 
grasp of political theory, which seemed to him irrelevant to the 
problans of German society. He made no exception to his general 
distrust of such theory in the case of Marxism, a fact which placed him 
intellectually in the liberal rather than the Social Democratic camp.
Tucholsky was basically an idealist in the philosophical as well 
as the more general sense of the term. It is true that his interest in 
political reform was increasing,but he still sought changes mainly 
within the abstract realm of the German people's attitudes. The 
.materialism which provided the philosophical basis for Marxism seemed 
to offer an incomplete picture of human development, and Tucholsky was 
therefore unwilling to believe that men's ideas were conditioned primarily 
by their role in the productive process. (75) Tucholsky likewise did 
not accept that, as Marx had stated(76), society was divided into
(75) Cf. Marx's Vorwort zur Kritik der politischen Qkonomie, in N&rx und 
Engels, Werke, East Berlin, Dietz, 1963, Vol.13, pp.9-10:
"Es ist nicht das BewuBtsein der Menschen, das ihr Sein, sondem 
umgekehrt ihr gesellschaftliches Sein, das ihr BewuBtsein bestinmt.."
In the above quotation fran Herren und Kerls, Tucholsky uses the phrase 
"die soziale Ungebung" as an equivalent for what Marx saw as the role 
of the individual in the productive process. This suggests that as yet 
Tucholsky did not fully understand Marx's point.
(76) Cf. Marx und Engels, Manifest der kcmmunistischen Partei, in Werke,
Vol.4, p.462.
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antagomstic classes, each with its own class-consciousness. Instead
Tucholsky tbok the liberal view that although similarities of economic
position were important, the differences in individual character were
still more significant. The clearest example of Tucholsky1 s stand-point
was in the article Herren und Kerls:
„In jeder Schicht gedeihen Proleten und Traumer 
und feine Menschen und Idealisten und unbekunrnerte 
Dummkopfe; die soziale Omgebung macht viel, aber bei 
weitem nicht alles am Menschen aus". (77)
These were not the sentiments of one who saw history as a succession of
class struggles, which would culminate in the dictatorship of the
proletariat. Indeed, the very word "dictatorship" must have sufficed
to make such a social system unacceptable to Tucholsky, in view of his
uncompromising opposition to "die Unfreiheit des Deutschen". (78) The
ardent advocate of freedom frcm the shackles of the old, caster-ridden
Prussian society could not tolerate in its place what must have appeared
to be another dictatorial form of government, even though on a numerically
broader base. In spite of insisting that his fellow-countrymen should
accept democratic principles and put then into practice, Tucholsky was
comparatively uninterested in economic affairs, and he ignored the issues
of economic democracy and nationalisation which were being widely
discussed among left-wing intellectuals in 1919.
Tucholsky*s employment of Marxist terminology was also infrequent 
and occurred generally in a negative context. He used the terms Burger 
and Proletarier in Wir Negativen in a manner which owed little to the 
definitions of the Ccmmunist Manifesto. Tucholsky defined the Burger turn 
in intellectual rather than economic terms, and considered its distinguish­
ing feature the anti-democratic mentality of the true Prussian. (80) When
(77) Berliner Tageblatt, 2/6/19.
(78) Der Uhtertan, GW I, p.385.
(79) Not until 1928 did Tucholsky charge the SPD with the failure to 
undertake "eine revolutionare Sozialisierung der Industrie". 
November-Uristutz, Schwarze Fahne, GW II, p. 1301
(80) GW I, p.373.
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he referred to proletarians, it was to offer sympathy and help 
on humanitarian, not political grounds, to the 1 Unterdriickten, die 
nicht inmer notwendigerweise Proletarier sein miissen". (81)
Tucholsky's individualism was the corollary of his rejection 
of Marxist collectivism. The passage quoted above frcm Herren und 
Kerls confirmed that its author saw society as composed of individual 
human beings rather than of classes held together by a common function 
in the economic process. Individualism was also indicated by his 
loathing of the national worship of collectivities; their proper role, 
he declared in Wir Negativen (82), was not as an end in thenselves but 
as "ein Hilfsmittel fur die einzelnen". This was the spirit in which 
Tucholsky later approached such groups as the USPD, the Pacifist 
Movement and the KPD, and it was far renoved frcm the Vereinsmeierei 
so typical of his compatriots. Tucholsky considered that his fellow- 
countrymen used such collective groups dishonestly, in order to compens­
ate for their own weakness (83), and to explain away offences which they 
would not have committed as individuals. (84) Such collectivities also 
served often as a hindrance rather than a help, shackling the individual 
with extra duties without providing him with additional rights.
After four years of war, the most demanding collective was 
evidently the state. The intellectual basis of Tucholsky's pacifism lay 
in the conviction that the state had no claim over the lives of its male 
inhabitants. He revealed this stand-point in a letter to Mary Gerold 
in the last months of the war, and for many years it provided the best 
summary of his view on the relationship between the individual and the
(81) ibid., p.377.
(82) ibid., p.376.
(83) Cf. Das Mitglied, WB 1/6/26, GW II, pp.457-8.
(84) Zur Erinnerung an den ersten August 1914, GW I, p.356.
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ocmmunity:
lfEs kauut nur auf den einzelnen an.
Das Volk und das Ganze slnd eingebildete Dinge, 
die wir uns gemacht haben". (85)
This rejection of the state should not be confused with that of the
Marxist, for whan the bourgeois state serves as the instrument of the
exploiting class against the proletariat. Not until his stay in Paris
in 1924 did Tucholsky adopt this opinion.
At this early stage in his career, Tucholsky's attitude to 
Marxism varied between the indifference of a writer uninterested in 
political theory and the hostility of a liberal individualist. Frcm. 
his sparse Garments on the subject, it may be deduced that he opposed 
the basic tenets of the division of society along economic lines into
i
antagonistic classes, and its corollary, the inevitability of the
proletarian revolution and dictatorship. On a more philosophical level,
he also rejected the materialism and collectivism characteristic of
Marxian in favour of an idealistic, individualistic position. As Prescher
has pointed out:
„Rein marxistische Gedankengange sind in seinen 
Veroffentlichungen aus dieser Zeit nicht enthalten; 
ein Marxist wurde den Tucholsky dieser Periode 
als einen biirgerlichen Humanisten bezeichnen". (86)
His later radicalism was a response to the failure of Weimar democracy.
That failure had not yet beccme apparent; indeed the government of
President Ebert and Chancellor Scheidemann and ministers frcm the SPD,
DDP and Zentrum appeared to have strengthened its position by defeating
its left-wing opponents. However, Ebert's triumph was bought at the
price of an alliance with the anti-Republican right, which was impatiently
waiting to start a counter-offensive. The next phase of Tucholsky's career
was therefore concerned with the battle for parliamentary democracy in
Germany.
(85) Letter of 14/7/18, Briefe, p.372.
(86) Prescher, op.cit., p.24.
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CH&PTER 3
The Revolution and its aftermath increased Tucholsky*s 
interest in political affairs and helped his opinions to mature. The 
qualities which distinguished the next phase of his career began to 
emerge under the stimulus of external events between the summer of 1919 
and early 1920. Gradually it became clear that Tucholsky had been over- 
optimistic in hoping that his compatriots would adopt a favourable 
attitude towards danocracy, particularly at the local level. The old 
authoritarianism persisted, and it was reinforced by popular resentment 
against the unexpectedly rigorous terms of the Treaty of Versailles.
Though progressive intellectual engagement was more urgently needed than 
ever, Tucholsky now realised that it must take a new form. Democracy 
could best be secured by appealing to the supposedly progressive govern­
ment. Reforms were particularly necessary in view of the signs that the 
counter-revolutionary forces which had suffered a temporary defeat in 
November 1918 were regaining their influence and self-confidence. The 
change in Tucholsky's attitude began purely negatively, with increasingly 
radical denunciations of militarism. Then he turned to directly political 
criticism designed to stimulate government action. At the same time he 
reinforced his own ccrrmitment to reform by abandoning his earlier sympathy 
for the DDP and joining the USPD, which by March 1920 was the fastest- 
growing left-wing party in Germany.
The harsh terms imposed by the victorious Allies at Versailles 
played an important part in dispelling not only Tucholsky' s optimism but 
also the desire for reform among many of his compatriots. Tucholsky 
himself had not shared his fellow-countrymen' s blind trust that the Treaty 
would enshrine President Wilson's liberal Fourteen Points, and feared with
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good reason that the French would maintain their uncanpronising
attitude in the negotiations. (1) When it became clear that Germany was
to lose territory and her colonies, pay reparations, accept restrictions
on the size and equipment of the armed forces, admit her "war guilt" and
hand over so-called "war criminals", the reaction of Tucholsky was
naturally unenthusiastic. Nevertheless his response represented a longer-
term view than was custernary in a German press which almost unanimously
remained content to echo the indignant "Unannehnbar!" of Premier Scheide-
mann. By contrast, Tucholsky avoided facile polemic and came to the
correct conclusion that Germany had little alternative but to sign:
„Bis zum Ende grade stehen?
Lieber 'in Ehren untergehen?'
Untergehn, wenn der Sturmwind braust?
Ein Volk geht nicht unter- 
ein Volk verlaust...
Werden wir also nicht unterschreiben?
Wird uns was andres tfbrig bleiben?.,." (2)
Protestations of injured innocence were rejected in favour of a deter­
mination to learn fran the mistakes of the Empire which had led up to 
the war.
At this point in the discussion of the Treaty, only the USPD 
among the German parties supported Tucholsky's realistic view. (3) By 
contrast, his previous allies in the DDP were bitterly opposed to any 
"surrender", and this hostility was nowhere more apparent than in the 
leading articles of the Berliner Tageblatt. As the editor of Ulk, Tucholsky 
could hardly adopt an attitude significantly different fran that of 
Theodor Wolff. Though Tucholsky ultimately triumphed over this obstacle,
(1) Volk in Not, Ulk, 9/5/19.
(2) Bilanz, WB 15/5/19,
(3) The USP did not share Tucholsky's motivation. They stressed the suffering 
likely to be inflicted on German workers, since they would have to bear 
the brunt of any resumption of hostilities, and recaimended acceptance
of the Allied ultimatum in the hope that the Treaty could be re-written 
after the impending social revolution in Western Europe,
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his first reaction to the probable editorial pressure was to take
refuge in uncharacteristic platitudes. (4) A week later, however, he
followed Wolff and confined himself in Friede? to the polemical attack
on the Allies which he had avoided in the Weltbuhne:
„tJhd ihr? Ihr spracht van Volkerbund,
Wir trauten den Vierzehn Punkten,
Wir dachten, ihr machtet Europa gesund 
als wir Waffenstillstand funk ten...
Friede? Das ist der blanke Hohn!"(5)
It was nevertheless significant that he still refused to reject the terms 
outright; he retained convinced that, sooner or later, submission was 
inevitable.
The efforts of Tucholsky to take the discussion of the Treaty 
in Ulk beyond the vehement criticisn of his colleagues that its acceptance 
amounted to national dishonour culminated in the poem Rrieg dem Kriege! (6) 
This embodied the Tageblatt's hostility to the terms, but for a reason 
characteristic of Tucholsky rather than Wolff: that it would drive Germans 
into supporting a war of revenge. Between the Armistice and the publication 
of the Allied peace terms, international understanding had seemed a feasible 
goal, with the war-weary German masses a receptive audience, Clemenceau's 
determination to exact full vengeance for the French defeat in 1871 
seriously weakened the Pacifist Movement in Germany. Conversely, it 
permitted the Nationalists to regain the initiative, with defiant state­
ments frcm the safety of the opposition benches. (7) The SPD and Zentrum 
were forced on to the defensive, after accepting the odium of signing the 
Schmachfrieden. This transformation of the political atmosphere amply 
justified Tucholsky's attack on Clemenceau. His fears inspired Tucholsky
(4) Kopf hochl, Ulk, 16/5/19.
(5) m ,  23/5/19.
(6) Ulk, 13/6/19, Gti 1, pp.432-33.
(7) Cf. Hinderiburg's report to Noske that military resistance in the west 
would be impossible, but that this course should nevertheless be 
followed, since "as a soldier I must prefer death with honour to a 
shameful peace". (Quoted in Carsten, op.cit., p.42)
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to embark on his career as the Weimar Cassandra, with a prophecy which
was to be punctually fulfilled:
„... Die Inperialisten,
die da driiben bei jenen nisten
schenken uns wieder Nationalisten.
Und nach abermals zwanzig Jahren 
kormen neue Kanonen gefahren". (8)
Tucholsky*s major contribution to the discussion of the Versailles 
teems was the realisation that they would act as a catalyst of future 
hostilities. For this reason he opposed the Treaty, However, he was not 
blind to the accidental advantages which its implementation might bestow 
on Germany. As a confirmed anti-militarist, Tucholsky welcomed the 
restrictions on the German armed forces; since his compatriots could not 
defeat their own military, the Allies were doing her a service by demanding 
disarmament. Tucholsky believed that his country would have fared better 
if she had adhered to the spirit of this point, since the forces created 
to circumvent the restrictions provided little external protection, and 
served as anti-Republican mercenaries.
Almost as revealing as the points of the Treaty which Tucholsky 
discussed directly were those aspects which he passed over without carment. 
The so-called Ehrenpunkte, notably the admission of German war guilt, 
elicited frcm Tucholsky little response, although this issue had stirred 
most wrath on the right. On the subject of the lost colonies, Tucholsky 
was even less ready to oppose the Versailles settlement, since he believed 
that Germany's treatment of her former Empire had indeed disqualified her 
as a future colonial pcwer, (9)
(8) Qfl .1, p.433.
(9) Ein wei.3er Rabef WB 4/12/19, ibid., p,539.
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The response of Tucholsky to the Treaty was far more calm 
and responsible than that of the press as a whole. He admitted fran 
the first that Germany had little alternative but to accept the Allied 
ultimatum, but he correctly foresaw that it would give rise to future 
conflict. However, the military and colonial restrictions seemed to 
him, in Poor's words, "a blessing in disguise". (10)
The Versailles settlement had a double significance in 
Tucholsky*s development. First, it provided propaganda amnunition for the 
Nationalists. This not only prompted Tucholsky to advocate counter-measures 
against the reactionaries themselves, but also led him to reflect on those 
responsible for the continuation of right-wing influence. He was there­
fore compelled to recognise the fatal results of the compromises by the 
SPD. Secondly, it is almost certain that Tucholsky found the attitude of 
the DDP unacceptable:; unlike the Democrats, he recognised that the Treaty 
would have to be signed. The right-ward shift of public opinion and the 
DIP's flight frcm responsibility stimulated his re-appraisal of the 
political situation.
The summer of 1919 was marked not only by the Versailles 
controversy but also by the signing of the Weimar Constitution, The 
constitutional compromise stirred no more enthusiasm in Tucholsky than 
among the public at large, tfore significant to Tucholsky was the fact 
that a measure of stability had returned to Germany; this allowed him 
to reflect on the situation in the country rather than the Constitution. 1 
He was carpel led to recognise that the restructuring of society along 
democratic lines vas as distant as ever; schools, universities and civil
(10) Poor, op.cit., p.99.
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service remained bastions of reaction. (11) A journey through seme 
of the less progressive provinces confirmed Tucholsky1 s belief that, 
to judge from its lack of impact on the conservative Stammtisch in 
Klein-Piepen-Eichen, the revolution might never have taken place. For 
a short time, Tucholsky continued to hope for the advent of a Gedanken- 
revolution, but his optimism was fast giving way to a resigned contemplation 
of the coming "winter of our discontent". (12)
In cramon with other Aktivisten, Tucholsky had come to recognise 
the pointlessness of further reliance on intellectual solidarity as a force 
for change. In their Berlin Congress in June 1919 the Rate geistiger 
Arbeiter had rejected their earlier ideal of engagement independent of 
existing organisations: a position, in Hiller's words, "links liber den 
Parteien"(13), in favour of work within political parties, Tucholsky 
himself was to follow this example by joining the USPD. This transitional 
period in his career was marked by a last effort to combine his two aims 
of engagement and the reform of social attitudes through the appeal for 
fellow-intellectuals to devote their energies to the political enlighten­
ment of the provinces. However, he can have had little hope of success, 
since the remaining Aktivisten were unlikely to derive inspiration frcm 
the prospect of "Kleinarbeit und der Mit zum Trivialen”, (14)
The unchanged nature of his compatriots' opinions became obvious 
to Tucholsky after two political trials: the trial of the murderers of 
Liebknecht and Luxemburg, and the indictment of Lieutenant Marloh for
  ■  _
(11) Cf. PreuPische Professoren, WB 22/5/19, GW 1, pp.42022; Die Schule,
WB 24/7/19, Ibid., pp.451-2; Noch immer, WB 17/7/19, ibid,, pp.448-9, 
The soundness of Tucholsky' s view is confirmed by Kolb, who notes 
how few Social Denocrats gained posts in the Prussian bureaucracy.
(op,cit.,pp:266-7).
(12) Eindracke von einer Reise, WB 16/10/19, GW 1, p,499.
(13) Cf. Eva Kolinsky: Engagierter Expressionismus, Politik und Literatur 
zwischen Weltkrieg und Weimarer Republik, Stuttgart, I'fletzler, 1970, 
P*119,
(14) Eindrucke von einer Reise, GW 1, p.498.
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shooting thirty unarmed sailors of the Volksmarinedivision. The 
approval with which the special military courts greeted the assassination 
of the Spartacist leaders, the obstacles placed in the way of those 
endeavouring to establish the true sequence of events demonstrated the 
strength of the old order, (15) The immediate reaction of Tucholsky vras a 
bitter denunciation of militarism, combined with a defiant optimism about 
the future:
„Das Ding liegt so: da steht der Militarisms, da stehen wir,
Und weil die Welt nicht in Staaten, wohl aber in Fortstrebende 
und Zurdckzerrende verfiU.lt, m!3t ihr beiseite gehen, in 
voller Uniform, in Feldbinde, Ordensschmuck und Helm, Und was 
die To ten rufen, ruft unser Herz: Ecrasez l'inf^ mel" (16)
By the time Marloh faced trial in December 1919, the tone of
Tucholsky1 s polemic had changed; he declared stoically:
HIch kampfe weiter, aber ich resigniere”, (17)
The majority of his compatriots had retained their exaggerated respect
for the army and condoned its brutality. For once even Tucholsky was
driven to admit his helplessness; none of his five personae could devise
a form of expression to convince his fellow-citizens:
,.Pathos tuts nicht und Spott nicht und Tadel nicht 
und sachliche Kritik nicht,
Sie vrollen nicht horen", (18)
By January 1920 it had become obvious to Tucholsky that the 
coalition government led by the SPD and Trade Union leader Gustav Bauer 
was devoid of all reforming zeal. There was no sign that it could master 
the post-war economic crisis. Still more serious was its failure to create
(15) Cf, Die lebendigen To ten, WB 15/5/19, ibid,, p,418; "Der Militarisms 
ist nicht tot: er ist nur verhindert".
(16) ibid,, p.419.
(17) Proze.Z Marloh, WB 18/12/19, ibid., p.546,
(18) ibid., p.547,
adequate defence forces against counter-revolution. Now that the Social 
Democrats had served their purpose of protecting Germany against 
Bolshevist!, the radical right considered them ripe for replacement by an 
openly Nationalist government. On several occasions Tucholsky warned 
of the danger of Noske's support for militarism and demanded his resign­
ation. (19)
Tucholsky1 s case against Noske was for a time weakened by his
inability to suggest how the minister might have created a Republican
force to resist revolutionary disorder. When Tucholsky surmounted the
despair which had characterised ProzeB Marloh, he emerged frcm his
personal crisis with new political insight. By February 1920 Tucholsky
no longer confined his polenic to the morally unsatisfactory conduct of
the officers or to the minister's support for militarism, but went on
to examine the situation in which the troops had been enlisted, and to
advocate a preferable course:
„Ein Heer? Die Gewerkschaften waren vollzahlig da, 
gut und zuverlassig an Gesinnung, leicht zu bewaffnen 
und meist aus alten Soldaten bestehend, Noske ,,. 
fuhrte das alte Offizierkorps, dessen Macht erloschen 
schien, neuen herrlichen Zeiten entgegen", (20)
To his ethical and social criticism, Tucholsky had added a new dimension
of political criticism. It was also significant that Tucholsky appeared
to have abandoned his earlier hopes for change through an appeal to the
majority of his fellow-countrymen, (21) As yet he provided no detailed
plan to be implemented by the government, but this was hardly surprising,
since he believed that the Bauer administration lacked interest in reform,
(19) Cf, Henny Noske, WB 4/9/19, GW III, p. 1334; and the motto of 
Proze.3 Marloh, GW 1, p.543,
(20) Das leere Schlo3, WB 19/2/20, ibid., p,499,
(21) The last article to concentrate on such an appeal was Militaria,
WB 22/1/20, ibid., p.592:"Gebt den Offizierstypen.., keine 
Untergebenen mehr her.., dann gehen sie ein".
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The SPD had failed to exert decisive influence (22) and its tenure of
power was likely to be brief. (23) However, Tucholsky did put forward
one general suggestion:
„Um zu regieren, dazu gehoren vor alien Mut und Macht,
Dazu gehort die gro3e Geste, die da sagt: Jetzt sind 
wir die Herren,, Wir herrschen! Wir reprasentieren!
Wir decken das Alte auf und zeugen Neues! Wir, Wir, Wir.1 (24)
A month later, after the Kapp Putsch, Tucholsky was to take the next
step with a detailed programme to stabilise democratic government,
A final element in this period of Tucholsky's development 
was his abandonment of the DDP, His disillusionment with the party was 
understandable, since it had ceased to subscribe to Wolff's progressive 
ideals. The DDP's election campaign had been financed by right-wing 
industrialists. Von Siemens and his colleagues, the discredited 
reactionaries whose rehabilitation Tucholsky had deplored in Osterspazier- 
gang (25), attempted to turn the party into a bulwark against Bolshevism. 
This conservative support drove the party to the right and led to 
contradictions in its policies. While the party continued to seek votes 
among workers and clerks by offering reform and the extension of public 
ownership, it promised its industrial paymasters to oppose economic 
experiments. To avoid losing either wing of its support, the DO? 
preferred compromise and passivity to any sponsorship of controversial 
reforms, Tucholsky considered that its contribution to the establishment 
of a truly democratic Germany amounted not to actions but only to the 
eloquence of its leader, Friedrich Naumann. (26) The materialist German 
middle-classes could not be won over to the progressive cause by a party
(22) Das leere Schlo.G, ibid,, p.599,
(23) ibid., p.603;"Diese Regierung ist auf die Dauer unhaltbar",
(24) ibid,
(25) BVZ, 20/4/19, GW 1, p.399.
(26) Wir Negativen, ibid., p.375,
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vfoose belief in democracy was enshrined in its name bat ignored in 
practice:
„Der kleine Noveraber-Schwips des Jahres 1918 hielt 
ganze sieben Tage an - dam begrftndeten sie die Deutsche 
Donokrati sche Partei, die mit der Idee der Danokratie 
so viel zu tun hat wie die Schoperihauer-Gesellschaft mit 
Schopenhauer, Wenn bei uns die Ideen popular warden, dam 
bleibt die Popularitdt, die Idee geht gewohnlich zum 
Teufel".(27)
One such inconsistent politician within the DDP seened to be
Walther Rathenau, a leading industrialist who was now endeavouring to
persuade the public that he had for years been a democrat at heart,
Tucholsky saw in Rathenau only the fanatical opponent of German surrender
in October 1918, and concluded that there was no place in Republican
politics for such unreliable characters:
„Neue Anschauungen itrassen von neuen Mannem 
getragen warden". (28)
In the light of Rathenau*s subsequent development as a democratic Erfullungs-
politiker, Tucholsky's suspicions proved unjustified. However, his article
amounted also to an attack on a type of politician widely represented in
the DDP: men who had "placed themselves on the basis of the Constitution"
for personal advantage rather than out of conviction.
The earlier conditional loyalty of Tucholsky to the HP was 
shaken by the party's move to the right and by the growing contrast between 
its principles and its political practice. In a situation in which 
decisive action was called for, the position of the Danocrats became un­
acceptable both bo Tucholsky and to the majority of the party's supporters 
at the January elections, Hie latter generally gravitated towards the more
(27) Macht und Mensch, ibid,, p,679,
(28) Der Schnellmaler, WB 29/5/19, ibid., p,425.
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right-wing Deutsche Volkspartei, which had made progress by blaming 
the Republic for problems stemming from military defeat, (29)
The suspicions of Tucholsky that the reactionary forces 
were preparing to destroy the Republic were confirmed in the Kapp 
Putsch of March 1920, This evidence of the vulnerability of the new 
state was the final element which caused Tucholsky to dedicate the next 
phase of his career to loyal, if critical support for the Republic as a 
framework for possible progress.
The rebellion began when a Freikorps unit, the Ehrhardt Brigade, 
vas encouraged to revolt by the ccstmander of the Reichswehr in the Berlin 
area, General Liittwitz. The disloyalty of the latter had been ocmmon 
knowledge among his colleagues for seme months, and even Noske had had 
seme doubts about him, (30) Nevertheless, the advent of the crisis took 
the minister by surprise. At a council of war hastily convened by Noske, 
most of the generals followed Seeckt’s example and refused to resist the 
rebels. As a result the government was forced into ignominious flight 
fran Berlin.
But if the centre-left coalition had been discredited by its 
inability to prevent the coup, the rebels received a still more demoralising 
lesson. The coup had been poorly planned; its political leader, General- 
landschaftsdirektor Kapp,had not expected it to take place until summer 
and the Freikorps, though they had for seme time talked of overthrowing 
the Republic, likewise lacked a plan of campaign, (31) They were given no 
time to develop one. Before leaving for Dresden, the Social Democratic
(29) The slogan of the DVP at the 1920 election was:
'' „Von roten Ketten macht euch frei 
allein die deutsche Volkspartei!"
(30) Noske, op.cit., p.202.
(31) Robert G L Waite: Vanguard of Nazism, The Free Corps in Germany, 
harvard, 1952, pp.156-7.
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ministers, supported by the Free Trade Unions, called a general strike.
The unity of the workers in response to this summons brought the collapse 
of Kapp's enterprise within four days. The violence of the rebels during 
their brief rule led to a great increase in anti-militarist feeling. On 
its return to power the government of Ebert and Bauer was presented with 
an opportunity to start afresh and "create a truly Republican military 
force on which it could rely in the uncertain and difficult years which 
lay ahead".(32)
There was general recognition in the Weltbithne and in the SPD 
itself that radical reforms were necessary. One result of this mood was 
the Bielefeld Agreement between the unions, the striking Ruhr workers 
and the right-wing Social Danocratic Ruhrkoimissar, Carl Severing, The 
signatories of the agreement accepted the need for reforms, including 
the formation, in consultation with the unions, of a coalition government 
of the SPD and USPD, who were to introduce an extensive programme of 
nationalisation.
Though these demands were supported by the leader-writer of the 
WeltbUhne, Heinrich Strobel, the proposals of Tucholsky were much more 
modest. He did not insist on the exclusion of the bourgeois politicians 
from power, but contented himself with -the advice to the new administration, 
irrespective of its composition, that the rebels and their supporters should 
be punished, the Reichsvehr replaced by a people's militia and in the 
process purged of counter-revolutionary officers. (33) Such reforms would 
have amounted to no more than the fulfilment of long-established SPD 
policy. The request for Noske's removal from public life could hardly be 
described as radical; in any case, it had already been half-fulfilled when
(32) ibid., p.168,
(33) Kapp-mttwitz, WB 25/3/20, GW 1, pp. 620-1.
Noske had resigned as Reichswehrminister after an attack on his 
military policy by Scheidemann.
However, even such moderate proposals were not implemented by 
the Social Democrats, Scheidemann was unwilling to take ministerial 
responsibility for carrying out the necessary reforms, and demonstrated 
a preference for brave words rather than action. (34) Control of the 
army passed to the unreliable Seeckt, Reichswahr troops, led by former 
rebel officers, ware sent into the Ruhr to quell disturbances by workers 
who had answered the government's call to strike and were reluctant to 
surrender their arms for fear of reprisals by the right, However difficult 
the position of the SPD, the occupation of the Ruhr demonstrated once 
again that since the Revolution the party feared its natural supporters, 
the working masses, more than its sworn enemies, Tucholsky's remaining 
proposals for change were also rejected. He called for a propaganda 
campaign against militarism, the dismissal of reactionary civil servants, 
and a democratic reorganisation of German schools. Chancellors Bauer and 
Muller shared Scheidenann' s tendency towards verbal radicalism rather than 
action, an attitude which Tucholsky summarised with heavy sarcasm:
nWarum dem gleich tun? Das ware schon dumm.
Reden genigt ja dem Publikum". (35)
The Putsch represented a potential turning-point in the history 
of the Republic. For the first time Tucholsky's assessment of long-term 
trends was proved correct, and the irresolution of Republican politicians 
shewn to be a mistake. However moderate Tucholsky's proposals, their 
inpleroentatian would have offered same safeguards for the future of 
democracy in Germany. But in spite of the doubts about the loyalty of
(34) Worte und Taten, WB 22/4/20, ibid., p.635,
(35) ibid.
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Seeckt's Reichswehr, the SPD ministers remained wedded to the idea of 
a strong military force to protect the country against foreign invasions 
and Oonmunist risings. In addition, they refused to reoognise that the 
conservative judges, civil servants and teachers constituted a serious 
danger to the Republic, The elections of June 1920 brought the party its 
reward when almost half of its former supporters turned to the more 
resolutely Socialist USPD,
In the context of this study the most important of the new
recruits to the USPD was Tucholsky himself. He joined the party in March
1920, though whether before or just after the coup is uncertain. By
the winter of 1919-20, the USPD had gained greatly in numerical and
organisational strength from working-class discontent wzith the performance
of the SPD in government. However, the influx of revolutionary workers
and -the murder of the Independent leader, Hugo Haase, caused the policy of
the USPD to move to the left. Its advocacy of the Ratesystem led to
carplete parliamentary isolation, (36) The consolidation of the reactionary
forces made this position impractical. The advent of a second revolution
was beccming increasingly unlikely, the Councils had lost almost all their
influence, and the Independents would therefore have been well advised to
concentrate on defending the achievements of November 1918 in the Reichstag.
However, the more realistic right-^ wing USPD leaders who called for a
strengthening of democracy were in the minority and could not shape parly
p o l i c y ,  (37) After the defeat of Kapp, the left wing of the USPD, led by Ernst 
Daumig, the theoretician of the former Revolutionary Shop Stewards, was
(36) The Aktionsprogramm drawn up by the party's Leipzig Congress in 
December 1919 is quoted by Wolfgang Treue, in Deutsche Partei- 
progranroe, 1861-1961, Gottingen, Mas ter schmidt, 1961, p. 98.
(37) The conflicting positions writhin the party are illustrated in Eugen 
Prager's official Geschichte der USPD, Berlin, Verlagsgenossenschaft 
Freiheit, 1921, p.203.
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as unwilling as the SPD leaders to form a united Arbeiterregierung. (38)
Tucholsky took part in the election campaign of June 1920,
writing several articles for Masse*s Berliner Volkszeitung, and
particularly for the USPD daily, Die Freiheit, and its sister newspaper,
Freie Welt. He was still principally concerned with the battle against
his traditional enemy, Prussian militarism, and he looked on the campaign
as an opportunity to remind his readers of their suffering during four
years of war. Tucholsky condemned the Nationalists and the DVP as the
instigators of the conflict. (39) He sensed the disillusiorment of many
workers towards the SPD as well as towards the former officers, and the
optimism prevalent in his new party ms evident in his advice to voters:
„Geht heute zur Ume und denkt an vier Jahre!
An vier Jahre, die gewesen sind, und an vier Jahre, 
die kormen werden. An vier Jahre schmutzigster 
Vergangenheit und an vier Jahre folgenschwerster 
Entwicklung, Dieser Stirrmzettel ist beides : eine 
Quittung und ein Wechsel auf die Zukunft,
Ich wei3, da3 sich viele von uns im griirmigen Herzen 
die Abrechnung mit manchen ihrer bun ten Peiniger noch 
anders vorgestellt haben als so-mit diesem einen 
‘ Briefumschlag. Aber dieser eine Briefumschlag kann 
genugen, ura'euren Willen, der in der groBen Zeit 
gebandigt und gefesselt am Boden lag, Geltung zu 
verschaffen".(40)
This oiphasis on the power of the ballot box was appropriate in the 
election issue of the party daily, but the number of USPD deputies in 
the Reichstag mattered to Tucholsky only as an indication of political 
trends. He ranained sceptical about future prospects, even though the 
USPD quadrupled its strength at the election and almost overtook the 
SPD itself.
The pessimism of Tucholsky was due in seme measure to the fact 
that the official policy of the USPD was considerably more radical than
(38)Cf, Rosenberg, Geschichte, p.98,
(39)Erinnerung fur die Wahl, Berliner Volkszeitung, 5/6/20,
(40)Vier Jahre und ein Tag, Freiheit, 6/6/20,
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his own views. It is true that, in the heat of his denunciations after 
the Kapp Putsch, he advised the readers of the Weltbiihne
„Wir haben keine Revolution gehabt, Macht eine", (41)
However, in the light of his political programme as a whole, this request 
should be seen only as encouragement to fulfil the premise of the November 
Revolution and protect its achievement, the Republic, against its 
reactionary enemies. It did not amount to a call for Socialist revolution 
or the establishment of a Workers1 Republic, In the inner-party conflict 
between the adherents of a Ratesystem and the supporters of parliamentary 
democracy, the whole tenor of Tucholsky1 s warnings to successive Republican 
governments placed him in the second category. Had he secretly favoured a 
revolution frcm the left, he would hardly have exhorted the workers to 
remain loyal to the Republican government. (42) When the USPD split in 
October 1920, Tucholsky expressed regret (43) that the progressive forces 
should be further divided at a time of Nationalist consolidation. The 
controversy within the party had been engineered by the Russian Bolsheviks, 
who hoped to turn their small and ineffective ally, the KPD, into a mass 
party embracing all those workers who opposed the SPD. After a brilliant 
speech by the Chairman of the Ocmintern, Zinoviev, the majority of the 
delegates to the USPD Congress at Halle voted to accept the Russian 
conditions, unite with the KPD and affiliate to the Ccmintem. However, 
Tucholsky remained unconvinced by the Russian rhetoric, and his support 
for the rump of the USPD never wavered until its reunification with the 
SPD in the autumn of 1922,
(41) Kapp-Luttwitz, GW 1, p.621,
(42) Cf. Dollar-2000 Mark, Freiheit, 20/8/22: "Und wir rufen den Arbeitem 
zu: Seid auf der Hut! Lafit euch nicht provozieren! Wer sich jetzt an 
euch herandrangt, urn euch Irrsinnstaten anzuraten, ist entweder bezahlt 
Oder ein Wahnsinniger. Hande weg!"
(43) Hepp Hepp hurra!, Freiheit, 15/10/20, GW 1, p,746.
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The anxiety which Tucholsky felt about future trends was 
stimulated less by the divisions in the USPD than by the electoral 
confirmation of his fear that the Nationalists had regained lost ground.
The industrialists of the BVP and the agrarian, anti-Semitic ENVP won 
victories as striking as those of the Independents, The parliamentary 
situation became critical when the donoralised leaders of the SPD, 
afraid of losing their remaining working-class supporters, left the task 
of government to a middle-class coalition, which included the DVP,
Although the SPD returned to the government on three subsequent occasions, 
in 1921, 1923 and 1928, in a Grand Coalition, its influence was far less 
significant than during the immediate post-war period, The phase of 
Republican opportunity gave way to a period when German democracy ms 
forced back on to the defensive,
The minority governments of the Zentrum-leaders Fehrenbach and 
Wirth ushered in "the era of Catholic democracy". (44) Neither had more 
success with the foreign and economic problems than their Social Democratic 
predecessors. In spite of the conciliatory Erfullungspolitik of Wirth 
and Rathenau, which was supported by both the USPD and the Weltbohne, 
the issue of reparations payments was not solved. The currency continued 
to depreciate and neither the middle classes nor the workers could keep 
pace with inflation. In their despair they were driven to seek salvation 
from the anti-Republican extremists of the right and left. To those such 
as Tucholsky who had hoped that the November Revolution would be followed 
by the restructuring of society along denocratic lines and by radical 
political reform, the developments of 1920-22 were a bitter disappointment. 
For several years he remained loyal to the Republican cause, which appeared 
to hold out the only hope of progress; but successive governments, generally 
well-intentioned and weak-willed, ignored his warnings and prophecies of
(44) Cf. Rosenberg, Geschichte, p. 100.
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disaster.
In June 1920 Tucholsky took the opportunity of a review of 
Heinrich Mann's essays to explain his own concept of democracy. The 
abstract idea stirred his imagination and his approach was idealistic 
rather than formalistic. Democracy was "eine Sache des Herzens", a far 
deeper concept than the "traurigen Parlamente" which ware endeavouring 
to put the principle into practice. Nevertheless Tucholsky recognised 
tha need to encourage then. As long as the Ccmmunists maintained their 
irresponsible efforts to overthrow the government by an armed uprising, 
and the Socialists were divided, Tucholsky and other left-wing intellectuals 
continued to support the Republic, (45) But Tucholsky believed, like 
Heinrich Mann, that he had the right and the duty to attack the imperfect­
ions of the existing state in the name of democratic equality:
„Nun kann nur Nein sagen, wer das Ja tief in sich filhlt,.
Es gibt etwas auch auBerhalb der Berufe und der sozialen 
Position, das uns alle gleich macht, soweit Menschen 
gleich sein konnen. Mutter konnen das. Manner konnen 
das auch",(46)
Two years later, in spite of all the intervening disappointments, Tucholsky
renewed his commitment to democracy:
(lEine, wo der Mann zu sagen hat, der Freie und 
der VerantwortungsbewuBte". (47)
This humanitarian ideal, combining freedom and equality, provided the
standard by which Tucholsky judged the Republican governments of the next
few years.
(45) For Ossietzky's similar view, cf, Koplin, op.cit,,p,46: "Die 
Weimarer Verfassung.. gab., kiinftigen Entwicklungensmoglich- 
keiten genugend Raum, urn auch die Schichten des deutschen 
Volkes zu integrieren, die ihm noch feindselig entgegentraten; 
wenn das bisher nicht geschehen sei, dann deshalb, weil die 
Deutschen das Wesen der Danokratie noch nicht erkannt hatten".
(46) Macht und Mensch, Gtf 1, p. 681.
(47) Wir alle f'inf, WB 24/8/22, ibid., p.1042,
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In the spring and summer of 1920, the writings of Tucholsky 
were dominated by his political persona, Wrobel. The abortive rebellion 
demonstrated for him the areas where democracy had to penetrate if the 
Republic were to survive. His suspicions of the conservative Burger turn 
had been well-founded. Even if the Berlin middle classes had hesitated 
to support the rebels, their provincial counterparts had shown, in March 
and at the June election, their opposition to the Republic. (48)
Tucholsky also recognised the unreliability of the judiciary, 
which treated the crimes of Nationalists as mere trifles, but punished 
left-wing offenders severely. (49) Mast of the Kapp rebels were amnestied 
and only one, von Jagow, faced trial. Other anti-Republicans, such as 
the right-wing student volunteers from Marburg University who shot 
fifteen allegedly Spartacist prisoners, were acquitted, an incident which 
Tucholsky described with savage irony. (50) The students in question were 
typical products of an educational system which encouraged monarchist 
propaganda in schools and universities. Tucholsky noted in March 1920 
that the failure to achieve reforms in the field of education constituted 
a long-term danger to German democracy. He pleaded in vain for government 
action to allow the democratic spirit to take root among German youth. (51) 
Tucholsky believed that radical change was necessary in all these fields if 
the democratic system was, as inplied by the Constitution, to become the 
automatically accepted form of the state.
The most important lesson of Kapp's unsuccessful rebellion was 
the unreliability of the army. The new Reichswehrminister,GeSler, proved
(48) In der Provinz, Freiheit, 16/5/20, ibid., p.649.
(49) Cf. Chapter 9.
(50) Marburger Nachwuchs, Freiheit, 23/6/20, GW 1, pp.686-7.
(51) Kapp-Luttwitz, ibid., p.621.
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as deaf to Tucholsky1 s advice as his predecessor , and in spite of his
incompetence and conservatism(52) he retained his post for eight years.
The framings of Tucholsky culminated in the article Die Reichswehr, which
concluded with a threat of what would happen to the Republic if its
leaders did not act against the army while there was still time. In
advising his readers:
„Bedankt euch in acht Jahren bei dieser Regierung, 
diesem Staatsrat, diesen Reichstag". (53)
Tucholsky anticipated that the Realpolitiker who supported the army
against his attacks would by then have been swept away by their proteges.
His fears were justified and even his estimate of when the military would
strike proved correct. As Schulz has pointed out:
„In acht Jahren wird... General von Schleicher 
hinter den Kulissen des Reichswehrministeriums 
in der BendlerstraSe die Faden ziehen, urn das 
Kabinett Hermann Muller, die letzte parlamentarische 
Regierung der Weimarer Republik zu sturzen". (54)
A more immediate cause for concern was the propensity of the 
military for the assassination of its political opponents. The murder 
of the pacifist Hans Paasche was followed by that of Matthias Erzberger, 
whom Tucholsky described as the "Konkursverwalter der Pleitefirma Deutsches 
Reich". (55) Tucholsky warned that the failure to protect Republican 
politicians and the connivance at the escape of the murderers represented 
an invitation to the latter to continue their work. Since the government 
refused to take action against the Organisation Consul, it was only a 
matter of time before his comment about the dead Erzberger:
„Du worst der Erste nicht - bist nicht der Letzte" (56) 
was proved correct by the murder of Walther Rathenau in June 1922.
(52) Tucholsky described GeBler as "weder ein Republikaner noch eine 
Begabung" (GeBler, Welt am Montag, 7/11/21, ibid., p.854.
(53) Die Reichswehr, WB 23/3/22,ibid., p.909.
(54) Schulz, op.cit., p.82.
(55) Nachruf, WB 8/9/21, ibid., p.824.
(56) ibid.
-78-
In the early summer of 1922 Tucholsky took up his political 
polemic again, after a comparative lull in this activity during the 
previous year. (57) He was stirred less by the hope that Wirth's Grand 
Coalition might be sympathetic to reform than by a premonition that 
immediate action was needed to prevent the collapse of the Republic. Its 
leaders appeared to lack all conviction. (58) Favourable opportunities 
to expose their Nationalist opponents had been allowed to pass; no 
effective Republican propaganda campaign had been launched against the 
militarist ethos which dominated the rural press and, through films 
celebrating Frederick the Great, the cinema also. Hindenburg was paid 
a state pension which enabled him to travel the country preaching the 
virtues of the old order. The workers and progressive sections of the 
middle classes had been given no support although they were willing to 
stand up for the Republic, irrespective of the party to which they 
belonged. (59)
The possible consequences of governmental indecision were 
described by Tucholsky in Was ware, wenn... (60) in which he speculated 
on the course of a possible military coup. The successful rebels would 
arrest the government ministers and have left-wing leaders shot. The 
resistance of the workers would be crushed, and the middle classes would 
praise the restoration of law and order in a hierarchical society. The 
reactionaries who had retained their posts would give open rather than 
covert support to the Nationalists:
(57) This is illustrated by the number of articles published under the 
pseudonym Wrobel. GW 1 includes 38 in 1920, only 20 in 1921 and 30 
to the end of August 1922.
(58) Die Geschaftsreisenden, in Welt am Mon tag, 12/6/22, ibid., p.968.
(59) .ibid.:"Die Republik hats gar nicht einmal so schwer. Wir alle, ohne 
Unterschied der Partei, stehen ihr zur Verfugung".
(60) WB 22/6/22, ibid., pp.975-80.
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„Die Bevolkerung lag, in schweren Ketten gefesselt, 
am Boden.
Und dankte einer Republik, die nichts fur sie 
getan hatte". (61)
Tucholsky*s warning was fulfilled at least partially -taro days later; 
the murder of Foreign Minister Rathenau was intended oy its perpetrators 
as the signal for a Nationalist rising. However, Ludendorff and the 
reactionary organisations were not prepared to risk another failure like 
that of March. 1920, and they were also taken aback by the hostility 
of public opinion after the assassination.
The murder of Rathenau united the democratic parties in a
denunciation of the extreme right. Chancellor Wirth became a convert
to Tucholsky1 s own slogan "Der Feind steht rechts!1 (62) The attacks
by Tucholsky on the government's lack of resolve had been justified, and
for a moment it seemed as if his energetic advice might be followed:
„Vier Jahre Mord - das sind, weiS Gott, genug.
Du stehst vor deinem letzten Atemzug.
Zeig, was du bist. Halt mit dir selbst Gericht.
Stirb Oder karrpfe!
Drittes gibt es nicht". (63)
As he had done after the Kapp Putsch, Tucholsky recognised the
importance of this political opportunity, and he went beyond general
exhortations with a detailed plan for purging the anty, police, judiciary,
civil service and local government, schools and universities of all
unreliable or openly monarchistic elements. In his opinion such men
accepted only one argument:
„die unlogische, nicht objektive, ungerechte, einfache 
Macht".(64)
His programme of two years before was extended; the blatant conservative 
bias of the courts and the reactionary administrations and social structure
(61) ibid., p.980.
(62) Achtundvierzig, WB 2/1/19, ibid., p.328.
(63) Rathenau, WB 29/6/22, ibid., p.989-
(64) Die zufallige Republik, WB 13/7/22,ibid., p.997.
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in Bavaria and East Prussia, compelled him to advocate an amnesty 
for all Republican political prisoners, and the strengthening of the 
authority of the central government over the individual states. The 
"new ideas of a new Republic" (65) had to be carried into the farthest 
comers of Germany, or the state would succumb to the next Nationalist 
assault.
When Tucholsky put forward this programme he had grounds for 
hope that the Republic had learned its lesson. The Republikschutzgesetz 
became law, imposing drastic penalties on those who plotted against the 
state and its ministers. The new Staatsgerichtshof gave approprately 
severe sentences to the surviving assassins of Rathenau, and to the two 
Nationalists who had attempted to murder Scheidemann. However, as soon 
as the energy of the government abated, the judiciary began to employ the 
new law only against the Ocmmunists. Open rebellion against the Republic 
was followed by a "trockener Putsch" (66), the manipulation of the instru­
ments of power against the Weimar state. Soon the attempted assassination 
of Republican personalities could once more be treated as a trifling 
offence, and excused by slanderous criticism of the victim's career, as 
in the case of the assault on Jfeximilian Harden. The trial of Harden's 
attackers had a similar effect on Tucholsky to that of Marloh three years 
before. He was forcibly reminded of the widespread support in Germany for 
the right:
„Es geht urn einen JVbrdversuch gegen einen politisch 
Andersdenkenden, und Grenz sagt: Funfzig Prozent des 
deutschen Volkes stehen hinter mix! Das ist rich tig.
So verlumpt, so amoralisch, so verkcmmen ist ein Teil 
dieser Nation. Er kennt sie". (67)
(65) ibid.
(66) Der trockene Putsch, Freiheit, 16/7/22, ibid., p.100-103.
(67) Grenz, a Nationalist bookseller, had been the instigator of the 
assault.
(68) ProzeB Harden, WB 21/12/22, ibid., p.1077
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Again Tucholsky was driven to conclude that a country whose people 
rejected all enlightenment was past saving. However, whereas ProzeB 
Marloh represented "ein muder Tag" in its author's career, the disappoint­
ment of 1922 lasted longer. During the following year Tucholsky wrote 
fewer articles than in any corresponding period between 1918 and 1932.
The unwillingness of the Republic to protect itself and its supporters 
had induced in him a deep-seated pessimism. His own struggle on its 
behalf had almost ceased after he had been taken to court for alleged 
libel of the Reichswehr in the article Die Erdolchten. (69) Though 
Tucholsky won his case, his comments on the issue resembled an epitaph 
far the phase of his career in which he had consistently worked for the 
protection of -the democratic Republic:
„Immer und inner wieder raffen wir uns auf; 
inner und inner wieder haben wir geraten 
und zu helfen versucht; inner wieder, im 
Inter esse der Sache und im Interesse der 
Republik haben wir geschwiegen und da nichts 
gesagt, wo wir vielleicht h'itten schaden konnen- 
immer und iirmer wieder haben wir Stange gehalten.
Wofiir eigentlich-?" (70)
The personal resignation of Tucholsky after the Harden Trial was 
prolonged by the political developments of 1923, when the economic and 
diplomatic crisis in Germany came to a head. The openly reactionary 
government of so-called Fachminister, led by the industrialist, Heinrich 
Cuno, was beneath Tucholsky*s contempt. This was hardly surprising, 
since one of Cuno's chief advisers on foreign and financial policy was 
the ENVP leader, Karl Helfferich. It was the latter's propaganda campaign 
which had created the political climate in which Erzberger and Rathenau 
had been murdered. However, Tucholsky's disapproval had rational as well 
moral grounds. The non-payment of reparations by Cuno provided the French
(69) WB 30/3/22, GW 1, pp.925-32.
(70) Gefller und wir, WB 27/7/22, ibid., p.1013.
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prenier, Poincare, with the excuse to send troops into the Ruhr,
and the government's policy of passive resistance led to the final
collapse of the German currency. Tucholsky's political acumen had
enabled him to foresee many of the dangers to democracy, but he
relapsed into despair when it became obvious that his labours had
been in vain. The height of the crisis in the summer of 1923 evoked
frcm him only the tired carmen t:
IfAls wir Republik sag ten, haben wir das da 
nicht gemeint".(71)
The most significant elements of the political situation - the dangerous
separatist movement in the Rhineland, the reactionary government in
Bavaria led by von Kahr, who was openly defying Berlin, the fate of the
Ccmmunist-supported administration in Saxony and Thuringia were deemed
unworthy of individual consideration: they seemed merely symptomatic of
the Kleinstaaterei which, he believed, would eventually destroy the
state. (72) Tucholsky's vision of Germany's future was distinguished
neither by reasoned analysis nor by polemical energy:
„Diese neuen Kleinstaaten.. werden sich zu dsn Deutschland 
des Oberkcmmis Wilhelm mit seinen Marmortoiletten Kempinskis 
verhalten wie die fins ter s ten Kongo-Neger zu einen Inka- 
Reich der Sonne. Warte nur, balder!"(73)
This loss of all hope for social progress in Germany explains 
Tucholsky' s decision to eschew political comment during the crisis of 
1923, a response vhich he was to repeat nine years later, as the Republic 
tottered towards final collapse. However, personal reasons also contribu­
ted to his abstention frcm Zeitkritik. The amoung of time available 
for writing was reduced when he was driven by inflation to take a job in
(71) Potsdam-1 WB 12/7/23, ibid., p.1115.
(72) Die Kegelschnitte Gottes, WB 12/7/23, ibid., p. 1124: "Dieses Reich, 
das iiber kurz oder lang zerfallen diirfte und sich in eine Reihe 
muhselig konstituierter Kleinstaaten auflosen wird.."
(73) ibid.
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a bank. Though the contact between Tucholsky and high finance in the 
person of the bank-owner, Hugo Simon, may have stimulated the 
Wendriner series(74), he found the environment uncongenial.
A more serious cause of Tucholsky1 s disillusionment was his 
increasing dislike of life in Berlin. He had implicitly recognised 
that the German capital was a cultural centre of seme standing by writing 
his theatrical reviews and by contributing to the flowering of post-war 
cabaret. Indeed, the Berlin of the 1920's seemed to many artists and 
intellectuals something of a cosmopolitan paradise (75) ,and no doubt its 
atmosphere was infinitely more stimulating than that of the traditionalist 
provincial towns. But Tucholsky found more in the capital to blame than 
to praise. For years he had been criticising the Berliners: their 
materialism, their over-organised daily life, their perpetual and pointless 
haste; above all, their inability to relax and to treat their fellcw-citizens 
as human beings. (76) This witty but superficial analysis was later 
supplemented by disapproval of the social trends set by the city's 
nouveaux-riches, those profiteers and speculators who feasted while their 
neighbours starved. (77) By 1923 he had evidently decided that amid the 
general misfortune any polemical attack on Berlin would be churlish, and 
such satires as 'n Augenblick mal-i (78) and Morgens urn acht(79) described 
the city with good-natured contempt rather than cold distaste. However, 
his dislike of Germany was rapidly increasing; by now the whole country 
inspired in him the same feeling of claustrophobia as its capital. In 
December 1923 he concluded his review of the film The Kid with rhetorical
(74) Tucholsky created the figure of the Jewish business-man, Wendriner,
in July 1922, but he only began to appear with some regularity in 1925.
(75) Cf. Peter Gay, Weimar Culture, New York, Harper and Row, 1968, p.128.
(76) Berlin! Berlin! WB 29/3/19, GW 1, pp.449-51.
(77) Das Gesicht der Stadt, Freiheit, 16/11/20, ibid., pp.756-59.
(78) Acfot-Uhr-Abendblatt, 26/5/23, ibid., pp. 1097-99.
.(79) WB 28/6/23, ibid., p.1111-12.
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questions to its hero, Charlie Chaplin. Tucholsky admired Chaplin’s 
portrayal of the "little man" as a welcome diversion from the reality 
of Germany; but still more attractive than such fantasies was the idea 
of escape:
„Wei£t du, daB wir Bessem hier versauem
und nicht aus der ewigen Schule herauskcrrmen konnen,
aus dem Kasemenhof, aus den Intemat Deutschland?
Wir sind festgebacken und war ten. WeiOt du,
wie wir warten? Auf die Stunde, die in die Freiheit
fuhrt?" (80)
Far frcm being a haven of democracy, freedom and. culture, his country 
had become "ein schlecht geheizter Warteraum voll bosartiger Irrer" (81) 
and Tucholsky could hardly wait for the train to take him elsewhere.
Tucholsky's wish was granted sooner than he could have expected.
In the short term at least his prognostications about the future proved 
false. The newspaper industry profited from the gradual economic recovery, 
and funds became available for long-cherished projects such as Tucholsky * s 
departure to become the Weltbiihne's correspondent in Paris. He arranged 
to supplement his income by writing unpolitical feuilletons for the liberal 
Vossische Zeitung, published by the Ullsteins, and edited by Georg Bernhard. 
Meanwhile Tucholsky1 s personal situation was improving as dramatically as 
his financial position; after obtaining a divorce frcm his first wife, he 
was free to mary Mary Gerold.
It was therefore no surprise that Tucholsky's response to Paris 
in the spring of 1924 was rhapsodic rather than rational, and that seme 
of his first contributions were declined by Jacobsohn as over-subjective 
and lacking in perspective. The city had the initial advantage of being 
hundreds of miles firm Berlin, but its intrinsic qualities also appealed
(80) The Kid, WB 6/12/23, ibid., p.1135.
(81) Kleine Reise 1923, WB 3/1/24, ibid., p.1143.
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to Tucholsky. The rhythn of life was more relaxed, and the friendly 
inhabitants allowed him to sit and dream in the sunshine. (82) Whereas 
Berlin had been a city of stuffy provincial egotism (83), the atmosphere 
of Paris was characterised by its Menschlichkeit; politeness and unpreten­
tious hospitality. (84) Tucholsky was carried away by this mixture of 
relief at escaping from the old and joy of discovering the new, and 
Jacobsohn's reserved judgment was understandable. (85)
In the field of political analysis, optimism about the French 
scene also appeared justified. At the elections of Jtoy 1924, the Poincar^ 
government, responsible for the invasion of the Ruhr, was defeated by the 
Cartel des Gauches, led by the more liberal Herriot. The German press 
had reacted with seme Schadenfreude, and Tucholsky attempted to correct 
their misconceptions. (86) The result did not signify a sudden outburst 
of enthusiasm for Germany, or the readiness to renounce reparations; 
Poincare*s aggressive methods had been rejected, but his aim of making 
Germany pay was shared by his opponents. In any case, the whole issue 
had played a minor role in the election campaign.
However, Tucholsky did detect hopeful signs in the French mood, 
as symbolised by the defeat of Poincare'. France wanted to be left in 
peace, and was prepared to co-exist with its eastern neighbour. This 
represented an opportunity for iirproving Franco-German relations, and 
Germany should abandon her diplomatic isolation and meet the French 
half-way:
„Frankreich streckt emeut die Hand hin- 
die Welt streckt emeut die Hand hin.
(82) Parc Monceau, WB 15/5/24, ibid., p. 1152.
(83) Immer raus mit der Mutter...! WB 5/6/24, ibid., pp.1162-3.
(84) Das Menschliche Paris, Vossische Zeitung, 19/6/24, ibid., p.1170.
(85) Cf. Pariser Dankgebet, WB 25/5/26, GW II, pp.448-9.
(86) Paris, WB 22/5/24, GW 1, pp. 1152-57.
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Wir haben keine Bedingungen zu stellen- 
denn sie haben den Krieg gewonnen. Nicht wir.
Es imiB vemiinftig und besonnoi von einer Demokratie 
zur andem verhandelt werden. Dazu nrassen freilich zwei 
da sein. Frankreich hat eine". (87)
Germany gave her answer a week later. In the elections of May 
1924, the democratic parties, weakened by the years of unrest and economic 
collapse, were defeated and the Nationalists emerged as the largest party.
At the outset of Tucholsky*s career in Paris, he was therefore confronted 
fcy bitter evidence of the failure of the forces of democracy at heme.
His patience had been taxed in supporting the Republicans until 1922 and 
in refusing to attack their incompetence in 1923. This new defeat 
suggested that the liberal democracy of Weimar was a lost cause, and 
encouraged Tucholsky to look elsewhere for a solution to Germany's 
problems
In 1920 Tucholsky had begun a new phase of his career as a 
supporter of parliamentary democracy and the Weimar Republic. Although 
it at no time measured up to his ideals, it appeared to hold out possibili­
ties of overcoming the hated Wilhelminian world of privilege and subordination 
and of attaining his goal of equality and human dignity. His political 
proposals after the Kapp Putsch and the murder of Rathenau were demands 
for radical reform rather than revolution. For two years he warned, cajoled 
and prophesied in an effort to exert a positive influence on government 
policy; only the most prejudiced observer could deny his writings from 1920 
to 1922 the title of constructive criticism. However, he was embittered 
by the continued rejection of his advice, especially since the results of 
government policy appeared to vindicate his own judgment. Germany went on 
struggling frcm one crisis to the next, and that of 1923, which threatened 
to engulf her, also temporarily silenced Tucholsky. His work in Paris was 
to take account of the earlier disappointments, and to demonstrate an 
increasingly radical response to than.
(87) ibid., p.1157.
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CHAPTER 4
The move to Paris gave a new impetus bo Tucholsky1 s work.
Though at first he adhered to Georg Bernhard's instructions and confined 
himself largely bo French affairs, his interest in German politics 
gradually revived. In 1924 the Weimar Republic, like Tucholsky himself, 
appeared to have emerged strengthened from the crisis of the previous 
year. The state of emergency ended, and Seeckt surrendered his dictatorial 
powers to the Cabinet. The National Socialists were temporarily broken 
by the failure of their November coup in Munich, and their leader was 
writing Mein Kampf in Landsberg prison. The French troops left the Ruhr, 
and the plans to set up an autonomous Rheinische Republik collapsed.
In the economic field, the currency was stabilised and inflation brought 
under control. Parliament's acceptance of the Dawes Plan and the American 
loans which it brought in its train apparently settled the problem of 
reparations and provided the investment capital which allowed the expansion 
of German industry. These developments led Republican politicians to 
believe that the state had overcome its difficulties.
In this relief they were joined by Tucholsky, at least in 
retrospect. Three years later he was to comment on the insurrections of 
the para-military units, "diese Horden:i, and to emphasise how fortunate 
Germany had been in 1923 to escape from the impending right-wing dictator­
ship. (1) Nevertheless, at the time Tucholsky refused to celebrate the 
survival of German democracy; instead he was inclined to scepticism about 
the country's long-term prospects. Tucholsky recognised that the crisis
(1) Cf. Fememorder, Prager Tageblatt, 17/4/26:.die Zusammenhange 
zwischen der Schwarzen Reichswehr und den zahlenden Gutsbesitzem 
sind so emster Natur, daO man heute erst sieht, an welchem 
entsetzlichen Ungluck Deutschland gerade vorbei gekommen ist.
Hatten diese Horden losgeschlagen, so waren die Folgen unabsehbar 
gewesen".
had resulted in a shift of power away from the workers and in favour of
the employers. Symptomatic of the change was the fact that during their
tern in the Stresemann government, the Social Democrats had been unable
to save the eight-hour day, one of their proudest achievements of 1918.
The industrialists claimed that in the difficult economic situation a
longer working day was necessary to increase production, a view with which
the middle-class politicians Stresemann and Marx concurred. Once again
it was shown that the SPD had obtained inadequate safeguards to protect
its positions of power. Indeed, Wilhelm Marx1 s government was the only
Western European adrministration opposed to the eight-hour day: its
contribution to the International Congress on Labour Questions of June
1924 amounted to the accusation that its critics among the other powers
were interfering in Germany's internal affairs. In his report of the
Congress, Der Achtstundentag, Tucholsky dismissed this uncooperative
attitude with a quotation from Karl Marx:
„Und doch zeigt die ganze Geschichte der modemen Industrie, 
da/3 das Kapital,v\enn es nicht im Zaume gehalten, 
rdcksichtslos und unbarrmherzig daran arbeiten wird, 
die ganze Arbeiterklasse auf diesen dulersten Stand 
der Heratwdrdigung zu bringen". (2)
In fact the following five years apparently demonstrated the opposite:
that it was possible for workers to improve their living standards under
capitalism, and that this improvement tended to encourage evolutionary
rather than revolutionary socialism. (3) The relative economic recovery
was followed during the early 1930's by a crisis which again revealed the
fundamental opposition between the interests of workers and employers.
However, the main significance of Tucholsky's quotation of Marx lies in
(2) Der Achts tunden tag, WB 31/7/24, East German edition of Tucholsky's
works, East Berlin, Verlag Volk und Welt, 1973, Vol.3, p.346.
(3) The Marxist "Verelendungstheorie" had first been criticised by Eduard 
Bernstein. Cf. Peter Gay: The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism,
Eduard Bernstein's Challenge to Marx, New York, Columbia University 
Press, 1952, pp.184-5.
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providing an indication of the former’s political development.
In spite of the signs of economic stabilisation, Tucholsky was beginning 
to sympathise with the radical left, as was shown by his acceptance of 
that basic Marxist tenet, the inevitability of class conflict.
Armed with these opinions, Tucholsky reached new conclusions
about the underlying forces in recent German history. He now believed
that the horrors of 1923 were part of the strategy of the capitalists.
They had encouraged the Freikorps and Hitler in a campaign to destroy
the working-class movement. Once these allies had served their purpose,
they had been replaced by the conciliatory spirit of 1924. The change
of style might annoy the Pile Germanen, the implacable anti-Semites who
had provided an inviting target for Tucholsky*s satire(4), but it satisfied
the more flexible industrialists:
„Der Ausflug ins Romantisch-VoLkische scheint beendet,
jeder Tag, der verstreicht, tut den Leuten Abbruch,
weil ja nichts geschieht, und weil das todliche Netz
der Borsen den Zauberwald grau umspinnt. Was nun
heraufkanmt, ist viel gefahrlicher. Es ist die
ginzlich unramntische Form des kaufirv'innischen Deutschen". (5)
The defeat of the extreme right, described by Tucholsky% became 
clear to -die public a month later, when the ENVP parliamentary group split 
over the Dawes Plan: half of their members recognised its value to German 
industry and allowed it to pass. The willingness of the Nationalists to 
cooperate with the centre parties heralded the advent of the conservative 
Borgerblock governments, which were to rule Germany until the 1928 election. 
In 1925, when the success of the moderate right was more evident, Tucholsky 
issued through the figure of a Bankdirektor an appropriate summary of the
(4) Pile Germanen, WB 3/3/25, GW II, pp.59-60.
(5) Der Geist von 1914, GW I, p.1203.
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political situation:
„Alles ist still. Im Reichstag liegen sie sich in den Haaren.
La3 sie liegen. Kein Bolschewismis. Kein Experiment". (6)
Although such findings were largely valid, Tucholsky1 s strength 
lay not only in the field of political analysis; he also knew how to 
illustrate his generalisations through the creation of fictional 
personalities. Most of the Weltbuhne writers would have agreed with • 
Tucholsky that the business world of Germany was controlled by ruthless 
conservatives, but it took a gifted satirist to create such a figure in 
the person of the Jewish businessman, Herr Wendriner. A series of 
feuilletons appeared in the years 1924-26, generally in monologue form.
This study may allude only briefly to Wendriner's personal pettiness, his 
trivial reflections on life and his constant preoccupation with his . 
business interests, even when he is ostensibly relaxing at the theatre or 
on holiday. (7) More significant is his role as a modem version of the 
Wilhelminian Untertan, obsequious to his creditors, harsh to his debtors. (8)
Shortly before the first article in the Wendriner-series in June
1922, Tucholsky anticipated the latter1 s character, while describing the
conservative bourgeoisie in general. Wendriner is a prime specimen of the
„Kaufleute, die keine andre Sorge kannten als eine Unterbrechung 
ihrer Geschaftstatigkeit". (9)
His impatience with political activity soon becomes obvious; although the
telephonists, vhose strike interrupts his call, are demonstrating only as
(6) Die freien Deutschen, WB 16/6/25, GW II, p. 147.
(7) Cf. Ingeborg Pistohl's study: Die Gestalt des Burgers im Werk
Kurt Tucholskys, Bonn, P.H.Rheinland, 1969, p. 14:
,.Wendriner ist der Typus des modemen Managers, 
der iiberhaupt nicht mehr abschalten kam, 
standig vom Gedanken an das Geschaft verfolgt wird, 
und diesen Zustand schon gar nicht mehr als Last 
enpfindet, sondem fur selbstverstandlich halt".
(8) Herra Wendriners Jahr fangt gut an, WB 5/1/26, GW II, pp. 315-17.
(9) Was ware, wenn..? WB 22/6/22, GW I, p.980.
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a mark of respect for the murdered Rathenau, Wendriner soon dismisses
them as Communists. He even has hard words for Rathenau*s presumption
in pursuing a political career (10), and thereby giving his fellow-Jews
a bad name. Wendriner*s character exemplified for Tucholsky the absence
of a liberal German Burger turn, the natural defenders of constitutional
democracy. Although the existence of the Republic does not prevent
Wendriner from making money, he still vaguely associates it with growing
militancy on the part of the workers, and therefore with the Bolshevism
which he detests:
MWieder Lohnerhohung? Die Leute sind ja verruckt...
Man hat leider viel zu wenig an die Wand gestellt.
Ich bin gewiB f ur sozial, ich meine, die Leute
mdssen ihren Lohn haben, aber sie konnen uns doch
nicht erwurgen. Die Leute richten ja den gesamten 
Mittelstand zugrunde". (11)
Instead of allowing his son to join the Republican Reichsbanner, he dotes
on the uniforms of the reactionary Reichswehr. (12) The defeat of 1918
has taught him nothing, for he considers that Germany should rebuild her
navy; in spite of the rampant anti-Semitism of the former Imperial court,
he even has kind words for Wilhelm II. (13) The survival of the worst
forms of Prussianism seems to Wendriner and his fellow-businessmen a fact
to be ignored or greeted with mild approval:
„0b ihre Kinder die Wehrpflicht wieder bekamen
(**Bei meinen Beziehungen!"); ob die Schulen den
schliirmsten Preuuen ausgeliefert wurden...
sie lebten in einer andem, glatt geschmierten Welt". (14)
If such narrow-minded businessmen were, in Tucholsky's opinion, 
the real rulers of the Weimar state, his attitude to the Republic could
(10) Herr Wendriner telefoniert, WB 6/7/22, ibid., p.991
(11) Herr Wendriner laBt sich die Haare schneiden, WB 22/9/25, GW II, p.224.
(12) Herr Wendriner la.3t sich die Haare schneiden, ibid.
(13) Herr Wendriner nimmt ein Bad, WB 30/6/25, ibid., p.153.
(14) GW I, p.980.
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hardly be favourable. Though for years Tucholsky had supported the
Republic as a framework for democratic reform, by the mid-1920's such
a development appeared impossible. He had previously considered that
the lack of resonance enjoyed by his pleas to successive governments had
been caused by the latter's incompetence and ill-will. (15) However, by
1925 Tucholsky believed that their failure to use the machinery of state
to introduce reform was inherent in their position as stewards of the
capitalist system. When opposed to the economic power, which lay with
right-wing industrialists, even progressive political authorities had
automatically been forced to surrender. The economic rather than the
political and ideological factor was of primary importance to the
individual and the state. This openly Marxist view was first proclaimed
by Tucholsky in the article Horizontaler und vertikaler, Joumalismus.
Similar social classes in different countries might display local customs
and prejudices, but:
„Sieht man.. sehr viel tiefer: durch ihre Vergndgungen, 
ihre Liebschaf ten, ihre Lektiire hindurch, so wird ihr 
Leben entscheidend von okonomischen Bedingungen bestirrmt". (16)
Tucholsky went on to endorse the doctrine of materialism: not 
only men's social lives, but also their ideas and attitudes were 
conditioned by their economic position:
„Verandere das Budget, und du verdnderst das ganze Weltbild". (17) 
he declared. It is true that Tucholsky chose to express this view only on 
a single occasion, but he did not feel it necessary to deny the validity 
of materialism until his disillusionment with left-wing politics in the 
1930's.(18J
(15) Der Wragen, Berliner Volkszeitung, 16/7/22, GW I, p. 1000-01.
(16) WB 13/1/25, GW II, p.16.
(17) ibid., p.19.
(18) Cf. letter to Hasenclever, 17/5/33, Briefe, p.257.
-93-
The acceptance of two fundamental Marxist theories was 
synptanatic of Tucholsky *s determination to fight the bourgeoisie by 
every means at his disposal. In rejecting "bourgeois romanticism" about 
the daily lives of the workers, Tucholsky made use of Marxist tenets; he 
was writing in the Weltbiihne, and there is therefore no reason to doubt 
his seriousness. However, he also conceded that:
„Die Lehre von Marx hat sicherlich viel Doktrinares". (19) 
and it was the practical application of Marxism rather than its philo­
sophical and theoretical trappings which was his main concern.
In his analysis of the situation in Germany, and in his references 
to political theory, Tucholsky was adopting an increasingly radical 
position. He had yet another reason for scepticism about the Weimar system: 
it seemed powerless to prevent a second war with France. There is no 
questioning Tucholsky*s sincerity when he wished for the French people 
peace, cooperation and friendly relations with Germany. (20) In the fight 
against war, any ally was welcome, including the Gorrraunist one. At a time 
when Tucholsky*s sympathies for other aspects of Marxism doctrine ware 
growing, it was natural to reflect on the function of the capitalist state 
in war and peace.
Ten years after the outbreak of war, Tucholsky rejected the view 
of the state as the embodiment of the collective aspirations of its 
members; it had therefore no claim on the lives of its citizens. Instead, 
it was merely an instrument in the hands of the industrialists. (21) The 
victims of Verdun had not fallen for France and Germany, but for Schneider- 
Creusot and Krupp:
(19) Horizon taler und vertikaler Joumalismus, CW II, p.18.
(20) Per vierzehnte Juli, WB 22/7/25, ibid., p. 169.
(21) Cf. Engels: Per Ur sprung der Familie, des Privatei gen turns und 
des Staats, in ]y&rx und Engels: Werke, Vol.21, 1962, p.165.
„Die Rastungsindustrie war ihnen Vater und Mutter gewesen;
Schule, Bucher, die Zeitung, ... die Kirche, ... alles das 
war im Besitz der Industriekapitane, verteilt und kontrolliert 
wie die Aktienpakete. Der Staat, das arme Luder, durfte die 
Nationalhymne singen und Krieg erklaren. Gemacht, vorbereitet, 
gefuhrt und beendet wurde er anderswo". (22)
War between capitalist states was madness, at least on the part of the
workers who bore the brunt of the fighting. Tucholsky advised the
uniformed proletarian masses not to kill their fellow-workers, but to
unite with than, as Marx had reccmmended in 1848. (23) When Tucholsky
informed the workers
„Du schieBt inner den Kamerad Werkmeister tot- 
niemals den einzigen Feind, den du wirklich hast". (24)
there can be no doubt that the one and only enemy was the capitalist
class.(25)
Tucholsky thereby endorsed the Marxist theory on the role of
the capitalist state, and also the Marxist strategy of international
proletarian solidarity against the exploiting classes. However, he regarded
solidarity not as an intrinsic value, but as a means to an end. Not only
might it prevent war, but the strength which it would confer on the vorkers
would help them in the Revolution which would establish a more just social
order. In the early 1920's he had occasionally advocated a revolution(26),
but his demands had in reality amounted only to a programme for radical
reform. Now Tucholsky used the word to mean the uprising of the masses
which Marx had foretold:
„Wu3te allerdings der Proletarier w/irklich,
wie es "oben" zugeht, wuBte er, was der Borsianer,
der Fabrikant, der GrOiSgrundbesitzer mit itm treiben,..
er machte das, was er in Deutschland noch nie gemacht hat -
Revolution".(27)
(22) Vor Verdun, QV I, p.1208.
(23) Marx and Engels: Manifest der kcmmunistischen Partei, in Werke,
Vol.4, p.493: "Proletarier aller Lander, vereinigt euch!"
(24) Sechzig Fotografien, WB 5/6/24, Gtf I, p.1162.
(25) Cf. Der Achtstiindentag and Vor Verdun.
(26) Cf. SchluBwort, WB 4/11/20, ibid. r p.755, and Die beiden Deutschland, 
Freiheit, 6/8/22, ibid., p.1029.
(27) Horizontaler und vertikaler Joumalismus, GW II, p.19.
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The individualism which had provided the philosophical
basis of Tucholsky* s writings since before the war had also been
modified by 1925. Individualism, in the field of political philosophy,
is a characteristically liberal attitude, and it was logical for
Tucholsky to question its value at a time when this form of democracy
was losing its attractiveness for him. The change had been foreshadowed
in 1923 in Tucholsky1 s review of an imaginary novel, Hermine, when he
recarmended as a subject not the fate of an individual hero, but
„etwas andres, etwas nie Beachtetes:die Kollektivitat".(28)
IWo years later he made an even more explicit rejection of individualism:
„Diese Geschichte(29) ist ein Einzelschicksal.
Und scmit in der Zeit des maschinellsten Kollektivisrmis 
unangebracht... Ich will wissen, was mit dem ist, der 
zugleich alle ist". (30)
During the period 1924-25 Tucholsky*s support for Marxist theory 
had gradually increased. He now accepted most of l&rx's fundamental 
principles: the idea of the class struggle between proletariat and 
bourgeoisie; the role of the former as leader of the revolution, the 
primacy of the economic factor in social relationships and the doctrine 
of materialism which depended on it; the role of the capitalist state as 
a tool of the exploiting class, and the substitution of a collectivist 
for an individualist approach.
However, this theoretically Marxist stand-point represented only 
a half-way position in Tucholsky*s development. The change was at first 
unaccompanied by any practical step such as publication in Oomnunist 
journals. Proletarian engagement did not cane easily to Tucholsky, and
(28) WB 5/7/23, GW I, p.1114.
(29) Les Marchands de Gloire,by Pagnol and Nivoux.
(30) Hausse in Ruhm, WB 12/5/25, DDR-Ausgabe, Vol.3, p.513.
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the tactics employed by the avant-garde of the Workers* Movement, 
the KPD, did nothing to ease the transition. A further stumbling- 
block in Tucholsky*s leftward path was the presidential election of 
1925, which induced a temporary reversal to his previous policy of 
support for Republican democracy. However, the election was also to 
confirm his conviction that there was no point in protecting a democratic 
system which had been undermined and then abandoned by those politicians 
nominally responsible for its defence.
The factors which led Tucholsky to hesitate before committing 
himself to the revolutionary left merit detailed examination. In spite 
of his endorsement of a collectivist approach, he was loth to restrict 
his own many-sided literary production to the themes of the representative 
individual or to the collectivity. Peter Panter continued his career as 
a reviewer; Kaspar Hauser began in the summer of 1925 his whimsical 
meditations on the after-life, the Nachher-series; Theobald Tiger wzrote 
poems modelled on Walt Whitman, reflecting on the situation of mankind in 
general. (31) Occasionally, however, Tucholsky admitted that the dilemma 
of potential commitment w/as serious. In Monolog mit Choren(32), he 
refused to adopt the self-indulgence with his feelings which he believed 
typical of the bourgeois poet, and he concluded his poem with the chorus 
of the Internationale.
Tucholsky's hesitation also had. an objective basis in the policy 
of the party which his theoretical view/s would have led him to support.
In January 1924 he described the leaders of the German Communist Party 
as "Radeks sitzengebliebene Zoglinge" (33) taking their orders like
(31) Alle Welt sucht,WB 11/8/25, GW II, pp. 186-7; Die fiinf Sinne,
WB 15/9/25, ibid., pp.217-19.
(32) WB 25/8/25, ibid., pp.201-02.
(33) Kleine Reise 1923, WB 3/1/24, GV I, p. 1143.
obedient children from Moscow, but failing to adapt them to the 
specific conditions of Germany. It was not merely the poor execution 
of Comintern orders, but the orders themselves vhich infuriated 
Tucholsky:
„Mag sein, daS Sinowjew mit seiner europaischen Taktik 
eine ganz bestimmte Linie einhalt, aber beurteilt man 
diese Taktik nach ihren Wirkungen, so mu3 man sagen, 
da3 die Rissen entweder ihre ganze Kraft auf den Femen 
Osten und keinen Wert auf Europa legen, oder da3 
Sinowjew ein Durrmkopf ist". (34)
Tucholsky*s sympathetic interest was paid not to the KPD leaders 
but to their followers. Some seven thousand workers had been sacrificed 
to their leaders* penchant for hopeless trials of strength with the armed 
forces and to the bourgeois state which Tucholsky detested. In particular, 
he championed Max Holz, the Robin Hood of the German Revolution. Holz 
had fought in Vogtland against Kapp's supporters, and in central Germany 
against the police of the SPD Qberprasident Horsing; the cause which he 
fought for was uncertain, since for most of his active career the official 
KPD would have nothing to do with him. Tucholsky did not condone Holz' s 
anarchism and violence, but he campaigned, along with other non-Oanmunist 
intellectuals (35), for a revision of Holz's sentence of life imprisonment. (36) 
Most of all, Tucholsky applauded Holz's conduct in court, when at the risk 
of his life he had hurled defiance at his judges.
Though Tucholsky *s criticism of the German state was more muted 
than that of Holz, he associated its leader, Ebert, with the prevailing 
oppression rather than with a long, unavailing struggle against reaction.
(34) Das nervose Paris, WB 6/1/25.
(35) The demand for a re-trial or amnesty for Holz was taken up by the 
Liga fur Menschenrechte, whose "neutral committee" included Thomas 
arid Heinrich Mann, Stefan Zweig and Albert Einstein; cf. Holz's 
autobiography Vom "wei.Qen Kreuz" zur roten Fahne, reprinted by Verlag 
Neue Kritik, Frankfurt, 1969, p.367.
(36) Vierzehn Kafige und einer, WB 27/1/25, GW II, p. 28.
When Ebert died in February 1925, an election resulted which was another
turning-point in Weimar history. The sight of German reaction massing
for the assault persuaded Tucholsky to offer temporary support to the
Republican cause, even if he felt little enthusiasm for it. Tucholsky
advocated the payment of a respectable pension to Ebert's widow, on the
grounds that
„Es handelt sich nicht um Frau Ebert, 
sondem um die Frau des ersten Prasidenten 
der deutschen Republik". (37)
In Die Inszenierung einer Republik (38) Tucholsky made a last effort to
turn the Weimar system into a democracy worth campaigning for. His
programme to fill the state's ideological vacuum amounted again to a
plea for the introduction of democracy at local level, and for a purge of
unreliable government employees. Nevertheless, Tucholsky's plan to
"create Republicans" was not unreasonable; only the lack of energy of
the Weimar parties made it appear too little and boo late.
The campaign of the Volksblock was a disaster. The first mistake, 
which Tucholsky rightly criticised, was the inability to agree on a joint 
candidate who might have built up a substantial lead in the first ballot. (39) 
When they did unite for the second ballot, their choice fell, characteristic­
ally, not on their most successful candidate, the Social Democrat Otto 
Braun, or even, as Hiller suggested (40), on the progressive Catholic Josef 
Wirth; instead they selected Wilhelm Marx. The Zentrum leader's conservative 
administrations had been unpopular with SPD voters, and, in spite of his
(37)Frau Ebert, WB 17/3/25, GW II, p.65.
(38)Vossische Zeitung, 12/4/25, ibid., pp.93-5.
(39)Was nun-?, WB 5/5/25, ibid., p.108.
(40)Hiller; Der Reichsprasident, WB 3/3/25.
-99-
dignified bearing and skilful handling of foreign affairs (41), he 
lacked the magnetism which might have attracted Tucholsky1 s whole­
hearted support.
The Nationalists* choice of Hinderiburg as their candidate
kept the doubting Tucholsky in the Republican camp. Hindenburg had
been nominated by the past and present military establishment, led by
Tirpitz, and he had never made any secret of his monarchist sympathies.
Tucholsky recognised that the election of "der kaiserliche Statthalter"
would be tantamount to an admission of defeat on the part of the Republic.
Even if Hinderiburg was unlikely to invite Wilhelm II back from exile, he
embodied Wilhelminian reaction. Tucholsky fought against this backward
step, warning his readers of the significance of a choice which would
shape Germany's future:
„Hindenburg ist: Zuriick in den Gutshof, fort aus der Welt, 
zuriick in die Kaseme. Hindenburg bedeutet: Krach mit 
aller Welt, unaufhorliche intemationale Schwierigkeiten, 
durchaus begrundetes MiStrauen des Auslandes, ins- 
besondere Frankreichs gegenuber Deutschland. Hindenburg 
ist: die Republik auf Abruf. Hindenburg bedeutet: Krieg".(42)
The election of April 25th justified Tucholsky's fears by resulting 
in a narrow victory for Hindenburg. He owed his success first to his 
prestige as a national hero, which outweighed that of the politician Marx.
In addition, the Bayrische Volkspartei considered Hindenburg's ultra­
conservatism even more desirable than Marx's Catholicism, and instructed
(41) Tucholsky did oarrpliment Marx for his conduct at the London Conference 
of 1924: Als es hie3, der deutsche Reichskanzler habe das Wort, stand 
ein stiller und bescheidener jy&nn auf, der sachlich und fest in der 
Materie, aber angenehm leicht und konziliant im Ton das Seine 
vorbrachte. Also: der Eindruck war ausgezeichnet". (Der erste 
Handedruck, WB 9/10/24). But this positive assessment of Marx 
owed much to Tucholsky's desire to find a favourable object of 
comparison in order to attack Stresemann.
(42) Der kaiserliche Statthalter, Menschheit, 17/4/25, GW II, p.99.
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its supporters to vote for the Prussian Protestant. Thirdly, the 
German Gcrnmunist leaders defied Stalin's advice and upheld the 
Zahlkandidatur of their leader, Thalmann; thereby they deprived Marx 
of nearly two million votes which might have given him victory.
However, Tucholsky put the main blame for the debacle else­
where. In common with other Weltbuhne writers (43), Tucholsky had always 
taken the risk of Hindenburg' s success seriously. He believed that the 
Republican campaign had demonstrated the contrary attitude: complacency 
about Marx's chances and reluctance to attack Hindenburg's Prussian ethos. 
Instead the Volksblock leaders had claimed that they were Nationalists 
too, but more subtle, that a victory for Marx would reassure foreign 
opinion and stimulate business confidence. (44) Tucholsky was right to 
deride this opportunistic approach. But to regard the weakness of the 
democratic campaign as being mainly responsible for the Nationalist 
triumph was a travesty of history.
The other instructive aspect of Tucholsky' s post-mortem was his 
mild treatment of the Ccmnunists. He excused the misguided Thalmann
candidacy by pointing out that the error had been made under extreme
provocation. A few weeks before, several members of the party had been 
the victims of a miscarriage of justice in the so-called Cheka Trial. The 
murder of a suspected informer by a local KPD group had been seized on by
the Staatsgerichtshof under Judge Niedner as the pretext for uncovering a
supposedly vast Communist conspiracy. By 1925 the Communists no longer
(43) Cf. Heinz Pol: SOS, WB 21/4/25:"Die Gefahr, da3 Hindenburg gewahlt 
wird, ist groB. Sie ist besonders groB, weil wir, seine Gegner, 
den Kampf gegen ihn nicht richtig gefiihrt haben".
(44) GW II, p.109.
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intended to bring down the Republic in the foreseeable future, but this
did not prevent Niedner fran sentencing most of the accused to execution
or life imprisonment. The political blunder of the KPD leaders seemed
to Tucholsky an understandable result of their resentment; he could only
content resignedly:
„Sie wollten eben nur demonstrieren, sie haben demonstriert, 
und das kam dem alten fcfenn zugute". (45)
When this assessment is compared with his attacks on the Republican
parties, Tucholsky1 s generosity towards the Canmunists is clear. This is
logical in the light of his own conversion to socialist doctrine. Though
he himself had decided that Wilhelm Marx represented the lesser evil,
Tucholsky could understand the Gcmmunist refusal to differentiate between
two undeniably conservative personalities. Still more significantly, the
election of the Ersatzkaiser appeared to symbolise the end of the Republic.
If Tucholsky was to continue his struggle against injustice, he needed
new allies, and the Communist-led vorking-class movement appeared the
last untapped reservoir of progressive forces.
Tucholsky's forecast of the results of Hindenburg's election was 
gloany. He believed that the Nationalists, unlike the Social Democrats in 
1918, would show no lack of ruthless energy in destroying the last vestiges 
of their opponents' rule. After dismissing the few remaining democrats 
from the civil service, judiciary and schools, they would reintroduce the 
Wilhelminian flag. If there was any resistance to the undermining of 
democracy by its elected representatives, it would be crushed in accordance 
with Article 48 of the Constitution, which allowed the President wide 
emergency powers in the event of a breakdown of law and order. (46) Tucholsky 
underestimated Hindenburg' s sense of honour, which made the new President
(45) GW II, p.108.
(46) These powers had been used sparingly by Ebert, who recognised that 
they represented a defeat for democracy, and a temporary return to
the traditional authoritarian form of government.
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general ly keep his oath of loyalty to the Republic; indeed his election
even provided the state with a greater measure of respectability in
conservative circles. But Hindenburg was an old man with only a
rudimentary knowledge of politics, and he was to prove wax in the hands
of intellectually superior advisers:
„Der kaiserliche Statthalter ist in der denkbar 
schlimmsten Gesellschaft. Sie wird ihn beraten?
Sie wird regieren. Und er wird tun, was er sein 
ganzes Leben lang getan hat: er wird unterschreiben". (47)
The expectation that these advisers would attempt to overthrow the Weimar
system was proved correct in the 1930's, when the ascendancy of Schleicher,
Papen and Hindenburg' s son Oskar contributed to the destruction of the
Republic.
Within weeks of Hindenburg' s triumph, Tucholsky and other left-
wing intellectuals had recovered from the shock (48); indeed they greeted
this confirmation of their worst fears with something approaching relief.
The prospect of a sudden end to Weimar democracy meant little, since for
sane time Tucholsky had been convinced that it existed only in name:
„Eine Maske ist von Deutschlands Gesicht gefallen?
So feierlich kann ichs gar nicht nehmen, hier gibt 
es schon lange nichts mehr zu maskieren". (49)
Intellectual engagement on behalf of the Republic had appeared 
to Tucholsky to offer the best guarantee of reaching his aims of equality, 
freedcm and justice in Germany. In the early 1920's he had served the 
Weimar system in the hope that it could be improved. Even as an incipient 
Marxist he might have continued to believe that bourgeois democracy 
represented a stage on the road to the classless society. By 1925, 
however, the Republic appeared hell-bent on a return to Wilhelminian 
authoritarianism:
(47) GW II, p.109.
(48) Cf. Leo Lania, Eberts Erbe, WB 5/5/25.
(49) GW II, p.110.
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„Es hat in der Geschichte Monarchien gegeben, 
die weitaus liberaler, pazifistischer und 
sozialgesimter waren, als die Regierung der 
jetzigen deutschen Republik”. (50)
Tucholsky could not accept the cotplacency of Republican leaders 
who were defending the empty shell of the Constitution, while it was being 
regularly violated by powerful enemies within the state machine. There 
seemed no point in fighting for the innocuous concept of Republican 
democracy, whose political exponents did not even recognise its failings. 
Tucholsky's career therefore took another turn: he became a bitter opponent 
of the facade of Republicanism which he regarded as the perversion of 
an originally progressive idea. (51) The much-vaunted "Sieg des 
republikanischen Gedankens" (52) was a myth; no such victory could be won 
before the vhole fabric of German society was revolutionised.
Once Tucholsky had rejected the principle of .the democratic 
Republic, he was also compelled to question the method of its implement­
ation in Germany, the parliamentary system. During the Revolution he had 
supported the election to the National Assembly. However, the increase 
of right-wing strength allowed the Biirgerblock governments bo maintain 
the economic and social status quo. This led Tucholsky and many of his 
Weltbuhne colleagues to abandon the cause of Parliament altogether (53); 
parliamentarian!sm seamed a mere facade, concealing the dictatorship 
of the bourgeoisie over the workers. In addition, Parliament was out of 
touch with the problems of the German people. The Social Democrats might
(50) Wofiir? Das andere Deutschland, 24/12/25, ibid., p.296.
(51) Cf. Der iiberalterte Parlamentarismus, Menschheit, 4/12/25: "Diese 
Regierungsform ist einmal sehr gut gewesen: als es gait, die 
Klasseninteressen der Bourgeoisie gegen Adel und Kirche zu 
verteidigen. Er war Vorbedingung und Schlussel far den heutigen 
Stand der Dinge - eine Endstufe ist er nicht".
(52) Verfassungsschwindel, WB 26/10/26, GW II, p.531.
(53) Cf. Alfons Steiniger: Ernst machenl WB 30/6/25: "Parlamentarische 
Demokratie (ist) eine Form der Dlktatur wie der Mussolinisrnus auch, 
nur: durch die Masse anonymer Statisten skrupelloser, durch die 
fraktionelle Bindung brutaler".
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have the largest Reichs tagsfraktion, bat that did nothing to counteract
the traditional attitudes which predominated in the countryside. It
was, in Tucholsky's opinion, a measure of the political maturity of the
French that they took the contrary attitude, demonstrating a lively
attachment to local democracy, coupled with indifference towards the
machinations of the party hacks in Paris. Although Tucholsky's sharpest
denunciation of the parliamentary system was not made until 1929, it
belongs thematically in this context:
„Dein Geschick, Deutschland, machen Industrien,
Banken und die Schiffahrtskcmpanien- 
Welch ein Buns theater ist die Wahl!
Reg dich auf und reg dich ab im Grimme!
Wahle, wahle! Doch des Volkes Stimme 
is ja janz ejal!"(54)
Tucholsky was therefore led to consider other forms of government.
While in Paris, he had learned to look beyond Germany and examine the wider
European political scene. His observations led him to the conclusion:
„Es gibt zwei Ilachte in Europa, die durchgesetzt haben, 
was sie wall ten: der Faschismus und die Russen".(55)
These movements had been victorious because, unlike the German Republicans,
they had shown uncompromising determination:
„Das entscheidende Moment ihrer Siege war 
eine tapfere Unbedingtheit". (56)
This represented a simplistic view of the historical process; mere
determination has never been a guarantee of success. That Tucholsky should
emphasise the triumph of the Bolsheviks comes as no surprise. The victories
of Fascism in Europe were also undeniable; Fascist governments ruled in
Italy, Hungary, Poland and the Balkans. However, Tucholsky1 s reluctant
respect for the extent of the Fascist triumph did not indicate support for
Fascist aims.
(54) Das Par lament, WB 15/5/29, GW III, p. 299.
(55) Was brauchen wir-? WB 16/2/26, GW II, p.354.
(56) ibid.
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During the winter of 1925-26, Tucholsky dealt several times
with the theme of Fascism: not, however, with Mussolini or Horthy, but
With the extreme right-wing opposition in France and Germany. He
contemptuously dismissed the adherents of the "Barbiergehilfen Hitler". (57)
The Action Francaise, on the other hand, seemed an organisation of seme
intellectual standing; its leader, Charles hurras, was a "fanatic" but
also a clear-headed man, true to his convictions. Tucholsky even claimed:
„Es ist gar kein'Zweifel, da£ einige Ideen des 
Faschismus modemer sind als die Demokratie". (58)
This statement indicated the depty of Tucholsky's disillusionment with 
Germany's ineffective democracy. Far from desiring a right-wing dictator­
ship, however, he advocated stronger left-wing resistance to the restoration 
of Wilhelminian Germany. Not complaints about Fascism, but action was 
needed:
„Das Gewasch der Scheindemokraten gegen den Faschismus 
ist Angst. Er verdiente kraftigere Gegner".(59)
There seamed only one progressive force strong enough to challenge
both Fascists and "so-called Democrats": the Workers' Movement. By the
spring of 1926, Tucholsky was recommending an energetic course:
„Den revolutionaren, unnachgiebigen, intoleranten 
und klassenkampferischen Erfolg". (60)
The left-wing intellectuals of the Weltbuhne were in general 
agreement about their country's political sickness, but their remedies 
varied in scope and practicability. The fate of the Aktivisten in 1918-19 
had demonstrated the difficulty of persuading intellectuals to act effectively
(57) Herr Maurras vor Gericht, WB 22/9/25, ibid., p.218.
(58) It was in particular parliamentary government which aroused Tucholsky' s 
disapproval on this occasion. (Faschismus in Frankreich, Vossische 
Zeitung, 8/1/26)
(59) Herr Maurras vor Gericht, WB 22/9/25, GW II, p. 222.
(60) GW II, p.354.
together, and the "New Left", which contained the former Activist leaders 
Hiller and Flake, vas to fall victim to the old errors. The details of 
their debates cannot be discussed here (61), but a summary of the most 
significant controversies is necessary, in order to place Tucholsky's 
views in perspective and to assess their degree of originality and 
practicality.
Since the rift between the SPD and the KPD, the progressive 
forces in Germany had been weak, and the conservatives had recaptured 
their positions of power. No counter-offensive could be mounted until 
the left-wing parties recognised the need to adopt a measure of cooperation. 
Theorists such as Hiller accordingly advocated that the left-wing 
intellectuals, uncommitted to either party, should build a bridge between 
enlightened members of the Ocmnunist and Socialist camps. (62) Taking up 
the proposal to establish a Rat der Republikaner (63), Hiller recommended 
for the Council a compromise programme designed to appeal to as many 
progressive groups as possible, and gradually induce the desired re­
alignment of the left. The idea of a purge of counter-revolutionaries 
from government service was aimed primarily at non-Socialist democrats, 
while the demand for a refusal of military service was intended to attract 
militant pacifists. Socialists and Communists alike could hardly reject 
the call for workers' interests to be protected on questions of wages, 
hours, taxation, housing and trade, or the reform of the educational system. 
The desirability of such goals was for Tucholsky self-evident. He did not 
criticise Hiller's programmatic efforts or the name which he suggested for 
the new grouping: Die deutsche Linke. (64)
(61) Cf. Istvan Deak, Weimar Germany's left-wing Intellectuals, Berkeley, 
Calif. 1968, pp.154-58.
(62) Hiller: Politische Neugruppierung, WB 26/5/25.
(63) Alfons Steiniger: Es lebe die zweite Republik, WB 19/5/25.
(64) Die deutsche Linke, WB 22/9/25.
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Tucholsky did not iirmediately decide to take part in the 
discussion, since he had no ambition to become the author of "Aktions- 
programme". He entered the controversy in response to an attack on 
the Weltbiihne theorists by the Social Democrat, Hermann Schiitzinger. 
Tucholsky answered the charge that the left-wing intellectuals were 
lacking in discipline with a counter-attack: for years the SPD had 
demonstrated any amount of discipline, and the quality had contributed 
to their failure. His strictures had some justification, since the SPD 
leaders had interpreted the term as an excuse to use procedural devices
and appeals for loyalty as a weapon against internal opposition: a
practice unlikely to commend the concept to independent intellectuals.
However, when Tucholsky described the role which he envisaged
for the Deutsche Linke, he was guilty of uncharacteristic over-optimism:
„ Unwalzungen haben irnner so angefangen, mit zunachst 
unbeachteten Konventikelunterhaltungen, und alles, , 
was spater eine Partei wurde, was zuvor eine Sekte.
Wir saen Keime. Einer wird schon aufgehen". (65)
The fallacy in this argument has been pointed out by Poor. (66) For every
sect which has grown into a successful party, a thousand make no impact
and fade into oblivion, and the Deutsche Linke was to be one of them.
In April 1926 Tucholsky produced his most important article on 
the Deutsche Linke. The proposals of the Weltbiihne writers had been 
becoming impractical and their controversies increasingly sterile. The 
idea of a new party to exist alongside the Social Democrats and the 
OCmnunists had been put forward by ffex Peters, and in his argument with 
Schiitzinger, Tucholsky had given it indirect support by evoking the sect
(65) GW II, p.351.
(66) Poor, op.cit. p.131.
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which might become a party. But in Was haben wir-? (67), Tucholsky
made it clear that he rejected the idea of a separate party1? there
were already enough divisions on the left. Instead he envisaged
the Deutsche Linke as
„ein Ideenzentrum, das Energien ausstrahlt.
Ein Kraftepunkt, von dem aus Manner der befreundeten 
Lager angefeuert, vor Irrtumern bewahrt bleiben, 
vorwarts gepeitscht, mit der Nase auf Wichtiges 
gestoBen werden konnen". (68)
The idea cf a progressive pressure group raised the question whether
Tucholsky would be willing to work with representatives of the SPD and
KPD, or whether he would support only the latter; this was answered by
implication by his continued attacks on the Social Democratic hierarchy,
while he spared the Ocranunists.
In this attitude, Tucholsky joined Hiller, who, in September
1925, had provided the movement with a much more radical programme than
his original proposals. Their lack of resonance, far frcm discouraging
Hiller, led him to reject "empty" Republicanism and advocate Marxist
goals to which the Social Democrats had in practice ceased to subscribe:
„Beseitigung der Profitwirtschaft, Vergese 11 schaftung 
der Produktionsmittel, intemationale Produktionsregelung.. 
und mit alledem Aufhebung der Lohnsklaverei, Vemichtung 
des Klassenstaates.(69)
Hiller's views were attacked by Otto Flake, who by now had a negative 
attitude towards political activity by intellectuals. He regarded the 
efforts of the Weltbiihne writers as pointless, since they did not reach 
those groups which had any influence within the state. This criticisn 
was riot unreasonable. But instead of exploring the possibility of commit­
ment alongside a major political group, as Tucholsky was to do, Flake 
withdrew in disillusionment.
(68) ibid., p.398.
(69) WB 22/9/25.
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Tucholsky had respected Flake's views for many years, but he
rejected such defeatism. (70) The purpose of the Deutsche Linke,
Tucholsky claimed, was to work hand in hand with those left-wing parties
which supported the idea of the class struggle, the Communists and
those few Social Democrats still worthy of the name, and to persuade
their leaders to put its progressive precepts into practice. Tucholsky
believed that the left-wing intellectuals had already been successful
in this endeavour, and he was confident about future prospects. (71)
The group's programme did hot exist in a vacuum, as Flake had maintained.
Tucholsky took the opportunity to express agreement with Hiller's proposals,
quoted above, as a valid contribution to the debate:
„In dem von Hiller entworfenen Mindestprogramm 
ist zu finden, daB eben ein Minimum an wirtschaftlichen 
und politischen Forderungen aufgestellt wird - man kann 
nicht gut klarer, nicht gut weniger verblasen sein". (72)
Tucholsky was not content with the abstract advocacy of an 
alliance between Ocmmunists, left-wing Socialists and the masses who 
supported them; during the spring of 1926 he himself worked for such a 
united front on the question of the Forstenabfinduing. In December 1918 
Tucholsky had celebrated the collapse of the monarchy. (73) However, 
relations between the new state and its former rulers were not broken 
off. The exiled Hohenzollems owned land and property in Germany, and 
they demanded financial compensation for their losses. Mindful of 
constitutional niceties, the Republican leaders allowed Wilhelm's
(70) The difference of opinion between Flake and Tucholsky is observed 
ty Doerfel, but she asserts: "Flake tendiert jetzt - wie Tucholsky 
schon lange - in Richtung auf eine to tale Negation", (cp.cit., p.
150). In spite of the convenient vagueness of the words "tendiert 
in Richtung auf", the remarkable reversal of roles undergone by the 
protagonists in her estimation should be challenged.
(71) GW II, p.398.
(72) ibid., p.397.
(73) Bruch, Ulk, 13/12/18, GW I, pp.322-3.
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lawyers to plead in court before judges whan he had appointed to
their posts. Fran the outset, Tucholsky treated with scornful sarcasn
the negotiations with Wilhelm von Abfundien:
„Ninin hin Million auf Million!
Das ist das Land, wie es immer war: 
es rackert fiir deinen Thron". (74)
«
The question remained a matter for each Land to settle with its 
former ruler until in 1926 a bill was introduced to compensate the 
princes on a unified national basis. Goirmunists and Social Democrats 
denanded instead the complete expropriation of the princes. Taking 
advantage of a constitutional clause which allowed a plebiscite on any 
issue where there was widespread public interest, they campaigned 
vigorously for the Fiirstenenteignung.
Here was the ideal opportunity for the Deutsche Linke to press 
for left-wing unity, and for Tucholsky to vent his own dislike of the 
Hohenzollems. The Weltbiihne propaganda for expropriation was led by 
Emil Rabold and Robert Kuczinski(75), but Tucholsky made a considerable 
contribution. As a former law student, he was aware of the difference 
between those few items which could be described as the princes' private 
property, and the lands, palaces and treasures which they had held as 
trustees for the state (76); these had been perquisites which belonged to 
the people and had been returned to them after 1918. The plebiscite 
was not a matter of the German people wishing to expropriate the princes, 
but a defensive manoeuvre to prevent "die Enteignung des deutschen Volkes 
durch die Fiirsten". (77) Instead of lavishing its limited resources on the 
Hohenzollerns, the government should provide better pensions for those
(74) Gri I, pp.611-2.
(75) Cf. Enseling, Die Weltbiihne, Organ der intellektuellen Linken,
Munster, Fahle, 1962, p.161.
(76) Der Hund und der Blinde, WB 1/6/26, East German edition, Vol.4, p.413. \
(77) GW II, p.400.
-Ill-
wounded in Wilhelm's war. (78) Tucholsky's tactical proposals also 
displayed caimon sense rather than originality: statistics ware to be 
presented to make possible a comparison between the monthly wages of 
the average worker and the proposed unearned income for Wilhelm, "den 
Deserteur in Doom". (79)
Tucholsky1 s main value to the campaign was as a satirist. In
the article Neues aus den Untersuchungsausschiissen, he criticised both
the circumstances of the abdication and the suggested payment:
„Fur den wahrend der Revolutionstage umsonst 
ausgestandenen Schreck sowie fur die damals 
verbrauchten Fahrgelder tritt ein Aufschlag 
von 10% in Kraft; laBt sich die Auszahlung 
mangels Bargeld aus Staatsmitteln nicht 
tatigen, so tritt eine Enteignung der deutschen 
Steuerzahler nur nach vorheriger Entscheidung 
des Reichsprasidenten ein. Die letzte Bestimmung 
kann bei Regenwetter aufgehoben werden". (80)
Although the plebiscite failed to obtain the support of a 
majority of the electorate, its sponsors had grounds for satisfaction 
with a poll of 15*5 million, half as many again as the combined left- 
wing vote at the previous election. Hie display of left-wing unity 
seamed to augur well for the future, since a joint action had weaned 
the SPD away frcm their former allies on the right. However, Tucholsky 
was not satisfied. During the campaign he had recognised that the Social 
Democratic establishment had feared the possibility of its own victory; 
as in April 1925 he diagnosed that the approach of the Republicans had 
been the biggest obstacle to success.
(78) Das Buch van Kaiser, WB 29/12/25, ibid., p.301.
(79) Ein Lump, WB 13/7/26, ibid., p.471.
(80) WB 16/2/26, ibid., p.356.
If Tucholsky1 s contribution to the plebiscite campaign has 
gone unnoticed by previous critics, his attacks on the Anti-Pornography 
Law of 1926 have been discussed by Prescher(81) and Nitteriberg(82). A 
brief examination of his attitude to censorship will suffice here.
It was natural for a writer to have a professional interest in 
fighting censorship. Before the war, Tucholsky had admitted its value 
in preventing the public showing of sensationalist films; but sanctions 
appropriate to an industry in its infancy were not applicable to the 
artistically advanced German theatre. (83) After the war he criticised 
the banning of literary works for alleged indecency; among the authors 
and painters who fell victim to the censoring office of Regierungsrat 
Brunner were Verlaine and Zille. (84)
Hie Gesetz zur Bekampfung von Schmutz und Schund had in 
Tucholsky1 s opinion more serious implications for German cultural life. 
If, as the Bill's preamble maintained, Parliament really wished to 
protect young people from corrupting influences, Tucholsky considered 
that the goal could best be achieved by radical social reform to improve 
the environment of poverty and squalor in which many of them were 
compelled to live. (85) He suspected that the real aim of the Bill, 
which had received strong support frcm the Catholic Zentrum, was to 
censor works aimed at an adult public. Hie existing laws seemed to 
represent more than adequate protection against pornography. Hie final 
and most important reason for Tucholsky1 s opposition to the Bill was his 
fear that it would be abused, like the Republikschutzgesetz, as a weapon
(81) Prescher, thesis, pp.45-47.
(82) Joanna Nittenberg, thesis, Vienna, 1970, p. 142.
(83) Verbotene Filme, SB 2/10/13, GW I, p.92.
(84) Der Zensor geht um! WB 25/11/20, GW I, pp.764-66.
(85) Eveline, die Blume der Prarie, WB 21/9/26, GW II, p.508.
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J  against pacifists and revolutionaries. (86) Even evidence that the 
censorship committees had adhered to instructions and withheld from 
the public mainly worthless products failed to mollify him. (87)
However liberal the attitude of the Berlin authorities, Tucholsky was 
convinced that provincial bodies, such as the Landesjugendamt in 
Catholic Diisseldorf, would continue to apply the regulations in a less 
flexible manner.(88)
The other forms of censorship which Tucholsky criticised at this 
time was the insidious right-wing bias of the broadcasting services. 
Although he had some justification in regarding German radio as yet 
another reactionary stronghold, the demand "Die Rundfunkzensur mui3 
fallen!1 (89) proved as unsuccessful as his attacks on the Anti-Pornography 
Law. Significantly, his most effective Garment on the radio authorities 
was made in the form of a humorous satire (90), and he did not participate 
in the detailed discussion which was taking place simultaneously in the 
Rote Fahne. (91)
Tucholsky1 s unwillingness to contribute to the Oarrrnunist press 
was partly due to the contempt which he felt for the low intellectual 
level and technical shortcomings of the Rote Fahne. He was also reluctant 
to surrender his intellectual freedom. Nevertheless, the contrast between 
his conversion to Marxist theory and increasing support for the Ocmmunist- 
led Workers' Movement on the one hand, and his reluctance to publish in
(86) ibid., p.507.
(87) laf WB 8/10/29, GW III, p.208.
(88) Schmutz und Schund bzw. Geldverknappung, WB 29/4/30.
(89) Rundfunkzensur, WB 17/4/28, GW II, p. 1109.
(90) Des deutschen Volkes Liederschatz, WB 22/3/27, GW II, pp.749-52.
(91) Cf. the articles by "SB" of 10/2/27, and 5/8/27, reprinted by
Manfred Brauneck in Die rote Fahne, Munich, UTB, 1973, pp.249-52
and 271-73.
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party journals on the other has a further biographical explanation*
His work as a political writer was restricted by new duties.
In December 1926 Siegfried Jaoobsohn died of a heart attack. 
Tucholsky was shocked by the loss of his mentor (92), but he was 
confronted by a more urgent problem than personal grief. As the 
Weltbuhne' s leading contributor, Tucholsky was an automatic successor 
as editor. He therefore had to return to the Berlin which he detested, 
and experience his country's political malaise. (93) In addition,the 
temporary separation from his wife led to a gradual breakdown of their 
marriage.
The most unfortunate consequence of Tucholsky ’ s new duties 
lay in their interference with his career as a writer. Tucholsky was 
a conscientious businessman (94), but he lacked the coordinating skill 
necessary to captain the Weltbuhne1 s team of writers. (95) He was 
therefore relieved to hand over responsibility for the day-to-day 
running of the journal to Ossietzky in the summer of 1927. Ossietzky's 
hatred of the military rivalled Tucholsky's own, and he had grown 
equally disillusioned with the centre-left parties. (96) But this identity 
of views did not ensure a fruitful relationship. Ossietzky printed all 
Tucholsky's articles, as befitted the work of his leading collaborator; 
but he could not act as the source of ideas, advice and inspiration which 
Jaoobsohn had been:
(92) Dem Andenken Siegfried Jaoobsohns, WB 14/12/26, GW II, p.572.
(93) Cf. his letter to Mary Tucholsky, 18/1/26,Br. p.477.
(94) Early in his career Tucholsky had learned from Jaoobsohn the 
importance of answering letters promptly; cf. Gedanken an 
Siegfried Jaoobsohn, WB 29/11/27, Gtf II, p.959.
(95) Cf. Schulz, op.cit. p.96.
(96) Ossietzky had even helped to found the Republikanische Partei in 
1924 as a protest against the lukewarm defenders of democracy; 
predictably, this creation of journalists and intellectuals was a 
failure.
„Er antwortet fast gar nicht; ich habe schon, 
glaube ich, vierzehn Tage nichts von ihm gehort- 
auf Anregungen, Vorschlage, Witze - nichts". (97)
During his period as editor of the Weltbuhne, Tucholsky 
wrote few articles of lasting importance, although ironically enough 
the year 1927 witnessed two of his greatest literary successes.
Ein Pyrenaenbuch, which was not so much an orthodox travel book as 
the account of Tucholsky1 s inner experiences, "eine Reise durch mich 
selbst" (98), had been written the previous year. Mit 5 PS, the 
first of a popular series of Sammelbande of Tucholsky1 s articles, 
involved much Kleberei and re-examination of earlier work, but included 
few original articles.
The new Weltbuhne-editor was involved in several political
controversies. His already strong dislike of the Social Democrats was
reinforced by correspondence with Reichstagsprasident Paul Lobe.
Tucholsky was dismayed when his application for parliamentary lobby
passes was turned down on the grounds that the Reichstag was already
overcrowded with visitors. At first he suspected that some obscure
civil servant was interfering with the political coverage of a journal
unpopular in official circles. Tucholsky1 s irritation turned to anger
when a personal approach to lobe, himself formerly a prominent journalist,
was dismissed on similarly legalistic grounds. His reply pointed out the
consequences of such high-handed treatment:
„Die behordlichen Stellen des Reiches und der 
Lander beklagen so oft die mangelnde Mitarbeit 
von Intellektuellen. Ich glaube nicht, da.3 man 
sie auf diese Weise fordert".(99)
(97) Letter to Mary Tucholsky, 11/7/27, Br. p.480.
(98) Ein Pyrenaenbuch, GW II, p.690.
(99) Cf. Ein Briefwechsel, WB 22/2/27, GW II, p.734.
-116-
This was reasonable criticism, though Tucholsky later went too far 
in ridiculing Lobe as "der Wanderbursch mit dem Schirm in der Hand". (100)
Tucholsky next took 15) the cause celebre in left-wing circles 
of the Italian anarchists Sacco and Vanzetti. After a trial in a United 
States court noted for xenophobia rather than impartiality, they had been 
sentenced to death. For seven years they had been uncertain of their 
fate, until a last appeal for a retrial was rejected. In common with 
many European intellectuals, Tucholsky protested to the American 
ambassador against the execution (101), but civilised opinion failed to 
sway the American government. Tucholsky's dislike of the USA as the 
leading capitalist power was reinforced by this apparent miscarriage of 
justice.
When Tucholsky* s short period as editor of the Weltbuhne is
examined, it must be admitted that he had temporarily lost direction as
a writer. From time to time resignation was evident in his work. He
claimed that:
„Ich gehore seit dem Jahre 1913 zu denen, 
die den deutschen Geist fur fast unwandelbar 
vergiftet halten, die nicht an eine Besserung 
glauben, die die verfassungsmauige Demokratie 
fiir eine Fassade und fur eine Luge halten". (102)
This statement provides confirmation of his pessimistic mood; it represents
the background to Poor's claim that in the later stages of his career
Tucholsky "fought a desperate ad hoc battle" on small issues, having
given the larger ones up as lost. (103) However, this carment is an
(100) Deutschland, Deutschland uber alles, Berlin, Neuer Deutscher 
Verlag, 1929, p.207-8. "Lobe ist einer der besseren Leube seiner 
unslglichen Partei; er tragt eine reine Weste und verrat seine 
Grundsatze niemals, denn er hat keine".
(101) An den Botschafter, WB 19/4/27, GW II, p.770-1.
(102) Stahlhelm oder Filzhut? WB 17/5/27, GW II, p.790.
(103) Poor, op.cit., p.187.
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exaggeration, probably caused by acceptance at face value of 
Tucholsky*s comparison of himself with Cassandra and Tiresias. Even 
as an unhappy editor whose literary and political career was hanging 
fire, Tucholsky did not yet despair. His left-ward development 
towards active support for the KPD had been temporarily halted, rather 
than effectively reversed.
Poor is wrong to assert that as early as 1927 Tucholsky
regarded Germany as a hopeless society. His hope rested in the tactic
which was to preoccupy the next three years of his career:
„den antidemokratischen, hohnlachenden, 
fur die Idee der Gerechtigkeit bewuSt 
ungerechten Klassenkanpf". (104)
(104) Deutsche Richter, WB 26/4/27, GW II, p.779.
CHAPTER 5
The uncertainty which often precedes an important decision 
was uppermost in Tucholsky's mind at the beginning of 1929. He had 
finally left the bustle and excitement of Paris for the seclusion of 
a Swedish village. The pressure of literary production for a weekly 
newspaper seemed more irksome since Jacobsohn's death, and the political 
scene offered little comfort. Tucholsky felt it necessary to maintain 
the element of distance from current affairs represented by Pan ter and 
Hauser; indeed this period saw many of their wittiest articles. (1) He 
even considered abandoning his political writing altogether, in 
preparation for a serious literary work, and decided against this course 
as much for financial as for intellectual reasons. (2)
These factors must be borne in mind in assessing Tucholsky's 
conduct when he plunged into the political struggle once more. The 
feeling of resignation vhich had afflicted him in 1919 and 1923 could 
temporarily be overcome by uncompromising support for the radical left; 
but if that cause failed him, the prospects for his polemical writing 
were grim. The period 1928-30 therefore represented the culmination of 
Tucholsky1 s career as a left-wing polemicist, to be followed only by 
resignation. In his work for the Arbeiter Illustrierte Zeitung and in 
the controversial book Deutschland, Deutschland uber alles, he appealed 
to a working-class readership to prepare for the revolution which would 
sweep away the unjust social system of Germany.
Tucholsky1 s decision to write political verse in the Communist
(1) Cf. Deutsch fur Amerikaner, V© 2/7/29, Gri III, pp. 125-27, and the 
Lottchen series such as Ankunft, Voss, 6/9/28, GW II, pp. 1226-7; 
Lottchen besucht einen tragischen Film, Voss, 20/10/29, GW III, pp. 
220-223.
(2) Cf. his letter to Emil Ludwig, 20/1/29, Briefe, p. 190.
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press reflected a stage in his development rather than a response to 
external events. When he began contributing to the AIZ in the surrmer 
of 1928, the economic crisis which was to shake western capitalisn to 
its foundations was still a year distant, and the irrmediate future 
appeared to promise continued stability and a gradual improvement in 
the living standards of the workers. Tucholsky could hardly have 
anticipated the ccming changes, but he felt the need for a larger audience. 
After shedding the responsibility of editing the Weltbuhne, he had the time 
to publish his work elsewhere. In addition, Ossietzky had himself 
assumed the role of the Weltbuhne1 s chief political commentator, which 
reduced the burden of expectation resting on Ignaz Wrobel.
The reasons for Tucholsky1 s devotion to the working class,
from which he was separated by birth, career and social status, have
been analysed by Poor. (3) He points out that Tucholsky, in common with
other left-wing writers of middle-class origin, may have felt a sense of
guilt that he himself had escaped the misery so prevalent around him. (4)
As Tucholsky wrote in Deutschland, Deutschland liber alles;
„Damit ich dieses Bilderbuch schreiben kann, ist notig:
da3 ich satt bin; daS ich ein Dach uber dem Kopf habe;
da3 ich die Mu3e und die Zeit habe, mir die Bilder,
die mir der Verlag ubergeben hat, anzusehn; dafi mein
Vater mir in der Jugend so viel Geld gegeben hat,
daS ich etwas mehr als das ABC und das Einmaleins gelemt habe..
Manchmal gelingt es einem heldenhaften Proletarier unter
heroischen Anstrengungen, diese Schranken zu durchbrechen
und trotz Hunger, Kalte und Halbbildung mit nuchtlicher
Arbeit und gewaltiger Willensanstrengung das zu erreichen,
was der Kaufmannssohn leichter erreicht".
Although Tucholsky wished to reach a working-class public, he 
remained suspicious of the main KPD newspaper, Die rote Fahne. However, 
there were also positive reasons for the decision to publish in the
(3) Poor, op.cit. pp.133-4.
(4) Poor refers to the article Das Volk. (Deutschlandbuch, p.17).
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semi-official Communist press enpire directed by Willi Mlinzenberg.
He had long given theoretical support to the idea of "die tendenz- 
fotografisch illustrierte Kanpfzeitung" (5) and claimed that photographs 
could capture attention more quickly than leading articles and enjoyed 
greater credibility than cartoons, since the camera could not lie. (6)
The AIZ, with photographs of "factories, strikes, labour exchanges, 
demonstrations, mass meetings and famine disasters" (7) appeared to be 
just such a "Kampfzeitung", and it had a circulation of around 400, COO 
copies. (8) Its entrepreneur was also well-known as the creator of the 
Internationale Arbeiter Hilfe, a Gcsimunist ancillary organisation by 
means of which many left-wing sympathisers were attracted to the KPD.
The flamboyant Miinzenberg was far more gifted than the average 
party hack, but like any Communist deputy, his loyalties were to the 
Zentrale. Therein lay a danger which threatened not only Tucholsky but 
also a large number of his colleagues. According to Deak(9), many left- 
wing intellectuals hoped to reach an understanding with Minzeriberg in 
order to overcane the disastrous fratricidal strife within the Labour 
Movement. Not only did they fail to make use of Munzenberg, but he in 
fact turned them into "the first fellow-travellers in the history of 
international Gonmunism". (10) Since Tucholsky himself wrote more than 
thirty articles for the AIZ in two years, it might be asked if Deak's 
strictures apply to him.
The expression "fellow-traveller" denotes one who sympathises
(5) Die Tendenzfotografie, WB 28/4/25, GW II, p. 107.
(6) Adolf Behne, writing in the Weltbuhne six weeks later, disagreed. 
(Das denkende Bild, WB 2/6/25).
(7) Miinzenberg, quoted by Koszyk, op.cit., p.332.
(8) Cf. Peter de Mendelssohn, Zeitungsstadt Berlin, Berlin, Ullstein, 
1959, p.264.
(9) Deak, op.cit., p.162.
(10) ibid.
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with many Communist aims and gives the party moral support while 
remaining outside it. This definition is certainly appropriate to 
Tucholsky, with his idealisation of the working class and advocacy 
of revolution. However, the tern is best avoided in an academic 
context, since it represents not merely a statement of fact, but also 
a value judgment; it implies at best naivete and at worst cowardice. (11) 
Tucholsky's work for Munzehberg was characterised by over-optimism, but, 
as will be seen from a detailed examination of his articles in the AIZ, 
the emotive term "fellow-traveller" does him less than justice.
In 1931 several of Tucholsky's poems were re-issued in an
anthology of left-wing verse, Rote Signale. While reviewing the volume
for the Weltbuhne, he carmen bed indirectly on his own literary practice.
Tucholsky declared that the mere evocation of proletarian misery should
be avoided, since the workers needed no reminding of their poverty.
He himself had only rarely been content to offer sympathy to the
sufferers. (12) Instead Tucholsky had tried to reveal to the workers
methods of escaping from their misery, and to reinforce their ranks by
winning over their colleagues. As he explained(13), the artistic value
of such Gebrauchslyrik was not an end in itself. What mattered was the
effect of such verses on their readers:
„Der politische Zweck... benutzt,um auf die Mas sen zu 
wirken, die Pormen der Kunst, deren nicht alltSgliche 
Ausdrucksformen ihm sehr gelegen karrmen. Die Wirkung 
soil sofort erfolgen, sie soil unmittelbar sein, 
ohne Urnschweife ... Die Verse der Gebrauchs lyr ik sind 
gereimtes Oder rhythmisches Parteimanifest". (14)
On the last score Tucholsky has been criticised. Party mani­
festos, even when put into a literary form by an experienced writer of
(11) Cf. Gaitskell's attack on the members of the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament as "pacifists and fellow-travellers" at the Labour 
Party Congress in 1960.
(12) Cf. Nie allein, Dt. Dt. and Gtf III, pp.298-99.
(13) Gebrauchslyrik, WB 27/11/18, GW II, p.1318.
(14) ibid., p.1319.
propaganda verse, can be dull reading, as Tucholsky later admitted. (15)
As Schulz claims, poems like the Fragen an eine Arbeiterfrau(16) do not 
represent Tucholsky's verse at its most effective. But whereas Schulz's 
opposition(17) stems largely frcm the poem's contents, the real weakness 
is its didactic approach. Tucholsky probably felt that a German working- 
class wife would have had little formal education and therefore had to 
be advised directly and without subtlety, but the result is uninspiring.
Tucholsky's propaganda verses were generally more successful. 
They originated with photographs which illustrated, for example, the 
Asyl fur Cbdachlose. (18) He would follow his broadside against the 
capitalists with slogans designed to encourage the workers to remedy the 
injustices of German society. They were to stand together and fight the 
lock-outs in the heavy industry of the Rhine and Ruhr (19) and refuse to 
be bribed into inactivity by the government's charity for the old and 
infirm:
..VJbhltaten, Ifensch, sind nichts als Dampf.
Hoi dir dein Recht im Klassenkanpf I" (20)
According to Tucholsky, the class struggle would solve the 
problems of the workers. In the articles Nur (21)and Wohltatigkeit(22), 
he combined this sentiment with a polemical illustration of the I'ferxist 
theory on the origin of profits. Marx believed that the capitalists paid
(15) Rote Signale, G7 III, p.979.
(16) AIZ, 1928, Qtf II, p.1123.
(17) Schulz, op.cit., p. 119:"Das klingt verdachtig nach einem Plansoll 
der Gesinnung, nach ' sozialistischem Realismus', und wer es nicht 
besser wein, wurde unvermeidlich annehmen, diese "Fragen" seien in 
den letzten Jahren fur ein ' SED-Lesebuch zum proletarischen Haus- 
gebrauch' zusammengereimt worden, stammten aber ninmermehr aus den 
in zwei Jahrzehnten erprobten Feder Theobald Tigers".
(18) AIZ, 1928, Gtf II, p.1232-33.
(19) Aussperrung, Dt. Dt., pp.58-9, GV III, p.296.
(20) G7 II, p.1233.
(21) Dt. Dt., pp.222-3 and GW III, pp.310-11.
(22) Dt. Dt., p.224 and Gtf III, pp.311-12.
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their workers a wage which was only just sufficient to maintain
their Arbeitskraft, by providing them with the necessary food, clothing,
lodgings and cultural opportunities. (23) But the labour-power of the
proletarians produced for their employer a much greater value in goods
and services than that for which they were paid. This extra production
Marx described as surplus value (Mehrwert), and he pointed out that by
turning this product of cooperative work into the profit of private
individuals, the capitalists were stealing the fruits of the workers'
labour. (24) By 1929 Tucholsky recognised that this economic system gave
neither manual nor intellectual workers their due, and he wrote bitterly: (25)
„Er (Der Arbeiter) zieht die Schrauben an,
als waren es seine eigenen und als bekame er es bezahlt.
Er bekcmmt es nicht bezahlt; er bekommt nur seinen Lohn".
This support for Marxist theory was explicit enough, and elsewhere in
Deutschland, Deutschland iiber alles, Tucholsky provided a poetic analysis
which clarified Marx's theorising for a proletarian public:
„Die Mark ist tausend- und tausendfach 
in fremde Taschen geflossen; 
die Dividende hat mit viel Krach 
der Aufsichtsrat beschlossen.
Fur euch die Briihe. Fur sie das Mark.
Fur euch der Pfennig. For sie die Mark."(26)
Though the revolutionary message displeases Schulz, even he admits (27)
that it is a fair description of the late 1920's, when laissez-faire
capitalism was at its height.
Tucholsky had long ceased to believe that the economic and 
social inequalities of Germany could be progressively reduced by the 
SPD's policy of gradual reform. He claimed that, ten years after the
(23) Cf. Marx and Engels, Werke, Vol.23, pp. 184-91, in the first volume 
of Das Kapital.
(24) Cf. the Marxist Mehrwerttheorie, ibid., pp.207-8.
(25) Nur, Dt. Dt. p.223 and GW III, p.311.
(26) Wohltatigkeit, GW III, p.312.
(27) Schulz, op.cit., p.141.
Revolution, conditions for the workers had scarcely improved. Hie 
SPD tactic of entering coalitions with middle-class parties had been 
a failure. (28) Hie significance of this renewed attack was that in 
May 1928 the SPD had re-entered the government. However,, their position 
within the coalition was too weak to enable the achievement of such 
fundamental reforms as the re-organisation of the Reichswehr or the 
restoration of the eight-hour day. Hermann Muller's government could 
hope only to maintain law and order, defend Republican institutions and 
protect the workers' living standards. (29)
Tucholsky found such passivity in the face of poverty and
injustice unacceptable. He attacked the Social Democratic leaders in
the Arbeiter Illustrierte Zeitung for abandoning the traditions of Bebel
and Wilhelm Liebknecht. Weis and Muller were bureaucrats (Bonzen), and
traitors to the cause of socialism. (30) Tucholsky made clear his support
for the KPD by quoting from the Internationale;
„Wacht auf, Verdammte dieser Erde,
die stets man noch zum Hungem zwingt!" (31)
Tucholsky overlooked the fact that the edition of the AIZ which contained
the unflattering portraits of the SPD leaders described in his Sozial-
demokratische Ehrentafel also carried photographs of the newly-elected
Oannunist deputies, few of whcm appeared more distinguished than their
rivals.(32)
Tucholsky's readiness to attack the SPD while sparing the 
Communists was apparent in his response to the fighting in Berlin on May 
1st, 1929. A Comnunist May Day demonstration had been forbidden by the
(28) Die Sicherungsverwahrung, Is© 4/12/28, GW II, p. 1329.
(29) Cf. Rosenberg, Geschichte, pp.191-92.
(30) Sozialdemokratische Ehrentafel, AIZ, 1928 and Rote Signale, 1931.
(31) Zwei alte Leute am ersten Mai, AIZ, 1930, GW III, p.435.
(32) The SPD leaders in the Ehrentafel were Weis, Stampfer, Hermann 
Muller, Erhard Auer, Horsing, Noske, Leinert, Landsberg, Kuttner, 
Heilmann and Breitscheid.
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Social Democratic Police President Zorgiebel. Under instructions fran 
Moscow, the KPD went ahead with their preparations. After seme 
skirmishes, the demonstrators set up barricades in working-class 
districts; though the armed police eventually restored order, seme thirty 
lives were lost, generally those of civilians unconnected with the riots.
The AIZ did not require Tucholsky's help to ma]?e political
capital out of the May Day events, and he chose Das andere Deutschland
as his platform. (33) While the democratic press and even left-wing
Social Democrats such as Heinrich Strobel put most of the blame on the
Gonmunists for defying the police ban, Tucholsky blamed Zorgiebel and the
SPD for the bloodshed. Tucholsky recognised that Moscow's hope of a
workers' rising had been unjustifiable. However, he felt that the
Communists should never have been given the opportunity to widen the
split in the working-class movement: the prohibition of the May Day
demonstration had been a scandalous assault on socialist traditions which
no imperial bureaucrat would have dared. Tucholsky directed the full force
of his attack against the military training of the Schutzpoli zei and its
development into a counter-revolutionary force, with an ethos similar to
that of the Reichswehr. The subject had exercised him since 1922^ (34) and
seven years later he could feel that he had been vindicated:
„Der Militarisms steckt nur in den Kopfen 
der Polizeioffiziere:.. die spielen Krieg, 
die bereiten Feldzuge gegen die eigenen 
Landsleute vor - Und der so zialdemokrati sche 
Polizeiprasident hat sie nicht in der Hand". (35)
Tucholsky' s opinion of the Prussian police was not mere left-
(33) Das Marchen von Berlin, DAD, 1/6/29, GW III, pp.77-80.
(34) Die Schupo, WB 29/6/22, GW I, p.987.
(35) GW III, p.80.
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wing polemic, since it has been supported by Rosenberg. (36) However, 
once again, Tucholsky excused the errors of the Communists. Had they 
not insisted on the demonstration, even claiming that the ban had been 
lifted, Zorgiebel*s men would have had no opportunity to go into battle.
It is true that Tucholsky was not alone in his opinion, and that 
Qssietzky went even further by participating in an unofficial "People's 
Court", which produced propaganda for the Communist version of the May Day 
events. (37) Though this helps to put Tucholsky's attitude into perspective, 
his opinion was still one-sided. He remained convinced that the SPD 
could do nothing right, and that revolutionary tactics were now required.
The slogans which provided the climax of Tucholsky' s verses in 
the AIZ and the Deutschlandbuch were often revolutionary in character, 
whether in the form of the simple imperative Kampfel (38) or the traditional 
refrain "Bruderl Zum Licht, zur Freiheit enpor!" (39) Though such battle- 
cries roused the workers, they were of necessity vague, and Tucholsky's 
prose articles illustrate his opinions more clearly. Doerfel states that 
he envisaged a spontaneous mass uprising (40), or in his own words "ein 
Elementarereignis". (41) She then asserts that he gave no details about 
the preparation and aims of such a revolution. On the first two points 
she is correct, on the third wrong.
The analysis of Tucholsky's career as a propagandist of revolution 
should mention the gulf between such opinions and his idealistic optimism 
of early 1919. The metamorphosis had not cane easily, and cannot be
(36) Rosenberg, Geschichte, pp. 177-8.
(37) Cf. Koplin, op.cit., pp. 129-33 and Ossietzky's articles Zorgiebel ist 
schuld! WB 7/5/29, and Areopag, WB 11/6/29, in Rechenschaft, pp. 100-4 
and 113-17.
(38) Wohltatigkeit, Dt. Dt., p.224, Gtf III, pp.311-12.
(39) Aussperrung, Dt. Dt., p.58, GW III, p.296.
(40) Doerfel, op.cit., p.156.
(41) Huh, wie schauerlich!, WB 5/7/27, GW II, p.822.
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explained away by a fascination for the "poetry of the Revolution" as
opposed to "colourless reform". (42) For ten years Tucholsky had watched
successive governments vainly attempting to reform society, and had
himself campaigned against militarism and reaction. Tucholsk/ was not
a Utopian, but after bitter experience he had given up hope for reform;
revolution therefore appeared to offer the only possibility of progress.
When the former opponent of Spartacist terrorism announced eight years
after the Revolution,
„Ich f iir mein Teil halte revolutionare Bluttaten 
fur gerechtfertigt", (43)
he had not lost his concern for the sanctity of human life. But Tucholsky
new felt that a sacrifice was necessary to make life worth living for the
majority of his compatriots and to prevent another war. This was no
mere "revolutionary romanticism" but a pragmatic choice of the "lesser
evil".
On the subject of the clandestine preparations for a revolution, 
and its method of accomplishment, Tucholsky's silence is understandable.
He was not a party organiser, and even if he had been, it would have been 
naive to betray his plans to his opponents. However, Tucholsky contri­
buted willingly to the discussion of revolutionary aims. In 1928 it was 
natural to reflect on the mistakes made ten years before. (44) With these 
errors in mind, Tucholsky shaped a programme for the future? imagining 
himself at the head of a Ooranunist workers1 government, he summarised his 
policy thus;
(42) Doerfel, op.cit., p.157.
(43) GW II, p.822.
(44) November-Unsturz, Schwarze Fahne, Novariber .1928, GW II, pp.1302-03.
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„Sozialisierung der Bergwerke;
Sozialisierung der Schwerindustrie?
Aufteilung des Groilgrundbesitzes;
Absetzung der Landerbiirokratie;
radikale Personalreform in der Justi zverwaltung;
Personalreform an Schulen und Universitiiten;
- Abschaffung der Reichswehr?
Schaffung eines sittlichen Strafgesetzes...
Steuerliche Erfassung der Bauern". (45)
The Marxist character of the plans for public ownership of the means of
production is clear. It is possible to decry such ideas as irtpractical,
and Tucholsky admitted that seme of his readers would do so, but to deny
that Tucholsky ever expressed an opinion about the aims of a revolution
is nonsense. When Tucholsky proclaimed: "Es lebe die Revolution!" (46), he
had a clear idea of the changes which it should bring.
A retrospective article dealing with the November Revolution (47) 
occupied a prominent place in the controversial Deutschland, Deutschland 
uber alles, which was published in Berlin by Munzeriberg's Neuer Deutscher 
Verlag in 1929. The articles, many of which had already appeared in the 
Weltbuhne(48), had their effectiveness reinforced by the skilful photo­
montage of John Heartfield. The ironically titled book amounted, in Poor's 
words, to "a bitter and sometimes shocking attack upon everything which 
Tucholsky disliked in Germany" (49): militarism, the judiciary, the 
conservative SpieSburger, the Reichstag, Wilhelm II and Ludendorff, 
Stresemann and Lobe. Not surprisingly, the Nationalists were furious:
„Ein Kubel geifemden Hasses wird
uber das Land und seine Bewohner ausgeschuttet".
the readers of the Deutsche Allgeneine Zeitung were informed. (50)
(45) Was wurden Sie tun, wenn Sie die Macht hatten?, Literarische Welt, 
9/11/28, GW II, p. 1303.
(46) November-Qnsturz, GW II, p.1303.
(47) Schone Zeiten, Dt. Dt., pp.33-35.
(48) For example, Deutsche Richter, Dt. Dt., p. 156-8, originally in 
WB 12/9/26.
(49) Poor, op.cit., p.181.
(50) Cf. Tucholsky's scrapbook in the archive in Rottach.
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Particular offence was caused by a photomontage of Gentian generals, 
accompanied by the quotation from a well-known children's book on 
zoology: "Tiere sehen dich an". Tucholsky later wrote to the novelist 
Jakob Wassenmann that this had been Heartfield's idea; he himself 
disagreed with the caption, out of respect for the animals. (51) However, 
other polemical passages of the book were definitely written by 
Tucholsky, and spared neither the right nor the Republicans. The final 
article, Heimat, which praised Germany's landscape, could hardly 
canpensate for the previous two hundred pages of criticism, since the 
German people could take no credit for their scenery. The evocation 
of his old "love-hate" relationship with Germany
„Wir haben das Recht, Deutschland zu hassen,
weil wir es lieben" (52)
was intended to refute the accusation that he and the left in general 
were lacking in Hehmatliebe, but no positive ending could have reconciled 
many of his readers to the satire which had preceded it.
Among critics of the Deutschlandbuch, two objections predominate. 
First, Tucholsky is blamed for playing into the hands of extremists of 
the right and left by helping to discredit the existing Republican system. 
The second objection is to the relevance of the satire, and its alleged 
lack of proportion. Tucholsky was apparently attacking as specifically 
German certain evils which were characteristic of the western world as a 
whole. In addition, he was continually reviling Wilhelminian Germany 
instead of recognising that ten years had passed since the fall of the 
Empire. For this reason even Poor describes the dominant quality of the 
book as its "lack of timeliness".(53)
(51) Letter of 1/3/31, Briefe, p.212.
(52) Heimat, Dt. Dt., p.231 and Qti III, p.314.
(53) Poor, op.cit. p.181.
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Tucholsky would not have denied his sympathy for the 
proletarian revolution or his dislike of the reformist policies and 
personal mediocrity of the Social Democrats. The satirical attacks 
on Lobe(54) and Noske(55) illustrate this disapproval. It is easy 
to point out that the Canminist ranks included equally unsavoury 
characters and ask why Tucholsky spared die ThaJmanner, but the 
answer has already been given: he looked on the party, and more especially 
its supporters, as the only remaining progressive force in German society.
The accusation that the book was "grist to the mill of the 
extreme right"(56) is less easily answered. Laqueur's claim that the 
book confirmed right-wingers in their prejudices against left-wing 
intellectuals is unimportant. Tucholsky had given up hope of winning 
over the Nationalists and intended instead to strengthen their opponents 
for the inevitable battle. But the attack on Republican institutions had 
an unfortunate effect at a time when the National Socialist Movement was 
setting out on the road to success. In his Swedish exile Tucholsky 
could hardly be blamed for underestimating the Nazi danger, since he was 
in the company of most of his country's leading statesmen. However, when 
a review of the Deutschlandbuch in the Nazi press praised Tucholsky's 
anti-Republican polemic as "Forderung der NS-Propaganda "(57) he took 
sufficient notice to preserve the article in his scrap-book. Whatever 
his intentions and however sound the excuses for ignoring the Nazis in 
his satire, this unexpected testimonial represents a serious objection 
to the book.
(54) Der Wanderbursch mit den Schirm in der Hand, Dt. Dt., pp.207-08.
(55) Cf. Rechenaufgaben, Dt. Dt., p.40.
(56) Walter Z. Laqueur, Weimar, A Cultural History, 1918-33, London, 
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1974, p.46.
(57) Der National-Sozialist, 6/10/29, in Tucholsky's scrap-book.
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Poor is not alone in asserting that the Deutschlandbuch has 
an anachronistic quality. The accusation was first made by the 
contemporary critic, Herbert Ihering, who also alleged that Tucholsky 
kept harping on the same thanes, and claimed that the Germans had no 
monopoly of the weaknesses which Tucholsky had pilloried. (58) Tucholsky's 
reply was characteristically aggressive. He was attacking the same 
targets, such as the military and the judiciary, because they remained 
as dangerous as ever. Tucholsky's diagnosis that Germany was suffering 
frcm "die Fortdauer einer wilhelminischen Gesinnung" (59) can hardly be 
faulted. His compatriots had elected Hindenburg President and another 
ageing reactionary, the pan-German industrialist Hugenberg, had just 
become leader of the Nationalists. These figures and their supporters 
were syirptcmatic of a specifically German fascination with the glories 
of the Empire.
Secondly, Tucholsky questioned the implication that his work
was entirely negative in intent. He claimed that it represented the
attempt to act as a spokesman for those victims of German society who
were unable to express their feelings in writing. This was the book's
positive content:
„Inmer, wenn ich schreibe, denke ich an das Leid 
der Anonymen, an den Proletarier, den Angestellten,
den Arbeiter, an ein Leid, von dem ich durch
Stichproben wei3 ". (60)
This unsentimental sympathy is evident in Jubilaum(61), Nie allein(62),
and Muttems Hande(63), and constitutes the opposite pole to the attacks
(58) Cf. Ihering in Das Tagebuch, 12/10/29.
(59) Letter to Ihering, 18/10/29, Briefe, p. 132.
(60) ibid.
(61) In Dt. Dt., pp.41-2.
(62) ibid., pp.124-31, GW III, pp.298-99.
(63) ibid., p.171 and AIZ, 1929, GW III, p.1138.
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on the middle and upper classes. Finally, in reply to Ihering1 s 
accusation that it was easy to indulge in polemic from a safe distance, 
Tucholsky retorted that his satire did expose him to danger; indeed 
within a month a Nazi mob rioted after he had read frcm his works in 
Wiesbaden, and a doctor mistaken for him was assaulted. (64)
Although the Deutschlandbuch represented the climax of 
Tucholsky1 s work as a satirist and polemicist, it can scarcely be 
regarded as his most effective book. It suffers frcm a naivet^ towards 
political extremism and a lack of proportion in the indiscriminate 
attacks on Republicans and Social Democrats. Such tactical errors should 
not, however, be allowed to obscure Tucholsky's concern for the under­
privileged and his justifiable indignation tovards their tormentors. In 
1919 he had described the satirist as unjust in the interest of the abstract 
idea of justice, and he went on to illustrate unconsciously his own 
later position as the writer of the Deutschlandbuch:
„Der Satiriker ist ein gekrankter Idealist: 
er will die Welt gut haben, 
sie ist schlecht und nun rennt er gegen das 
Schlechte an".(65)
Tucholsky*s engagement for the revolutionary left had caused 
him personal difficulties before the riot in Wiesbaden. For over four 
years he had contributed feuilletons to the danocratic Vossische Zeitung.
In September 1928 the editors, among than his old collaborator Szafranski(66), 
expressed their concern at his work for the AIZ, asking if it was fair to 
attack capitalism while accepting a retainer from the Ullsteins. (67)
(64) Cf. letter to Walter B. Meyer, 27/11/29, Briefe, p.210.
(65) Was darf die Satire? BW 27/1/19, GW I, p.363.
(66) Szafranski had produced the illustrations for Rheinsberg.
(67) For the following, cf. letter to Mary Tucholsky, 18/9/28, Briefe, 
pp. 488-91
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Tucholsky was honest enough to recognise that Szafranski and Korff had 
a point. His position was also weakened by the fact that his financial 
security depended largely on his articles for Ullstein, since the 
Weltbuhne alone could not pay him an adequate salary, and, in spite of 
Tucholsky1 s offer of a closer liaison, Munzenberg would have been unable 
to fill the gap. However, Tucholsky could rightly assert that Ms recent 
articles in the Vossische Zeitung had been very popular. (68) More 
important was the fact that the Ullsteins had hired only Tucholsky*s non­
political persona, and he therefore felt that they had no right of comment 
on his work for the AIZ. In any case, he would allow no one to interfere 
with his artistic freedom. Korff and Szafranski, recognising the danger 
of losing a successful columnist, backed down, and Tucholsky was able to 
continue writing for the Vossische Zeitung for the next three years.
In spite of the anti-climactic ending, this controversy was 
significant. However aggressive Tucholsky*s stance might appear, he had 
been compelled to recognise that the alternative of abandoning Ullstein 
for Munzenberg was not merely financially untenable. Ihe CcmmuMsts 
themselves regarded him with little enthusiasm. Much of his work in the 
next two years was devoted to the search for an answer to Ms "great 
personal diletrma" (69): the relationship of the intellectual syrnpatMser 
to the OcmnuMst Party.
In the course of Ms journalistic career, Tucholsky gave Ms 
support to three major parties: the DDP, the USPD and the KPD. (70)
However great Ms sympathy for the workers, Ms dislike of the SPD and
(68) Cf. Wo kommen die Locher im Kase her-? Voss. 29/8/28, G\F II, pp. 
1212-15.
(69) Doerfel, op.cit., p.158.
(70) In a curriculum vitae wMch acccmpaMed an application for Swedish 
citizenship in 1934, he claimed to have been a member of the SPD, 
after the merger with the rump of the USPD. However, no information 
has cane to light about the duration of tMs monbersMp and it had 
no visible effect in Ms writings:Cf. Text und Kritik, no.29: Kurt 
Tucholsky, p.4.
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his enthusiasm for the Revolution, he never became a member of the KPD.
Nor did he participate in any of the Caimunist Writers* Congresses or 
join such "front organisations" as the Bund proletarisch-revolutionarer 
Schriftsteller; on the contrary, he became involved in controversy with 
them. In spite of the insinuations of one critic (71), the decision not 
to join the party was not due to a fear of losing his job with the 
Ullsteins. The reasons for his hesitation went deeper, reflecting the 
difficulties faced by an intellectual from a middle-class background in 
winning acceptance frcm the party functionaries on his terms rather than 
theirs. Tucholsky was unwilling to abandon his comfortable way of life 
or sacrifice his integrity as a writer on the altar of slavish obedience 
to the party line. His final objection was political rather than personal: 
he was beginning to recognise the tactical errors of that line, dictated 
in accordance with the overall strategy of the Bolsheviks in Moscow rather 
than by the Karl-Liebknecht-Haus in Berlin.
Tucholsky discussed his dilemma in two important articles, 
Gebrauchslyrik (72) and Die Rolle des Intellektuellen in der Partei(73) 
without finding a solution. His good intentions were transparent: instead 
of blaming the KPD for their suspicions of intellectuals like himself, 
he held up as a warning the decline of the SPD since the loss of such 
brilliant but unproletarian figures as Liebknecht and Jogiches, Eisner and 
Landauer. (74) Thus he turned a potentially oiibarrassing request into a 
eulogy of two former KPD leaders and diverted his attack from the real 
target, the fourth-rate intellectuals of the KPD, to the philistines among
(71) Doerfel, op.cit., p.158.
(72) WB 27/11/28, Gfi II, pp.1318-22.
(73) Die Front, 1/1/29, GW III, pp.13-18.
(74) GW II, p.1322.
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the Social Democrats. To escape the charge that his way of life 
contrasted with his political sympathies, and probably also to 
reassure party functionaries, he disclaimed any desire to act as 
"leader" of the proletariat:instead he and his colleagues, men of 
words rather than action, would be content with the subordinate role 
of assisting the workers.(75) Tucholsky even asserted:
„Ich halte einen Zusanmenhang der radikalen
Intellektuellen mit der KPD fur einen Segen
und fur ein Gluck". (76)
In pursuit of this objective, he declared that fellow-intellectuals 
should accept the need for discipline, for steady, unspectacular work 
and for political cannon sense. This represented a considerable concession, 
and was the nearest Tucholsky ever came to the KPD. But even his willing­
ness to conciliate the party leaders had Its limits, whether they be 
ascribed to bourgeois individualism, personal integrity or good sense.
As the price of his cooperation he attonpted to impose on the party 
conditions which would ensure mutual success. The KPD leaders were to 
recognise that the situation of Germany differed frcm that of Russia, and 
those incapable of such perception should be replaced.
These conditions represented the minimum safeguards required 
by the left-wing intellectuals. Hiller, writing on a similar thane a 
month later in the Weltbuhne, was far less enthusiastic towards the 
Communists (77), preferring instead to pursue the idea of a united front 
which would embrace Ocrnnunists and Social Democrats, and would be organised 
by the small splinter-groups between the two hostile sister-parties.
Thalmann and his colleagues should have recognised the difference between 
the two positions, and the opportunity offered by Tucholsky's constructive
(75J ibid., p.1321.
(76) ibid., p.1322.
(77) Cf. Deak, op.cit. p.169.
proposals. However, Commmist functionaries were hamstrung by 
party directives which opposed any compromise. Both articles were 
seen as a concerted attempt by the intellectuals to dictate terms for 
collaboration with the party, and Hans Conrad, editor of the periodical 
Die Front, set out in December 1928 to demolish the fragile bridge which 
Tucholsky had been trying to construct.
Conrad had as little time for Tucholsky1 s suggestions as for
Hiller's belief that Germany's tragedy lay in the division of the Labour
movement. In an inauspicious echo of the "Block, nicht Brei!" slogan of
Hugenberg1 s DNVP, he rejected any idea of a united front with the SPD
or other groups to the right. Conrad claimed that the real troubles of
the country lay elsewhere:
„Die Tragodie Deutschlands ist nicht zuletzt 
die jarrmerliche Halbheit seiner "linken" Intellektuellen, 
die da uber den Parteien thronen, weil es "einem in den 
Reihen nicht leicht gemacht wird". (urn mit Kurt Tucholsky 
zu sprechen). Diese Leute haben 1918 glanzend versagt, 
sie versagen noch heute". (78)
Instead of offering condescending advice to the party, intellectuals
should combine revolutionary theory and practice, as Marx and Lenin had
done, by experiencing for themselves the conditions under which the
proletariat lived and worked.
This demand for personal and ideological conformity could 
hardly encourage Tucholsky in his attempt to mediate between the Weltbuhne 
writers and the KPD, but he did not yet abandon hope. After all, many of 
Conrad's objections had been irrelevant: unlike Marx and Lenin, he did 
not aspire to lead the proletariat, and it was therefore unnecessary to 
sacrifice his material well-being to become a "genuine" proletarian. 
Tucholsky forebore to mention that he had already made this point in
(78) Deutschlands Tragodie, in Die Front, No. 7, II. Jg. 1929, p.197.
I
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Gebrauchslyrik, and he rejected polemic in favour of reasoned analysis
of the uncomfortable position of the intellectual sympathiser:
„Der Kampf der Arbeiterklasse fuhrt zum Siege; 
er ist jferecht. Wir haben es sehr schwer, uns 
von der Grundlage unserer Erziehung, unserer 
Ausbildung, unserer Arbeit loszulosen. Man 
schilt uns von der Burgerseite her: Bolschewisten.
Man miBtraut uns von der Funktionarseite der 
Arbeiterparteien her - niamals haben uns die 
Arbeiter miBtraut, sofem wir uns zuruckhaltend 
und sympathisierend angeschlossen haben". (79)
However, even this conciliatory definition wan Tucholsky no 
new friends in the party. The distinction between the workers and their 
spokesmen was unacceptable in a monolithic organisation, constructed on 
the principle of obedience to the leadership. Conrad, himself an 
intellectual speaking on behalf of the workers, was also unlikely to 
forgive Tucholsky the accusation of inverted snobbery. (80) In spite of 
a final plea that what mattered was to work for the cannon cause (81), 
Tucholsky1 s second article was sharper in tone than that of five weeks 
before, while its contents made no new concessions to Canmunist dogmatism.
Conrad's polemical reply was therefore no surprise. (82) His 
corment that Tucholsky should be satisfied to be a private in the 
revolutionary army showed that he neither understood nor cared about 
Tucholsky's problematical relationship with the party functionaries.
The proposal that Tucholsky should work in the revolutionary factory 
newspapers, or in the sphere of political theory was inappropriate. Still 
more serious was Conrad's refusal to recognise any viewpoint other than
(79) GW III, p.15. '
(80) ibid., p. 14: "Es gibt heute einen Snobismus der schwieligen Faust, 
der unertraglich geworden ist".
(81) ibid., p.17.
(82) Uber die Rolle des Intellektuellen in der proletarlschen 
Revolution, Die Front, Jg.2, No. 11, p. 280.
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the gospel according to Lenin. (83) Tucholsky and his colleagues should 
join the party, or they would be treated as enemies. The discussion 
between Conrad and Tucholsky had net been a genuine dialogue: it had 
amounted only to a repetition of old arguments.
From the summer of 1929 the Communist line in literary affairs 
was represented in Germany by a new organisation, the Bund proletarisch- 
revolutionarer Schriftsteller. (84) The BPRS too began to attack the 
progressive non-party intelligentsia, thus widening the gulf between 
Tucholsky and the KPD. His article in celebration of the Weltbuhne1 s 
twenty-fifth anniversary(85) found no favour. To same extent the 
objections of the BPRS were justified; what Tucholsky offered as a future 
programme:
„aus Teutschland Deutschland zu machen 
und zu zeigen, daB es auBer Hitler,
Hugenberg und dam fischkalten Universitatstypus 
des Jahres 1930 noch andre Deutsche gibt". (86)
was undeniably vague.
Nevertheless, the most important reason for the indignation of 
the Linkskurve (87) lay in Tucholsky's defence of the Weltbuhne' s position 
above the parties in general and the KPD in particular:
(83) ibid.:"Wir haben ein Prograitm, das Programm Lenins, den 
Leniniamus. Wer es mit der Sache der Arbeiterklasse emst nimmt, 
der ist verpflichtet und der kann im Rahmen dieses Programms 
ausgezeichnet revolutionare Arbeit leisten, dann namlich, wenn 
er die Rolle einer zielklaren Partei des Proletariats als 
Fuhrerin im Befreiungskampfe der unterdruckten und leidenden 
Menschheit erkannt hat".
(84) The leading members of the BPRS included Johannes R. Becher and 
Georg Lukacs.
(85) Funfundzwanzig Jahre, WB 9/9/30, GW III, pp. 510-21.
(86) ibid., p.521.
(87) Cf. Die Linkskurve, quoted by Doerfel, op.cit., p.165:"Befangen, 
unemst und unwahrhaftig ist eine derartige "Wurdigung" des 
Vergangenen. Wo aber sind die Perspektiven fur die Zukunft?
Was will die Weltbuhne? Welchon Ziel gilt ihr Kampf?1'
\
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nEs flihrt notwendig zu einer Verengung 
des geistigen Horizonts, wenn die Parteien 
den MaBstab ihres Dogmas nun auch an Leistungen 
legen, die zunachst auf dem Felde des Geistes 
getan werden". (88)
The relationship of intellectual and party could only be settled on
the latter's terms, and Tucholsky by now had abandoned the search for
a compromise. His endeavours throughout had been directed by the need
to reach a progressive mass audience and by over-optimism with regard
to the flexibility of the KPD: however well-meaning the attempt, it
appears in retrospect somewhat naive.
Tucholsky's attitude to the KPD certainly reflected his 
personal situation, that "uncomfortable position between two stools". 
However, the actions of the KPD itself, and of its Russian masters, 
also played a large part in his increasingly unfavourable assessment of 
party policy in the 1930's.
The political record of the KPD in the Weimar era was poor,
far poorer indeed than Tucholsky was ready to admit. In its early years
the party had the excuse that its outstanding leaders had been murdered,
but it brought further misfortune on itself by the masochistic expulsion
of Levi, Reuter and Rosenberg. They were made scapegoats for successive
drastic changes in party policy, since the undonocratic KPD could neither
tolerate disagreement within its ranks nor admit that its new leaders
were less than infallible. This was the tendency which Tucholsky later
criticised by attributing to the party the observation:
„ Sc hade, daB Sie nicht in der Partei sind- 
dann konnte man Sie jetzt ausschlieBeni" (89)
Such perception on Tucholsky's part was still distant. Concerned
(88) GW III, p.518.
(89) Schnipsel, WB 26/1/32, GW III, p.1000.
about the SPD's encouragement of militarism and the weakness of the 
Republicans, he had little interest in the KPD1 s early and self-inflicted 
disasters: the premature uprising of January 1919, the mass strikes in 
the spring of that year, the so-called Marzaktion in central Germany of 
1921. The party refused to lend its support to the Republic against 
counter-revolution, and was incapable of overturning it and establishing 
a left-wing dictatorship. Germany's acute political and economic 
weakness of 1923 was allowed to pass with only brief participation in 
the Arbeiterregierunqen in Saxony and Thuringia and the hopelessly 
isolated Hamburg Rising in October to show for this unique revolutionary 
opportunity. By the mid-1920's the party's mothership was stagnating, and 
its influence on the factory floor and in the trade unions was waning.
The result of these failures was the subservience of the KPD 
to the more successful Russian Bolsheviks. The latter imposed on their 
German colleagues a collective leadership whose consistent blunders 
contrasted unfavourably even with the SPD. Yet Tucholsky never lampooned 
the obtuse Thalmann or the adventurer Neumann as he did their SPD 
counterparts. The remark in December 1925 that the KPD lacked leaders (90) 
appears a misleading understatement.
The dangers inherent in the KPD's position after its leaders 
had been degraded to the executive arm of the Comintern were threefold. 
First came the Russians' over-confidence in their own ability as 
revolutionaries, their tendency to assume that the methods which they 
themselves had used would in turn lead to the success of the KPD. (91)
(90) Abreifikalender, WB 15/12/25, GW II, p. 289.
(91) Die Augen der Welt, WB 11/8/31, Qti III, p.910.
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When the latter failed, their leaders could be replaced, but the 
, direction of the policy frcm M dscow retained. This was what Tucholsky 
meant when he begged the Russian leaders to get to know the German 
. situation better. (92) By 1928 his hopes of a liaison with the KPD 
encouraged him to put forward the proposal that German Gcmmunist leaders 
themselves should recognise that their country was not Russia. (93) The 
weakness of his argument was that it ignored what he had recognised three 
years before: that the Comintern hierarchy rather than puppets like 
Thalmann was responsible for the fixation with Russian methods. The idea 
that the German Zentrale could independently dismiss members for slavish 
loyalty to M dscow was absurd.
The "remote control" of the KPD by the Comintern was undesirable 
for a second reason: the fundamental nationalism of the German people.
The pre-war SPD had been regarded by many as "vaterlandslose Gesellen".
Ihe Communists' loyalty to the USSR as the supposed "Vaterland der 
Werktatigen" did nothing to increase their popularity, since patriots were 
as numerous among the workers as elsewhere. When the KPD tried to conceal 
its true loyalties with an exaggerated display of "Nationalbolschevismus" (94), 
most workers recognised the sudden conversion for the opportunistic 
manoeuvre it was.
(92) Gegen den Strom, WB 13/4/26, GW II, p.413.
(93) Gebrauchslyrik,ibid., p. 1322.
(94) Cf. Werner T. Angress: Stillborn Revolution, Princeton 1963, 
pp.336-7, and his account of Radek's eulogy of the Freikorps 
leader Schlageter, who was executed by the French for sabotage 
during the occupation of the Ruhr. Angress points out that 
Radek's speech amounted to "a tactical manoeuvre rather than a 
fundamental revision of policy, an attempt to split the ranks 
of the various nationalist groups by proving that only the 
Communists could in the long run offer effective opposition
to the Versailles Treaty".
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The alignment with a foreign power, let alone one 
'traditionally regarded with deep suspicion, helps to explain why 
even in the crises of 1923 and the early 30's, with their SPD rivals 
discredited by their toleration of Cuno, Stresenann and Briining, the 
Communists failed to win over a majority of the workers to the revolu­
tionary cause. Other factors contributed to this failure: the strong 
link between the Social Democrats and the Trade Unions, and the 
apolitical inertia of many workers vho had joined the SPD in their youth, 
had grown accustomed to the monthly round of meetings and outings, and 
had lost interest in the advent of the proletarian revolution. This 
last reason, an attitude of mind rather than a political or economic 
factor, was noted by Tucholsky (95), but he closed his eyes to the more 
fundamental problem of persuading workers that the distant USSR was more 
important to their future than Germany itself.
However, the gravest disadvantage of the KPD's subservience 
lay in the fact that the Ccmintem itself was no more than an instrument 
of Russian government policy. In the early 1920's the Soviet Union was 
under pressure from its own counter-revolutionaries, the Polish nationalists 
and the constant threat of renewed Allied intervention. Lenin therefore 
encouraged risings against the German government in the hope of establish­
ing a sympathetic left-wing administration in Berlin, or at least of 
reducing the Nationalist threat from that quarter.
By 1921 Lenin was compelled to acknowledge that social revolution 
outside the Soviet Union was no longer likely. The New Economic Policy 
was introduced, and the Russians began establishing normal diplomatic and 
trading relations with neighbouring governments. As a result of the
(95) Cf. Ein alterer, aber leicht be softener Herr, WB 9/9/30, Gri III, 
p.524.
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Treaty of Rapallo in 1922 their first "bourgeois partner" was Germany, 
a fellow^ -outcast in the international field. Stalin continued his 
predecessor's policy out of conviction: it seemed more profitable to do 
business with the Reichswehr and accept credits for the equipping of 
Russian industry than to seek to bring down the capitalist systan in 
Germany. For all its revolutionary rhetoric, the KPD was denoted to the 
status of a reserve force, a threat to be employed in emergencies, but 
otherwise restricted to organisational activities.
In retrospect this analysis is obviously correct, At the time
both the German vorkers and their bourgeois opponents accepted the KPD
at face value, as a genuinely revolutionary party. Tucholsky gradually
began to suspect the truth, but he did not became certain until after the
Nazi seizure of power. The economic alliance between the Soviet Union
and the capitalist west was common knowledge when Tucholsky ccrrmented on
it, very mildly, in 1932:
„Warum sagen die Russen eigentlich niemals, wieviel 
Geld sie sich im Ausland geliehen haben? Ihre 
Leistung verkleinerte es nicht". (96)
His indignation at the Soviet betrayal of their German comrades appears
to stem largely from astonishment that the Bolsheviks could put credits
from the Nazi government above the fate of the persecuted workers. (97)
Yet this was no new policy, merely the logical extension of Stalin's
decision to build "socialism in one country" and leave the rest of Europe
to take care of itself. Again Tucholsky's determination to trust the
Gatmunist workers too long blinded him to the inadequacies of their German
and Russian leaders.
(96) Schnipsel. WB 29/3/32, ibid., p.1038.
(97) Cf. letter to Heinz Pol, 7/4/33, Briefe, p. 227.
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Another consequence of the KPD's dependence on the
Qcmintern was the necessity of following Stalin in the struggle for
power within the Russian party. When Stalin purged the Bolshevik
Central Ganmittee of the "right-winger" Bucharin, the KPD too adopted
"ultra-left" tactics. (98) Instead of seeking alliances with the
Social Democrats against the bourgeois parties, they fought the SPD as
"Social Fascists". Twice they joined the Nazis against the Prussian SPD(99),
believing that Thalmann and not Hitler would emerge triumphant. To be
sure, they offered their fellow-Marxists the opportunity of a united front:
all that was necessary was that the Social Democratic workers should reject
their treacherous leaders in favour of the Goirmunist Zentrale. This was not
an offer of compromise but a demand for surrender, and not surprisingly
the SPD would have none of it. Tucholsky*s judgment was therefore at
fault when he claimed that the Social Democratic and not the Communist
leaders represented
„die schlimmsten Hindernisse bei der so notigen 
Einheitsfront gegen den Faschismus". (100)
though it could be said in his defence that other left-wing intellectuals
took a similar view. (101) Once again Tucholsky refrained frcm criticising
the Communists, out of a misunderstood respect which by 1933 he bitterly
regretted. (102) In a letter written after abandoning his journalistic
(98) Cf. Ossip K. Flechtheim: Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik,
Offenbach, 1948, p.248.
(99) The KPD supported the Nazis in the plebiscite for early elections 
in Prussia and the strike of the Berlin Transport Workers.
(100) Auf dem Nachttisch, WB 2/6/31, in a review of Die Sowjetunion by 
Max Hodann.
(101) Cf. Koplin, op.cit., p. 167:" (Ossietzky) lieJS dabei nahezu ganzlich 
jene Tatsache unbeachtet, die am augenfalligsten die Unfahigkeit 
der KPD bloBstellte, der Situation in den Jahren vor der NS- 
Machtergreifung gerecht zu werden: die selbstmorderische Taktik 
der KPD, den Hauptangriff gegen den "Sozialfaschismus" der SPD zu 
richten".
(102) Letter to Pol, 20/4/33, Briefe, p.227.
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career, Tucholsky at last described KPD policy with the contempt
•Which it deserved:
„Die KPD hat in Deutschland von vom bis hinten 
dummes Zeug gemacht, sie hat ihre Leute auf der StraBe 
nicht begriffen, sie hat die lessen eben nicht hinter 
sich gehabt". (103)
Tucholsky's attack on the KPD after the fall of the Republic 
cannot detract from the indirect support which he gave to the party in 
the late 1920's. The Communist workers were the last agents to whom he 
entrusted the role of creating a more humane, egalitarian Germany. In 
order to remain in contact with then, he endured the dogmatism and 
intellectual inferiority of the KPD leaders, though he showed no mercy 
towards similar failings in the SPD. He commented only briefly on the 
policy of the Comintern: his loyalty to. the USSR as the land of the 
proletarian revolution even led him to pledge support for Russia in any 
war begun by the capitalist west, including Germany. (104)
Nevertheless, Tucholsky's direct support for the KPD was 
limited. He joined neither the party nor any of its auxiliary organisations, 
thereby incurring the wrath of those whom he hoped to conciliate. However 
closely he identified himself with the party's apparently revolutionary 
goals, the barriers on both sides remained: their suspicions of the 
bourgeois intellectual, his recognition that the Communists, like the 
USPD and the Pacifist Movement, fell short of his ideal. At the close 
of his dialogue with the KPD, he described these barriers in the poem Hej-i
(103) ibid., pp.227-8.
(104) Wie wurden Sie sich im Falle eines Krieges gegen die udSSR verhalten?, 
Moskauer Rundschau, 22/6/30, p.477: "Handelt es sich .. urn einen 
europaischen ZusammenschluB von Machten, die mit Hilfe der Kirche 
gegen jenes RuBland hetzen, das ihnen wegen der eigenen Arbeiter- 
bewegungen ein Dorn im Auge ist, so kann meine S tel lung nur eindeutig 
sein: fur RuBland gegen jene Machte, auch dann, wenn es sich urn 
Deutschland handelt".
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i
Auch sie: dieser Welt hingegeben 
-erwarte nicht den Hlirmel von ihnen- 
auch sie: Nationalisten: 
freilich mit einer Idee; 
auch sie: fur den Krieg 
auch sie: erdgebunden.
Bist du stark genug 
mitzuarbeiten am Werk?
Noch nicht-
geh noch nicht hinein.” (105)
For six years Tucholsky stood outside "das russische Haus", shouting
advice and encouragement to those within and refusing to discuss their 
failings with outsiders; but he decided not to go in, and finally turned 
away in disgust at the conduct of his former friends.
Tucholsky's attitude to the Soviet Union itself went through
a series of changes parallel to those which governed his opinion of the 
KPD. The immediate aftermath of the October Revolution drew no comment 
from him, since he was engaged directly in the struggle to create a 
better Germany. As long as he believed that the Weimar Republic could 
be inproved by constructive work from within, he retained sceptical about 
Russian achievements and resisted any credulous enthusiasm among his 
fellow-intellectuals.
In this context Poor mentions (106) Tucholsky's review of a
travel book by the Communist sympathiser, Alfons Goldschmidt. (107) Though
he respected the author, Tucholsky complained that Goldschmidt had seen
in Moscow only what he wanted to see. Belief in Lenin did not entitle
Goldschmidt to go into ecstasies about Soviet every-day life, or to leave
unmentioned the country's obvious problems:
„Welch ein Reich! Es gfbt wenig zu essen, 
es gibt fast nichbsanzu ziehen, es wird in 
klarer nationalistischer Tendenz Krieg gefuhrt". (108)
(105) Hej-1 WB 29/10/29, GW III, p.228.
(106) Poor, op.cit., p.142.
(107) Aus Moskau zuruck, Freiheit, 13/10/20, GW I, pp.742-45.
(108) ibid., p.743.
Goldschmidt would rightly have denounced such tendencies in Germany,
•and Tucholsky considered that it would have taken more courage to admit 
them than to paint a roseate picture of Bolshevik progress.
As Tucholsky's discontent with events in Germany increased,
he too began to look elsewhere for inspiration. In the 1920's the
-Soviet Union faced a unique double challenge (109); it was
„ein hinter der europaisbhen Zivilisation
zuruckgebliebenes Land, das alles einholen will,
was es in 200 Jahren versaumt hat. Es versucht
dort ferner eine revolutionare Regierung, ihr f
Programm durchzusetzen".
In the latter capacity, as the home of the revolution, it attracted
his support. He felt great personal admiration for Lenin, as the leader
of that revolution, and regarded the early death of the Russian statesman
as a tragedy. (110)
Tucholsky's support for the USSR was reinforced by the
recognition that its enemies were the opponents of progressive democracy:
the Nationalist right. The disarray on the right in 1918 had rapidly
been remedied by the evocation of a supposed "enemy": Bolshevism. Eduard
S tad tier organised a campaign against Liebknecht and the KPD, portraying
then as bloodthirsty anarchists. Having established the Bolsheviks in
the national consciousness as
„blutgierig, das Messer zwischen den Zahnen, 
in Lumpen gehullt und jederzeit bereit, sich 
auf ganz Europa zu sturzen", (111)
the extreme right perpetuated this myth in the German press long after
Lenin had abandoned any intention of fomenting revolution in Western
Europe. This picture was a travesty of Russian aims and achievements;
(109) Auf den Nachttisch, WB 2/6/31.
(110) Auf dem Nachttisch, WB 2/11/30, GW III, p.359.
(111) Schnipsel, WB 26/4/32, ibid., p.1048.
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but the German Nationalists feared the Bolsheviks in their role as 
a revolutionary ideal. Their attacks on Moscow often amounted to 
the attempt to put pressure on the Labour Movement at home. As 
Tucholsky declared:
,.RuBland ist ihr schlechtes Geswissen".(112)
Tucholsky answered such indirect attacks on the German workers by 
defending their Bolshevik mentors.
The important qualities of the USSR in the 1920's did not 
end with the success of the revolution and economic consolidation.
Another feature of the Bolshevik state was its authoritarian system of 
government. This was by no means exceptional in central and eastern 
Europe between the wars; nor was it a specifically Leninist innovation, 
merely a continuation of the repressive Czar ist tradition. Nevertheless 
it was an aspect of Bolshevik policy which Tucholsky for a long time 
underestimated: seeing only revolutionary determination, he ignored the 
terror which accompanied it.
Gradually Tucholsky became suspicious of the authoritarian 
dictatorship and the necessity for ideological conformity which at this 
period characterised Russian society. As Doerfel points out(113), the 
first warning sign was the publication in 1928 of an official Bolshevik 
history of the Red Army, in which its creator and organiser during the 
Civil War, Trotsky, went unmentioned. Tucholsky made no attonpt to 
analyse the difference of opinion between Stalin and the apostle of 
"permanent revolution", which had led to the latter's banishment: this 
was an internal Russian issue on which he felt inadequately informed. But 
he did object, quite reasonably, to the "byzantinische Geschichtsfalschung"
(112) RuBland. WB 10/3/31, ibid., p.799.
(113) Doerfel, op.cit., p.174.
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as a sign of weakness and fear on the part of the Bolshevik authorities. (114) 
• He felt similar disquiet when the entire intelligentsia of M d sc ow ignored 
the visiting Ernst Toller, because he had been attacked in Pravda. (115) 
Tucholsky*s criticism of those involved for a lack of intellectual 
independence was nevertheless still naive; he failed to realise that 
such independence was inccmpatible with the situation in Stalin's Russia.
Tucholsky's subsequent attempt to explain away miscarriages of
justice in Soviet courts represented a masterpiece of circumspection,
as he strove to understand the Russian point of view. As an individualist,
Tucholsky declared himself unqualified to appreciate the effects of
such sentences. Thereby he came close to the attitude for which he had
criticised Goldschmidt: the condoning of an injustice in Russia which
he would rightly have castigated in Germany. However, Tucholsky was
beginning to lose faith in the Soviet judges, and in the state in which
they presided:
„Noch hat man nicht den Eindruck, da;3 die 
urteilenden Genossen Pharisuer seien- 
durchaus nicht. Der Weg, den sie gehen, 
kann sie jedoch dahin fiihren, es zu werden". (116)
The dilerma of Tucholsky was that a Socialist revolution in 
Germany would only be possible with Communist help, but even if such a 
Socialist regime emerged, it was unlikely to be more progressive and 
democratic than its Russian model. His enthusiasm for the Soviet Union 
was waning, and he did not contribute to its frequent glorification in 
the AIZ. (117) However, he also refrained from mentioning its problems, 
the food shortage which had resulted from the collectivisation of 
agriculture, or the housing problem, and he made no direct criticism of 
the personality cult which was beginning to surround Stalin.
(114) Dank vom Hause Stalin, WB 8/5/28, GW II, pp.1132-3.
(115) Auf dem Nachttisch, WB 3/3/31, GW III, p.794.
(116) Auf dem Nachttisch, WB 5/5/31, ibid., p.850.
(117) Cf. Koszyk, op.cit. p.332.
When this restraint is compared with Tucholsky1 s violent
‘attacks on Western capitalist!, it becomes clear how anxious he was to
give the Russians the benefit of the doubt as long as possible. The
discrepancy was noted by an anonymous contributor to the Weltb'Jhne
in April 1931; he wrote a poem in Berlin dialect, Der Menschenfreund.
Tucholsky replied in like manner: (118)
„Erst Jevitter, denn n Rejenbojn.
Keener weeB: wat wittn nu zuletzt?
Aba wat wird jejn die jelogn! 
wat wird jejn die jehetzt!
Bei die andem is et ooch beschmissen.
RuBland is n Mahnruf ant Jewissen.
Mensch, ick kann nich.
Ja, da is so manches Blut jeflossen,.
Mensch, ick kann nich...
Doch ick wee.3 in mein Sinn: 
alle Proletarier sehn nach hin.
Anjeklafft, jefnrcht, umstellt: 
det is ehmt fur die janze Welt 
... eene Hof fnung".
In spite of the evocation of the old shibboleths, such as the hostility
of the bourgeois states and the loyalty of the workers throughout the
world, this "answer" has rightly been described by Prescher as unconvincing. (1!
The repetition of "Mensch, ick kann nich" implies an emotional commitment
to the Soviet Union rather than a rational refutation of the accusation of
double standards. However faint the hope might be, Tucholsky clung to it
desperately, sensing that it was his last.
Tucholsky's positive attitude towards Soviet Russia had latterly 
been subjected to the same strain as his indirect support for the KPD.
After Hitler's seizure of power, the betrayal of the German Communists by 
Stalin and the Comintern destroyed his last illusions. (120) The members 
of the proscribed KPD were thrown into prison or concentration camps, or
(118) Der Menschenfreund von einem Anonymus; Antwort, by Tucholsky, 
both in WB 7/4/31.
(119) Prescher, thesis, p.112.
(120) Cf. letter to Arnold Zweig, 15/12/35, Briefe, p.338: "... dieser 
l'icherliche Stalin, der seine Leute verr.;it.."
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shot by the SA without trial while the Kremlin looked on benignly.
When Stalin did intervene, it was to send scene Oarmunist exiles back 
to Hitler's Germany in order to stamp out their "deviationist" views. 
Tucholsky could still admit that since the October Revolution Russia 
had taken a great step forward into the 20th century, and he told his 
friend Hasenclever that the thought of the Bolshevik state being 
destroyed by Nazi troops was "etwas Tragisches und Schreckliches". (121) 
Nevertheless, he was bitterly disappointed and regretted his earlier 
restraint towards the faults of the USSR.
Above all Tucholsky objected to the narrow nationaliam inherent
in Stalin's response to Hitler's accession: that exclusive concern with
short-term Russian interests which led him to become Hitler's ally six
years later. The Russian dictator had manipulated Marxist ideology for
his own benefit, and was only interested in maintaining his own power.
It is ironic that Tucholsky's recriminations after he had abandoned his
journalistic career represented a more accurate picture of the Soviet
State than his earlier forbearance and optimism had allowed:
„RuBland ist nicht mehr die Sache,
for die der Proletarier kampft-
es ist nicht mehr der Hort des Klassenkanpfes.
Ein Petroleumstaat wie jeder andere auch". (122)
The question of Tucholsky's attitude to Marxist theory is more 
controversial than his opinion of the party and the country which claimed 
to embody it. Some East German critics (123) have claimed that he lacked 
detailed knowledge of the Marxist classics and the doctrine which they 
contained. The point is refuted by Weise's rejoinder that the mere fact
(121) Letter of 7/10/34, ibid., p.289.
(122) Letter to Pol, 7/5/33, ibid., p.229.
(123) Walter Victor: Bericht uber Kurt Tucholsky im Auftrage der 
Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR, 1959, p.4, and Klaus 
Beilin: Untersuchungen zur Literaturkritik Tucholskys,
Potsdam, 1960, p.51.
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that Tucholsky did not review works by Marx or Engels was no proof 
that he had not read them. (124)
In fact this survey has already demonstrated (125) Tucholsky's 
familiarity with the basic tenets of Marxism. He approved of the 
doctrine of materialism, and thus accepted the theoretical foundation of 
Marx's political philosophy. Abandoning his earlier individualism, he 
adopted a collectivist view of politics. Tucholsky went on to agree 
with Marx's division of capitalist society into bourgeoisie and proletariat, 
and to endorse the latter's struggle against their exploiters. The state 
appeared to him as a weapon employed by the bourgeoisie in the subjugation 
of the proletariat, and he supported Lenin's suggestion that in the event 
of war the workers should fight their real enemies at home rather than 
their foreign comrades. Tucholsky rejected parliamentary democracy in 
favour of a revolution leading to a Socialist government, which would as 
its first action abolish private ownership of the most important means of 
production and introduce the dictatorship of the proletariat. Furthermore, 
by 1928, Tucholsky had became convinced that the abstract advocacy of 
such aims was not sufficient service to the revolutionary cause, and was 
popularising these ideas among the workers by writing in the Communist 
press.
In spite of such evidence, seme critics (126) still give credence 
to Tucholsky's own opinion^  as stated to his brother Fritz in 1934, that 
he had never been a Marxist. (127) Otheismake this case by implication 
rather than direct assertion. Poor, for example, claims that Tucholsky 
was uninterested in any ideology, Marxist or otherwise. (128) However, Poor
(124) Weise, thesis, p.185.
(125) Cf. Chapter 4.
(126) Doerfel, op.cit., p.155.
<-127) Cf. letter of 24/2/34, Briefe, p.317: "Die Theorie ist eben falsch - 
ich bin nie Marxist gewesen".
(128) Poor, op.cit., p.145.
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quotes only from articles written during and after 1930, and so he 
fails to deal with the crucial period from 1925 to 1930. Other critics 
sidestep the issue by asserting, correctly but irrelevantly, that in 
spite of his indirect support for the KPD, Tucholsky never became a 
Ccmmunist. (129) Marxism is a theoretical doc trine,while Gcmmunism in 
the 1920's was an amalgam of Marx's doctrines and the political practice 
of Lenin and Stalin. It is possible to collaborate to a limited extent 
with a party without endorsing all its aims. This attitude may be 
demonstrated by the token gesture of refusing to pay a membership fee, 
thereby remaining separate from the organised faithful. In the theoretical 
field, the position of a sympathetic outsider is more difficult to maintain: 
there is no process by which one denies payment of a symbolic obolus to 
an abstract concept. When a writer publicly accepts the major points of 
Marxist theory and supports its revolutionary aims, he may justifiably be 
termed a Marxist. Whatever reservations Tucholsky may have felt on the 
subject, he did not express thorn in writing; they cannot therefore be 
checked or taken into account in this survey. The present writer believes 
that Tucholsky can be described as a theoretical Marxist between 1925 and 
1928, and as a theoretical and practising Marxist until around the end 
of 1929.
The extent of Tucholsky's adherence to Marxism should be borne 
in mind in any consideration of his increasingly critical attitude towards 
the doctrine from 1930 onwards. The vehemence with which he rejected 
Marxism after 1933 may well be attributable to the disappointment of a 
former believer. The transformation began cautiously enough, parallel to 
his gradual disillusionment with the KPD and the Soviet Union. Two factors
(129) Schulz, op.cit., pp.119-20.
stimulated his criticism: the attempt by same Marxists to turn their 
doctrine into a substitute for religion (130), and his admiration for 
the psychoanalytical work of Sigmund Freud.
Dogmatism was foreign to Tucholsky's nature; he sought the 
truth and the ideal but was realistic enough never to claim that he had 
found them. He had begun to doubt the idea that human beings were by 
nature good, but were corrupted by their social environment, and to 
question the Marxist solution to the problem: that the political system
should be changed in order to improve men's moral standards.
This view had originally been popularised by Rousseau, whose 
book Du Oontrat Social provided a blue-print for the ideal society out 
of ethical motives. Marx had followed a similar line, using, the term 
Entfrendung (alienation) to describe the attitude of the proletarian to 
his job. (131) Marx considered that work played an essential part in 
human development, and that men should be able to recognise the value 
of their own activity. Under capitalism, however, work was merely a means 
of self-preservation. Compelled to sell his labour-power at a price 
below its true value, the proletarian lost control over his labour and 
the products which it created. He was no longer a conscious craftsman, 
but the mechanical performer of a repetitive task of uncertain significance. 
The abolition of private property in the means of production would allow 
the proletarian to take pride in his work once more, since as a result of 
public ownership he would be working for himself and receiving the full 
fruits of his labour. This liberation of the proletariat would also mean 
freedom and a new moral stature for mankind as a whole.
(130) Cf. the criticism of "kommunistische Theologie" in Von den Kranzen; 
der Abtreibung und dem Sakrament der Ehe, WB 17/2/31, GW III, p.786.
(131) Marx and Engels, Okononisch-philosophische Manuskripte, in Werke, 
Erganzungsband, Erster Teil, pp.511-20.
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Tucholsky rejected this optimistic view. Instead he quoted
■a passage from Freud's newly-published essay Das Unbehagen in der
Kultur, in which the psychoanalyst maintained that even the abolition
of private property would not suddenly turn men into angels. Their
innate sadistic impulses wauld lose one important outlet (13 2), but
others would remain, especially sexually imspired aggression. (133)
The high priests of Marxism were wrong to put forward their doctrine as
the only panacea for the world's ills:
„Es ist an der Zeit, den Unentwegten mitzuteilen, 
daS man den Marxisrnus nicht wie eine Kaseglocke 
iiber die Welt st'ilpen kann. Er deckt sie nicht". (134)
The criticism that Marxism had become an article of faith 
rather than reason, and that other doctrines could also help men with 
their problons was not in itself a complete rejection of Marxist 
principles. Tucholsky envisaged a combination of psychoanalysis and 
Marxism (135) His respect for the former was indicated when he described 
Freud's writings as
„Elf Bande, die die Welt erschutterten". (136) 
and it was no dishonour for Marx's achievenent to be ranked alongside 
them. Tucholsky still admitted that the materialist philosophy which 
provided the basis for Marx's political work had much to commend it, 
especially when compared with idealist doctrines which talked of man's 
"reine Seele", and dismissed his economic welfare as unimportant. (137)
(132) Cf. Freud: Abri3 der Psychoanalyse and Das Unbehagen in der Kultur, 
Frankfurt, Fischer, 1972. The passage from the latter is quoted by 
Tucholsky in Replik, WB 22/4/30, GW III, p.424.
(133) Cf. Henri Barbusse und die Platte "Lord help me-1", WB 19/11/29, 
ibid., p.254.
(134) Gesunde und kranke Nerven, WB 14/10/30, ibid., p.557.
(135) GW III, p.557.
(136) Auf dem Nachttisch, WB 5/5/31, ibid., p.847.
(137) ibid., p.557.
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Marxian had provided a healthy reaction to such abstract theorising.
.However, it could not cure those
„geistige Betriebsstorungen, die ewig sind 
wie die Welt"(138):
that was a task for the psychiatrist. But few Marxists responded to
the challenge to define critically the limits in efficacy of their
gospel: improvements in the social framework were still regarded as
sufficient to solve men's mental problems. Two years later Tucholsky
finally lost patience with such dogmatism:
„Wenn ich so die unentwegten ]y&rxisten lese, 
dann frage ich mich immer: wird eigentlich in 
Rutland auch gestorben? Und was ist der Tod 
bei denen? Ein Betriebsunfall? Ein kleinburgerliches 
Vorurteil?‘t 139)
In 1934 he even wrote to Hasenclever that the "pure materialism" on
which Marxian was based was as nonsensical an attitude as pure idealism. (140)
Tucholsky's doubts about the theoretical basis of Marxism
were serious. Doerfel's description of his attitude
„In seiner Kritik versucht er, da wo es nur ein 
absolutes Ja oder Nein gab, Fairness walten zu lassen". (141)
is correct, though couched in unduly pejorative terms. But these weaknesses
in the underlying philosophical aspects of Marxian might not have sufficed
to transform his opinions. After all, Marx's philosophical writings were
not his most important contribution to scholarship. As the political
scientist John Plamenatz has explained:
(138) ibid., p.558.
'(139) Schnipsel, V© 21/6/32, ibid., p. 1078.
(140) Letter of 7/10/34, Briefe, p.288.
(141) Doerfel, op.cit., p.175.
"Marx was not really a philosopher at all; that he 
appears to have been one is merely an accident of 
German history. It was the fashion in his day for 
men to derive their political theories from their 
general views about the nature of the universe". (142)
Tucholsky had other reasons for gradually withdrawing frcm 
his Marxist allegiance. From 1925 orwards he had been willing to 
sacrifice his individualism and think in terms of the happiness of the 
workers as an organised group. Their strength lay in solidarity, and 
so he had encouraged then to maintain it against the capitalists. His 
own failure to reach an understanding with the Communists probably was 
responsible for his disenchantment. The central figure of the poem 
Hej-1 rejects all the houses competing for his support. (143) Thousands 
were in a similar position, and Tucholsky justified their refusal to 
subnit to the discipline of a group; they were to go their own way as he 
was doing himself.
Isolated in a Swedish village, Tucholsky began to regard all
mass organisations as equally abhorrent, since irrespective of their
political affiliation they symbolised the "Hordenwahnsinn" of mankind.
In a complete reversal of his position of 1925(144), he asserted that one
day individualisn would again become modern, and it is evident frcm his
tone that he approved of this development:
„Dann wird einer kcmmen, der wird eine gradezu 
donnernde Entdeckung machen: er wird den 
Einzelmenschen entdecken. Er wird sagen: es
gibt einen Organismus, Mensch geheiien, und auf 
den kcmmt es an. Und ob der glacklich ist, 
das ist die Frage. Da3 der frei ist, das ist 
das Ziel".(145)
This was a rejection not merely of capitalist states like Germany, but 
of any group which usurped authority over the individual. The praise
(142) John Plamenatz: German Marxism and Russian Communism, London, 
Longmans, 1954, p.9.
(143) GW III, p.230.
(144) Cf. GW II, p.287.
(145) Blick in feme Zukunft. WB 28/10/30, GW III, p.580*
of this liberal principle amounts to another oblique attack on Marxism.
Tucholsky fs final public criticism of Marxism concerned a 
more practical issue. According to the Gommunist Manifesto, capitalist 
society contained two classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.
This rigid division according to ownership of the means of production 
was open to attack. Marxists might claim that clerks and staff employees 
possessed as little land and as few shares as the workers, but their 
class consciousness did not allow the German Angestellten to describe 
themselves as proletarians. Tucholsky contended that Marxists should 
adapt their theory to this subjective reality rather than deny its 
existence. (146) Their failure to do so provided him with another example 
of dogmatic rigidity.
If Tucholsky was sceptical about Marxism between 1930 and 1932, 
his private comments on the subject after 1933 amounted to outright 
rejection. It should nevertheless be noted that he still admired the 
writings of the young Marx, and thought it worth while to strip the 
doctrine of its pseudo-religious trappings and set it in its historical 
context. He also refused to blame Marx for the errors of his followers.
When they based their optimistic belief that the revolution would triumph 
on Marx1 s theory, that history progressed through thesis and antithesis 
to a higher synthesis, Tucholsky did not attack Marx for ambiguity. On 
the contrary, it was his interpreters who had failed to give due emphasis 
to the need to work for a revolution, rather than merely to organise a 
political party and indulge in bloodthirsty rhetoric. The victory of 
the despised bourgeoisie was a refutation not of Marxism but of contemporary 
Marxist tactics:
(146) Auf dam Nachttisch, WB 22/4/30, ibid., p.430.
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„Das kcmmt davon, da3 diese Leute 
ihren Marx nicht gelesen haben". (147)
In general, however, Tucholsky regarded Marxism latterly 
as an "Irrlehre, im Keim verkehrt" * (148) He dismissed the proposition 
that "das Sein bestimmt das BewuDtsein" as no more sensible than the 
assertion that men's health was determined by the state of their 
teeth. (149) He also claimed that he and his correspondent Hasenclever 
had always known it to be false. This may be true of Hasenclever, but 
Tucholsky himself had accepted the validity of the concept in 1925(150) 
and not denied it since. His recognition that man was not a mere "homo 
oeconomicus" but "ein ganzer, runder Mensch" (151), also represents the 
reversal of an earlier opinion on the primacy of the economic factor in 
human relations. (152) Tucholsky even objected to the proposition that 
the workers of the world had a cannon class consciousness. It had never 
existed, except in Marx's imagination:"KlassenbewaGtsein" was "das 
hegelsche Produkt einer Professors". (153) Indeed the idea of the 
Internationale had in practice had a negative effect; instead of rallying 
the workers across the frontiers it had stimulated their capitalist 
opponents to organise the successful defence of their spoils.
Tucholsky's hostility to Marxist principles frcm 1933 until 
his death is due in seme degree to his disappointment with the failure 
of the German and Russian Communists to prevent Hitler's seizure of power. 
Do erf el is also correct in asserting that Tucholsky's bitterness stemmed
(147) Letter to Fritz Tucholsky, 24/2/34, Briefe, p.317.
(148) Letter to Hasenclever, 17/5/33, ibid., p.257.
(149) Letter of 1935, ibid., p.303.
(150) GW II, p.18.
(151) Briefe, p.303.
(152) GW II, p.19.
(153) Briefe, p.303.
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partly frcm the realisation that the collapse of the revolutionary
mass movement meant the final destruction of his personal hopes. (154)
However, the key to his violent anti-Marxian may be another renark to
Hasenclever:
„Man muB diese Lehre Marxens passiert haben, 
man muls sie teilweise und kritisch auzuwenden 
verstehn".(155)
Tucholsky was able to apply Marxist standards critically, expecially 
after 1930 when he was losing confidence in than. However, the crucial 
point is the duration of the period when he "passed through" Marx's 
doctrine. This writer believes that Tucholsky's vehemence also stemmed 
frcm the knowledge, which now filled him with embarrassment and regret, 
that he had himself publicly supported Marxist principles for five years. 
A combination of these three factors is the best explanation of his bitter 
conclusion:
„Es wird den Arbeitem erst wieder gut gehen, 
wenn es keinen Marxismus mehr gibt". (156)
At the root of Tucholsky's later political writings lie two 
apparently contradictory tendencies. His devotion to the cause of the 
down-trodden German workers was indicated by frequent articles in the 
Weltbihne, by his new readiness to write propaganda verses on their behalf 
and to publish the Deutschlandbuch. When he encouraged readers of the AIZ 
to remain loyal to "the party" which was fighting to improve their lot, he 
meant the KPD. The Soviet Union seemed to him a symbol of hope for 
workers throughout the world, and he looked forward to a successful 
revolution in Germany. At first his opinion of Marxist theory was equally 
positive. The period 1928-30, bringing a combination of theoretical 
conviction and practical revolutionary propaganda, represented the 
culmination of Tucholsky's left-ward development.
(155) Letter of 7/10/34, Briefe, p.288.
(156) ibid., p.303.
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Tucholsky's sincerity in espousing the cause of the workers 
cannot be doubted. However, the very intensity of his support was a 
signal that the struggle could not long be maintained by an intellectual 
whose humanitarian enthusiasm had already given way to resignation in 
December 1919 and throughout 1923. Even as he threw himself into the 
role of poetic propagandist for Munzeriberg, Tucholsky recognised that 
his writing career might be better served by a complete break with current 
affairs.His many-sided literary talents also continued to require the 
outlets provided by Panter and Hauser.
The detachment symbolised by the latter two personae reappeared 
more significantly within Tucholsky's political writings. He saw the 
relationship between the progressive intellectual and the working-class 
party as problematical, and was repelled by the suspicions of Gcmmunist 
functionaries and by their instructions to join the party. Discipline 
was desirable, as Tucholsky recognised, but his political integrity 
mattered more; he therefore remained a sympathiser, outside the fold.
Keeping his distance was made easier for Tucholsky by the 
KPD's tactics, dictated by Moscow to assist Soviet foreign policy rather 
than to protect the German proletariat. Although for a long time 
Tucholsky spared the Communist leaders frcm the bitter criticism heaped 
on their SPD colleagues, he lived to regret the omission. His attitude 
to the Soviet Union under Stalin gradually changed too. When compared 
to the bourgeois democracies it still appeared worthy of support, but 
problems existed there too, and the solutions imposed by the Bolsheviks 
on their own country were sometimes as questionable as the instructions 
to the KPD.
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Marxist theory fared little better in Tucholsky's 
estimation than its exponents after 1930. He first reduced its 
status to that of a means to an end: the class struggle was necessary, 
as was the belief in ultimate victory, but there could be no sudden 
transition frcm Weimar Germany to the new Jerusalem. Tucholsky cited 
Freud as evidence against the proposition that men's problems could 
all be solved by political revolution. In private letters after his 
retirement from journalism, he rejected materialism and the primacy 
of the economic factor, and even denied that he had ever been a Marxist. 
The last assertion should not be unthinkingly accepted, as it has been 
by many critics. It illustrates Tucholsky* s disappointment and regret, 
and is in fact untrue.
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CHAPTER 6
Between 1930 and 1932 the decline of the German Republic 
helped to weaken Tucholsky's resolution to resist the impending 
catastrophe. The Grand Coalition broke up in 1930 when the industrial­
ists of the DVP and the trade unionists of the SPD could not agree on a 
programme to cope with unemployment and the budget deficit. The new 
Chancellor, Heinrich Brining, was uninterested in obtaining a parlia­
mentary majority for his deflationary economic policy, and relied 
instead on emergency presidential decrees. Suspicious of Bruning's 
authoritarianism, the Social Democrats helped to defeat his government, 
but the resultant election of September 1930 proved disastrous both to 
the Chancellor and to his left-wing critics. After a violent propaganda 
campaign, the National Socialists, previously an ineffective splinter- 
group, won 107 seats to become the second-largest party in the Reichstag- 
The Oonmunist share of the vote also increased.
From 1930 parliamentary democracy was under pressure from both 
political extremes and was undermined by the government itself. Earlier 
in his career Tucholsky had indulged in polemic against more progressive 
politicians than Br ining. However, it is characteristic of his later 
writings that he only produced one mildly satirical reference to the 
Chancellor's ability to survive difficult situations. (1) The SPD's 
decision to tolerate Brining also met only token resistance from Tucholsky. (2) 
Ossietzky might still demand that the SPD create a new state based on a 
return by the party to the principles of social rebellion(3), but Tucholsky 
had long given up hope of progress frcm that quarter. He also was
(1) Deutsches Chaos, WB 4/8/31, GW III, pp.902-03.
(2) ibid., p.902.
(3) Koplin, op.cit., p.170.
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beginning to recognise that his link with the KPD might not provide 
an intellectual standpoint worth fighting for. As he began to study 
Marxism more critically, so this Jewish-born atheist examined the 
role played in Germany by the Catholic Church.
A detailed discussion of Tucholsky's attitude to the meta­
physical aspects of religion lies outside the scope of this survey. (4)
There is evidence that he studied the subject in his last years, but 
that he could not make the final step to religious belief. (5) Unlike 
many of his colleagues, he was no mere "patentierter Freidenker"; he 
regarded such an attitude as simplistic. (6) Symptomatic of this open- 
minded approach was his readiness to correspond with a Catholic journalist, 
Marierose Fuchs, in an effort to clarify their respective positions. 
Admitting that as an outsider he could not fully appreciate the secrets 
of Catholic dogma, Tucholsky nevertheless recognised the generations of 
scholarship responsible for "den richtigen, den echten Katholizismus". (7) 
What he saw in Germany, on the other hand, was debased "Vulgarkatholizismus" 
which had to be fought. Tucholsky thereby distinguished between the 
Church as "Hort des Glaubens" which he refused to criticise, and its 
secondary role as a "politische Institution im Staat".(8)
The political influence of the Catholic Church resulted frcm the 
indispensability of the Catholic Centre Party for any coalition government. 
After the war its leader, Erzberger, had supported the Republic and worked
(4) Schulz, op.cit., pp.l33f.
(5) In one of his last letters to Hasenclever, Tucholsky quoted a passage 
frcm the Danish metaphysician, Kierkegaard, about "den Dichter, der 
iiber sich selbst hinaus mochte und der es nur zur religiosen Sehnsucht, 
nicht zur Frcnmigkeit selber bringt... Ich f'ihle das genau so". (Letter 
of 29/1/35, Briefe, p.308^
(6) Carl Sonnenschein, WB 6/1/31, GW III, p.761.
(7) Tucholsky's letters to Fuchs have now been published as Briefe an 
eine Katholikin, R^ wohlt, 1970. This quotation is frcm his letter
of 16/1/29, BK p. 16.
(8) letter of 14/8/29, ibid., p.13.
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towards European peace by striving to improve relations with France.
His successors Wirth and Marx were skilful tacticians who guaranteed 
the continuation of this enlightened foreign policy in spite of virulent 
attacks frcm the extreme right. Tucholsky had noted with approval this 
contribution to national stability. (9) The Zentrum also helped to 
maintain Braun's coalition government in Prussia, thereby ensuring 
democratic control of the most important German province throughout the 
Weimar era.
By the late 1920's the major aims of the Zentrum's foreign 
policy had been implemented by Stresemann and Marx. When the party was 
confronted by domestic problems, it adopted a more conservative line. (10) 
It insisted on maintaining separate Church schools, in order to retain 
its influence over Catholic children. More controversial was its belief 
in the sanctity of marriage, reaffirmed by the Papal Encyclical of 1931. 
The Zentrum also led the opposition to birth control and abortion. Tuch­
olsky believed that such moral rigour ignored the changes in social 
attitudes towards sexual intercourse, and he regarded the restrictions 
imposed on Catholic wives as intolerable. This conduct represented in 
his opinion an abuse of political influence, and he felt justified in 
organising resistance to the Church which invoked divine law in order to 
ensure an adequate supply of Catholics for the factories or the trenches. 
Not the doctrine but its practical application led Tucholsky to advise the 
proletariat: "Tretet aus der Kirche aus!"(ll)
Nevertheless the Catholic Church in Germany was not a purely 
conservative force, without sympathy for the suffering of the poor. It
(9) Cf. Der erste Handedruck, WB 9/10/24.
(10) Old Baumerhand, der Schrecken der Damokratie,WB 14/12/26, GW II, p.562.
Auch eine Urteilsbegrundung, WB 12/5/31, GW III, p.857.
could point to the many caritative works organised in Berlin by 
Carl Sonnenschein, a "one-man Salvation Army" (12), for whose energy 
Tucholsky felt great support. Sonnenschein looked on his humanitarian 
activities as intrinsically Important, and Tucholsky defended him against 
the charge of seeking to convert those to whom he gave assistance. After 
Sonnenschein*s death, Bishop Schreiber of Berlin appeared a likely 
successor, since he too sympathised with the masses on such issues as 
poor housing and unemployment.
Tucholsky praised Sonnenschein and Schreiber for attempting to 
find a solution to social problans. Nevertheless he disagreed with their 
plans to reconcile the workers with their orployers, and regarded as 
illusory the exhortation that the latter renounce seme of their wealth 
to improve the position of the under-privileged. The Marxist remedy of 
the class struggle was more likely to succeed, and Tucholsky described 
the Church's alternative as a correct diagnosis, but an inadequate 
therapy. (13) Schreiber's ideas were merely "pseudo-Socialism"; inevitably 
so, since the Zentrum was becoming dominated by rich industrialists. The 
efforts of individuals could not disguise the fact that the Church as a 
political institution was playing a reactionary role, and Tucholsky pledged 
that he would fight against it on the side of the workers.
Tucholsky was correct to suspect that the Zentrum was moving 
to the right. Its new leader, Monsignor Kaas, represented the conservative 
wing; and although Brining had worked in the Christian Trade Unions, he 
too believed in order rather than reform. It is difficult to assess haw 
far their authoritarian policies stemmed merely frcm personal inclination, 
and how far they reflected prevailing attitudes within the party. The
(12) ibid., pp.760-1.
(13) GW III, p.348.
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Zentrum deputies gave enthusiastic support to Br uning1 s economic 
and constitutional plans; but their conservatism did not extend to 
the toleration of Papen, even though he had represented than in the 
Prussian Landtag and had a large share-holding in their newspaper,
Germania. Tucholsky's attack on the industrialist right of the party 
was therefore only partially justified.
To understand the changes in Zentrum policy it is necessary 
to recognise, as Tucholsky did, that it owed its loyalty not to a form 
of government or an economic principle, but to the Vatican and to the 
well-being of a socially heterogeneous electorate. Its leaders had 
been monarchists under the Protestant Hohenzollerns, Republicans under 
Ebert and Hindenburg, and would always be on the side with the strongest 
battalions. (14) As early as February 1930 Tucholsky noted the sympathy 
of sane sections of the Catholic press for the National Socialists (15), 
and a year later he declared that only the Nazi attacks on the Vatican 
and Alfred Rosenberg' s cult of Wodan were preventing the Zentrum from 
open defection to the Fascist cause. (16) The negotiations between Hitler 
and Kaas in the summer of 1932, and the Zentrum' s subsequent support for 
Hitler's Ermichtigungsgesetz can therefore hardly have surprised Tucholsky. 
However, the Pope's decision to sacrifice the party in order to achieve 
a Concordat with Hitler shocked him into comparing Pius XI with the other 
figure who had betrayed his German supporters, Stalin. (17)
(14) Tucholsky recognised this fact, even while praising the party's services 
to democracy: "Das Zentrum ist niemals treu republikanisch gavesen, so 
wenig, wie es treu monarchistisch war - es ist eine Sache for sich,
mit ganz besondern Interessen, mit besondem Stranungen, besondern 
Fundamenten". (Der erste Handedruck, WB 9/10/24). Six years later he 
wrote: "Im ganzen ist es wohl so',"~~daS diese Partei iitmer wartet, wer 
beim Kampf die Oberhand gewinnt; bei dem ist sie dann".(GW III, p.343).
(15) ibid., p.349.
(16) ibid., p.795.
(17) Cf. letter to Fritz Tucholsky, 5/12/35, Briefe, p.327.
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Tucholsky's interest in the Catholic Church related not 
to its dogma, which he regarded with sympathetic incomprehension, but 
to its political role. Its main agent, the Zentrum, had distinguished 
itself in foreign policy, but Tucholsky condemned its intolerance in 
the domestic field. He considered the Church's efforts to solve social 
problems as well-meant, but of necessity inadequate, because of the 
Zentrum's industrialist wing, which preferred an alliance with the NSQAP. 
The direction of the Zentrum from Rone finally led to its dissolution, 
since the Pope believed that the Catholic Church in Germany could better 
be served by appeasing Hitler than by antagonising him; this was a decision 
which Tucholsky opposed on moral grounds.
The failure of the left and the Church to extend or even main­
tain progressive democracy in Germany was all the more disturbing because 
that democracy was under attack frcm the National Socialists. The rise 
of the Nazis stemmed partly frcm the economic crisis, which caused mass 
unemployment and created a mood of despair in which the lower middle 
classes proved especially receptive to right-wing radicalism. Hitler's 
speeches provided them with a series of traditional scape-goats, such as 
Communists, Je/s, and Republicans, while his para-military SA appealed to 
their love of uniforms and impressed thorn by its display of force.
Goebbels' skilful propaganda, with its lavish and self-contradictory 
premises to the various special interest groups- won more converts. As 
their movement gained control of the streets and steadily increased its 
electoral strength, many Nazis began to believe in the inevitability of 
their success.
Nevertheless, it would be simplistic to claim that Hitler's 
victory was certain. Whatever the dynamic of the NSDAP, it could hardly
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have triumphed so completely but for the weakness of its opponents.
The last Republican Chancellors assisted the Nazis by undemining 
democracy, though their motives varied. Brining merely wished to 
prevent the Reichstag from interfering with his financial policy, Papen 
had vague visions of an authoritarian Neuer Staat, and Schleicher hoped 
to tame the NSDAP by saddling them with responsibility for unpopular 
but necessary government decisions. The Social Democrats played a 
passive role, waiting for the end of the economic crisis to strengthen 
democracy once more; they refused to take to the streets against the 
Nazis.
Tucholsky was justified in claiming that the Republic no longer
believed in itself. Its police gave the Nazis freedom of the streets,
while its judges condoned terrorism frcm the right.
„Hier beginnt die Schuld der Republik: 
eine Blutschuld"
Tucholsky wrote at the beginning of Brdning's term of office. (18) As so
often in the past, Tucholsky's warning proved correct. In January 1933
the Nazis took over power in the unspectacular matter foreseen by
Tucholsky1s Hellseher:
,.Putsch trocken. Ich sehe kein Blut.
Ich sehe die aufgeregte Insel Deutschland.
Faschismus Lagerbrau Wozu ein Putsch?
Die Herren haben ja beinahe alles, was 
sie brauchert: Verwaltung, Richter, Militar,
Schule, Universitat...1 (19)
On the subject of possible resistance to a right-wing govern­
ment, Tucholsky was pessimistic. (20) The workers were the only group 
likely to put up a fight, but they had no chance of success. They were
(18) Die deutsche Pest, WB 13/5/30, GW III, p.441.
(19) Der Hellseher, WB 1/4/30, ibid., p.398.
(20) ibid., p.399.
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divided among themselves; the best were dead or in prison and those 
who remained lacked weapons with which to fight the army and the 
police. Tucholsky therefore prophesied only a few brave but hopeless 
uprisings. Here too his forecast was fulfilled; in spite of many acts 
of individual heroism, the working classes could offer no effective 
resistance to Hitler. (21)
Those who might have expected to suffer most at the hands of 
the triumphant Nazis were the Jews. Tucholsky1 s relationship with the 
German Jews is examined in detail later in this chapter. Relevant in 
the present context is the last article in the Wendriner series, Herr 
Wendriner steht unter der Diktatur(22), written shortly after the Nazis' 
first major electoral success. Poor rightly describes this article as
"a chillingly accurate description of certain
aspects of the later Nazi dictatorship".(23)
Wendriner is surprisingly content with the situation after the 
Nazi take-over. "H" may be from Czechoslovakia, but he knows what Germany 
needs: Qrdnung. The characteristics of this "order" soon emerge. All 
Jews have to carry a special gelben Schein and an SA-man is in charge of 
every street. Though Wendriner naturally only dares to whisper to his 
friends, he clearly envisages neither resistance nor flight. In fact 
things have turned out better than he expected:
„Dieses System hat auch seine gute Seiten..
es hat seine geschichtliche Berechtigung".(24)
(21) This emerges even frcm such an apologia of illegal Communist 
activity as Jan Petersen's Unsere StraBe, first published in 
1935. Petersen's colleagues maintain the local KPD organisation 
at the cost of many lives, but can achieve little against the
• all-powerful NSDAP.
(22) WB 7/10/30, GW III, pp.547-50.
(23) Poor, op.cit., p.197.
(24) GWIII, p.549.
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His fellow-Jews, especially those frcm Eastern Europe, have given 
the race a bad name, and deserve the scorn of the new rulers. ‘Wendriner 
also rejoices over Hitler's recognition of the value of military 
traditions, and is relieved that the Communists will now be kept away 
frcm his safe. Tucholsky's later disgust with the German Jews stemmed 
largely frcm the fact that so many of then responded to the advent of 
Hitler with the misguided equanimity of Wendriner, with the same naive 
trust that some arrangement with the National Socialists would be 
possible. On this point Tucholsky knew better. When Wendriner leaves 
the taxi to go into the theatre, he assures his wife that it will not 
rain; after the performance he discovers that it is indeed raining, but, 
unlike his creator, chooses to ignore the omen.
Tucholsky's analysis of the NSDAP itself was not always as 
clear-sighted as his assessment of its opponents. On one point, never­
theless, he cannot be faulted. Although Otto Strasser and the economist 
Gottfried Feder talked of a German road to Socialism and liberation frcm 
Jewish Zinsknechtschaft, Tucholsky recognised that such slogans 
represented only a trick to win over the workers and a token concession 
to the radical activism of the SA.
„Die Geldgeber dieser Bewegung sind erzkapitalistisch" (25) 
he declared. As he had predicted, Thyssen, Kirdorf and other industrial­
ists regarded the National Socialists as a bulwark against Corrmunism and 
were unwilling to tolerate any tampering with the status quo. In any 
case, Hitler himself had no plans to alter the economic system. Tuch­
olsky was right to forecast that the Nazi government would favour capital 
rather than labour. During the period frcm 1933 to the outbreak of war, 
profits rose sharply, especially in the field of heavy industry, while 
the wages of the average worker hardly increased. This proved possible
(25) QW III, p.439.
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because, as Tucholsky had also anticipated, the National Socialists
almost immediately seized the opportunity to ban the KPD, exclude the
Social Democrats from public life and abolish the trade unions:
„Was wirklich abgebaut wird, das wird die Kampfkraft 
der Arbeiter sein. Auch die zahmsten Gewerkschaften 
werden nichts zu lachen haben" .(26)
Paradoxically, Tucholskyfs recognition of the source of party
funds blinded him to the relative strength of the Nazi "revolution" on
the one hand and the weakness of the traditionalist right on the other.
He accepted the theory that Hitler was "der Trommler", a mere figure-head
who was being manipulated by his Nationalist colleagues and would be
pushed aside when he had served his purpose:
„..Wie sie regieren werden? Viel harmloser, 
a Is die Radios enttauschten, aber bald gebandigten 
Kleinburger glauben. Deren radikale Flugel wird 
rasch unterdr'ickt; auch Herr Hitler hat seine 
Schuldigkeit getan und kann gehen. Es wird 
keine Revolution sein, so wenig wie die von 1918 
eine gewesen ist".(27)
An authoritarian government would emerge, similar to the pre-war Imperial
cabinets:
„Nun wird Deutschland streng national liberal". (28)
This prognostication at least proved false. Within months of
taking pcwer, Hitler had disposed of the more recalcitrant DNVP ministers
and reduced the others to obedient technical assistants;all other political
parties had ceased to exist, and the Wehrmacht swore its oath of allegiance
to the person of Hitler. The Nazi leader could therefore assert at the
Nuremberg Party Gongress of September 1934:
„Nicht der Staat befiehlt uns, sondem wir 
befehlen dam Staat".
(26) ibid., p.400
(27) Der Hellseher, ibid., p.399.
(28) ibid.
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Since it is unusual for Tucholsky's analysis of events 
and his assessment of future prospects to be so inaccurate, several 
questions arise: was he alone in his opinions, why did he hold than 
and what effect did they have on his anti-Nazi writings?
When Tucholsky underestimated the NSDAP, he was echoing an 
opinion widely held in Germany. Few intellectuals and even fewer 
politicians had learned frcm Mussolini's seizure of power in Italy 
the lesson that there were infinite possibilities for a Fascist party 
to take over the entire machinery of state and systematically destroy 
all opposition. Ossietzky misjudged Hitler's position as Tucholsky 
had done, failing to recognise the bargain which had been struck by 
the National Socialists and their industrialist paymasters. (29) Hitler's 
chances of success were also misunderstood by politicians of the extreme 
left and the Nationalist right. The Communists hoped to take power after 
the supposedly inevitable collapse of their rivals. A more serious 
miscalculation was made by the DNVP. Hugenberg helped Hitler into office 
out of a desire to become the "economic dictator" of Germany, but also in 
the expectation of dominating the politically inexperienced National 
Socialists. Hindenburg's advisers were also over-optimistic in assuming 
that they could make use of Hitler.
Tucholsky underestimated the strength of the National Socialists 
partly because he had spent most of his career campaigning against their 
rivals on the right. The main German Conservative Party in the period 
between 1919 and 1930 had been the DNVP, and its traditional militarism 
had been so deeply rooted in national consciousness that it had resisted
(29) Cf. Koplin, op.cit., p.162: "Machtaspirationen Hitlers multen nach 
Ansicht Ossietzkys an dan Widerstand seiner auf Selbstherrschaft 
erpichten kapitalistischen Protektoren scheitern".
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even Tucholsky's determined challenge. Having lived abroad for most 
of the period since 1924, Tucholsky found it impossible to appreciate 
the rapidity of its decline and the simultaneous advent of a new enemy, 
the NSDAP".
It is also true that the gulf which separated Tucholsky from
both the DNVP and the NSDAP prevented him from putting into perspective
the differences between the two right-wing groups. As a revolutionary
Socialist, he found it impossible to take seriously the propaganda of
the National Socialists. Conservatism was for Tucholsky synonymous with
reaction, with a return to the previous Imperial order, whereas the
Nazis were looking towards the future, in which they would set up their
Third Reich. They also were invoking a "national revolution", which
Tucholsky saw as a contradiction in terms, since he could only imagine
revolution as a progressive, left-wing cause:
„Von einer revolutionaren Idee ist...
bei den Nazis nicht das Leiseste zu bemerken". (30)
However, Tucholsky believed that even if, contrary to his
expectation, the National Socialists did intend to transform society,
they would be restrained by their financial backers and by the suspicions
of their lower middle-class supporters, a group for which Tucholsky felt
only contempt:
„Der Kleinb'irger hat drei echte Leidenschaf ten:
Bier, Klatsch und Antisemitismus. Das wird ihm 
hier (d.h. in der NSDAP) alles reichlich angeboten:
Bier in den Versairmlungen, Klatsch in den Blattem 
und Radau-Antisemitismus in den groSmauligen 
Parolen der Partei".(31)
The definition was at best half-true. The German Kleihbnrger was indeed
narrow-minded and he longed for simple solutions to the country's complex
problems; but he was also afraid of a further economic and social decline,
(30) GW III, p.440.
(31) Die deutsche Pest, ibid., p.440.
and prepared to support extreme measures if they were presented by 
as convincing a demagogue as Hitler.
Tucholsky also underestimated the Nazi leader himself. In
cannon with Karl Kraus (32), he regarded Hitler as an uninteresting
figure, and he felt that Hitler owed his rise to the weakness of his
opponents.(33) Tucholsky thereby ignored the Fuhrer1 s shrewdness and
determination. He could not even appreciate the oratorical skill which
was one of Hitler's strongest weapons:
„Die Stimme ist gar nicht so unsympathisch, 
wie man denken sollte... Aber sonst: nichts, 
nichts, nichts. Keine Spannung, keine 
Hohepuhkte, er packt mich nicht, ich bin 
doch schlieSlich viel zu sehr Artist, urn 
nicht noch selbst in solcham Burschen das 
Kunstlerische zu bewundem, wenn es da ware.
Nichts. Kein Humor, keine Warme, kein Feuer, 
nichts. Er sagt auch nichts als die d'immsten 
Banalitaten, Konklusionen, die gar keine sind - 
nichts." (34)
These words, written after Hitler's accession to power, demonstrate a 
misplaced contempt for the adversary. Tucholsky had for years criticised 
the Republic for failing to inspire loyalty among its citizens, yet he 
did not recognise the charismatic qualities of the National Socialist 
leader.
One reason for Tucholsky's low opinion of Hitler, and of the 
National Socialists as a whole, was their poor intellectual standards. 
Tucholsky had seen himself, along with such figures as Heinrich Mann, 
as a representative of Geist, a quality which Hitler conspicuously
(32) Cf. Kraus: Die dritte Walpurgisnacht, Munich, Kosel, 1952, p.9:
"Mir fallt zu Hitler nichts ein". Other progressive writers, such 
as Thomas Mann, were intrigued by Hitler's personality, in spite 
of their moral and political repulsion. (Cf. Bruder Hitler, in Altes 
und Neues, Frankfurt, Fischer, 1953, pp.622-29).
(33) Schnipsel, WB 26/1/32, GW III, p.llOl.
(34) Letter to Hasenclever, 4/3/33, Briefe, p.247.
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lacked.(35) The movement also did not possess any clear ideological 
position, a fact which proved advantageous to a party seeking the 
widest possible support. Hitler and Goebbels had no scruples about 
aiming their propaganda at the lowest common dencminator of public 
opinion; as the latter confided to his diary, they were only interested 
in power. (36) Tucholsky's error of judgment lay in the assumption that 
his compatriots were politically mature; they would therefore recognise 
that Goebbels was "'n kleener Mann" (37), that his party was beneath 
contempt, and therefore unworthy to be the target of Tucholsky's polemic 
and satire. He asserted fastidiously that
„Es lohnt nicht - so tief kann man nicht schie3en. "(38)
Tucholsky *s mis judgment of Nazi strength had the effect of 
restricting his polemic against the party. His work comprised only the 
prose articles already mentioned(39), and one poem in the AIZ, Deutschland 
erwache! (40) in which he claimed that the workers were ready to resist 
the Nazis. The energy and persistence with which he had engaged in 
polemic against militarism and class justice was now lacking.
This reticence was particularly regrettable since Tucholsky's 
comparatively rare satirical attacks on the N3DAP produced such effective 
Kampfgedichte as Das Dritte Reich(41), Die Mauler auf1(42) and Rosen auf 
den Weg gestreut. (43) The last takes as its starting-point the Oommunist
(35) Altes Lied 1794, WB 3/5/32, GW III, p.1054.
(36) Josef Goebbels: Von Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, Berlin, 1934, p. 135.
(37) Joebbels, WB 24/2/31, GW III, p.790.
(38) Schnipsel, WB 8/3/32, ibid., p.1029.
(39) Der Hellseher, Die deutsche Post and Herr Wendriner steht unter 
der Diktatur.
(40) Arbeiter Illustrierte Zeitung, 1930, Gtf III, p.417.
(41) WB 6/5/30, GW III, pp.437-8.
(42) WB 26/8/30, ibid., pp.502-03.
(43) WB 31/3/31, ibid., p.814.
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slogan "Schlagt die Fascisten, wo ihr sie trefft!" which had been
prohibited by the courts as an incitement to violence, at a time when
the terror of the SA was at its height. There was no law against an
ironic parody which kept the motto in the public mind:
„Nennt sie: die s'iSen Schuckerchen, 
gebt ihnen Bonbons und Zuckerchen, 
und verspvirt ihr auch 
in euerm Bauch
den Hitler-Dolch. tief bis zum Hef t- 
Ko3t die Faschisten, kuiSt die Faschisten,
Ku*3t die Faschisten, wo ihr sie trefftl" (44)
However witty such poems might appear, they were no substitute 
for a fundamental analysis of the National Socialist phenomenon, or a 
direct polemical assault. Tucholsky took little part in the rearguard 
action led by Ossietzky. The editor of the Weltbuhne exposed the falsehood 
of Hitler's premise to stay within the law while he simultaneously 
subverted it. (45) Ossietzky pleaded with Communists and Social Democrats 
to unite against a man determined to destroy them both(46); Hiller and von 
Gerlach continued the campaign. Tucholsky*s premature admission of defeat 
was therefore by no means typical of left-wing intellectuals in Germany.
All in all it must be admitted that Tucholsky did abandon the anti-Nazi 
struggle fairly early, since his last important political article, Fir 
Carl von Ossietzky(47) was written in May 1932, though his defenders on 
this issue rightly assert that throughout the year he was a sick man. (48)
Tucholsky was nearing the end of his journalistic career when 
the National Socialists emerged as the greatest threat to the progressive 
cause since the war. He recognised the lack of determination which paralysed
(44) ibid.
(45) Cf. Ossietzky's article Egal Legal, WB 24/3/31, in Rechenschaft, 
pp.142-44, where he attacked Hitler's plea before the Reichsgericht 
during the trial of three young Reichswehr officers who sympathised 
with Nazism.
(46) Ein runder Tisch wartet, WB 3/5/32, Rechenschaft, pp.181-5.
(47) V© 17/5/32, GW III, pp.1055-58.
(48) Schulz, op.cit., p.127-8.
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the Republicans, and justifiably criticised those in power for the 
deliberate and unintentional assistance vhich they gave to the NSDAP. 
Tucholsky foresaw the inglorious end of German democracy and also the 
fact that Hitler's natural opponents, the workers and the Jews, would 
be unable or unwilling to resist him.
Tucholsky refused to be duped by Nazi talk of changes in the 
economic system; Hitler would favour his capitalist paymasters rather 
than the workers, he surmised. However, this correct assumption led him 
to overestimate the strength of the traditional reactionaries who were 
helping Hitler to power. Men such as Hugenberg were Tucholsky's old 
enemies on the right, and he failed to appreciate their loss of influence. 
Conversely, he despised the cheap propaganda of the Nazis, underestimated 
the impetus of the mass movement and believed that, once in office,
Hitler would be manipulated by his more experienced Nationalist rivals. 
Tucholsky was not alone in holding this view, but events proved it false.
Finally, Tucholsky suffered frcm uncharacteristic over-optimism 
in thinking that the emotionalism and contradictions of the NSDAP would 
prevent its success. He saw the movement as disgusting rather than 
dangerous, and, unlike many of the colleagues in the Weltbuhne, only rarely 
indulged in polemic against it. He preferred to satirise the party, 
wittily but infrequently, and had abandoned the struggle against Hitler 
months before the Nazi leader came to power.
The last years of Tucholsky were marred by physical illness 
and depression. He suffered frcm almost constant headaches which were 
at first wrongly diagnosed as symptoms of a nervous disorder. Eventually 
he convinced his doctors that he needed surgical treatment, and a 
debilitating series of operations ensued, bringing at best temporary relief.
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Tucholsky's failing health combined with his pessimistic view of
political developments in Germany, and gradually led him to despair.
Yet paradoxically this was also the period of his greatest literary
success. Fifty thousand copies of the Deutschlandbuch were sold in
a few months, his Sammelbande were eagerly read by an increasing
number of devotees, and the short story, Schlo3 Gripsholm, written in
1931, was to prove his most popular work. However, Tucholsky always
considered the effect of his work to be of paramount importance, and
he was compelled to recognise that his endeavours were proving fruitless:
„Mir erscheint es manchmal als so entsetzlich
wirkungslos; da schreibt man und arbeitet man -
und was ereignet sich nun realiter in der Verwaltung?...
Gehen die Sadisten? Werden die Burokraten entlassen?
Das bedruckt mich mi tun ter11. (49)
Events in Germany confirmed his fears. In spite of the economic 
crisis, left-wing unity was as far off as ever, and by the autumn of 1931 
he gave up hope for it. (50) The remaining democratic groups were also 
in retreat, seeking salvation in Brining' s Prasidialxegierung. Although 
Tucholsky noted the paradox that the conservative monarchist, Hindenburg, 
was now widely regarded as the last hope of the Republic (51), he reacted 
not with alternative suggestions but with resignation.
IWo explanations for Tucholsky's despair are therefore his 
illness and the disillusionment induced by the German political scene.
A third point, raised by Prescher, is the motif of suffering (Leiden), which 
becomes increasingly prominent in Tucholsky's later works. (52) Prescher 
alludes first to Freud's Trieblehre, his study of the often sadistic
(49).Letter to Franz Hammer, 5/5/31, Briefe, p.213.
(50) His last optimistic article on the subject was Die Herren 
Wirtschaftsfuhrer, WB 18/8/31, GW III, p.915.
(51) Der breite Rucken, WB 25/3/30, ibid., p.1342,
(52) Prescher, thesis, pp.170-76.
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subconscious impulses which form part of man's personality and defy 
rational control. Tucholsky believed that the existence of such impulses 
represented an omission in Marxist theory. Freud appeared to have 
recognised a fundamental truth:
„Die Wahrheit: der Wille des Manschen ist nicht frei".(53)
Once Tucholsky had expressed his agreement with the proposition, his 
pessimism was understandable. He could not ask his readers to make 
rational political choices if they had no free will to choose.
Prescher maintains that the energy with which Tucholsky conducted 
his journalistic campaign was logically reduced by this recognition. For 
many years he had sympathised with the suffering of workers and political 
prisoners, and tried to alleviate it by direct assistance and by prop­
aganda. Life's victims had done nothing to deserve their fate, and he 
longed for the day when they would lose patience with their oppressors:
„Lautert Leiden? Welchen Sinn hat es?
Was haben sie getan, mein Gott: das Pferd, der Hund, 
der Angestellte, der Proletarier, das Fursorgekind-?
Sind sie schuld?
Woran sind sie schuld?
Nimm ihnen die Geduldi (54)
Yet the invocation of God, even if only in the role of catalyst, was a
sign that Tucholsky's own resolve to fight against suffering was weakening.
This was still more apparent in a poem written eighteen months later,
Die Gefangenen, which ends not with a call for rebellion but with despair
and surrender:
„Gott, du siehst es-
Erbarme, erbarme dich der Gefangenen!
Der Mensch, der da richtet, erbarmt sich nicht.
H5rst du sie, siehst du sie, fuhlst du sie, 
die Gefangenen. 55)
Men could do nothing, and only God could help. This conclusion left
(53) Auf d m  NaChttisch, WB 5/5/31, GW III, p.848.
(54) Geduld, WB 17/9/29, ibid., p.188,
(55) WB 14/4/31, ibid., p.832.
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Tucholsky with the alternative of religion or resignation, and he 
chose the latter.
In Prescher's opinion Tucholsky did not give up the political 
struggle because of events in Germany. His resignation is seen as 
motivated by the recognition of deep psychological truths, concerning 
the absence of human freedom. Prescher's case is well presented, but 
seems ultimately unconvincing. His argument ignores Tucholsky's ill- 
health and emits the obvious comparison with his silence in 1923, when 
he was also disgusted with German politics. The motif of Leiden is 
indeed important to Tucholsky's work, but it should be regarded as a 
symptom rather than a cause of his resignation. The theory of Freud 
that man was by nature cruel impressed Tucholsky not as a new discovery, 
but as a confirmation of what he had already sensed. (56) Tucholsky's 
concern with the reasons for human suffering did not cause his resignation; 
it sprang from his depressed reaction to illness and to the defeat of the 
progressive forces in Germany.
By 1931 Tucholsky had recognised that the Republican cause was
lost, abandoned by its defenders to its more resolute opponents. The
prophet of doom had been vindicated, a fact which may explain the grim
satisfaction in the words:
„Der Lebenswille der andern war starker; 
und wer starker ist, hat das Anrecht auf 
einen Si§g. Beklagt euch nicht". (57)
If his fellow-countrymen were preparing for "die Reise ins Dritte
Reich" (58), he had neither the energy nor the desire to stop them. There
was no-point in becoming a martyr. This became apparent in the summer
(56) Cf. ibid., pp.250-1 and p.255,
(57) Bauem, Bonzen und Bomben, WB 7/3/31, ibid., p,824.
(58) Schnipsel, WB 26/1/32, ibid., p.1001.
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of 1932, when Ossietzky faced a second trial on the charge that 
Tucholsky's statement "Soldaten sind Murder" (59) libelled the Reichs- 
wehr. Though Tucholsky himself was not accused, left-wing intellectuals 
such as Toller expected him to return to Germany as a gesture to assist 
them in their propaganda. Tucholsky believed that the publicity would 
be of only limited value, and had no desire to expose himself unnecess­
arily to possible assassination.
Uncertain about how his absence VvOuld be viewed in Berlin, he
wrote to his former wife Mary for advice. (60) She replied that he must
make up his mind. He should return without reservations, as a fighter
ready to face the future, or remain in Sweden and make the final break
with Germany. (61) Tucholsky decided on the second course. When Ossietzky
began his term of imprisonment in connection with the Kreiser affair (62),
Tucholsky produced one last vigorous polemic against the army and the courts
He promised that the Weltbuhne would continue to be published in the
spirit of its former editor:
lfAnderthalb Jahre Gefangnis fur eine gute Ware 
erhalten zu haben - das kann bescheinigt werden.
Die Ware wird weitergeliefert". (63)
But he himself made few contributions to the "product", and abandoned all
political writing.
The immediate effects on Tucholsky of Hitler fs accession to 
power were legal and financial. Being deprived of his German citizen­
ship seemed no great blow to Tucholsky, He refused to protest, since 
he felt that in victimising their opponents the Nazis were acting as
(59) Der bewachte Kriegsschauplatz, WB 4/8/31, ibid., p,105.
(60) Letter, 29/3/32, Briefe, pp.494-6.
(61) Cf. Schulz, op.cit,, p.124.
(62) Cf, Chapter 8,
(63) Fur Carl von Ossietzky, GW III, p,1058.
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any revolutionaries would. It was only unfortunate that his own side 
had not been able to inflict such treatment on the Nazis instead. (64)
The burning of his books in a public auto-da-fe elicited from him no 
more than ironic amusement. (65) However, the confiscation of his assets 
and royalties was more serious, since he no longer had many sources of 
income.
Tucholsky suffered most frcm the permanent loss of his reading 
public. This in turn led to an alienation from his native language, a 
problem which has been analysed by Poor (66):
"Tucholsky was a stylist and a satirist, 
skills which required an intimate knowledge 
and unique insight into the workings of a society 
and its language,.. Not only did he have little 
to say to any other audience, but his style 
was more untranslatable than that of most German 
authors".
Although he spoke excellent French and later learned Swedish, he felt 
himself Insufficiently versed in either language to demonstrate his 
literary ability in it. In any case, he saw no point in participating 
in political discussion outside Germany. This reluctance to publish in 
a foreign language makes his refusal to contribute to the emigrant German 
press at first appear all the more surprising. The result of this refusal 
is that his opinion on developments in Germany can only be assessed frcm 
the correspondence with his brother, his colleague Heinz Pol, and especially 
his friend Walter Hasenclever,
In the twenties and early thirties Berlin had been one of the 
centres of European cultural life. The liberal atmosphere of the German 
capital came to an end with the rise of Hitler, Many leading German
(64) Letter to Fritz Tucholsky, 31/8/33, Briefe, p.315.
(65) Letter to Hasenclever, 7/5/33, ibid., p.258.
(66) Poor, op.cit., p.205.
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writers of Jewish birth, and those known bo hold left-wing views, 
were obliged to emigrate in 1933, leaving the field free for the 
mediocrities on the literary right, such as the Blut und Boden school. 
Centres of emigrant resistance were established in Prague and Vienna.
Frau Jacobsohn continued to publish the Weltbuhne from Vienna under the 
editorship of W. S. Schlamm. Tucholsky thus had many opportunities to 
publish in the exile press, had he wished to do so.
Tucholsky1 s refusal bo work for the exile journals was the 
logical extension of his decision to cease publication in the Weltbuhne 
in the winter of 1932. The progressive cause had been defeated, as he 
had warned it would be, and its supporters should accept the consequences. 
His reaction to the Nazi take-over was to re-emphasise his contempt for 
the movement:
„Man kann nicht schreiben, wo nan nur noch verachtet". (67)
There were two other important reasons for Tucholsky's silence.
He might have continued the fight if the majority of his compatriots
had been tyrannised by a minority; but this was not the case. The
elections of March 1933 seemed to indicate that a majority of the German
people supported the Hitler-Hugenberg coalition. In 1929 Tucholsky had
claimed that the Nationalist right were not the only or the true
representatives of Germany (68), and many of his fellow-exiles still
distinguished between the wicked National Socialists on the one hand and
the misled, but basically good German people on the other. This theory
Tucholsky now rejected;
„Die These Heinrich Manns und auch Tollers ist 
falsch. Hitler ist Deutschland". (69)
(67) Letter to Hasenclever, 20/4/33, Briefe, p.256,
(68) Cf. Heimat, in Dt, Dt,, p,231,
(69) Letter to Hasenclever, 5/1/34, Briefe, p.275,
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Even those Germans imenthusiastic about Hitler were opposed, in 
Tucholsky's opinion, to his violent methods rather than to his basic 
doctrine.(70)
The second reason for Tucholsky1 s continued silence lay 
in the lack of impact of the exile press, and the errors of judgment 
made by its editors. If the opposition within Germany had been unable 
to prevent Hitler's rise to power, a few newspapers produced by exiles 
for exiles would not bring him down. The oppositional Kaseblatter had, 
he believed,other weaknesses. Their contributors had learned nothing 
frcm defeat: instead of analysing where they had gone wrong, Jews, 
Socialists and Gamiunists alike insisted that they had not been to 
blame. (71) Another problem was sectarianism. Tucholsky regretted that 
the Weltbuhne had not merged with another periodical, Der Aufruf, in 
order to create a common platform and comparative financial security. (72) 
He saw such behaviour as characteristic of emigrants, especially German 
ones; those Involved were spending more time fighting each other than in 
uniting against the Nazi enemy. (73) The same intellectual coteries were 
making the same mistakes, and not attracting any young anti-Fascists to 
join them. (74) In the circumstances Tucholsky considered there was no 
point in supporting the emigrants' campaign:
„Mein Leben ist mir zu kostbar, mich unter einen
Apfelbaum zu stellen und ihn zu bitten,
Bimen zu produzieren". (75)
Although Tucholsky entertained no naive hope cf influencing 
his compatriots, he determined on personal resistance to Hitler's
(70) letter to Hasenclever, 4/3/33, ibid., p.248,
(71) Letter to Arnold Zweig, 15/12/35, ibid., p.336.
(72) Letter to Pol, 20/4/33, ibid., p.227.
(73) Letter to Hasenclever, 4/3/33, ibid., p.246.
(74) Letter to Hasenclever, 11/4/33, ibid., p.251.
(75) Letter to Zweig, 15/12/35, ibid., p.337.
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Germany. In his Swedish exile he boycotted all German products
and avoided contact with anyone whom he suspected of Nazi sympathies.
In the latter case he went too far:
„Ich lehne.. jeden ohne Ausnahme radikal ab, 
der das bejaht, der dort mitmacht, ja, 
schon den, der dort leben kann".(76)
Many of those still living in Germany had no alternative, and others
were resisting the Nazis as strongly as they dared. Nevertheless,
an economic and diplomatic boycott of Nazi Germany, if carried out on
an international scale, would certainly have damaged Hitler's cause
more seriously than the emigrant press. But the Russians remained 
I
anxious for trade with the Nazis, and the British government courted 
Hitler in order to obtain an agreement on the size of their respective 
fleets. Tucholsky's consistency had much less effect than the opportunism 
of these foreign governments.
Tucholsky' s assessment of future developments in Germany and 
Europe was affected not only by depression but also by lack of contact 
with his native land. Even after 1933 he did not recognise the 
revolutionary aspect of National Socialism: the use of terror for the 
sake of terror, which was institutionalised in the SA, the SS and the 
concentration camps. As Poor has pointed out(77), Tucholsky also 
failed to appreciate that Hitler's strength lay in his hypnotic appeal 
to the masses, which in turn depended on the frequent ritualistic 
invocation of "enemies" to be overcame.
On other issues Tucholsky's judgment was partially correct.
He recognised that Hitler would retain power, and that the other 
European states would tolerate his domestic tyranny, as long as he did
(76) Letter to Hasenclever, 7/10/34, ibid., p.288.
(77) Poor, op.cit., p.211.
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not interfere-directly in their affairs. War was inevitable, in 
view of the expansionist policy of the National Socialists, and the 
capital investment of the arms manufacturers. The Western powers 
would remain passive, and the conflict would be a local affair in the 
east, which Germany would probably win. In fairness to Tucholsky, 
nothing in the conduct of Britain and France until the spring of 1939 
suggested that they would resist Hitler, so the miscalculation of their 
eventual intentions was understandable.
A final political theme which played an important part in 
Tucholsky's correspondence in exile was that of the German Jews. Though 
bom into a prosperous Jewish family, Tucholsky had never been interested 
in orthodox Judaism. He had left the faith in 1911, out of
"a youthful loathing of the unctuous rabbi
and an instinctive recognition of the cowardice 
of Jewish society". (78]
This was a theme which recurred in several letters after 1933. He
seldom wrote about the Jewish question in general and had nothing to
say about the Zionist movement. (79) He owed his loyalty to a humanitarian
progressive group which included Jews and Gentiles, as did that of their
opponents.
Gradually Tucholsky was compelled to admit that, even if anti-
Semitism was unimportant to him personally, it mattered greatly in
Germany as a whole. The Jews provided the German right with a perfect 
scape-goat to divert public attention from its own responsibility for 
the outbreak of war, its prolongation and the eventual defeat. This 
propaganda was so successful that as early as 1920 in seme parts of the 
country there was no discussion of whether the Jews were to be murdered
(78) Letter to Zweig, 15/12/35, Briefe, p.333.
(79) Letter to Hans Reichmann, 4/5/29, ibid., p.205.
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but only of how the massacre was to be carried out. (80) The Nationalist
case was "Volksverduirmung schlinmster Art" (81) and Tucholsky countered
it by alleging that even if the right-wing view were accepted and the
Jews had played such a destructive role, this was really an indictment
of the more numerous Germans for failing to stop them. Yet as late as
1931 Tucholsky still found it impossible to take the anti-Semites
seriously. Their gospel reeked of the provincial Stammtisch and ignored
the real weaknesses of their opponents:
„Die meisten Antisemiten sagen viel mehr uber 
sich selber aus als uber ihren Gegner, den sie 
nicht kennen". (82)
Tucholsky's opinions demonstrated considerable common sense, 
but they won him few friends among anti-Semites or Jews. The former 
attacked him as a typical Jew, a rootless cosmopolitan whose writings 
were designed to undermine the fabric of German society. In fact most 
of the Weltbuhne' s leading contributors and a large proportion of its 
readers were Jews, and the German right often assumed that an allusion 
to the writer's religion represented a complete refutation of his views. 
However frequently Tucholsky might assert that anti-Semitism left him 
unmoved, he could not avoid stimulating it by his own journalistic 
activity.
Many of Tucholsky's fellow-Jews were almost as hostile to 
his activities as the anti-Semites. Recognising the prejudice against 
them which existed in German society, Jewish businessmen proclaimed 
themselves good Nationalists. This attempt to curry favour roused
(80) Das leere SchloB, WB 19/2/20, GW I, p.601.
(81) Hepp hepp hurra! Welt am Mantag, 14/2/21, ibid., p.789.
(82) Sigilla Veri, WB 29/9/31, GW III, p.951.
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Tucholsky's disapproval; reversing the Nationalist slogan, he 
asserted:
„Es ist nicht wahr, daB die Deutschen verjudet 
sind. Die deutschen Juden sind verbocht". (83)
Such conservatism was personified by Wendriner.
In the last months of Tucholsky's life, his hostility to 
the Jews in Germany increased. He was amazed at the naive optimism 
vhich led the vast majority not to emigrate, because they hoped to 
protect their financial interests. He believed that they would 
eventually be expelled in any case, and meanwhile the ill-treatment 
which resulted frcm their undignified conduct was well deserved. (84)
The climax of his attacks on the German Jews came in a letter to one 
of then, the exiled novelist, Arnold Zweig. Unlike the latter, Tuch­
olsky did not regard then as members of an army which had lost a battle 
but not a war. They had never been an army. Victories such as political 
emancipation had been granted to then by the French Revolution, not won 
by their own efforts. (85) Even in the 20th century, they continued to 
accept life in a cultural if not a physical ghetto; to compensate for 
their social inferiority, they were ready to concentrate on achieving 
success in business. In short, they were cowards, lacking any natural 
desire for freedom. (86)
This was a bitter Abrechnung, and it is not surprising that 
Tucholsky's fiercest critics have included Jews such as Gershpm Scholem(87) 
and Walter Laqueur. (88) The creation of Wendriner as a target has been
(83) Letter to Zweig, 15/12/35, Briefe, p. 334.
(84) Letter to Pol, 7/4/33, Ibid., p.226.
(85) Letter of 15/12/35, ibid., p.334.
(86) ibid., p.335.
(87) Cf. Scbolem at the World Jewish Congress of 1966, quoted by Poor, 
op.cit., p. 218.
(88) Laqueur, op.cit., pp.45-47.
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attacked as contributing bo anti-Semitism. No doubt Tucholsky 
opposed in Wendriner the businessman rather than the Jew (89), 
and his selection of a Jewish milieu stemmed largely from his greater 
familiarity with it. Nevertheless, a writer as concerned with the 
effect of his work as Tucholsky was, must be judged by his actions 
rather than his intentions, and in this light his tactics appear 
misguided. Although he was not to know that Hitler would take power, 
he was aware of how seriously his fellow-Jews were disliked, and he 
should have avoided the slightest risk of providing ammunition for 
their opponents. To this extent Tucholsky's Jewish critics are justified; 
the Wendriner feuilletons might conceivably have assisted the propaganda 
of the Nationalists.
However, it should be pointed out in Tucholsky's defence that 
in practice it is most unlikely that the figure of Wendriner did 
stimulate anti-Semitism. As Tucholsky constantly complained, his work 
had little direct impact. Few Nationalists read the Weltbuhne, and it 
is difficult to imagine anyone being converted to the anti-Semitic cause 
merely through a witty monologue such as Herr Wendriner betrugt seine 
Frau. (90) The Jewish cause was harmed far more by the machinations of 
men like Wendriner than by Tucholsky, who criticised them. Scholem and 
Laqueur would do well to recognise the truth of Tucholsky' s remark about 
Germany:
nIm iibrigen gilt ja hier derjenige, der auf den 
Schmutz hinweist, fur viel gefahrlicher als der, 
der den Schmutz macht". (91)
The despairing polemic of the letter to Zweig has also been 
used against Tucholsky. It was subsequently published by the SS news-
(89) Poor, op.cit., p.219.
(90) WB 6/10/25, GW II, pp.235-7.
(91) Letter to Ihering, 1922 or 1923, Briefe, p. 130.
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paper Das schwarze Korps, as an example of masochistic jiidischer 
Selbsthafi. Tucholsky's disillusionment with his fellow-Jews certainly 
led him into exaggerations which have been pointed out by Poor. (92)
Yet to establish his reaction as motivated entirely by Selbsthafi is 
an over-simplification. It was his Hafiliebe that was responsible. He 
had hoped for much frcm the German people, and been disappointed, and 
his experience with the Jews was similar. He did not "expect more of 
Jews" (93),but simply demanded certain standards of conduct frcm himself 
and others, Jews and Gentiles alike. Tucholsky grew bitter only when 
those whom he had trusted, whether Social Democrats, Communists or Jews, 
failed to live up to these standards.
For several reasons it is difficult to evaluate Tucholsky's 
attitude to the German Jews. His journalistic work on the subject 
was limited in scope, and he favoured satirical articles rather than 
direct polemic. Secondly, anti-Semitism has become an emotive issue, 
as a result of Hitler's notorious Endlosung. Critics of Tucholsky 
have therefore tended to attack him with the benefit of a hindsight 
which he could not possess; they also attribute to his work a greater 
effect than it in fact enjoyed. The target of the Wendriner feuilletons 
may have been unwisely chosen, but neither directly nor indirectly 
did they lead to Auschwitz. Thirdly, a non-Jew finds it difficult to 
carment in detail on the specific religious and racial consciousness 
of the group, and the influence of unspoken childhood assumptions on the 
adult Tucholsky. In a general survey of Tucholsky's political develop­
ment, it is only possible to allude to the complexity of the issues 
involved in Tucholsky's comments on his fellow-Jews.
(92) Cf. Poor, op.cit., p.223.
(93) Poor, op.cit., p.214.
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Poor has described the letter to Zweig as one of the last 
acts in Tucholsky's long drama of despair. (94) It certainly was his 
last political act. The dispiriting effect of solitude was staking 
its toll of a sick and impoverished man. Disillusionment with events 
in Germany and recognition that the progressive cause was lost contri­
buted to the feeling that life was not worth living. In a final 
moving letter to his former wife, Mary, Tucholsky admitted that he no 
longer felt any relationship to the outside world:
„Der Grund zu kampfen, die Brucke,
das innere died, die raison d'etre fehltn.(95)
Shortly after writing these words, Tucholsky took poison; he died
two days later, on December 21st, 1935.
(94) Poor, op.cit., p.233.
(95) Letter of 19/12/35, Briefe, p.502.
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CHAPTER 7
The ctiticism made by Tucholsky of Republican and Social 
Democratic Realpolitiker has been a recurrent feature of this study.
It is now necessary to examine his reasons for taking such an unccm- 
pranising stand against experienced politicians, and the extent to 
which his attacks were justified.
Several explanations for Tucholsky's attitude have been 
given, but they appear unsatisfactory. It is not sufficient to assume, 
as Doerfel does, that Tucholsky's negative criticism was based on the 
over-simplifications of an intellectual who could not ccme to terms 
with the need for moderation and ccnpromise in a pluralist democracy. (1)
This view implies that Tucholsky lacked any grasp of the necessities of 
practical politics. Such an opinion appears unjustified, since Tucholsky 
possessed a greater awareness of long-term possibilities and dangers for 
the Republic than many parliamentarians. The via/ of Doerfel is opposed 
by the majority of Tucholsky-critics, who consider that the politicians 
were discredited by their failure to stabilise the Republican form of 
government and by their final abject defeat at the hands of the Nazis. 
However, the question should be asked whether, in the concrete historical 
situation, Ebert, Noske and Streserann could have acted other than they 
did. The differing careers of these three leading Weimar politicians 
will therefore be studied. But before this detailed investigation,
Tucholsky' s definition of the differing stand-points of intellectual and 
Realpolitiker should be examined.
(1) Cf. Doerfel, op.cit., p.l41:"Politik in einer durch Reparationslasten 
und innere Unruhen schwer belasteten Republik war fur Tucholsky primur 
eine Frage des Mutes. Die kcmplizierte Maschinerie einer demokratischen 
Partei im Zeitalter der pluralistischen Indus triegesellschaft war ihm 
fremd..."
-194-
Tucholsky revealed in the article Macchiavelli that
his suspicions of Realpolitiker stemmed frcm two distinct considerations.
The first was one of principle and temperament; his nature made him
instinctively distrust those who sought to exclude idealism frcm political
affairs. He declared:
„Wer kuhhandelt, ist kein Pries ter der Wahrheit". (2)
At first this claim might seem irrelevant, since pragmatists such as
Ebert, Noske and Stresemann did not aspire to this lofty, prophetic
role; they believed that day-to-day problems could best be solved by
concentrating on the matter in hand rather than by lifting their eyes
to the stars. Tucholsky attacked this view in Wir Negativen; even if
the essence of an ideal was that it could not be realised in practice, it
retained its value as a long-term goal and a spur to immediate activity:
„Wir wissen wohl, dai3 man Ideale nicht verwirklichen 
kann, aber wir wissen auch, daS nichts auf der Welt 
ohne die Flamme des Ideals geschehen ist, geandert ist, 
gewirkt wurde. Und... wir glauben nicht, da3 die Flamme 
des Ideals nur dekorativ am Stemenhiirmel zu leuchten 
hat, sondern sie mu3 hienieden brennen...1 (3)
To strive towards the ideal in political life provided lasting perspect­
ives, a yard-stick by Which to measure the progress already made. However, 
during the tribulations of Weimar democracy, Tucholsky1 s idealism was 
generally called upon to demonstrate how far the achievements of the 
various political leaders fell short of the ideal.
Had Tucholsky's criticisn of pragmatists been based entirely 
on this issue of principle, both the "realist" and the "idealist" view­
points would have been valid in their separate spheres. However, Tucholsky 
made another attack on the compromising and bargaining of party bureau­
crats: not only was such activity morally questionable, but it usually
(2) WB 17/10/18, GW I, p.308.
(3) ibid., p.375.
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proved unsuccessful in practice. The SPD of President Ebert contained 
a high proportion of pragmatists, or, as Tucholsky described them in 
March 1919:
„Leute, bar jedes Verstandnisses f or den Willen,
der liber die Tagesinteressen hinausheben will". (4)
Six years later Tucholsky recognised that his prophecy of SPD failure 
had been justified, and he canpared the party's record to that of a 
Judas without even the thirty pieces of silver. (5) Tucholsky's attitude 
to the Weimar SPD and to its leader Ebert, is central to the assessment 
of his political acumen.
ETHEDRICH EBESRT
Since 1891 the Social Democrats had accepted the Marxist theory 
of the workers* revolution which was to lead to a temporary dictatorship 
of the proletariat and eventually to the classless society. Yet when 
that revolution took place, the SPD leaders collaborated with their 
former conservative opponents in order to restrain the workers. This 
paradox may best be explained by a brief analysis of political trends 
within the Wilhelminian SPD,
The German Social Dsnocrats represented the largest and most 
respected party within the Second International. Their very success led 
to misguided complacency, to the belief that socialism could be introduced 
through an electoral triumph which appeared to be inevitable. As long as 
Germany continued to be ruled by Bismarck's Constitution, the undemocratic 
restrictions placed on the party kept alive its revolutionary traditions, 
at least in the realm of theory. But in terms of practical policy, the 
SPD was gradually becoming a radical, democratic party rather than a 
revolutionary, socialist one.
(4) ibid., p.376.
(5) Zwei Sozialdemokratien, Die Msnschheit, 3/4/25, GW II, p.84.
This graving conservatism was reinforced by the trade union 
and party bureaucrats who were paid to deal with day-to-day organisational 
problems rather than to speculate on the prospects for revolutionary change. 
Indeed, Eduard Bernstein and the revisionist right-wing of the party 
even strove to have the traditional revolutionary theory abandoned
i
altogether. The left, led by Rosa Luxemburg, drew a different conclusion 
from the contradiction between the party's doctrines and its policies: 
they demanded that the SPD's actions should correspond to its Marxist 
principles. The political and ideological leaders of the Social Democrats, 
August Bebel and Karl Kautsky, rejected the proposals of both Bernstein 
and Luxemburg, since either course would have destroyed the unity of the 
party. Ho/ever, the inconsistency between theory and practice continued 
to undermine the SPD, and was to become more dangerous during the war.
A similar contradiction existed in the SPD's attitude to 
foreign policy. The doctrine of proletarian internationalism had made 
great advances during the SPD's proscription in the 1880's, and in the 
decade before 1914 the SPD took part in several anti-war demonstrations 
organised by the Second International. However, another tradition was 
gaining ground within the party: it stressed the Prussian virtues of 
unconditional obedience to the leadership and patriotic loyalty. (6)
In August 1914 the two attitudes came into conflict when the Social 
Democrats debated whether to support war credits, and it was Ebert's 
unwillingness to leave the fatherland in the lurch which triumphed over 
the opposition to German aggression of Liebknecht and Haase. It should 
be added that Ebert and his trade union colleagues were also anxious to 
protect their organisations against possible reprisals by the government. 
This combination of patriotism and "Organisationsdenken" was characteristic 
of the future President.
(6) The party of "Kaiser Bebel" was nicknamed "die koniglich-preuBische 
Sozialdemokratie".
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The decision of the SPD Reichstagsfraktion to vote for 
war credits provided the basis of Tucholsky*s first opposition to 
Ebert. Though at the time he probably agreed with the SPD leader,
\J Tucholsky became a pacifist on account of his experiences during the 
war. In an article ccnniemorating the tenth anniversary of the outbreak 
of war, he denounced Ebert and his colleagues:
„Manche hatten eine Seele, alle hatten ein
Mitgliedsbuch, und Charakter hatte am 4.
August 1914 keiner". (7)
In his opinion this conduct represented a betrayal of socialist principles, 
and it appeared to contrast unfavourably with that of the Russian 
Bolsheviks, who had consistently followed the path of revolutionary 
virtue. (8) This view of Tucholsky was not entirely fair, since the roles 
played by the two parties had also been influenced by objective differences 
of situation. Had the SPD opposed the war in August 1914,they would have 
risked being misunderstood by the majority of their own supporters, vfoo 
believed that Germany had to be defended against the threat of invasion 
from the east. Lenin, the leader of a small conspiratorial sect from 
his exile in Zurich, did not have the same problem of winning and maintain­
ing public support. On this issue Tucholsky was therefore guilty of 
seme oversimplification.
After 1914 the Social Democrats increasingly assumed the role 
of loyal supporters of the German war effort. They were willing to post­
pone the campaign for the long-overdue social reforms until victory had 
been won. The hope of a reward for good conduct proved illusory, and as 
the German military situation deteriorated, rank and file Social Democrats 
in the army and the munitions factories grew weary of the bloodshed and 
deprivations. Left-wingers in the party stimulated this change of attitude.
(7) Per Geist von 1914, WB 7/8/24, GW I, p. 1202.
(8) Gegen den Strom, WB 13/4/26, GW II, p.409.
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Karl Liebknecht was expelled frcrn the SPD, and Haase left with several 
colleagues to form the Independent Social Democratic Party in 1917. 
Opposition spread within the mother party itself, especially after the 
unsuccessful strikes of January 1918. Nevertheless, in October 1918 
the SPD, by virtue of its revolutionary tradition, was the only party 
which retained any influence over the radically-minded masses.
The decision to join Prince Max's government, taken by Ebert 
against the advice of many of his colleagues, reflected his patriotism, 
his readiness to accept unpleasant responsibility and his fundamental 
conservatism and fear of revolution. Even in November he persuaded 
Scheidemann and Bauer to remain in the coalition until their presence 
risked ocnprcmising his party in the impending struggle. Though he 
placed the SPD at the head of the demonstrating workers on November 8th, 
Ebert remained anxious to forestall violence and to deflect demands for 
change into constitutional channels. This explained his insistence on 
early elections to the National Assenbly, and his opposition to the Rate, 
which in his opinion were symptomatic of the anarchism of the Russian 
Revolution.
Tucholsky's judgment of Ebert was in general highly critical.
It is true that he paid tribute to the late President's honesty when it
was under attack from the Deutschnationalen:
„Der President war ein sauberer Mensch. •
Selbst sein scharfster politischer Gegner 
darf ihm nicht nachsagen, daS er sich bei 
irgendeiner Gelegeriheit bereichert hatte". (9)
He recognised that there was, in a positive sense, no comparison between
Ebert and his inconsistent and extravagant predecessor, though in view
of his low opinion of Wilhelm II, such a comment might be interpreted as
damning with faint praise. (10) But Ebert's political record, and in
(9) Frau Ebert, WB 17/3/25, GW II, p.65.
(10) Jener, WB 9/10/24, GW I, p.1247.
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particular his role during the revolution, seemed to represent a
succession of defeats. Tucholsky believed that the SPD leader was
an unimaginative party hack, who had missed the opportunity for social
reform and that he was therefore to blame for the gradual triumph of the
old order which had followed. In the course of a polemic against Ebert's
former press secretary, Robert Breuer, Tucholsky expounded in January
1926 his own mature view of the revolution:
„Es ist ja nicht wahr, wenn gesagt wird, 
der 9. November konnte keine Entscheidung 
bringen. Er hat eine gebracht. Den 
vollstandigen Sieg der deutschen Reaktion.
Und das ist Eberts Schuld, von der ihn 
niemand reinwaschen kann". (11)
The claim by Tucholsky that democratic ideals did not take root 
in Weimar Germany, which instead remained a society of hierarchy and 
privilege, is not in dispute. Even Ebert's sympathetic biographer, Besson, 
admits that his subject's career was a story of failure. (12) But if 
Tucholsky's criticism is to be accepted, it must be demonstrated that 
Ebert had same freedom of action during the Revolution, that decisions 
which prevented the desirable reform of society sprang from personal errors 
of judgment and were not forced on Ebert by the exigencies of the situation. 
On this subject the experts disagree. In the 1950's and early 1960's, such 
scholars as Erdmann (13) and Besson (14) recognised the injustice done to 
Ebert by the conservative Weimar historians, who had generally remained 
true to the monarchy, and had denounced all participants in the Revolution 
as Novemberverbr echer.
(11) Die Ebert-Legende, WB 12/1/26, GW II, p.322.
(12) Waldemar Besson: ETiedrich Ebert, Verdienst und Grenze, Gottingen, 
Musterscfrmidt, 1970, p.9.
(13) Cf. K-D Erdmann: Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte,3, 1955, p.7.
(14) On p.74 of his Ebert biography, Besson does reject Ebert's oversimplified 
alternative of parliamentary democracy or Bolshevism, but six pages 
later he accepts by implication that Ebert and Noske had no choice but
to send the old Imperial officers against the revolutionary workers.
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The new school of thought admired Ebert for his brave but 
unavailing labours for the Republic, and accepted his conclusion that he 
had been confronted by a choice between parliamentary democracy and 
Bolshevist terrorism, and that, to safeguard the former, his alliance 
with the representatives of the old regime had been a disagreeable 
necessity. There appeared to be a serious threat of political and economic 
chaos, which might have led to Allied military intervention. As a result, 
no real social change had been possible in 1918, and Ebert deserved respect 
for accepting the inevitable. (15) Ebert's government, after all, achieved 
several long-sought goals, including the proclamation of the eight-hour 
working day, the establishment of unemployment insurance, the right of 
workers bo return to their previous jobs after demobilisation, the setting- 
15) of joint union-management committees for wage negotiations and the 
extension of the franchise in equal and secret ballot to all Germans aged 
21 and over. Erdmann and Besson praised these successes, and assumed that 
no more could have been expected of Ebert. Such was the prevailing vie/ 
among historians when Klaus-Peter Schulz in his monograph criticised 
Tucholsky for failing bo recognise Ebert's greatness, and it may well 
explain Schulz's evident suspicion that Tucholsky's radicalism had got the 
better of his objectivity. (16)
At first the acceptance of Ebert's case rather than Tucholsky's 
may seem justified. The only contemporary party which in 1926 was attacking 
Ebert for not going far enough with his reforms was the KPD, which identified 
itself with his Spartacist opponents. Was Tucholsky a more reliable 
canmentabor? His views on the Revolution changed radically, from hostility 
to the Spartacists in 1918-1919 to apparent endorsement of their actions in
(15) Cf. Gerhard Schulz, Revolutionen und FriedenSsChlusse, Munich, DQV,
1965, p.151.
(16) Cf. K-P Schulz, op.cit., p.67.
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1929, In a retrospective article in Deutschland, DeutsChlandtlber 
alles. (17) Hcwever, the objection of inconsistency is unconvincing.
Though Tucholsky1 s dislike of the Spartacists was gradually reduced, his 
attitude to Ebert remained more or less constant, frcm the distrust of 
Das T.ied vam Kanpranifi to the detailed Abrechnung of the winter of 1925- 
26 and the attack in the Deutschlandbuch.
Until recently it seemed that Tucholsky1 s criticism of the
SPD for its failure to stabilise democracy would find little support
among historians. Hcwever, research by Kolb and Riirup suggests that his
attitude amounted to far more than the outpourings of an impractical
idealist. They agree with his fundamental analysis: that the SPD leaders
were the victims not of an inescapable historical process but of their
own errors. They accept by implication the criticism of Ebert's lack of
imagination and of his unpreparedness for extra-parliamentary action. In
addition they believe that the fear of exercising power in an unfamiliar
situation played as great a role as the party's attachment to democracy
in Ebert's wish to leave all dec is ion-making to the Constituent Assembly. (18)
This conclusion differs from Tucholsky' s only in tone, since he expressed
his similar judgment polemically. He considered that the conduct of Ebert
during the Revolution had been disastrous for the cause of the democracy
and socialism which the SPD leader ostensibly supported:
„Die allereinfachsten Reformen aus Angst versaumen, 
die s impels ten NOtwendigkeiten verkennen, das 
Sinnfallige nicht tun, seine Rucksicht noch auf die 
Symbole der alten Herrschaft ausdehnen - das heiBt 
nicht : ein Experiment vermieden haben, das heiBt: 
ein Feigling und ein Verrater an der eigenen Sache 
sein".(19)
(17) Schone Zeiten, in Deutschland, Deutschland uber alles, p.35:"Das Blut 
der Revolutionare soli nicht umsonst geflossen sein. Sie sind fur 
eine Sache gefalien. LaBt sie keimen".
(18) Kolb, qp.cit., pp.35 and 181.
(19) Die Ebert-Legende, GW II, p.322.
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Tucholsky1 s views remain controversial, even with the support 
of Kolb and Rurup. It is certainly true that Tucholsky concentrated to 
a great extent on the individual responsibility of Ebert, and did not 
examine in any detail the particular trends within the party which any 
SPD leader was likely to personify. The lack of a policy to exploit a 
revolutionary situation had been inherent in the Erfurt Programme, with 
its Marxist theory and moderate political practice; not only Ebert, but 
also Bebel, who had led the party until his death in 1913, was therefore 
to blame for this emission. In addition, although Ebert became the most 
important spokesman of a system of parliamentary democracy based on a 
compromise with the forces of the old order, he also expressed the views 
of thousands of workers and party functionaries. (20) Insofar as Ebert 
was the representative of opinions widely held within the SPD, Tucholsky*s 
polemic against him was over-personalised and sane/hat exaggerated.
Hcwever, the new Chancellor was more than a mere embodiment of 
the attitudes which prevailed within his party. As an active participant 
in German politics, he helped to reinforce such attitudes. That Ebert's 
temperament was essentially conservative and opposed to revolutionary 
disorder had been evident long before the Spartacist rebellion, through 
his efforts to prop up the old regime. (21) His decision to retain the 
specialist bureaucrats in their posts may therefore logically be interpreted, 
with Tucholsky, as the action of a "geborener Regierungsrat" (22), rather 
than of a Socialist, reluctantly compelled to compromise with reactionary 
forces in order to protect the country from Bolshevism. Ebert over-estimated 
the Spartacist danger through his failure to distinguish between the small 
band of dedicated revolutionaries with their often criminal following on
(20) Cf. Rosenberg, Geschichte, p.20.
(21) As late as November 9th 1918, Ebert still hoped for a constitutional 
monarchy rather than a Republic.
(22) Die Ebert-Legende, GW II, p.322.
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the one hand, and on the other the large numbers of his cwn former
supporters, disappointed by his lack of energy and themselves inspired,
in Tucholsky's words, by an "energischer demokratischer Wille". (23)
Although he had been a middle-class radical rather than a Socialist,
Tucholsky had demanded the introduction and stabilisation of democracy
in 1918-19, and his distinction denoted a subtler mind that Ebert's:
„Dieser Reforms inn war keineswegs bolschewistisch; 
er war auch auf Seiten der Arbeiter recht burgerlich 
und ware nienals imstande gewesen, etwa groBe 
Sozialisierungen durchzuf uhren". (24)
It seems probable that a more imaginative statesman, a man
less afraid of going down in history as the Kerensky of the German
Revolution, might have taken advantage of this spirit to begin the reform
of his country's institutions. But Ebert's exaggerated suspicion of the
left was equalled by his blind confidence in the Imperial bureaucrats
and officers, so that Tucholsky's attacks on him for taking advice only
from the right were justified:
„Vcfn Mittag des 9. November an Angst vor den 
Bolschewismus haben; Auswiichse einer Revolution 
verhindem wollen, die uberhaupt noch nicht da war; 
nach rechts und inimer nur nach rechts sehen; 
mit Hilfe der ubelsten Erscheinungen des Militars 
eine Heeresmacht wiederauf rich ten, die die Pest 
dieses Landes ga/esen ist: das ist Verrat an der 
Arbeiterklasse und an der Idee der Revolution". (25)
Tucholsky had the right to feel frustrated since his criticism had
originally contained no drastic proposals; instead of suggesting that
■the Social Democratic leader should govern in harmony with the Rate, which
were dominated by members of Ebert's cwn party, he had merely commented:
(23) ibid., p.321.
(24) AbreiBkalender, WB 15/12/25, GW II, p.287. Cf. also R)Seribergi 
Entstehung, p.223.
(25) GW II, p. 287. Kolb strongly supports Tucholsky's view: "Dieselbe 
Regierung, die den Linksradikalen gegeniiber so peinlich auf die 
Wahrung ihres Prestiges bedacht war, hatte sich gegeniiber der OHL 
mehr als einmal zu Kanprmissen und zum Nachgeben bereit gezeigt.." 
(op.cit. p.239).
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„Den groBen Verwaltungsapparat konnte man 
nicht von heute auf morgen reorganisieren.
Aber man konnte die allerschlinmsten Saulen 
des alten Regimes entfernen".(26)
Though Tucholsky continued for seme time to object to Ebert's 
policy on primarily moral grounds (27), the political dangers emanating 
fran the still powerful reactionaries should have been evident to the 
experienced SPD leader. This argument owed nothing to hindsight: Ebert's 
Independent colleagues, Haase and Eisner, both foresaw the possibility of 
conflict between the revolutionary government and the reactionary bureau­
cracy, and another USPD minister, Barth, pressed for Hinderiburg's 
resignation as a commander^ in-chief. Ebert rejected Barth's request and 
chose to ignore Haase's warnings. He therefore was fully responsible, as 
Tucholsky pointed out(28), for the subsequent actions of his proteges.
The conduct of the latter provided many examples of anti- 
Republican activities. The monarchists in the civil service repaid Ebert's 
generosity, by sabotaging even* those mild reforms which he and his colleagues 
endeavoured to enforce. The proposals for nationalising important industries 
were held back by the bureaucracy until the government abandoned its plans. 
Conservative Prussian Landrate ensured that town councils elected by the 
notorious Dreiklas senwahlrecht remained in power for months after the 
Revolution. (29) Tucholsky carmented with justifiable bitterness in February 
1920:
„Die republikanische Regierung ist so gut 
wie machtlos. Ihr eigener Apparat hohnt 
sie aus und verkehrt fast alle MaBregeln 
in ihr Gegenteil".(30)
(26) Das leere SchloB, WB 19/2/20, GW I, p.599.
(27) Cf. Wir Negativen, ibid., p.375.
(28) AbreiBkalender, GW II, p.288.
(29) Cf. Kolb, op.cit., p.269.
(30) Das leere SchloB, WB 19/2/20, p.599.
As for ihe judiciary, it continued to administer justice in the 
interests of the monarchists and against the workers. The most striking 
case of reactionary bias occurred in 1924, when a court in Magdeburg 
found Ebert himself technically guilty of high treason for his part in 
the munition workers' strike of January 1918. Such evidence suffices to 
demonstrate that Ebert was wrong to retain the old bureaucrats, and that 
his decision made the future stabilisation of democracy in Germany all 
but impossible.
It is paradoxical that Ebert, the epitome of pragmatism, should 
have been misled on this issue, because for once his cwn idealism got the 
better of his sober, practical nature. In his naive respect for the 
smooth functioning of the machinery of state, he assumed that the bureau­
cracy and Officer Corps would continue their "unpolitical" loyalty, even 
though the form of the state had changed, and that all the "political" 
decisions would remain in his cwn hands. (31) The supposedly impractical 
idealist, Tucholsky, knew better, and his polemical conclusion, borne out 
by recent scholarship, is convincing:
*Die Manner des November haben nicht erreicht,
. was zu erreichen war: Personalreform an alien 
Gliedem des Staates; Aufhebung des Militarismus; 
denokratische Erziehung der Jugend; und - vor allem - 
die Unterstiitzung einer neuen geistigen Atmosphare.
Sie haben sie zerstort".(32)
As the revolutionary wave subsided, Ebert was elected the first 
President of the Weimar Republic. His performance in this new role like­
wise failed to win Tucholsky's support. He had already made up his mind 
about Ebert's political abilities, and saw no cause to make allowances for 
the President's new constitutional position above the parties. Ebert
(31) Cf. Riirup, op.cit., p. 124.
(32) Die Ebert-Legende, GW II, p.324.
remained for him a traitor to the socialist cause, who owed his 
loyalty primarily to the Reichswehr rather than to Marx or to the 
workers. (33) This judgment was less than fair. When the Socialist 
parties failed to win a parliamentary majority and the SPD took "eine 
Kur in der Opposition", Ebert was forced to look elsewhere if the demo­
cratic Republic was to have a government at all. Guiding the country 
through the humiliation of Versailles, through rebellion, political 
assassinations, unemployment, inflation and separatist threats was an 
unrewarding and exhausting task, and Ebert's performance in this office 
was distinguished by devotion to duty and courage in the face of bitter 
opposition from right and left. The government's failure to stabilise 
democracy after the Kapp Putsch and the murder of Rathenau could not be 
blamed on the President. When Tucholsky compared the conduct of Ebert 
as President with the reign of Louis Philippe, the champion of the "juste 
milieu" (34), his criticism for once was misplaced; Ebert could hardly 
be blamed for the misuse of a power which he no longer possessed. Though 
Doerfel's views on the controversy between Tucholsky and Ebert have been 
largely rejected in this study, she does make a valuable allusion to 
Jacobsohn's efforts to restrain Tucholsky from attacking the President.
The editor of the Weltbuhne forecast correctly that, compared to his 
successor, who would almost certainly be a Nationalist, Ebert would appear 
"the lesser evil".(35)
It could be argued in Tucholsky's defence that his criticism 
was based less on a misunderstanding of Ebert's no/ constitutional role 
and more on a conscious refusal to differentiate between the Ebert of 1918, 
who had pcwer and failed to use it wisely, and President Ebert, whose 
authority was strictly limited by the Constitution and eroded still further
{33) Jener, GW I, p.1247.
(34) Kleine Reise 1923, WB 3/1/24, GW I, p.1143.
(35) Doerfel: The Origins of a left Intellectual: Kurt Tucholsky, the 
Romantic Conservativer Oxford German Studies, Vol.7-8, 1972-4, p.134.
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by successive election results. Tucholsky probably reasoned that it 
was the failure of Ebert the revolutionary to carry through democratic 
reforms which left the Republic constantly vulnerable and made the task 
of Ebert the President so difficult.
Tucholsky1 s attacks on Ebert were regarded by his contemporaries 
as a sign of extreme left-wing prejudice, and they are certainly somewhat 
over-personalised. Hcwever, they have been vindicated to a considerable 
extent by recent historical research. The political failure of Ebert is 
not in dispute, only the question of whether it was inevitable in view of 
the historical situation, or caused by his own mistakes. Such historians 
as Kolb and Riirup agree with Tucholsky that the latter was the case. The 
pragmatism of Ebert was not merely foreign to Tucholsky's nature, but it 
also created as many problems for his country as it solved. Even Besson, 
the President's admiring biographer, admits the defects of a purely 
pragmatic approach and the dangers which resulted for the Republic frcm 
Ebert's lack of inspirational appeal:
nEr kann bewahren, aber nicht neuschaffen.
Er ist der verdiens tvolle Platzhalter;
aber ihm fehlt jedes Charisna, und so
bekcmmt es auch die Republik nicht". (36)
Ebert nay not have intended to betray the working class, as Tucholsky 
claimed (37), but in practice he and his party abandoned their revolutionary 
aims without managing to strengthen parliamentary democracy.
GUSTAV NQSKE
The other Social Democrat who rose to national prominence after 
the NOvariber Revolution was Noske, who became Minister for Military Affairs 
and later Reichswehrminister. Before the war he had been a well-known
(36) Besson, op.cit., p.82.
(37) Die Ebert-Legende, GW II, p.321.
figure on the revisionist right wing of the SPD. His reputation as 
the party's military expert and his strong patriotism led to membership 
of parliamentary delegations to the Front, and to social contacts with 
high-ranking Imperial officers which were to prove important later. When 
the mutiny which heralded the Revolution broke out among the sailors of 
the High Seas Fleet in Kiel, it was Noske's affiliation to the tradition­
ally radical SPD which won him the confidence of the sailors and allowed 
him to control the rising without bloodshed. When the Independents left 
Ebert's government in December 1918, he was a natural choice to take over 
the responsibility for maintaining law and order. It was in this capacity 
that Noske quickly gained a reputation as the "strong man" of the govern­
ment. Hcwever, Noske did so only at the cost of antagonising many potential 
SPD supporters, including Tucholsky, vho within a year of the Minister's 
rise of power was to describe him as "eine Katastrqphe". (38)
Government in Prussia had traditionally been based on the alliance 
between the monarchy and the Amy Command. When the former was swept away 
in November 1918 there were many demands that the officers should also be 
dismissed. Ebert rejected such plans: he regarded the support of the 
officers as essential to ensure an efficient demobilisation of the conscript 
any and to protect the new regime against the revolutionary left. It 
should be kept in mind that the SPD's orientation towards the officers as 
guarantors of Ruhe und Qrdnung existed before Noske himself took over 
power, though his later conduct demonstrated full agreement with this 
policy.(39)
The role of Noske in the Revolution has proved almost as 
controversial as that of Ebert, but on one point historians of the period 
are unanimous: that Noske was a man of action rather than reflection. (40)
(38) Neuer Militarismus, WB 2/10/19, GW I, p.485.
(39) Cf. Besson, op.cit., p.80: "Noske war der Ebert am meisten verwandte
Sozialdenckrat". ,
(40) Cf. Golo Mann, Deutsche Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts,
Frankfurt, Fischer, 1959, p. 669.
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A clash of temperament with the idealistic intellectual, Tucholsky, 
was likely, and in view of their differing reactions to the political 
situation this conflict of opinions became inevitable. The volunteers 
enlisted by Noske brutally crushed the Spartacist menace, but in the 
cause of counter-revolution rather than that of the provisional governr- 
ment. (41) Yet the minister protected his officers against the accusations 
that they had ccranitted atrocities, and he even employed them as the basis 
of the new Reichswehr. He therefore was attacked by Tucholsky for mis­
handling the revolutionary situation(42) and for helping to perpetuate 
militaristic attitudes in Germany. (43)
Noske survives the first of these accusations best. Seme force 
had to be created to protect the government, and for the time being it 
was logical to rely on the most efficient troops available. (44) There is 
no agreement among historians on the viability of Tucholsky's counter­
proposal of February 1920 that volunteers should have been sought in the 
ranks of the organised Trade Unions. (45) Such battalions existed, 
including the Social Democratic Regiment Reichstag. But whether, as 
Rosenberg claims (46), they could have been relied upon to take up aims 
against their Socialist brothers under Liebknecht seems doubtful, especially 
in view of the workers' war-weariness and their wish to return to civilian 
employment. It could also be argued against Tucholsky that he did not 
put forward this suggestion until more than a year after the event.
It is nevertheless impossible to excuse Noske from all blame 
for the behaviour of his troops. Their victims, as Tucholsky pointed
(41) Besson, cp.cit., p.78.
<42) Uhser Millt&r! WB 29/5/19, GW I, p.427.
(43) Prozefi Marloh, WB 18/12/19, ibid., p.546.
(44) Cf. F. L. Cars ten, The Reichswehr and Politics, Oxford, Clarendon,
1966, p.23.
(45) Das leere SchloB, GW I, p.599.
(46) Rosenberg, Geschichte, p.60.
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out (47) , included not merely the Spartacist leaders Liebknecht, 
Luxemburg and Jogiches and many of their followers, but also numerous 
civilians who had taken no part in the fighting and whose crime was 
the possession of a weapon(48), a U3PD membership card, or a large 
street-map of Berlin. The mere possibility of such excesses should 
have made Noske hesitate about setting his troops loose on the capital.
In fairness to Noske it must nevertheless be admitted that 
the rebellion could not be tolerated. In view of the massive anti- 
governraent demonstrations, it was hardly surprising that he over-estimated 
the strength of the rebels. Noske1 s error was not moral but tactical; - 
it did not lie in his willingness to play the bloodhound, as Tucholsky 
believed (49), but in his inability to recognise the unreliability of 
his new allies.
Tucholsky correctly assessed Noske1 s motivation in sending
Freikorps to crush the rebel workers. Had the minister reluctantly
submitted to necessity, he would have dissociated himself at the first
opportunity from soldiers who had indulged in indiscriminate slaughter.
A man of foresight would not have built the new Reichswehr on such
insecure foundations. Noske1 s trust in the officers amounted, as Tucholsky
realised (50), to the secret respect of a sergeant unexpectedly promoted to
commander- in-chief:
„Seine Haltung nach auBen hin war wiirdelos.
Er warf mit aufgeschnappten Redewendungen
des Kaisers um sich,... beschimpfte jeden,
der wagte, das Of f iz ierkorps als unrein anzusprechen -
dem gehorten aber Verbrecher an - und befand sich
vollig im Bann des Militars". (51)
(47) Das BUch von der deutschen Schande, WB 8/9/21, GW I, p.822.
(48) Noske1 s SchieBerlaB was issued after a false report that Spartacists 
had massacred sixty policemen in Lichtenberg. All armed men resisting 
his troops were to be shot.
(49) This was Noske's own image, and it was echoed by Tucholsky in Die 
lebendigen To ten, (GW I, p.419):"Er ist ein Schadling, denn s chi inner 
als die exploitierenden Rechten sind ihre Handlanger, schlinmer als 
der GroBbauer ist sein Hund".
(50) Cf. Die baltischen Helden, WB 23/10/19, ibid., p.505.
(51) Kapp-Liittwitz, WB 25/3/20, ibid., p.616.
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The truth of this accusation is demonstrated in Noske*s own account 
of his ministerial career, in which he shews his naive pride at being 
appointed military governor of Kiel, his indignation at insubordination 
by the sailors, and his admiration for the officers. (52)
The problem of internal and external security made a temporary 
alliance between Noske and the generals practically unavoidable. Tucholsky 
was being unrealistic when he made his generalised attack on "dieser 
ehemalige Sozialdemokrat" for ignoring "die gute Gelegenheit,... alle 
NutznieBer des alten Systems auf die StraBe zu setzen". (53) Seme of 
Noske's appointees, such as the Prussian Minister of War, General Rein­
hardt, proved reliable democrats, willing to assist Noske's "Prussian 
Socialism". There was nothing wrong with a temporary compromise between 
the army and the SPD, providing that the latter was reconciled to the new 
state, rather than the state becoming a mere appendage of the arny.
Noske must take responsibility for the failure of his plan.
It is true that he faced opposition within his party. Same of his 
colleagues demanded from the outset that Social Democrats should have 
nothing to do with a force which would perpetuate the traditions of the 
Kasemenhof, rather than those of socialism or democracy. By preventing 
SPD supporters from joining up, and thus maintaining the army as a bourgeois 
preserve, they turned their pessimistic assertion into a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.
Tucholsky avoided this trap by adopting a more moderate position. 
His aim of a new, democratic army was undeniably a constructive proposal. (54)
(52) Noske, Von Kiel bis Kapp, Berlin, 1920, pp.27-28.
(53) Mill tar ia, WB 22/1/20? GW I, p.590.
(54) Unser Militar!, GW I, p.347.
He may have been alluding to the Republikanischer FCihrerbund (55), which,
according to Carsten,
"strove to implant a republican and democratic 
spirit in the Wehrmacht by gathering all leaders 
and NOO's who honestly accepted the Republic". (56)
Whether this organisation offered a long-term solution preferable to
Noske's capitulation to the generals cannot be asserted with certainty,
but the minister was at fault for neglecting to encourage the experiment.
Soon the Fuhrerbund was dissolved, since when the Versailles restrictions
came into force, the generals took care to discharge the Republicans among
the officers. Noske's lack of imagination meant the loss of an opportunity
to create the loyal, Republican army which Tucholsky supported.
Instead Noske handed the initiative back to the generals. For a 
short time the latter had been in a difficult position, amid a war-weary 
populace. However, the officers profited from the discord between the 
Social Democrats and the revolutionary left. By their brutality, they 
continually reinforced the ranks of "the enemy within", and provided a 
constant justification for their own existence.
This strategy was very different from Noske's, and a more subtle 
politician would have required no warning against his "Truppe fiir stellungs- 
lose Edelmenschen". (57) But Noske was only too willing to be convinced of 
the value of Prussian traditions. He had first distinguished himself in 
Parliament with a bellicose speech on the arny estimates in 1907, and the 
lessons of the intervening years were lost on him. Whereas Tucholsky had 
hoped that the new army would be inspired by a spirit of Republican comrade­
ship, Noske, according to his biographer, Ulrich Czisnik,
(55) In Der Knochenzerschlager, (Berliner Volkszeitunq, 27/2/20), Tucholsky 
praised the FCihrerbund and criticised the minister's opposition to it.
(56) Carsten, op.cit., p.72.
(57) NeUer Militarismus, WB 2/10/19, GW I, p.486.
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nerwartete von seinen Soldaten kein Engagement 
aus Uberzeugung fur die Demokratie, sondern 
vaterlandische Gesinnung".(58)
This formulation explains Noske's difficulties in recruiting troops
among the workers: the enlisting of the old officers was at least as
much the cause as the effect of the workers' suspicions. Like his
colleague Ebert, Noske lacked any reforming zeal, and therefore he
deliberately decided to uphold the Wilhelminian traditions.
Tucholsky had two objections to the new Reichswehr. His first 
point vus political: he distrusted the motives of the recruits. He 
surmised that they were not joining the army out of idealism; social and 
economic reasons were more important than any opposition to Bolshevism. (59) 
The officers were "Dilettanten von Beruf "(60) who had learned nothing more 
useful than how to wear their epaulettes (61), and vho had therefore no 
interest in returning to civilian life. They were also attracted to the 
army as a career because it provided a lawful outlet for their sadistic 
impulses. (62) To employ such men as the basis of the new Reichswehr 
seemed to Tucholsky the height of naivete, and the Kapp Putsch proved him 
right.
Tucholsky' s second objection to Noske's officers was of a more 
abstract, moral nature. Having himself experienced the humiliations of 
a conscripted soldier during the war, he recognised that such treatment
(58) Ulrich Czisnik: Gustav Noske, ein sozialdemokratischer Staatsmann, 
Gottingen, Masterschmidt, 1969, p.82: "Auch den Wert einer ungebrochenen 
Tradition abersah die sozialdemokratische Regierung nicht. So anderte 
man das militarische Zeremoniell kaun und belieB den Einheiten die 
alten Truppenfahnen, Traditionsnamen usw".
(59) Zur Erinnerung an den ersten August 1914, GW I, p.357:
"Man sagt: Vefteidigung der Heimat gegen die 
Bolschewisten und meint: Stellenversorgung".
(60) Offiziere, Freiheit, 16/8/20, ibid., p.722.
(61) Kehrseite, WB 15/7/20, ibid., p.699.
(62) Das Buch von der deutschen Schande, WB 8/9/21, ibid., p.821.
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was an essential part of the traditional Prussian militarism. If
democracy were to establish itself in Germany, the caste system of the
Imperial army had to be destroyed by the enforced retirement of its most
prominent exponents. Noske was unable to perceive that the existence of
the Officer Corps was incompatible not merely with socialism but with
democracy itself. Tucholsky*s most effective attack on Noske was made on
this issue in December 1919:
„Er (Noske) weiB gar nicht, daB der Militarisraus 
eine geistige Gefahr ist; er waiB nicht, daB hier 
Machte am Werk sind, alles schlechte Alte zu konservieren 
und einer grade zu barbarischen Schicht wieder auf die 
Beine zu helfen. Er weiB es nicht und hilft mit". (63)
In dealing swiftly and effectively with the immediate and apparently 
serious threat of the Spartacist Rising, Noske showed his brutal but 
undeniable strength as a ran of action. His blindness towards long-­
term dangers was, as Tucholsky pointed out, only equalled by that of 
Wilhelm II. (64) It was for political rather than moral reasons that 
Tucholsky issued his final and appropriate condemnation of Noske. After 
the Kapp Putsch, the minister had been transferred to an important admini­
strative post, but Tucholsky wished Noske to leave politics altogether:
„Ich halte es nicht fur richtig, diesen Mann 
noch eirmal in eine prcminente Stelle zu setzen.
Ich sage das nicht, weil er eine Politik getrieben hat, 
die mir in der Seele widerwartig war, sondern weil er 
eine schlechte Politik gemacht hat. Er hat sich 
blamiert. Alle seine Voraussetzungen sind nicht 
eingetroffen, alle seine Beurteilungen von Menschen 
und Dingen waren falsch, alle seine Vorkehrungen sind 
gegen ihn ausgeschlagen, seine Plane ins Wasser gefalien, 
seinen Proklamationen Liigen gestraft. Dieses UnmaB 
von Kurzsichtigkeit ware kaum mit dem groBten Erfolg 
zu entschuldigen - bei Erfolglos igkeit ist es nicht 
zu ertragen".(65)
(63) Prbzefi Marloh, GW I, p.546.
(64) Ibid.
(65) Oberprasident Noske, undated article, consulted in the 
Tuchol sky-Archiv.
Schulz has suggested that Tucholsky*s criticism of Noske 
was justified, but that his attacks on Ebert were unfair. (66) In this 
survey his conclusion is rejected, along with that of Doerfel, who assumes 
that Tucholsky opposed the SPD leaders out of a personal inability to adjust 
to the necessities of democratic political life. He was not simply a 
bora Negativer; on the contrary, he was right to be hostile to both the 
President and the Reichswehrminister. Noske1 s compromises with the Officer 
Corps proved as damaging to the cause of denocracy as Ebert's bargain with 
the bureaucracy and the judiciary. Both men failed to recognise the 
duplicity of their partners. The idealist Tucholsky saw further than the 
experienced pragmatists of the SPD. At worst he did not share their blind 
confidence in their reactionary employees, and at best he sensed the opport­
unity for a genuine reform of society: a reform which, for fear of Bolshevism, 
Ebert and Noske postponed indefinitely.
GUSTAV STRESEMANN
The career of Gustav Stresemann shows significant differences 
from that of Ebert and Noske. During his term as Foreign Minister, from 
1923 until his death in 1929, he was the leading figure in Weimar politics. 
This period was characterised by economic stability and consolidation; the 
ftarl i pt opportunities for democrat!sation and th& threat of a reactionary 
Putsch were absent, and Tucholsky therefore had no cause to engage in as 
regular a controversy with Stresemann as he had with Noske.
The criticism by Tucholsky of the SPD leaders owed much of its 
validity to the fact that they were pledged, at least in name, to the 
progressive cause, which he himself supported. He could assume that their 
failure to satisfy him with the democratisation of German society represented 
also a failure to reach their cwn target. By contrast, Stresamnn was
(66) Schulz, cp.cit., p.80
separated from Tucholsky not merely by a pragmatism similar to Ebert's, 
but also by a conservative philosophy which Tucholsky neither shared 
nor fully understood.
The record of Stresemann before he became Foreign Minister was 
hardly calculated to win Tucholsky1 s confidence. As leader of the 
National Liberals during the war, he had pressed for annexations, supported 
unrestricted submarine warfare and earned from his left-wing opponents 
the scornful title Ludendorffs junger Mann. Undeterred by the military 
defeat which showed his attitude to be impractical, he offered his services 
to Max von Baden's coalition; like Rathenau, he considered his presence on 
the political stage indispensable to his country's well-being. The self­
esteem of such unsuccessful Inperial politicians met with Tucholsky's 
distaste. (67) He also rejected Stresemann's new party, the Deutsche 
Volkspartei. as a group of backward-looking middle-class monarchists (68), 
especially when its. leader cooperated with Kapp, only to disclaim all 
responsibility after his failure.(69)
During the French occupation of the Ruhr Stresemann acted as an 
unofficial spokesman for the Cuno government's policy of passive resistance, 
delivering aggressively nationalistic speeches which stirred Tucholsky to 
humorous contenpt. (70) As Chancellor of a Grand Coalition, he was guilty
(67) Cf. Per Schnellmaler, GW I, p.425.
(68) Schaferliedchen, WB 20/2/19, ibid., p.371.
. (69) Cf. Kapp-Liittwitz, ibid., p.618. Cf. also Henry Ashby Turner, 
Stresemann and the Politics of the Weimar Republic, Princeton,
1963, pp. 65-66, where even a sympathetic biographer admits that 
"the Putsch was one of the least creditable episodes in Stresonann's 
career".
(70) Qase,WB 3/5/23, GW I, p.1093, and Reprasentanten, WB 20/7/26, where 
he describes the Minister as "diesen mittleren Burger, der durch die 
Nase nacheinander zum Staatsmord hetzt, den widerlich-korrupten 
Ruhrkairpf nach Kraften unterstiitzt und heute die abgelegten Zitate 
des Herm von Biilcw spazierenf uhrt".
of biased handling of the Communists in Saxony and the National Socialists 
and their separatist allies in Bavaria. Although Oonnunist participation 
in a coalition in Dresden dominated by the SPD was far less dangerous to 
the Republic than the anti-Semitic and separatist extremists in Munich, 
only the former state was punished by a military Reichsexekution. (71)
When Stresemann resigned the chancellorship in November 1923 to devote 
himself to foreign policy, Tucholsky could not be blamed for suspecting 
him of continued right-wing sympathies.
There were, however, other elements in Stresemann's career 
which might have led Tucholsky to modify this opinion. It is true that 
the DVP leader still felt a deep respect for the Hohenzollems, as was 
demonstrated when he permitted the former Crown Prince to return to 
Germany. But in matters of practical politics he had became a Vernunft- 
republikaner. He believed that, for the time being, parliamentary demo­
cracy represented the best form of government for his country, and that a 
collapse of the Republic could lead only to the equally unpalatable 
alternatives of a dictatorship of the left or the right. Although Strese­
mann's ambition should not be underestimated, he showed courage in accept­
ing the chancellorship at the height of the crisis. In this role he was 
compelled to terminate the unsuccessful policy of passive resistance, 
thus earning himself the violent hostility of the Nationalists. This 
decision represented an example of Realpolitik in a positive sense, and 
paved the way for an improvement in Germany's international position.
Like most of his fellow-countrymen, Stresemann looked on the 
Versailles Treaty as a national humiliation. (72) He set out to alter
(71) Cf. Anneliese Thirarae: Gustav Stresemann, Hannover, Norddeutsche 
Verlagsanstalt, 1957, p. 59.
(72) Cf. Henry L. Bretbon: Stresemann and the Revision of Versailles, 
Stanford, California, 1953, p.25.
its terms frcm a weak military and economic position which gave him 
little scope for bribery or threats. (73) However, he was helped by 
a change in American foreign policy, which by the mid-1920's had turned 
towards supporting Germany rather than France. There is no doubt that 
Stresemann's tenacious, step-by-step diplomacy proved successful. The 
reparations debt was reduced by the Daves and Young Plans, which allowed 
Germany to prosper and to finance her annual repayments out of American • 
investment loans. French suspicions were allayed by the conclusion of 
the Locarno Security Pact of 1925 which guaranteed France*s eastern border. 
By recognising the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, Stresemann made a second 
occupation of the Ruhr impossible and prepared for a gradual evacuation 
of the French troops from the Rhineland. The German membership of the 
League of Nations and Stresemann*s signing of the Briand-Kellogg Pact in 
Paris demonstrated his interest in the peaceful settlement of international 
disputes.
Tucholsky might have appeared likely to support such policies.
Far years he had hoped for the consolidation of the Republic; now Stresemann, 
by his very presence in successive coalition governments, provided that 
stability which had been lacking in the early 1920's. Furthermore, since 
his arrival in Paris Tucholsky had advocated the conciliatory policy 
towards France which Stresemann was apparently pursuing. Tucholsky * s 
continued reservations sprang from two sources: he distrusted the minister*s 
methods and his inner motivation.
The presence of Stresemann in the government did indeed inspire 
confidence at heme and abroad, but the trust placed in the minister in 
foreign capitals appeared to Tucholsky dangerously exaggerated. (74)
(73) At his secret meeting with Briand at Thoiry in 1927, Stresemann did 
offer German economic aid to stabilise the franc, in exchange for an 
early referendum on the return of the Saar to Germany, but the French 
government rejected his plan.
(74) Cf. Per erste Handedruck, WB 9/10/24, in which Tucholsky claimed that 
Stresemann's membership of the Freemasons should not be interpreted by 
his French colleagues as a symptom of true Republican internationalism.
As for the domestic continuity afforded by Stresemann, Tucholsky no
longer valued this quality highly. In the first place, he felt that
it had been bought at the unacceptable price of the minister's
ccrprcmises with parties from the Social Democrats to the Nationalists:
„Er meiert sich bei jedem an"
he ccnmented. (75) Stresemann1 s intention was to strengthen the Weimar
system by basing it on a synthesis of the best features of the old and
the new Germany. For this purpose he was willing to indulge in coalitions
with the right or the left, depending on his imnediate needs. However,
Tucholsky rejected any ocxtprcmise with the old ideals:
„Neuerdings wird von republikanisch-demokratischer 
Seite, getreu nach dem Rezept des Meisters Stresemann, 
versucht, "Briicken zu schlagen". Das macht man so, 
daB man der Reaktion taglich predigt: Wir sind gar 
nicht so schlinm, wie ihr glaubt...
Es gibt keine Briicken". (76)
Tucholsky had other reasons for distrusting Stresemann's role 
in domestic affairs. His record had been that of an alter Unfaller(77) 
and Tucholsky believed that his ocnmitment to a conciliatory policy would 
be abandoned under pressure. This view was lent additional credibility 
by occasional bellicose speeches which recalled the minister's former 
intransigence. It was difficult to knew whether his oratorical concessions 
to the right were a purely tactical device, or whether they reflected his 
own long-term aims; and in any case they did nothing to increase the 
respect of his negotiating partners. (78)
By the time that the value of Stresemann's dominance in the 
Cabinet had been generally recognised as strengthening the Republic, 
Tucholsky himself had abandoned hope for the Weimar system and had placed
(75) Mai singen, Leute-i, WB 18/11/24, Gtf I, p.1284.
(76) Gewehre auf Reisen, WB 16/10/24, ibid. , p. 1253.
(77) Ein Betrunkener in der Wilhelmstrafie, WB 1/1/29, GW III, p.8.
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his faith in a second, more radical social revolution. To a critic
who looked on politics in terms of polar opposites, Stresemann's
tactical finesse and apparent unreliability appeared even more dangerous
than the openly reactionary attitude of the Stahlhelm. In the essay
Stahlhelm Oder. Filzhut? of 1927(79), Tucholsky wrote:
„Die groBe Gefahr fur den europaischen Frieden 
liegt nicht im Stahlhelm.
Die wirkliche Gefahr in Deutschland ist der 
interfraktionelle Stresemann - Typus, den man 
von den Deutschnationalen bis zur Demokratischen 
Partei in alien Schattierungen vorfindet. Es 
ist der lebenstuchtige, verschlagene, grundsatz- 
lose, groBfressige und kleintrdtige Kaufmann, der 
Qrganisationshuber, der "Mann des realen Lebens", 
der gebildete Kaffer, dem es bei aller Liebe zur 
Republik ein biBchen raulmig urn die Brust wird, 
wenn einer gar zu sehr gegen die Ideale des alten 
Regimes vorgeht".
This assessment of Stresemann is decidedly harsh, since the minister
laboured long and hard for the Republic which his Nationalist opponents,
the future allies of Hitler, helped to destroy. Poor is right bo blame
Tucholsky for being on this occasion
"blinded to the finer distinctions necessary for 
every-day political life".(80)
Stresemann's concept of detente with the French likewise failed 
to win the approval of Tucholsky. As long as no significant changes book 
place within Germany, he regarded conciliatory statements made by 
Stresemann bo Briand or to the League of Nations at Geneva as empty words; 
the evocation of the "spirit of Locarno" seemed to bear no relation to the
practical results of the '.Treaty:
„Was hier in Paris an Locarno-Schnaps verscherikt wird, 
ist verschnittenes Zeug... Wo scharfstes MiBtrauen am 
Platz ist, werden Reden gewechselt, denen nichts, auch 
nichts in der Innenpolitik der beiden Landerr/entspricht. _
Locarno bleibt Locarno". (81) /
(79) WB 17/5/27, GW II, p.789.
(80) Poor, op.cit., p. 161.
(81) Der Fall Rottcher, WB 19/11/27, GW II, p.966.
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Such suspicions were based on an issue of principle and on 
the question of Stresenann's real intentions. By 1927 Tucholsky had 
no faith in inter-state diplomacy in general, because he looked on all 
capitalist states as the servant of their ruling classes. They were at 
the mercy of industrial, agricultural and financial interests. Even if 
Stresemann's offer of mutual cooperation and his guarantees for European 
security were sincerely meant, when a crisis came he would be unable to 
honour them. (82) But Tucholsky was unable to suggest an alternative to 
the Locarno policy. Vague statements such as
„Es kcxnttt das foderalistische Europe - trotz Genf"(83) 
and „Unser Genf liegt in Moskau"(84)
were of little practical value. The policy of Stresemann undoubtedly 
represented an advance on the desperate Erfullungspolitik of Wirth and 
Rathenau or the intransigence of Cuno and Hugenberg. However, the Locarno 
policy itself was not without its contradictions. Tucholsky had good 
reasons for suspecting that Stresemann remained a Nationalist at heart, 
and that his main concern was not with the preservation of peace in Europe, 
but with German power and prestige. (85) First there was Stresemann's 
refusal to conclude an "eastern Locarno". The minister had no wish to 
guarantee Germany's eastern border with Poland and hoped to regain the
(82) Anfien- und Innenpolitik, Die Friedenswarte, July 1926: "TatsSchlich 
hat kaim einer der Premiers, die im Volkerbund vorsichtige und 
altschablonierte Reden halten, auch nur die Macht, einen Locamo- 
Geist, wie man das heute nennt, bei sich zu Hause emsthaft zu 
verwirklichen".
(83) Wahnsinn Europa, WB 18/12/28, GW H, p. 1349.
(84) Griirms MMrchen, WB 4/9/28, ibid., p.1221.
(85) H.L. Poor is wrong to claim that the Brief an einen besseren Herm
(GW II, pp. 167-72, in which Tucholsky forecast the expansionist 
foreign policy leading up to the Second World War) was addressed to
Stresemann. Clearly Seeckt was intended. It was the latter who had
been appointed to his post five years before by a Social Democrat - 
President Ebert - and had rebuilt the anry. Poor over-states his 
case, but it is clear from the above quotations frotr Stahlhelm oder 
Filzhut-? and Der Fall Rottcher that Tucholsky did regard the policy 
of the Foreign Minister as ultimately aggressive in intent.
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Polish Corridor, though by diplomatic rather than military means.
Tucholsky correctly foresaw that such a project would stimulate Polish 
nationalism and might lead to war. (86)
A more significant reason for Tucholsky to distrust Stresemann1 s
"Europeanism" lay in the minister's attitude to the military on the one
X hand and the pacifists on the other. Stresemann had done nothing to
prevent German re-armament and Tucholsky wondered with good reason if in
fact he supported its
„Naturlich ist Gustav Stresemann nicht einmal ,
ein bosartiger Verschworer, aber ich kann mir 
nichtsdabei denken, wenn man mir erzahlt, daB 
"das Auswartige Pmt geschlossen gegen die 
Reichswehrpolitik stehe"... Aber sie wird doch 
gemacht!.."(87)
The clearest evidence in favour of Tucholsky's theory was Stresanann's
conduct towards German pacifists. Although in cormon with his co-signatories
( at Locarno Stresemann had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, his attitude
to the amateur peace-makers at home was contemptuous. The minister's
answer to the accusation that a Schwarze Reichswehr still existed was not
to remedy this violation of the Peace Treaty but to encourage the punishment
of the journalists involved for betraying military secrets. It was not
surprising that Tucholsky claimed:
„Es hagelt... Landesverratsprozesse, und es gehort 
die ganze Stim Stresemanns dazu, sich in Wien 
hinzustellen und bei einem imperialistischen 
AnschluB den Pazifisten zu markieren.1 (88)
On this point the judgment of Tucholsky cannot be faulted; 
he refused to be deflected by Stresemann's poor relations with Seeckt.
Their dispute stemmed on the one hand from Seeckt's attempts to conduct 
a private foreign policy; Stresemann naturally resented this interference.
(86) Ein Betrunkener in der WilhelmstraBe, GW III, p.9.
(87) GW II, p.966.
(88) ibid.
The Prussian aristocrat in turn looked down on the middle-class minister 
and interpreted his diplomatic finesse as Flaumacherei. (89) However, 
recent research (90) has shown that the minister believed as strongly as 
Seeckt in the need for military strength, to back up his negotiating 
position, and has re-esnphasised his aversion to those German pacifists 
who believed in international reconciliation. In the words of VJheeler- 
Bennett:
"Stresemann conveniently supplied the diplomatic 
front behind which Seeckt perfected his military 
foundation for the Greater Germany of the future". (91)
In general Tucholsky1 s assessment of the right-wing pragmatist 
Stresemann lacked the perception which marked his criticisn of the SPD 
Realpolitiker. Admittedly the minister remained a nationalist at heart, 
as was revealed by his encouragement of re-armament and his prosecutions 
of German pacifists. The fact that the radical right failed to recognise 
his continued conservatism provides seme token of their prejudice. But 
Tucholsky cannot be blamed for correctly criticising Stresemann merely 
because the minister was already under attack with less justification, 
from the right. (92)
However, the other reasons for Tucholsky's dislike of Stresonann 
reveal as much about the critic as about his opponent. His attack on the 
Locarno policy was largely based not on its objective failings but on a 
Marxist conception of the role of the modem state, and his own alternative 
suggestions were extremely vague. Still worse vas his mis judgment of the
(89) Hans W. Gatzke: Stresemann and the Re-armament of Germany,
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1953, pp.11-14.
(90) ibid., p. 109: "There is ample evidence that Stresemann was a 
nationalist and remained one until the end of his life".
(91) John W. Wheeler-Bennett: The Nemesis of Power, London, Macmillan,
1954, p.107.
(92) Cf. the censorious tone of Doerfel, cp.cit., p.132:
"Auch hier war es ihra enfcweder nicht bewuBt oder gleichgiiltig, 
daB er die Melodie der nationalistischen Rechten aufgegriffen 
hatte, die seit Jahren eine bosartige Hetzkarapagne gegen den 
deutschen AuBerminister fuhrte".
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respective dangers to democratic progress which emanated from 
Stresemann on the one hand and the extreme right on the other. The 
minister had not given clear support to the Republic until 1923, when 
Tucholsky himself was beginning to give up hope for it; and by the time 
carmentators had recognised the role played by Stresemann in stabilising 
parliamentary democracy, Tucholsky believed:
„Diese Republik ist nicht die meine".(93)
Tucholsky1 s opinion that Stresemann remained a nationalist at heart: was 
correct, and it was hardly surprising that he had little sympathy for 
such views. But his distrust of the pragmatic, conservative Foreign 
Minister was definitely exaggerated.
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CHAPTER 8
Che subject predominated in Tucholsky* s polemic between 
1919 and 1932: the attack on the military and militarism. The 
former topic requires little clarification; in the Weimar Republic 
it comprised the official Reichswehr and various right-wing 
volunteer forces. The term "militarism" has been defined adequately 
by Wolfgang Sauer, who sees it as involving two factors. The first 
he describes as the one-sided dependence of the day-to-day policy 
of a state on military considerations, or the existence of an 
outright military dictatorship. His second, broader definition 
alludes to a sociological factor: the predominance of the military 
and "militarische Strukturformen" in the social order. (1)
Tucholsky would have concurred with this second definition. 
However, he went on bo deduce that such social predominance could 
not have existed without the willing consent of the majority of the 
German people. He understood militarism as an attitude of mind.
It was the main quality of the Prussian spirit: the authoritarian 
values which in his opinion had strangled social progress and hindered 
men’s spiritual development. He believed that militarism should be 
rejected in favour of the civilian, democratic virtues of freedom 
and peaceful change. Tucholsky*s progressive idealism was also 
evident in his pacifism. Though Tucholsky*s targets.changed with the 
evolution of the Republic and its armed forces, his anti-militarism 
and pacifism were as pronounced in the early 1930*s as in his first 
major work after the Revolution: the Militaria-series.
(1) Cf. Sauer's chapter on the armed forces in Karl-Dietrich 
Bracher, Die Auflosung der Weimarer Republik, Ring-Verlag, 
Villingen, 1960, p.238.
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These controversial articles appeared at a time when 
public opinion about the military was more volatile than it had 
been for many years. Thoughout the nation the army had been held 
in high regard since the days of Frederick the Great. In spite of 
the defeat of 1918, many Germans, particularly those who had not been 
involved in the fighting, still regarded its officers as "heroic and 
noble". (2) Any attacks on this exaggerated respect for the army were 
likely to meet bitter resistance fran the supporters of the old 
system. When Tucholsky wrote Offizier und Mann in January 1919, he 
must have suspected that it would lead to vilification, court actions 
and the "undying hatred of the military establishment". (3)
Tucholsky risked such unpleasantness because the potential 
rewards of publishing at this time were great. A substantial minority 
of Germans had spent four years in uniform, and had in the process lost 
their respect for their officers. Although the conscripts did not 
generally hold important positions, their opposition to their comnanders 
and to a continuation of the war proved the catalyst in the overthrew 
of the established order in Novenber 1918. Tucholsky's articles were 
symptomatic of this widespread anti-militarist feeling. As he was 
writing in the poem Helm abl (4) of a Prussian army helmet lying "auf 
wohlverdientem Mist", officers were having their epaulettes tom off by 
demonstrators and the RatekongreB was passing the Hamburg Points, which 
included demands that the Soldatenrate should be responsible for the 
reliability of units and the maintenance of discipline, for soldiers to 
elect their cwn leaders and for the speedy abolition of the old anry and 
the formation of a Volkswehr. (5)
(2) Poor, op.cit., p.95.
(3) ibid., p.98.
(4) WB 28/11/18, GW I, pp.319-20.
(5) For the Points in full, cf. Cars ten, op.cit., p. 18
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The wave of anta-militarisn not only stimulated Tucholsky
to produce his polemic, but also provided its justification. As long
as the thousands of former soldiers had the degradation and torment at
the hands of the officers fresh in their minds, they were likely to
support their self-appointed spokesman, when he demanded that such
outrages should not happen again:
„Wie soil je eine Besserung kcarmen, 
wenn wir es jetzt nicht sagen?
Jetzt... denn spa ter, wenn das neue Heer 
wiederaufgebaut ist, ware es uberfliissig, 
noch einmal die Sunden des alten Regimes 
auf zublattem. Und es muB den Deutschen 
eingehanmert werden, daB das niemals 
wiederkcmmen darf". (6)
In addition, Tucholsky could point to positive goals for the new German
armed forces. They were to be characterised neither by slovenly
inefficiency nor by the spirit of the "notorious Prussian N00" but by
"Sachlichkeit", and the role of the officers ms to be that of a
"befehlender Kamerad". (7) These suggestions entailed a vast reduction
in the privileges of the officers. To justify his proposals, Tucholsky
had to demonstrate the total moral and political bankruptcy of his
opponents, and in Militaria he set out to do this.
Tucholsky's experience of military service behind the front 
lines provided the background for a violent attack on the officers.
During the war they had possessed almost unlimited power over their 
subordinates and the citizens of the occupied territories, and they had 
abused that power in the pursuit of immediate self-interest. After an 
initial denunciation of their former god-like status, he reviewed their 
conduct and found that they lacked any consciousness that their additional 
rights imposed corresponding obligations. Corruption and greed was the
(6) Wir NQgativen, GW I, p.373.
(7) Uhser Militar, ibid., p.347.
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theme of the article Verpflegung, which described how misappropriated 
food found its way profitably on to the black market. (8) Another case 
of Corruption was described by the N00 in a military hospital, where 
the food needed to keep the wounded alive was consumed by those nominally 
responsible for their well-being. (9) The exploitation of the local 
population in so-called Reguisitionen was a logical extension of such 
behaviour, since the robbery of the "eneny" must have seemed a meritorious 
action to men accustomed to despoiling their own subordinates.
In view of the ill-feeling stirred up by these activities,
sane officers at least should have opposed this palpable abuse of
privilege, if only for the reason that no sufferers were likely to accept
this treatment indefinitely. The more intelligent of the officers, those
in responsible positions at Headquarters, did recognise that the morale
of the men was being undermined, but they preferred to blame the growing
distrust on Bolshevist agitators rather than on their own conduct.
Instead of dealing with the causes of the men's disaffection, they mounted
a propaganda offensive, the so-called vaterlandischer Unterricht; to
persuade the men that
„Das sei eine herrliche deutsche Weltordnung, 
die dem einen alle Muhe und dem andem alien 
Lohn zuwies". (10)
Tucholsky was disgusted by these activities. He felt that 
there could be no dialogue or ocnprcmise with the officers; in spite of 
his efforts to achieve objectivity, the indignation of the Old Testament 
prophet was evident in his polemic. His reply to the charge of needlessly
(8) WB 23/1/19, GW I, p.332.
(9) Zur Erinnerung an den ersten August 1914, WB 14/8/19, 
ibid., pp.353-4.
(10) Vaterlandischer Unterricht, WB 13/2/19, ibid., p.340.
recalling the misdeeds of the past was that of the moralist:
„.. .Warum noch einmal das Alte aufruhren?
Weil wir aus der Luge heraus wollen...
Wir alle wissen, daB unser Heer, daB unser 
Volk im Kriege moralisch nicht intakt 
geblieben ist, nicht sauber bleiben konnte.(11)
Since Tucholsky1 s moral disapproval was apparent in the 
strictures against the officers, the attack by Doerfel (12) on his 
judgment as "oberflachlich moralisierend" has seme justification. 
Although such articles as Zur Erinnerung an den ersten August 1914(13) 
did examine the social background of the officers, Tucholsky made 
no serious attempt to understand their point of view. His own argument, 
that neither social origins nor military training had provided a 
corrective to their elitist ethos might seem a mitigating circumstance, 
revealing them as not merely the representatives but also the victims 
of Prussian tradition. In the heat of the moment, such considerations 
of fairness must have appeared of secondary importance.
Tucholsky declared that:
„Der deutsche Offizier hat in sittlicher Beziehung 
im Kriege versagt. Der Geist des deutschen 
Offizierkorps war schlecht". (14)
His right-wing contemporaries at once made the obvious reply: that
Tucholsky was over-generalising from individual cases. He lent,
indirect support to this reproach by admitting that he was concerned
not with the punishment of Feldwebel Ncwotnik, Leutnant Peters and
Hauptmann Dckbritz, but with the spirit of the officers as a class. (15)
(11) Verpflegung, ibid., p.334.
(12) Doerfel, op.cit., p.117.
(13) GW I, p.348.
(14) ibid.
(15) Unser Militar, ibid., p.345.
It could also be argued that the number of occasions on which
Tucholsky alluded to the issue revealed his own disquiet. His
biographer Schulz remarks:
„Wer tatsachlich nicht verailgemeinert, 
braucht nicht so oft hervor zuheben, 
er tue es nicht". (16)
However, a simpler explanation for Tucholsky1 s frequent reference 
to this criticism is that he sensed its importance, since it repres­
ented the instinctive response of many readers.
The first part of Tucholsky1 s answer to the charge of 
generalisation was made indirectly. If his allegations had been 
unfair, they would have received support only frcm other left-wingers. 
The function of the quotations in Zur Erinneriing' an den ersten August 
was to underline Tucholsky1 s credibility. If a Feldwebel in a field 
hospital felt moved to write a book entitled Ariklage der Gepeinigten (17), 
if the conservative-minded poet Richard Dehmel judged harshly the men 
of his own class (18), Tucholsky's judgment no longer appeared arbitrary 
and personal. He admitted that there had been exceptions, officers 
who had performed their duties conscientiously. (19) However, this 
display of inpartiality was followed by a further series of general­
isations, which reduced the concession to a matter of form.
'Ihe direct efforts of Tucholsky to escape frcm the accusation 
"Man darf nicht verallgoneinern" were less convincing. The distinction 
between the officers as individuals and as members of a group:
(16) Schulz, op.cit., p.73.
(17) Zur Erinnerung, ibid., pp.353-54.
(18) ibid., pp.354-56.
(19) Offizier und Mann, ibid., p.329: „Es gab selbstverstandlich 
viele Ausnahmen - betrachtet wird hier der Geist, der das 
deutsche Offizierkorps beherrscht hat, und der war schlecht".
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„Die Behauptung, die deutschen Offiziere 
taugten nichts, ist falsch, wenn man die 
• einzelnen Personen Mann fur Mann betrachtet; 
sie ist richtig, wenn man sie ansieht, 
scweit sie Offiziere sind".(20)
was too fine a point for the readers of the original polemic to
appreciate. Although Tucholsky demonstrated the reprehensible
conduct of individual officers, his attacks on the whole class were
both unfair and tactically unwise. Even the former StabsOffizier,
whose more objective criticism of the Imperial army had also been
published in the Weltbilhne, was driven to attack Tucholsky *s
exaggeration (21), and less fair-minded officers were provided with an
excuse to discount his comments altogether.
In supporting the Staff Officer against Tucholsky, this 
study canes to the same conclusion as H.L.Poor, who is probably the 
most reliable of critics on this issue of the military. Poor also 
alludes correctly to the indiscriminate nature of the polemic. (22) 
Tucholsky had defined the ethos of the Officer Corps as a distillation 
of the individual attitudes of its members. Before such an assessment 
could be made, it was necessary to demonstrate the similarity of 
upbringing and outlook of the group. Tucholsky attempted to do this 
by asserting that they were almost all Prussian Junker who lacked 
knowledge of the world outside the barracks. (23) This argument was 
false. Most of the front-line officers who stanned from the nobility 
fell as early as the autumn of 1914 at the Marne. (24) It was their 
replacements, called in at short notice and with ho experience of 
responsibility, who provided the real models for Tucholsky*s criticism.
(20) Die ErdOlChten, WB 30/3/22, GW I, p.926.
(21) Cf. Poor, op.cit., pp.98-99.
(22) Ibid., p.98.
(23) zur Erinnerung, gw i, p.348.
(24) Rosenberg: Entstehung, p.85.
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Perhaps such men did look up to the regular lieutenant as an 
ideal, but they, were not members of a homogeneous Junker caste.
Tucholsky believed that a polemicist must occasionally 
be unfair in the interests of the ideal of justice.(25) He hated 
the military, and the later history of the Reichswehr and the para­
military forces justified his mistrust. However, it must be admitted 
that his early polemic against the military was over-generalised and 
on occasion inaccurate.
Nevertheless, vhen Schulz attacks Tucholsky's criticism 
of the military, he is himself guilty of over-simplification. He sees 
Tucholsky as a blind doctrinaire, first advocating a new army w: thout 
any traditional discipline, and later substituting for this absurdity 
the rejection of any officers, and, by extension, of any army at all.
Schulz's argument is based on a misunderstanding. Tucholsky 
rejected not the principle of discipline and subordination but its 
abuse in practice. He recognised as clearly as any other former soldier 
the need for an officer to rely on the unquestioning obedience of his 
men while in action,, and described discipline as "dienstlich absolut 
notwendig".(26) He began to criticise the officers only when they 
exploited their power to secure privileges while off duty.
After denouncing the old officers Tucholsky naturally could 
foresee no place for them in the armed forces of the Republic. Their 
successors should personify the new spirit of Sachlichkeit, and the 
recipe for progress was simple:
(25) Politische Satire, V© 9/10/19, GW I, p.492.
(26) Offizier und Mann, GW I, p.329.
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„Das neue Heer sei die Schule
des freien Marines, eine lebende
Einheit von Offizieren und Mannschaften". (27)
This approach under-estimated the difficulty of training new officers
to meet the internal dangers, but it promised greater success than
the restorative policy of Reichswehrminister Noske.
When Tucholsky is accused of fanaticism in his struggle 
against the military, it is not the optimistic plan of Unser Militar 
which is attacked, but the more intransigent attitude adopted later 
in Per Offizier der zukunft. Tucholsky was reviewing a book by Amo 
Voigt, a fellow-contributor to the vveltbuhne on military affairs, who 
had argued:
„Der deutsche Offizier der Zukunft soil 
ein geistiger Mensch sein".
a constructive suggestion similar to that of Unser Militar. Hcwever, 
Tucholsky had temporarily abandoned this position, and he greeted the 
demand for officers with "menschlichen Qualitaten" by asking "Wbzu?" (28) 
and answering "Zum Mcrd". This unccmpromising pacifism foreshadowed 
many of Tucholsky*s articles in which war was equated with murder. More 
significantly, the denunciation of the former officers for their lack 
of Geist and the nov assertion that the words geistiger Offizier repres­
ented a contradiction in terms, led to the conclusion that what Germany 
needed was no officers at all.
When Schulz describes this position as "der Pazifismus 
schlechthin am Ende seines Lateins" (29), he bases his argument on the 
need for an army for national defence. Unfortunately he has failed to
(27) Unser Militar, ibid., p.347.
(28) Per Offizier der Zukunft, V1B 5/6/19, ibid., p.430.
(29) Schulz, op.cit., p.74.
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understand Tucholsky1 s position. The latter knew that Prussia had 
for centuries been a state existing for the benefit of its army 
rather than vice versa. In 1914 he had seen a w^ r of aggression 
disguised as self-defence against Russian invasion and French revanchism. 
Per Offizier der Zukunft provided the first hint of his later conviction 
that as long as armies existed, governments would find a pretext to set 
them against one another for national self-aggrandizement.
Schulz's error lies mainly in his disregard for the historical 
context in which Tucholsky was writing. He assumes that the doctrinaire 
attitude of Per Offizier der Zukunft is typical of Tucholsky fs anti­
militarism, whereas in 1919 it represented an extreme viewpoint, adopted 
in response to Noske's partiality for the traditionalist officers in 
the n&f7 Reichswehr. When Tucholsky*s positive proposals were rejected 
and the opportunity for reform was missed, it was natural for him to 
assume that an army with such insecure foundations was worse than no 
any at all. However, there is no other evidence that Tucholsky had as 
yet abandoned hope for his original, constructive plan to influence 
the new amy. On the contrary, as late as the aftermath of the Kapp 
Putsch he demanded not the disbandment of the unreliable Reichswehr, but 
its democratic reorganisation, and the promotion of such idealists as 
Hauptmann von Wrochem. (30) Schulz concludes that Tucholsky's reasoning 
is "feuilletonistisch und nicht genugend durchdacht" (31); this 
quotation is untrue when applied to Tucholsky, but an apt description
(30) Cf. the article Eine Ausnahme, Berliner Volkszeitung, 21/4/20,
CSV I, p. 626: "Mit solchen Leu ten, mit solchen Charakteren muBte 
eine neue, eine andere Reichswehr aufgebaut werdeni"
(31) Schulz, op.cit., p.74: He himself makes a serious logical error 
in asserting that, had Tucholsky lived in the 1950's, he might 
easily have supported German rearmament. This is an assumption 
for which not a scintilla of evidence is, or indeed can be 
produced:
„Lassen wir dahingestellt, ob Tucholsky heute, lebte er 
noch, an seinem bedingungslosen Pazifismus und seiner ebenso 
bedingungslosem Antipathie gegen alles Militarisch-Soldatische
festhielte - daB er es nicht tate, ist zumindest nicht 
unwahrscheinlich..." (ibid., p. 75)
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of his own argument.
The officers were the most important target in Tucholsky's 
post-war struggle against militarism, but he did not forget their 
commanders, Hindenburg and Ludendorff. The two men personified the 
Prussian tradition, and Tucholsky opposed them as "die besten Vertreter 
des schlechtesten Systems". (32) Both men had to be removed frcm their 
pedestal of public approval if militarism were to be overcome in Germany.
The ambitious Ludendorff appeared to Tucholsky the more 
dangerous of the two generals; his judgment was confirmed by the part 
played by the former dictator in the Kapp Putsch. Tucholsky's suspicions 
of Ludendorff were also based on personal dislike; after observing his 
testimony to the Reichstag Committee of Inquiry, Tucholsky stressed the 
general's "Gefuhlskalte" and "unerschiitterliche, unfaBbare, sich selbst 
unbewuBte Roheit". (33) This ill-feeling even led Tucholsky to 
criticise the quality of Ludendorff's generalship, the one aspect of 
his opponent's career which he was least qualified to judge. (34) He 
disapproved strongly, but with greater justification, of Ludendorff' s 
conduct in the last days of the war, when he had issued conflicting 
orders to the army and the peace negotiators, and then had fled to 
Sweden to escape possible retribution at the hands of his troops. On 
this point Tucholsky praised Hindenburg, who had stayed at his post 
during the crisis.(35)
In spite of the loss of the war, many conservative Germans
(32) Zwei Mann in Zivil, WB 27/11/19, GW I, p.532.
(33) ibid., p.529.
(34) Schuldbuch, WB 28/8/19, ibid., p.468. Cf. Rosenberg who sees 
Ludendorff as an excellent general, however grievous his errors 
in the political field. (Entstehung, pp.77-78.)
(35) Zwei Mann in Zivil, ibid., p.532.
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still regarded the generals with undiminished admiration, as 
"Deutschlands Helaen aus groBer Zeit".(36) Tucholsky had one final
argument to convince such traditionalists. The conduct of modem, 
automated war, he claimed, had little in common with that of previous 
ages, when generals rode into battle at the head of their troops and 
inspired them by personal example. Tucholsky reminded his readers 
that in the 20th century generals directed operations by telephone 
frcm well behind the lines. The old cliches about heroism were no 
longer relevant. At best, Hindenburg and Ludendorff had displayed 
the organisational talent of yerwaltungsbeamte, while the meanest of 
their subordinates were the real heroes. (37)
In spite of the efforts of Tucholsky, the German public's 
love of its military leaders triumphed over the call for retribution 
of November 1918. The Reichstag Committee of Inquiry into the causes 
of the defeat was dominated by Hindenburg' s proclamation that the army 
had been stabbed in the back by the revolution at home. Tucholsky was 
acute enough to realise that the majority of Germans supported the 
"old world" rather than the new one. (38)
It was characteristic of this early stage in Tucholsky's 
career that he attacked in Hindenburg and Ludendorff the symbol of 
military power rather than its substance. The latter was personified 
by Wilhelm Groener, Ludendorff's successor as Chief of Staff. Groener 
had compelled the abdication of Wilhelm II by informing him that he had 
lost the confidence of the army, and on the night of November 9th he
(36) ibid., p.531.
(37) ibid.; "Der Landser war ein Held und der arme Kcmpagniefuhrer 
war einer, der im Dreck stak und seine Leute herausriS".
(38) ibid., p.530.
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had offered support to Ebert's government. These actions were part 
of Groener's strategy to keep the Officer Corps intact. Ultimately 
he and his disciple, Seeckt, hoped to secure the independence of the 
army frcm parliamentary control, and they made concessions to the new 
state only as a temporary measure to counter anti-militarist feeling. (39)
Since the conscripted army melted away on its return from 
the front line, Groener's principal instrument of power was the Freikorps, 
which sprang up all over Germany under the banner of the "restoration 
of law and order". The money to finance their activities came mainly 
frcm "eine gerissen politisierende Industrie" as Tucholsky and other 
opponents of the military were well aware. (40) The pay-masters made 
a sound investment. The "White Guards" protected the political and 
economic status quo against the revolutionaries, but they despised 
Ebert's government as much as its "Bolshevist" opponents. Tucholsky 
correctly maintained that the recruits were uninterested in politics; 
they sought well-paid employment and adventure. (41) The Freikorps 
fostered not the new democracy but the spirit of the Kasemenhof; in 
response to orders and in accordance with their own sadistic impulses 
they treated their compatriots "schlimmer als die Neger". (42)
In March 1919 Noske decided to employ the volunteer units 
as the basis of the provisional Reichswehr. Tucholsky recognised that 
this move was a mistake: the Free Corps units were fighting for 
injustice as well as against it, and should be immediately dissolved. (43)
(39) Cf. Carsten, op.cit., p.397.
(40) Das Buch von der deutschen Schande, GW I, p.821. Cf. also Robert G. L. 
Waite: Vanguard of Nazism, the Free Corps Movement, Harvard 1952, p. 194 
"There was nothing particularly mysterious about the sources of their 
financial support. The Landbund sponsored therm. Heavy industry also 
made generous contributions".
(41) Tucholsky described them as:"eine garende, immer kanpflustige, 
versorgungsbestrebte Masse unbefriedigter junger Leute: aktive 
Offiziere, Studenten, aus der Bahn geschlagene Beamte,
Abenteurer und Schieber".(GW I, p.821.
(42) ibid.
(43) Preui3i'scha Stucienten, GW I, p.409.
This did not occur, and the military restrictions in the Versailles
Treaty furthered Groener*s plan for a compact, efficient army operating
as a state within the state. Tucholsky reacted to the deteriorating
situation with demands for Noske's dismissal:
„Haben Sie nicht einen andem Reichswehr- 
minister? Dieser hier ist uns drei Nuniner 
zu groB".(44)
The net?; Reichswehr and the Freikorps embodied and reinforced 
the "geistige Militarisierung" vhich Tucholsky found morally as well 
as politically offensive. The spirit of militarism appeared to Tuch­
olsky as the opposite of the desired new Kultur. (45)* His most detailed 
definition of the concept was made in the article GeBler: militarism 
comprised the over-emphasis on rank at the expense of personal warth, 
the demand for unquestioning obedience, the readiness to hide behind 
the group to avoid responsibility and retribution, and finally a 
pathological brutality. (46) Yet the government made no attempt to 
counter the anti-Republican propaganda of the military.
Hie conduct of the Freikorps enlisted to fight in the Baltic 
states gave rise to more immediate disquiet. They had been premised 
land by the Latvian government, and were far more interested in such 
considerations of personal advantage than in making fine distinctions 
between Socialists, Bolsheviks, Jews and other hostile elements. In 
October 1919 the Allies, tiring of their interventionist policy against
(44) Herny NOske, WB 4/9/19, GW III, p. 334.
(45) Militaria, WB 22/1/20, GW I, p.591.
(46) WB 7/1/21, ibid., p.855: "Dieser Ungeist sagt: Du bist nichts;
dein Rang ist alles! Dieser Ungeist sagt: Untertanen haben zu gehor- 
•chen - Hande an die Hosennaht! Dieser Ungeist sagt: Wfozu du selber 
zu feige bist, das tu nur, aber tu es im Namen einer Vielheit, im 
Namen einer Macht. Es ist so suB, seinen Nebenmenschen fiihlen 
zu lassen, daB man ihn treten und einsperren darf...".
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Oomriunist Russia, and suspicious of the Free Gorps as agents of 
German nationalism, called a halt to the anti-Bolshevist crusade 
and demanded that the volunteers be disbanded in accordance with 
the disarmament clauses of the Peace Treaty. As Tucholsky realised, 
the concentrations of troops on Germany's eastern frontier represented 
a serious threat; there was an obvious contradiction between their 
oft-proclaimed devotion to the national interest, and the damage 
inflicted on the country by their activities.
Noske discovered that it was easier to arm the volunteers 
than it was to persuade them to return to civilian life. The only 
result of his half-hearted efforts to disband the Baltlkiiner was bo 
turn their dislike of the government into hatred, since it appeared 
bait on destroying their livelihood. In this conviction they were 
strengthened by their own leaders, who enjoyed the experience of 
absolute power, and by the Berlin army commander, General Luttwitz. 
Certain of his support, the Ehrhardt Brigade ignored the belated order 
for their dissolution and marched on the capital.
Noske*s hopes of taming the Reichswehr had rested on the 
assumption that it would resist rebellion from the right as well as 
the left. In March 1920 his generals proved such optimism misguided. 
Oily his adjutant, von Gilsa, and General Reinhardt favoured armed 
resistance to Ehrhardt; the remainder, led by Seeckt, decided to 
wait and see which side would prevail. (47) Most of the troops followed
(47) Cf. Gordon Craig: Hie Politics of the Prussian Army, Oxford, 
Clarendon, 1955, p. 378: "Seeckt had no intention of becoming 
involved personally in Luttwitz *s hazardous adventure, or at 
least not until he knew that it was going to succeed... He 
had been as insubordinate as Luttwitz, even if in a scraewhat 
different way".
Seeckt in benevolent neutrality towards the rebels:
„Die Soldaten fuhren in ihren Lastautos 
durch die Stadt und waren treu. Wem.. da- 
von stand nichts in den Kriegsartikeln.
Aber treu waren sie, mit jener stuqpfsinnigen 
Treue, die urn ihrer selbst willen da ist, 
ohne sich um den Herm zu kitnmern, dem zu 
dienen ist".(48)
It was not the regular soldiers who frustrated the 
conspirators1 plans to set up a right-wing dictatorship, but the 
workers whose general strike allowed Ebert to return to Berlin in 
triumph. However, the widespread anti-militarist feeling in the 
wake of the coup was permitted to evaporate. Indeed, the long-overdue 
resignation of Noske made the situation worse, since control of the 
army passed to Seeckt. In spite of his protestations of loyalty to 
the Constitution, Seeckt was a convinced Prussian monarchist. His 
military expertise, conservatism and strong personality won the support 
of his fellow-officers. He aimed to create a strong army, organised 
on traditional lines as a reliable instrument of its commander. 
Eventually Seeckt hoped for political power, though for the time being 
he preferred to remain in the background. His manoeuvring was satirised 
by Tucholsky in the poem Marke: Essig. (49)
Seeckt*s efforts were assisted by the new Defence Minister, 
Otto GeBler, who contented himself with the role of parliamentary 
spokesman of the Chef der Heeresleitung. In this capacity GeBler drew 
most of the attacks frcm the left. Tucholsky was scornful of the 
civilian for allowing himself to be dominated by the military (50) and 
opposed his readiness to put the interests of his department above 
those of the Republic as a whole. (51) When GeBler and Seeckt produced
(48) Kapp-mttwitz, GW I, p.618.
(49) Freiheit, 5/12/20, ibid., pp.772-73.
(50) Per kleine GeBler und der groBe Grosz, Freiheit, 24/10/20, .ibid., 
pp.751-52.
(51) GeBler, ibid., p.857.
the Wehrgesetz of 1921, Tucholsky was justifiably suspicious of
this attempt to preserve the spirit of Sedan. The army had no
\
reason to preserve ideals at all; but if any Spezialehre had to be 
invoked, it was not that of Prussia. As for Seeckt*s claim that the 
new army should be "unpolitical", this was impossible. The person­
ifications of the Sedan spirit were bound to be hostile to the 
Republican government. Even if the Reichswehr miraculously lived up 
to Seeckt's principle of neutrality, Tucholsky rightly claimed that 
the attentisme of March 1920 represented an inadequate concession to 
the Republic:
„Unsre Wehrmacht... hat nicht, 
wie GeBler sie will, "unpolitisch" - 
sie hat republikanisch zu sein". (52)
Until the end of 1922 Tucholsky continued his efforts to
cajole successive governments into reforming the army; he warned of
its attachment to the imperial ideals and of its unreliability:
* „t)ber die Notwendigkeit einer Reichswehr 
laBt sich streiten - iiber die Beschaffenheit 
dieser Reichswehr gibt es nur eine Meinung - 
sie muB geandert werden". (53)
Occasionally the energy with which his own campaign was being pursued
misled Tucholsky into believing that real progress had been made. In
his optimistic mood he felt that he was preaching not merely to a few
converted anti-militarists, and to the officers in the Defence Ministry
who scanned the columns of the Vfeltbuhne in search of "libel of the
Reichswehr", but also to large numbers of intelligent readers willing
to be convinced by his arguments. He declared that the age of
militarism was past; "ein groBer Teil anstandig gesinnter Deutscher
ruckt von diesem Ungeist.. ab". (54) Agitation for constructive reform
(52) Die zUfallige RepUblik, WB 13/7/22, CJv I, p.995.
(53) Die Reichswehr, WB 23/3/22, ibid., p.908.
(54) Die ErdOldhten, V© 30/3/22, ibid., p.934.
-2 4 2 -
and this occasional wish-fulfilment alternated with warnings of a 
successful right-wing COup if no action was taken. (55)
After the murder of Rathenau in June 1922, Republican
leaders appeared set on resolute action, and in spite of previous
disappointments Tucholsky offered then his support. The. first of
his denanas went to the heart of the problem
MUnwandlung der Reichswehr in eine Volksmiliz.
Entferhung aller uberfliissigen und gegen- 
revolutionaren Generate und Offiziere”. (56)
The "people's militia" had been traditional SPD policy since the days
of Engels; its establishment would have been a difficult task, but
after three years of bitter experience with the Reichswehr-, the
Republican leaders should have been sufficiently concerned to undertake
sane such reform. Tucholsky was also correct in warning yet again of
the danger frcm the counter-revolutionary Verbande. (57)
All Tucholsky's attacks on militarism as a social evil, 
and on its specific manifestations, the army and the Free Corps, were 
ignored by politicians who underestimated the threat to democracy.
After a despairing silence in 1923, Tucholsky' s attitude to the military 
changed. The democratic reformer of Unser Militar. had existed uneasily 
for four years alongside the doctrinaire pacifist of Per Offizier der 
ZukOnft, who had wished not to democratise the army but to abolish it.
In 1924 the second view-point was to gain the ascendency.
Tucholsky's Pacifism.
The writers and intellectuals of Germany had generally 
shared the enthusiasm which greeted the outbreak of war in 1914.
(55) V*as ware, wenn.. VvB 22/6/22, ibid., p.975-80.
(56) Die ziifallige Republic, ibid.,p.997.
(57) Verfassunqstag, Freiheit, 13/8/22, ibid., p,l033.
The -pacifist organisations, whether they drew support from the 
SPD or middle-class groups, had little influence, and in any case 
were soon forbidden by the authorities. However, the course of 
the war itself proved the best propaganda for the pacifist cause. (58) 
The official DuTchhaltopanole still found spokesmen in Traub, 
Hochstetter and Rudolf Herzog, but the most gifted of the younger 
writers, such as Toller, Brecht, Ossietzky and Tucholsky himself, 
opposed the war. In 1919 Tucholsky became a member of the Pacifist 
Movement; he spoke in the Nie-wieder-Krieg denonstrations and wrote 
articles in August 1920 and 1922 to remind readers of the anniversary 
of the declaration of war, and of the horrors which had followed.
Tucholsky became a pacifist out of moral rather than 
political conviction. His attack on war was based on its negation of 
humane values. It seemed absurd that what in one district was called 
murder and punished by imprisonment or execution, should in another 
area be not merely permissible but obligatory, as long as the victim 
was one of "the enemy". (59) The oonmandment "Thou shalt not kill" 
had an absolute value and could not be hedged about with conditions. 
Tucholsky detested the casuistry of the field chaplains for whom the 
sixth oarmandment read "Du muBt toteni " (60) The duty of enlightened 
Germans was not to join the army and try to influence its development, 
but to support the fight for peace led by the Pacifists. This radical 
pacifist message (61) contrasted with Tucholsky's regular warnings to 
the government that the Reichswehr should be reformed. The two contra-
(58) Cf. Richard Barkeley, Die deutsche Friedensbewegung, Hamburg, 
Kammerich and Lesser, 1948, p.28.
(59) Von grofien Requisitioned, V© 30/1/19, GW I, p.336.
(60) Das FQldOrlebnis, V© 17/8/22, ibid., p.1036.
(61) Cf. Krieg dem Kriege, ibid., pp).432-33, and Die Flecke, BVZ, 
21/12/19, ibid., pp.547-48.
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dictory positions illustrated respectively the pessimistic doctrinaire 
and the optimistic reformer in Tucholsky; but during the early years 
of the Republic, the latter was more prominent.
Tucholsky recognised that war was not only wrong in 
principle, but disastrous in practice, both for its participants, 
the cannon soldiers, and for the bulk of the civilian population. (62)
The soldiers had been drilled until their spirit was almost destroyed, 
cheated and humiliated by their superiors, and sent to face barbed 
wire, poison gas, machine guns and tanks. Tucholsky also remembered 
the deprivations of their dependents, struggling against poverty and 
inadequate rations. This picture was far removed from the official 
legends which described the war as the beginning of a glorious new era.
The experience of the war had demonstrated to Tucholsky the 
powerlessness of the individual vhen confronted by a hostile group such 
as the officers. He had therefore aligned himself with the Aktivisten, 
and later the USPD, without sharing all the aims of either group. 
However, he owed more lasting loyalty to the Pacifist Movement, of 
which he remained a member until the early 1930’s. His association 
with the Movement began in 1919 when, he joined the Friedensbund der 
Kriegsteilnehmer, set up by Hiller and Ossietzky. Tucholsky agreed 
with the latter that his compatriots should be reminded of the suffering 
of 1914-18 as a deterrent for the future.(63) However, by December 1919 
the public mood had changed from uncertainty about the causes of defeat 
to a vindictive hostility towards the pacifists for undermining the 
national will to win. A demonstration against the DolchatoBlegende, 
in which Tucholsky was one of the main speakers, was broken up by a
(62) Cf. the Militaria series, Pile Kamellen, WB 6/2/19, GW I, pp.365-66.
(63) Cf. Tucholsky's poem Nach fiinf jahren, V© 7/8/19, ibid., p.459 
and Koplin, op.cit., p. 41.
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gang of soldiers. Thereafter most Germans remained wedded to 
militarist traditions.
As it became clear that organised pacifism faced an uphill 
struggle, Tucholsky felt: the need to clarify his own views on the 
causes of modem war. His shorter articles in 1919 and 1920 had been 
designed to stir his readers' emotions against war, but he now 
recognised that reasoned argument was necessary also. He had put 
himself at the disposal of the German state in 1915 and served it 
loyally, though without enthusiasm, fthen he joined the Pacifist Move­
ment in 1919 he was forced to consider if it would not have been better 
to refuse service, even at the cost of imprisonment. Tucholsky*s new 
answer was that of the radical pacifist:
„Lehre? Nie wieder Krieg. Mittel? - 
Den Heeresaienst auch dann zu verweigem, 
wenn. ihn ein Gesetz vorschreibt. Beginn 
des Kampfes gegen den Kampf?- Heute". (64)
Tucholsky1 s opposition to war service was an assertion of
the right of the individual. At this stage in his career he agreed
with Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster, the editor of Die MenSChheit, who
saw Prussian militarism as the main cause of the Vtorld War. (65)
Tucholsky did not adopt an anti-capitalist stance until August 1922,
and even then he mentioned only briefly the economic causes of war:
„Dieser Krieg war die naturliche Folge 
des kapitalistischen Wsltsysterns". (66)
He still pictured the state as a faceless collectivity, and criticised
"die lacherliche Oberspannung der Staatsidee" (67), but made no deduction
about the interests which it represented.
(64) Rausch, SUff und Kdtzenjanrner, Freiheit, 3/8/20, GW I, p.714.
(65) Cf. Barkeley, op.cit., p.98.
(66) Vor acht Jahren, Freiheit, 1/8/22, On I, p. 1016.
(67) ibid.
1923 marked another turning-point in the relations 
between the Republic and its armed forces. Tucholsky had long been 
aware of the Reichswehr1 s function in domestic politics, as an 
expensive, elitist force, covertly and sometimes even openly disloyal 
to Republican governments. Supporters of the Reichswehr had maintained 
that Germany needed an army to protect her against foreign aggression. (68) 
In January 1923, however, the Reichswehr proved unable to prevent the 
French invasion of the Ruhr and the national humiliation which followed. 
The one positive value which the army might have possessed was thereby 
shown to be illusory.
By contrast, the dangers to Germany represented by the 
Reichswehr and the para-military forces were only too real. In 
September 1923 an anti-Republican rebellion by the Schwarze Reichswehr 
was frustrated at Kustrin. With the connivance of his superiors, the 
leader of the coup, Oberleutnant Schulz, had organised the Fernemorde, 
or executions without trial of alleged traitors in the Free Corps.
Details of the murders were made public two years later by Carl Mertens, 
in the Weltbiftine. (69) Tucholsky followed the matter-of-fact narration 
by Mertens with two poems: one called for the punishment of the 
murderers, the other sympathised with the young and misguided victims. (70)
The unreliability of the Reichswehr in 1923 was as striking 
as that of the Verbande. The Bavarian army group, led by Los sow, 
supported Kahr's reactionary regime in Munich, and even Seeckt hardly 
justified the government's trust. When President Ebert asked him which 
side the army would take in the dispute with Bavaria, he replied 
arrogantly:
(68) Cf. Schulz, op.cit., p.74.
(69) Cf. Mertens' articles on 18/8/25, 8/9/25, 15/9/25, 6/10/25,
13/10/25, 20/10/25.
(700 Cf. Gut Mcrd! WB 16/3/25, Gtf II, p.377 and Der Kopf im Walde,
GW m ,  p. 301.
„Die Reichswehr steht hinter mir". '
Seeckt's opposition to the Verbande stormed from their insubordination 
and clumsiness; he feared that they might interfere with his own bid 
for supreme power. (71) Though Seeckt refrained from open revolt, he 
did not endear himself to the Republican leaders, or to Tucholsky.
The lesson of 1923 was that neither the Reichswehr nor 
its commander could be trusted. The officers were reactionaries 
almost to a man, and could neither be persuaded to serve the Republic 
loyally nor be dismissed. Seeckt would not permit such reorganisation, 
and the crisis had demonstrated his strength. It was too late to 
reform the army; the only tactic left to Tucholsky was to oppose all 
government expenditure on the Reichswehr, and to reiterate his 
objections to war service.
Tucholsky returned to his pacifist agitation on taking up
nesidsre in Paris in 1924. It was natural. for a German living among
his country's traditional enemies to reflect on past and future
Franco-German relations. The French capital had positive attractions.
Tucholsky was delighted to discover that the officers of the recently
victorious French army ranked low in public esteem
"parce que ces gens-la ne sont pas tres instruits". (72)
Tucholsky was not blind to the fact that the French military budget was
as inflated as that of the Reichswehr, but he contrasted the average
Frenchman's attitude to the army with that of the German and concluded
that the French were arming only in self-defence:
„Frankreich hat Angst. Man hat sie angegriffen 
und sie haben den Krieg im Lande gehabt; sie kennen 
den Krieg".(73)
(71) In general, Seeckt supported the Verbande. When the pacifist 
Quiade attacked the illegal organisations in a letter to Chancellor 
Marx in January 1924, Seeckt threatened Quidde with prosecution for 
treason. (Cf. Barkeley, op.cit., pp.77-8).
(72) Ein aeutscher Reichswehrminister, Menschheit, 5/6/25, GW II, p. 142.
(73) ibid., p. 140.
The evidence of French anti-militarism encouraged 
Tucholsky. Further stimulus to his campaign was provided by the 
inevitable daily reminders that in an age of conscripted armies, he 
and his new neighbours might have been obliged to kill one another 
a few years before. (74) He visited Verdun, scene of a battle of 
attrition in 1916 which cost both nations half a million casualties. 
Tucholsky1 s report from Verdun (75) marked the transition from abstract 
awareness of suffering to empathic experience of it in the casualty- 
rocm:
irAn den Wanden kleben die Schreie;
hier wurde zusammengeflickt. und umwickelt,
hier verrochelte, erstickte, verbrullte
und krepierte, was oben zugrunde gerichtet war". (76)
At Verdun Tucholsky recognised the destructive power of
modem technology. This increased his desire to prevent any repetition
of the fighting. He felt with seme justice that the attitude of his
compatriots had since 1914 changed only for the worse. Ten years
before they had been inspired by boastful expansionism and duped by
their newspapers. By 1925 their hostility to France had been reinforced
by the desire to avenge the defeat of 1918, and the humiliation of
Versailles. Although Tucholsky could not know the full extent of
Seeckt*s secret re-armament of Germany, his instinct about the
intentions of the General Staff did not play him false:
„Wir gehen nicht den Vfeg des Friedens..
Die Kinder unsrer bekanntesten Manner 
haben alle Aussicht, unbekannte Soldaten 
zu werden.. Wir stehen da, wo wir im Jahre 
19CX) gestanden haben: zwischen zwei Kriegen". (77)
(74) Vision, V© 7/8/24, GW I, p.1202.
(75) Vor Verdun, VJB 7/8/24, ibid., p.1304,
(76) ibid., p. 1210.
(77) Zwischen zwei Kriegen, *WB 10/2/25, GW II, pp. 42-43.
Like So many of Tucholsky's prophecies, these words proved correct: 
fourteen years after 1925, just as after 1900, war broke out.
Tucholsky fs clairvoyance extended to the German policy
which led up to that war. His Brief an eincn besseren Harm (78)
was addressed to Seeckt. Tucholsky recognised with reluctant respect
the general's achievement in turning the army into an obedient tool
in his own fight for pcwer, and admitted his triumph over Republican
politicians. He then analysed Seeckt' s long-term strategy. The
aggressive eastern policy which Tucholsky described certainly figured
in Seeckt's plans; the Prussian aristocrat despised the Slav peoples
and had plotted for years with the Soviet government to strengthen
his army for a confrontation with France's eastern allies. This
remarkable prophecy deserves quotation as an exact forecast of Hitler's
strategy in 1938-9:
„Also zunachst wird alles klappen.
Sie konnen den AnschluB Osterreichs 
erreichen, der fur sie unerlaBlich ist...
Die Tschechoslowakei wird nicht so leicht 
zu fangen sein. Aber das ist auch gar nicht 
notig.’ Dieser Staat, durchsetzt von Leuten, 
die keine Tschechen sind, noch geschiittelt 
von Nationality tskampfen, wenn auch bemerkenswert 
gut gefuhrt, stellt fiir Sie, der Sie nicht anders 
als militarisch denken konnen, keine erhebliche 
Gefahr dar...
Bleibt Folen. Sie kalkulieren so:
Die Bolen sind fur den Anfang zu uberrennen.
Dazu ist n5tig, daB Sie sich mit RuBland 
verstandigen.." (79)
Tucholsky also warned of the likely consequences of this policy:
the creation of an anti-German coalition similar to that of the First
World War.
(78) V© 24/3/25, ibid., pp.67-72.
(79) ibid., p.69.
The accuracy of Tucholsky's vision was the more 
remarkable since it was made during the short era of international 
understanding in the mid-1920's. The efforts of Stresemann and 
Briand to ease tension between their two countries seemed to be 
successful, as was indicated by the conclusion of the Locarno Pact. 
However, Tucholsky ranained sceptical of Stresemann's attachment to 
revision of the Versailles Treaty by peaceful means alone. (80) In 
any case, Tucholsky considered that future wars could not be prevented 
by negotiations between the two Foreign Ministers, since they owed 
their positions to the support of the bourgeoisie. A renewal of 
hostilities would one day seem in the interests of German industry, 
and then the achievements of Stresemann and Briand would prove an 
inadequate safeguard against conflict.
Tucholsky' s strategy to prevent war was based on inter­
national understanding not between statesmen but between the working 
classes of each country. He therefore greeted with enthusiasm such 
demonstrations of proletarian solidarity as the visit to Paris by 
German working-class children, who’ had been warmly welcomed by their 
temporary foster-parents. Tucholsky hoped that the experience of 
French hospitality might turn the children into "bad soldiers", and 
therefore, in his opinion, good human beings. (81)
On the other hand, Tucholsky remained sceptical about the . 
efficacy of the Social Democratic recipe for Franco-German understanding, 
which consisted in periodic visits to Paris by their expert on foreign 
policy, Rudolf Breitscheid, to reassure French colleagues of the
(80) Cf. Chapter 7.
(81) Deutsche Kinder in Paris, V© 7/4/25, GW II, pp.87-90. The 
exchange was organised by the Communist auxiliary Internationale 
Arbeiter-Hilf e.
German government's pacific intentions. (82) Tucholsky recognised 
that such journeys had little effect on public opinion on either 
bank of the Rhine. Vforse still, they served as a palliative; once 
the party's Socialist honour had been satisfied, its members felt 
free to support national defence, by voting with only a token 
protest (83) for the inflated military budget.
Tucholsky's battle against militarism was altogether 
more militant. While successive German Finance Ministers struggled 
to balance the budget, vast sums continued to be squandered on the 
array. Since the war, Tucholsky had opposed the level of military 
expenditure. (84) In common with many fellow-pacifists (85), he 
recognised that most members were unable to understand the budget for 
which they were voting. (86) By 1926 Tucholsky objected not merely to 
the details but to the principle of military expenditure. The army 
would not deter Germany's neighbours from making war, since its much 
stronger Imperial predecessor had failed to do so. On the contrary, 
its very existence provided- French militarists with a justification 
for their activity, and at heme it reinforced the Prussian spirit. 
Against generals who made no concession to the pacifists, Tucholsky 
felt it reasonable to echo the slogan of the Wilhelminian SPD:
„Dieser Reichswehr keinen Mann und keinen Groscheni"
(82) Zwei SOzialdenokratien, Monschheit, 3/4/25, ibid., p.85.
(83) They indicated their reservations in a procedural motion, 
certain to be rejected, which would have forbidden payment of the 
salary of the Reichswehrminister. Cf. Ein deutscher Reidhswehr- 
minister, Msnschheit, 5/6/25, ibid., p.142.
(84) Cf. Zehn Prozent, Freiheit, 6/10/20, GW I, p.740. .
(85) Cf. Walter Kreiser's attacks on concealed expenditure in the 
military budget, which led to the trial of Ossietzky as 
responsible editor of the Weltbuhne.
(86) Keinen Mann und keinen Groschen-1, Das andere Deutschland,
1/5/26, GW II, p.428.
Tucholsky1 s proposals corresponded closely to the 
plans of the left-wing opposition within the SPD, a group led by 
Paul Levi, which was growing in strength, and was to obtain for its 
uncorprcmising anti-militarist stance a third of the votes at the 
1929 SPD Congress. (87) It is possible that Tucholsky wished to 
strengthen this opposition group, whose attitude was already clearly 
defined by 1926, and to induce the Social Democratic establishment to 
make concessions to the pacifist stand-point. However, his attacks 
on the party at this time (88) suggest that neither wing of the SPD 
appeared to offer him any hope of a change of policy. The similarity 
of view between Tucholsky and the SPD left is therefore probably 
coincidental.
The Social Democratic leaders were no longer capable of 
such opposition to the principle of militarism. They felt it 
necessary to accept the Reichswehr as part of their plans to bolster 
up the institutions of the Republic. Their attitude was summed up 
by the SPD MP, Eggerstedt, who attempted to demonstrate that they had 
always supported national defence, and only disapproved of the 
excesses of the Wilhelminian system. (89) In this spirit Scheidemann 
took up in Parliament in December 1926 the denunciations of the 
Schwarze Reichswehr by the pacifists Lehmann-RuBbuldt, Mertens and 
Kfeiser. The former Chancellor was as concerned to embarrass his 
Communist rivals by revealing the complicity of Seeckt and the Red 
Amy as to strike a blow against the military. The SPD success in
(87) For the text of the left-wing resolution, cf. Charlotte 
Beradt: Paul Levi, ein demokratisdher socialist iii der 
Weimarer Republik, Frankfurt, Europaische Verlagsanstalt,
1969, p.137.
(88) Cf. FeldfrUchte, V© 21/9/26, GW II, pp.508-9.
(89) Wehrmacht und Sozlaldemokratie, Das andere Deutschland,
10/4/26, DDR-Ausgabe, Vol.4, pp.371-75.
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bringing down Marx's government was shewn to be merely a matter 
of form when they tolerated the new administration, even though 
it still contained the offending GeSler. The consistently anti­
militarist Tucholsky felt that Scheidemann had little right to 
attack his former friends. (90).
A similar conflict of opinion between Tucholsky and the 
Social Democrats was evident in his criticism of the Reichsbanner. 
The organisation had been formed as a Republican counterpart to 
the right-wing Verbande, and Tucholsky admitted that it had done 
useful work against reactionaries in the’provinces. (91) But, like 
Ossietzky two years before (92), Tucholsky had serious reservations 
about the activities of the Reichsbanner, since it lacked clear, 
positive ideals. Its aim, to protect the Republic, was too vague, 
since apart fran a tiny minority of Prussian traditionalists, even 
conservative public figures now accepted the Republican form of 
government. Such empty Republicanism meant little to Tucholsky; 
since he had cane to reject the Weimar system, it is hardly sur­
prising that he could muster little enthusiasm for its defenders, 
the Reichsbanner.
Indeed the organisation's aims appeared to Tucholsky 
dangerous. He did not share the optimism of the Reichsbanner leader, 
Otto Horsing, that it would prove a force for peace: instead, Tuch­
olsky believed that its merrbers would support the war effort, as the 
previous generation of Social Democrats had done.
(90) Opposition! Opposition!, WB 8/2/27, GW II, p.722.
(91) Der Sieg des republikanischen Gedankens, WB 14/9/26, ibid., 
pp.497-98.
(92) Cf. Ossietzky: Schutz der Republik - die grofie Made, in 
Das Tage-Biich, 13/9/24, published in ReChonschaft, pp.36-8.
Tucholsky1 s view of the Reichsbanner was distorted by 
his lack of confidence in the Republic. When democracy was in 
danger after Papen’s dismissal of the Prussian government of Braun 
and Severing in July 1932, the rank and file of the organisation 
clamoured for resistance to the dictatorial coup. • But Tucholsky's 
suspicions of the Reichsbanner were ultimately justified by the 
pusillanimity of the SPD leaders, who sacrificed the last opportunity 
to fight Fascism in favour of a fruitless appeal to the ReiChsgericht.
The most ludicrous example of the SPD's efforts to oppose 
the military but support "die Wehrhaftigkeit des deutschen Volkes1 
came in 1928. The Versailles Treaty permitted Germany to construct 
two pocket battleships, a concession of which her governments had 
been unable to take advantage due to the unfavourable economic 
situation. While the middle-class parties wished Panzerkreuzer A 
to be built at once, the SPD advocated that the money should be used 
instead to provide school meals; they fought a successful election 
campaign with the slogan "Kinderspeisung statt Panzerkreuzer" (93). 
However, their leader, the new Chancellor Muller, was persuaded in 
the interests of unity in the coalition to order the construction of 
the battleship. Tom between its traditional anti-militarism and 
its loyalty to Republican oamprcmise, the SPD found itself in a 
plight which appeared to Tucholsky to call for satire rather than 
polemic;
„Erst haben sie alle Nein gesagt, 
dann haben sie alle Ja gesagt - 
jetzt ist das Ding bewilligt.
Die Reichswehr treibt nun Wassersport, 
und kriegt fur unser Geld hinfort 
einen Torfkahn zugebilligt". (94)
(93) Heimut Heiber; Die Repiiblik vori Weimar, Munich, DTV, 1972, 
p.194.
(94) Schiffstaufe, WB 28/8/28, GW II, p.1210.
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The gulf which separated Tucholsky1 s unoanpromising pacifism 
from the "Ja, aber" attitude of the SPD was illustrated by the 
name which Tucholsky suggested for the new vessel: "The Battleship 
Potemkin".
The traditionally pacifist Social Democrats proved 
unwilling to carry out any of Tucholskyfs anti-militarist proposals; 
only the left-wing opposition supported his conclusions, and they 
had little influence over the cautious ParteiyorS tand. If the weak­
ness of the SPD was its over-emphasis on party unity, the Pacifist 
Movement suffered frcm the opposite failing. Its effectiveness was 
greatly reduced by internal controversy and fragmentation. Hiller 
and Kuster quarrelled successively with Foerster, Quidde and each 
other (95), while a visit to Paris by Karl Kraus was distinguished by 
an attack on Tucholsky for the Kriegsanleihegedicht, and by Kraus' s 
dislike of Jaoobsohn. (96) Such conflicts made the organisation 
appear ridiculous.
Tucholsky1 s gradual left-ward development was reflected 
in the changing type of pacifism which he favoured. In the early 
1920's he greeted any demonstration of Franco-German understanding 
as a step in the right direction, and he wrote enthusiastically of 
the visit to Berlin in June 1922 by Victor Basch, chairman of the 
French League for Human Rights. (97) By 1925 Tucholsky had recognised 
the eoonanic interests which caused capitalist states to go to war, 
and he no longer believed that goodwill visits by foreign pacifists 
could make a significant contribution to international understanding .(98)
(95) Cf. Barkeley, op.cit., p.102.
(96) Tucholsky's letter to Jaoobsohn, 9/3/25, Briefe, pp. 100-01.
(97) Per Herr in der Loge, V® 22/6/22, Gtl III, p. 1336.
(^98) Deutsche Woche in Paris, V© 9/2/26, GW II, pp.345-49.
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The young generation was unimpressed by such "pseudo-pacifist 
occasions", Tucholsky wrote(99); instead its members were flocking 
to the military. Only an energetic anti-militarist campaign had 
any prospect of gaining their support.
Tucholsky himself was neither complacent nor quarrel­
some, but his convictions marked him out as an adherent of one 
school of pacifist thought and an opponent of others. He criticised 
sectors of the Movement for allowing themselves to be forced on to 
the defensive. (100) Tucholsky1 s own tactics were aggressive enough. 
He reiterated still more forcefully his recommendation that the 
call-up be refused:.
„...daB also zunachst einmal die 
seelische Zwangsvorstellung auszurotten 
ist, die den Msnschen glauben macht, 
er musse, miisse, mlisse traben, wenn es 
blast. Man muB gar nicht. Denn dies 
ist eine simple, eine primitive, eine 
einfach-groBe Wahrheit:
Man kann namlich auch zu Hause bleiben". (101)
Even if the individual was forced to join the army, he should.make
use of the right
„sich im Kriege zu driicken, wo burner 
man nur kann". (102)
and not allcw himself to kill or be killed for the benefit of the
capitalist state. These tactics were typical of the Bund revolution-
Srer PazifiSten, to which Tucholsky belonged, along with Hiller and
Kuster. (103) Now that Tucholsky regarded the conscientious objectors
(99) ibid., p.348.
(100) Vorwarts-1, WB 5/1/26, ibid., p.313.
(101) tjber wirkungsvollen Pazifismus, V© 11/10/27, ibid., p.910.
(102) ibid., p.912.
(103) Kuster was the editor of the radical pacifist journal Pas 
andere Deutschland, to which Tucholsky contributed regularly
j] in the late 1920's.
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as the real heroes of the war, he was driven to state not merely 
that war was murder, but that its participants were professional 
murderers.(104)
Another aspect of Tucholsky's pacifism in the late 
1920's was that, unlike such liberal pacifists as Quidde, he had 
no confidence in the machinery for arbitration provided by the 
League of Nations. The value of the League, he declared(105)# lay 
only in representing a forum where Briand and Stresemann could sound 
out each other's intentions. However, as long as the absolute 
sovereignty of individual capitalist nation-states existed, Geneva 
was "a farce".(106)
Tucholsky's Marxist view of the state as an instrument 
Of oppression employed by the ruling class had evolved by 1924,
Since he looked on the state in negative terms, it is unfair for 
Doerfel to criticise the absence of a "positiver Staatsbegiiff" 
in his writings. (107) She is on surer ground in attacking his 
inability to provide an alternative source of allegiance. When 
Tucholsky talked of his duty to a "Vaterland Europa" (108), his 
meaning must remain to some extent a matter of conjecture. However, 
it is certain that he did not envisage merely a Free Trade Area, 
or a perpetuation of the system of "anarchisdh lebende kapitalistisdhe 
Staaten" of his own day. (109)
Tucholsky saw the true frontiers for mankind as lying 
not between the "lacherliche Grenzpfahle" but between exploiters 
and exploited. (110) Insofar as he did define what he meant by a
(104) Per bewachte Kriegsschauplatz, WB 4/8/31, GW III, p.905.
(105) DeutschenSpiegel, WB 17/7/28, GW II, p. 1179.
(106) SchnipSel, WB 29/3/32, GW III, p. 1038.
(107) Doerfel, op.cit., p.111.
(108) Die groBen Familien, WB 27/3/28, GW II, p. 1086.
(109) Grimms Marchen, WB 4/9/28, ibid., p. 1223.
(110) Und wer spricht fur euch-"?, Das andere Deutschland,
22/10/27, ibid., p.923.
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united Europe, his hopes for progress were based on the Russian 
model. In his enthusiasm for the Soviet Union, Tucholsky even drew 
a distinction between the Reichswehr soldier who fought for the 
existing unjust German state, and his counterpart in the Red A*my, 
who took up arms "on behalf of an idea". (Ill) This was nonsense: 
the campaign of the Red Army in Poland and the Baltic during the 
early 1920's had shown it to be as much a tool of Russian imperialism 
as the Reichswehr was of German. Yet Tucholsky's mistake was a 
pardonable one. Since Foerster's trust in the Western Allies had 
been proved illusory by Clemenceau and Poincare, and the Germany of 
Hinderiburg gave pacifists no comfort, radical anti-militarists such 
as Tucholsky and Hiller naturally looked to the USSR as the only model 
still apparently intact.
Tucholsky's trust in the Soviet Union led him into 
contradiction, and he was more confident about the reasons for 
rejecting the existing nation-states than about what was to replace 
them. Though he did not set out to be a political philosopher, such 
an emission weakens his argument, Hcwever, Tucholsky was entitled to 
claim that his suspicions of diplomacy between capitalist states, as 
a road to war rather than peace, were vindicated. In common with other 
radical pacifists, such as Ossietzky, Kreiser and Jacob, he criticised 
the German government for preaching peace abroad while secretly re­
arming at heme. Even though the civilian government had no immediate 
aggressive intentions, Tucholsky was right to conclude that the very 
existence of such a destructive military apparatus meant that it would 
eventually be used:
(111) WO waren sie im Kriege, Herr-? WB 30/3/26, ibid,, p,392,
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,(Jedenfalls lebt kein vollsinniger 
Kaufmann auf dieser Erde, der Milliarden 
und Milliarden in ein Geschaft hineinsteckt, 
das er niemals auszunutzen gedenkt. Das tut 
aber der MLlitarismus. Und es gibt so eine 
Art Naturgesetz: was man jahrelang. mit dem 
Aufwand der auBersten Geldeinlagen 
vorbereitet, das muB sich eines Tages von 
selbst auslosen." (112)
The re-armament of Germany in defiance of international 
law placed her pacifists in a difficult position. If they knew that 
the Versailles Treaty had been broken, they had an obligation, not 
only to the truth but also to the tax-pay er, to publish their findings 
in the hope of discouraging their military. But this proceeding was 
likely to be exploited by the foreign press and the French armaments 
lobby as an excuse for building up their cwn arsenal. Great care was 
required in the choice of one's informants; there must be no question 
of betraying secrets for personal gain, and other conditions had to 
be met:
„VJier stellt das Ansinnen an mich?
Sind es pazifistische Freunde?
Was werden diese pazifistischen Freunde 
mit meinem Material tun? Niitzen sie damit 
unserer Bewegung? Besteht Gefahr, daB 
dieses Material so verarbeitet wird, dafi 
seine falschliche Ausnutzung durtih frande 
Naticnalisten in gewissem MaBe verhindert 
wird?" (113)
Tucholsky continued that if the German military machine could be 
weakened, her generals would be forced to think twice about using it, 
and war might be averted or at least postponed. In these circumstances 
he believed publication both justified and necessary:
(112) Gesunder Pazifismus, Das andere Deutschland, 31/3/28,
GW II, p. 1190.
(113) Uber den sogennanten "Landesverrat", Das andere Deutschland, 
11/9/26, ibid., p.495.
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„Dieser Landesverrat kann eine 
Notwendigkei t sein, un etwas 
GroBes und Widhtiges abzuwehren: 
den Landfriedensbruch in Europa". (114)
There was another consideration likely to deter a
German pacifist from oomrnunicating military secrets: the threat of
being taken to court by representatives of the Reichswehrministerium.
This summons entailed an appearance before the Reichsgericht, whose
harsh sentences against left-^ wingers were well known, on a charge of
Landesverrat. Such was the fate of Ossietzky and Kreiser. An article
by the latter in the Weltbuhne (115) had made public the construction
and testing facilities provided by the Soviet government for the
German air force. This case, like many others (116) was treated by the
Reichsgericht as an opportunity to punish its political opponents. Not
only were Kreiser's allegations true, but they had been canton knowledge
for a year, since an SPD deputy, Kruger, had questioned the Rcidhswehr-
minister in 1928. Nothing had been betrayed by Kreiser and Ossietzky
to the French authorities, since the latter already knew all the facts.
Kreiser was within his rights in informing the German people about
the ingenious and underhand book-keeping which characterised the
military budget. As Tucholsky wrote:
„Nicht die Enthiillung hat geschadet- 
die Tatsachen haben geschadet". (117)
Ossietzky was nevertheless sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment. In 
view of such precedents, Tucholsky's reluctance to return to Germany 
and continue the struggle was not surprising.
(114) Die groBen Familien, V© 27/3/28, ibid., p.1085.
(115) WindigeS aus der deutschen LUftfahrt, WB 12/3/29.
(116) Cf. the case of Kuster and Jacob, described by Tucholsky in 
Die groBen Familien.
(117) Ftir Carl vOri Ossietzky, General-Qulttung, WB 17/5/32,
GW III, p.1057.
In any case, by 1932 Tucholsky was convinced that
further resistance to the military would be pointless. In spite of
all his efforts for thirteen years to discredit the army, his
premonitions of 1919 had proved correct: the German people had ignored
his warnings and prophecies of disaster. After Hitler*s accession to
pcwer, Tucholsky gave up the struggle:
„Man muB die Lage so sehen, wie sie ist: 
unsere Sache hat verloren. Dann hat man als 
anstandiger Mann abzutreten". (118)
Tucholsky ' s long battle against the military and war 
therefore ended in defeat. Yet the failure of Tucholsky *s endeavours 
should not disguise the coherence of his development or the prescience 
of his warnings. In the early months of 1919 he took the opportunity 
offered by the Revolution and strove for a reform of the anry which 
might allcw the emergence of a democratic spirit. Tucholsky was 
particularly concerned to remove the old officers, who had been morally 
discredited during the war. Due to the conservatism of Noske and the 
terms of the Versailles Treaty, this moderate reocarmendation was not 
implemented. For a time Tucholsky* s response was inconsistent. 
Occasionally he adopted an unconditionally pacifist attitude and 
demanded complete German disarmament, but until 1924 his general strategy 
was to call for democratic reform and the creation of a people * s militia 
to replace the Reichswehr.
After his arrival in Paris, Tucholsky developed into a 
radical pacifist. He rightly feared that the state of Hindenburg and 
Seeckt was planning a war of revenge against France. In order to 
prevent this catastrophe, Tucholsky advised his compatriots to refuse
(118) Letter to Hasenclever, 11/4/33, Briefe, p. 251.
military service: the capitalist German state had no right to 
canp^ l them to kill or be killed for the sake of industrial profits. 
However, Tucholsky* s alternative concept of loyalty to a "united 
Europe" was somewhat vague, and his trust in the superior morality of 
the "Fatherland of the Workers", the USSR, proved ill-founded. 
Tucholsky was faced in the early 1930's by a German High Command at 
its strongest and most confident since 1918, and simultaneously found 
himself without a positive ideal for which to continue the struggle. 
His warnings and prophecies had been ignored. Tucholsky was left only 
the melancholy pleasure of gradually seeing than fulfilled, as Hitler 
elevated still further the social prestige of the army, so that he 
could rely on its obedience in the war which Tucholsky had foreseen. 
His countrymen supported the army and the militarism which it embodied. 
It was not Tucholsky's advice, but only the experience of a second 
holocaust which led them to question the value of the Reichswehr.
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CHAPTER 9
Tucholsky1 s campaign against traditionalist German 
institutions which had retained their influence after the November 
Revolution led him to attack not merely the any but also the legal 
and educational systems and the press. He also opposed a conservative 
social group: the Burgertum.
The legal system and judiciary.
In a review of Tucholsky1 s Gesartmelte Werke, Kurt Hiller
declared:
„Diese Justizkritik reicht aus, 
ihn unsterblich zu machen". (1)
When allowance is made for the exaggeration of a former colleague,
this assessment contains a measure of truth: the judiciary provided
Tucholsky with a target second in importance only to the military.
The law had been his chosen field of study early in his career, when
he had planned to beocme a defence counsel.
Tucholsky1 s approach to the theme of Justiz was character­
istically idealistic. His initial concern was not with the law as a 
man-made construction for the protection of society, or with the 
persons of its administrators, but with the abstract principle of 
right and wrong, which it was the function of the law to interpret:
ltEin Volk, bei dem das Recht,
das objektive Recht, scweit es
Menschen zu finden wissen,
nicht cbenan steht, fangt an zu faulen".(2)
It might therefore be claimed that Tucholsky was bound to criticise
the legal standards which applied in Germany, since they automatically
fell short of this ideal.
• •  ►  ■ ............
(1) Hiller, letter to Mary Tucholsky, in„Deutsches Literatur- 
archiv", Marbach.
(2) Militctrbilanz, WB 22/4/20, GW I, p.633.
The performance of the Weimar judiciary justifies 
Tucholsky* s view, rather than that of the Social Democratic Real- 
politiker. For a few weeks after the November Revolution, the latter 
had had the power to reform the legal sVstan and begin the change of 
personnel necessary to bring the judiciary into line with the 
principles of democracy. They failed to do so because they them­
selves believed in an ideal as illusory as Tucholsky*s cwn concept of 
"das objektive Recht".
nMannglaubte" plotzlich an eine Unabhangigkeit 
des Richters,die man jahrzehntelang als 
trugerischen Schein... gekennzeichnet hatte". (3)
Faithful to the abstract ideal of the separation of powers, Ebert and 
his colleagues confirmed the former judges and prosecutors in their 
posts, and reaffirmed that their appointments were for life. This 
over-optimism on the part of alleged pragmatists contrasted unfavour­
ably with Tucholsky*s later, more practical view:
„Eine deutsche Justizreform ohne die gesetzliche 
Aufhebung der Unabsetzbarkeit der Richter ist 
undenkbar". (4)
The SPD leaders might have cane to a different decision if 
they had reflected on the background cxxnmon to most maribers of the 
legal profession. They had owed their appointment to the Wilhelminian 
Empire and were unlikely to transfer their loyalty overnight to the 
Republic. A far more probable outcome was for them to retain their 
positions and seek to undermine the democratic order from within. They 
had been recruited from the prosperous middle and upper classes who 
alone could finance the lengthy training period. In addition, the 
long road to promotion provided ample opportunity for the exclusion 
of untypically progressive students, so that the traditional spirit
{3) Heinrich Hannover and Elisabeth Hannover^ Druck: politische 
Justi2, 1918-33, Frankfurt, Fischer, 1966, p.23.
(4) Deutsche Richter, WB 26/4/27, GW II, p. 772.
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of the profession could be preserved for future generations, A
final barrier to change was that judges were co-opted by their fellows,
and as Tucholsky knew:
„Die Gruppe wahlt sich hinzu, 
wer sich dem Gruppengeist anpaBt - 
irrmer adaquate, nieraals heterogene 
Elemente". (5)
Most members of the profession were afflicted by the prejudices of 
their narrow middle-class group and had neither understanding nor 
interest for the problems of workers summoned before them. The result 
was unconscious but brutal Gesinnungsjustiz: the sentencing of men not 
far their actions but for their opinions. This reactionary bias 
explains and justifies Tucholsky's polemic.
The class prejudice of the Weimar judiciary was reflected 
in the draconian sentences imposed on the workers who had taken part 
in the Spartacist Rising. Other workers were imprisoned far hauling 
down the former Imperial flag, and even for obeying the government's 
call to resist Kapp and his rebels. (6) On the other hand, right-wing 
offenders could count on leniency. Those soldiers brought to trial 
for crimes committed during the pacification of Berlin were dealt with 
by special military courts, and tried by juries which included their 
comrades. (7) This system was responsible for the trifling sentences 
imposed on the murderers of the Spartacist leaders, and it was also 
used in the hope of suppressing the truth about the Marloh massacre.
However, the full extent of this politische Justiz was
*
revealed to Tucholsky by the research of Professor E. J. Gumbel, whose
(5) ibid., p.775.
(6) Gegen die Arbeiter? Allemall, WB 5/12/21, GW I, p.868.
(7) Die lebendigen To ten, ibid., p. 417.
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book Zwei Jahre polltischer MQrd he reviewed in September 1921. (8)
Gumbel had examined murders committed by extremists of the left and
right, and compared the average sentence imposed an those found guilty.
As Tucholsky explained: ’
„Fur 314 Morde von rechts 31 Jahre 3 Monate 
Freiheitsstrafe scwie eine lebenslangliche 
Festungshaft.
Fur 13 Morde von links 8 Todesurteile, 176 
Jahre 10 Monate Freiheitsstrafe.
Das ist alles Mogliche. Justiz ist das nicht.
Ganz klar wird das, wenn wir das Schicksal 
der beiden Urns turzversuche: Kapps und der 
Minchener Kcmmunisten vergleichen, zweier 
Versuche, die sich juristisch in nichts 
unterscheiden:
Die Kommunisten haben fur ihren Hochverrat 
519 Jahre 9 Monate Freiheitsstrafe erhalten.
Eine TodesStrafe hat man vollstreckt.
Die Kapp-Leute sind frei ausgegangen". (9)
In view of this documentary evidence, Tucholsky's loss of confidence 
in the German judiciary's handling of political cases was understand­
able.
Although public opinion at first took little notice of 
Gumbel's findings, it could not indefinitely ignore -the lenient 
treatment of Nationalists who murdered prominent Socialist and 
Republican statesmen. After Rathenau's assassination in June 1922, 
the government established a Staatsgerichtshof, since the existing 
courts could not be trusted. The new institution was intended to 
protect the state against the threat of rebellion from the right, but 
Thcholsky recognised that it would beocme yet another weapon against 
the left. (10) • Though all the judges were appointed by the President, 
and only three were drawn from the reactionary Reichsgericht, Ebert
(8) Das Buch von der deutschen Schande, ibid., pp. 818-24.
(9) Ibid., p.823.
(TO) Per tfockene putsch  ^Freiheit, 16/7/1^ 2, ibid., p.1002.
-267-
permitted a conservative majority in the new body. (11) As a result 
no attempt was made by the Staatsgerichtshbf bo unmask the conspirators 
in Munich who had financed the campaign of the Organisation Consul, 
and after .public indignation had died down, the attackers of Harden 
received the more traditional generous treatment. Taken in its 
historical context of class prejudice and arbitrary sentences, the 
comment of Tucholsky was justified:
„Reiflt dieser Justiz die falsche Binde
herunterl Wir haben keine Justiz mehr". (12)
In the later years of the Republic, other groups fell victim 
to this politische Justiz, but its essentially reactionary principle 
remained unchanged. German pacifists discovered that it was not the 
defiance of the Versailles Treaty by the army which constituted a serious 
offence, but the betrayal of the guilty secret to the public. As the 
final court of appeal in cases of alleged Landesverrat, the Reichs­
gericht could permit itself ridiculous sentences, knowing that they 
could not be overturned. The cases of Buller jahn, Kuster and Jacob 
and Ossietzky proved the correctness of Tucholsky1 s assertion that 
the court was not a branch of the law but of the Amy Ministry. (13)
In the opinion of the courts, nationalist militarism was 
a virtue and internationalism a vice, which, especially in conjunction 
with membership of the working class, merited severe punishment. This 
was the background to the vast difference between the treatment of 
the Nazis and that of the Ocrrinunists. Hcwever, Tucholsky was less
(11) Cf. Hannover, op.cit., p.116.
(12) Prozefi Harden, GW I, p.1078.
(13) Frage Und AntWOrt, WB 22/3/26, GW II, p. 746.
critical of this example of judicial prejudice than 'might have 
been expected: it did not oame to light until the early 1930's,-when 
his interest in political affairs was fast giving way to despairing 
fatalism.
The Carinunists were not the only minority which fell 
victim to judicial bias. Artists and writers found that sympathy 
with the left was an expensive attitude. George Grosz, already fined 
in 1921 for libelling the Relchswehr (14), was accused of blasphemy 
in 1928 for his drawing of the crucifixion, in which Christ was 
depicted as a soldier wearing a gas-mask. Grosz’s anti-militarism and 
his implied criticism of the Church for giving its blessing to war (15) 
earned him a heavy fine from his first judges. Though this sentence 
was later reversed by the Landgericht III Berlin, chaired by the 
"danokratisch. gesinnte Richter Siegert" (16), this exceptional decision 
in favour of a progressive intellectual does not refute Tucholsky's 
general criticism. The Reichsgericht made up for this unaccustomed 
liberality by quashing the acquittal. It was therefore reasonable 
for Tucholsky to conclude that neither the workers nor their supporters 
could expect a fair trial.
A third group which found it impossible to obtain justice 
in German courts were foreigners, who faced a barrier of nationalistic 
ignorance. The word of a Polish immigrant such as Josef Jakubcwski 
had little weight when compared to the self-contradictory testimony of 
a German family. By the time the court had reluctantly overturned 
the previous judgment, an innocent man had been executed. The violent
(14) DadaHPnozeB, WB 18/4/21, GW I, pp.800-04.
(15) Die Bcqriftidung, WB 19/3/29, GW III/ pp.53-54.
(16) Cf. Hannover, pp.cit., pp.250-01.
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language with which Tucholsky reacted to this Justizmprd (17) was 
symptomatic of the contempt with which he had ocme to regard the 
judiciary and all its works.
The research, of Gumbel and Hannover therefore vindicates
•
Tucholsky's attacks on the Weimar judiciary. Their treatment of
offenders from the middle and upper classes was in stark contrast
to the heavy sentences inflicted on those who did not conform to their
narrow values. Tucholsky responded by claiming that, though the
judges still possessed political pcwer, they had forfeited all moral
authority. The sentences which they imposed
„sind ausschlieBlich als Kampfmomente . 
im Streit der Klassengegensatze zu werten.
Das deutsche Volk hat in seiner uberwiegenden 
Mehrheit, soweit es politisch aufgeklart ist, 
kein Vertrauen mehr zu dieser politischen 
Justiz, und sie verdient auch keins". (18)
The remedies which Tucholsky proposed for this situation
have been the subject of seme controversy. He believed that German
law was being administered in the interest of the ruling classes.
Their representatives would not voluntarily renounce their positions
of power, and there was no prospect of achieving change by parliamentary
means. The Biirgerblock governments were uninterested in reform, and
past experience had demonstrated that when the SPD formed part of a
Grand Coalition, even a well-intentioned deputy like Gustav Radbruch
was powerless to make fundamental changes. The time for alterations
of detail was past, and there was only one approach to reform which
premised success:
„den antidemokratischen, hohnlachenden, 
fur die Idee der Gerechtigkeit bewuBt 
ungerechten Klassenkanpf". (19)
(17) Jafotoowski, V2B 16/10/28, GW II, p.1^ 70.
(18) ibid., p.772.
(19) GW II, p.779.
This was a call for the workers to seize power and occupy 
the machinery of state. Tucholsky has been criticised for the 
ostensibly faulty logic of this demand(20): if the judges' outlook 
was conditioned by the values of their class, proletarian judges 
would produce sentences biased very differently from those of the 
Reichsgerichtsrate, but equally one-sided. However, this argument 
misses Tucholsky's point. "Neutral" administration of the law in the 
interest of society as a whole seemed impossible in class-ridden 
Weimar Germany. The preparation of a successful proletarian revolution 
might allcw the economically weakest class to escape frcm its under­
privileged position before the law. This was what Tucholsky meant by 
the assertion that the class struggle was unjust for the sake of an 
ideal of justice.
The onus is on any critic of Tucholsky' s Marxist stance to 
demonstrate a more promising approach to law reform. Doerfel attempts 
this by pointing to the contribution to the theory of criminal law 
reform made by the progressive legal expert, Ernst Fraenkel. (21) But 
Eraenkel's reflections, however sympathetically presented(22), have two 
weaknesses. He offered no immediate practical advice to the workers.
Both of the al ternative courses which he suggested realistically promised 
blood, sweat and tears in the present, but neither indicated a method 
by which this could be avoided in future. Tucholsky*s revolutionary 
solution w*as more extreme, but in this respect at least it was also more 
constructive. Secondly, Fraenkel himself must have been aware that the
(20) Doerfel, qp.cit., p.184.
(21) Fraenkel, Klassenjustiz, Leipzig, 1927, quoted by Doerfel, op.cit. 
p. 181.
(22) "Nach Ansicht des seit Jahren fur die Gewerksdhaft arbeitenden 
Juris ten ging es fiir die Arbeiterschaft darum, sich klar zu werden, 
ob sie sich unter Hinnahme harter Urteile fur eine moglichst enge 
Bindung des Richters an das Gesetz entscheiden wollte, Oder ob sie 
vor allem eine moglichst gerechte Gesellschaf tsordnung anstreben 
wollte, die aber keinen Schutz vor Willktirakten der Gegenwart bot", 
(ibid.)
piecemeal reform of the Weimar judiciary was a labour of Sisyphus.
The weakness of the progressive forces among the legal profession 
has since been well documented. (23) The Pepublikanischer Richter- 
bund, which laboured from 1922 to strengthen the democratic ideal 
in the profession, had less than 400 members, thirty times fewer than 
the membership of the traditionalist Deutschor Richterbund and 
PreuBischer Richteryerein. Although its journal Die Justiz contained 
frequent contributions from Fraenkel, Radbruch, Gumbel and other 
eminent jurists, it never achieved the practical importance of its more 
conservative rivals. Tucholsky himself did not ignore such liberal 
endeavours, but he regarded them as half-hearted and refused to over­
estimate their importance:
„Es hat immer eine Minoritat von anstandigen 
Juristen gegeben, die gegen die Untaten ihrer 
Kollegen, gegen die offenkundigen Mangel des 
Systems, gegen ein groBenwahnsinnig gewordenes 
Strafrecht gekampft haben. Aber mit welch 
braven Mitteln! Ich glaube nicht an eine 
Evolution im Strafrecht".(24)
It is hardly fair to hold up Fraenkel1 s proposals as "a 
good example of the concrete ideas on the Socialist side" and contrast 
them with the "radical but totally impractical demands of many left-wing 
intellectuals". (25) Fraenkel's plans had no more hope of realisation
than Tucholsky* s own. Doerfel also gives insufficient weight to the 
fact that, although Tucholsky saw the class struggle as representing the 
most promising comprehensive approach to law reform, he suggested 
smaller-scale improvements which had a better chance of implementation 
than the abstract speculations of Fraenkel. More detailed coverage 
by the press of court proceedings might have a deterrent effect on the
(23) Hannover, op.cit., p.14.
(24) ibid., p.782.
(25) Doerfel, op.cit., p.182.
• -272-
*
worst judicial excesses, by ensuring greater public awareness of 
miscarriages of justice. The accused should be informed of his rights, 
including that of remaining silent: this advice could best be given 
by sympathetic Republican lawyers, as the conservative prosecutor was 
unlikely to give such assistance voluntarily. Tucholsky also proposed 
that judges should be liable to be dismissed for misconduct. Although 
all of these suggestions took second place to Tucholsky fs advocacy of 
proletarian revolution, they did represent an attempt to achieve reform 
in the short term. In addition, the first two proposals at least could 
be put into effect by Republican reporters and lawyers, and did not 
depend on the approval of the judiciary itself.
The remainder of Tucholsky's criticism of the judiciary was 
intended not as constructive advice for reform, but as a means of 
discrediting the entire social group. He considered that they mis­
understood their function. They believed that their duty was to punish 
crimes, whereas Tucholsky thought that their main responsibility should 
lie in the protection of the community against anti-social elements. If 
this could only be achieved by the temporary removal of such individuals 
frcm society by imprisonment, Tucholsky was ready to accept such a 
remedy:
„Es ist keine Rede davon, unter O-Bruder-Mensch 
Geschrei dem Rechtsbrecher die FiiBe zu kussen.
Es gibt unter den Beruf sverbrechem bose Jungens, 
wirklich niedrige Charaktere, deren seelische Anlagen 
geseUschaftsschadlich sind und es auch bleiben.
Man sichere die Gesellschaft vor ihnen - niemand 
aber vermesse sich, sie aus Rache zu qualen".(26)
Such a view was not more impractical idealism; but it was far removed
from the authoritarian ethos of the courts, and frcm the belief that-
'■t
every acquittal represented an unfortunate defeat for the state prosecutor.
(26) Das schwarze Kreuz auf grunem Grunde, V® 21/4/31, GW III, 
p. 837.
Tucholsky's disapproval of the biased sentencing policy 
has been noted. He disapproved also of the gratuitously arrogant 
tone adopted by judges and prosecution towards working-class witnesses 
or defendants. The latter dared not protest for fear of being 
additionally charged with contempt of court, and their experienced 
counsel generally remained silent, because to contradict the judge was 
likely to result in a still heavier sentence for his clients. The only 
hope for the defendant lay in confessing his crime: this saved the 
court's time by obviating the need to prove guilt, improved the judge's 
temper and inclined him towards leniency. There was no legal basis 
for this procedure, or for the judges' habit of examining the past life 
of the accused in search of clues which might justify the attribution 
of the crime to him. A dissolute private life might be highly dangerous 
for a man charged with murder. (27) Other examples of the court's 
inccsprehension of how the majority of their compatriots lived included 
the arbitrary apportioning of prison sentences by men who had never 
seen the inside of a jail. (28) Tucholsky was therefore justified in 
attacking the tone of court proceedings, as evidence of lack of under­
standing, arrogance to inferiors and exaggerated respect for authority.
But even as his polemic against the judiciary was at its 
height, Tucholsky recognised that it would prove fruitless. It was 
easy enough to advocate a revolutionary overthrow of the existing legal 
system, but difficult to imagine the divided forces of the Weimar left 
carrying out such an enterprise successfully. As for Tucholsky*s 
attacks on the typical attitude of the judges, he was preaching only 
to converted left-wing readers. The judges themselves were unlikely
(27) Wie benehme ich mich als MordeT-?, WB 6/3/28, GW II, p. 1070.
(28) Haben Sie schOri mal..?, WB 17/8/26, ibid., p.478.
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to read Die Weltbuhne, and even if they did, they dismissed his polemic 
as the over-generalisations of a ignorant outsider.
Tucholsky1 s detailed criticism of the faults in trial
procedure amounted partly to the issue of principle noted by Franz
Josef Degenhardt:
„Fur Tucholsky war Art und Weise der 
Durchfuhrung von S trafverfahren Indikator 
fur das Funktionieren des Staates in seinem 
Vorgehen gegen den einzelnen".(29)
But the transfer of emphasis frcm radical suggestions for legal reform
and the proposing of revolutionary remedies, to the narrower target of
the conduct of trials, demonstrated also Tucholsky's willingness to
concentrate on achieving the minor improvements which he had previously
scorned.
With this change in spirit, an element came to the fore in 
Tucholsky's writings, which had been prominent early in his career, 
but which had been temporarily pushed into the background: his sympathy 
for the suffering of the individual. In the early 1920's his concern 
for the Bavarian revolutionaries in Nieders chdnenfeld prison had been 
reflected in criticism of governor and warders, and in public appeals 
for financial and material assistance to the prisoners, irrespective of 
their party affiliation or public importance. (30) Personal sympathy 
for the individual worker at the mercy of the court was still a major 
therre in the poem Prolet vor Gericht of 1925. Some six thousand 
workers, like the hero of this poem, had succumbed in the unequal 
struggle with police spies, prosecutor, judge and warders. Here the 
accent shifts to the hope of revolutionary change:
(29) Cf. Degenhardt' s preface to the selection of Tucholsky's 
articles, Folltisehe JUstiz, (Reinbek, Roraro, 1970, p.9)
(30) The prisoners included the dranjatist Toller, the anarchist 
poet Muhsam, and Eisner's former secretary, Felix Fechenbach.
Cf. Gib ihm Saures - er kann sich nicht wehronl, WB 21/11/21,
GW I, pp.861-2, and Weihnachtsbitte, WB 15/12/21, ibid., p.877.
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(1Es kcmnt der Tag, da wir uns rachen: 
Da werden wir die Richter sein i" (31)
Hcwever, as Tucholsky"s hopes began to fade, ho returned
to the theme of individual suffering and strove to mitigate the evil
which he could not cure. He renewed his appeal for the financial
support of prisoners and their dependents, recommending a donation to
the Ocanrunist Rote Hilfe. (32) An underestimated aspect of his later
writings was his insight into the conditions of prison existence:
„Was dam Mann in der Freiheit als eine 
Lappalie erscheint, ist im Gefangnis 
von eminenter Wichtigkeit fur die Seelen- 
verfassung der Gefangenen. Die Folge 
davon ist, daB jedes Erlebnis, jede 
Sinnenreaktion, tausendmal starker, 
daB jedes Vorkonmnis tausendmal grdBem 
Eindruck hervorruft, als es das im freien 
Leben zu tun pflegt, wo es sofort wieder 
von anderen verdrangt wird". (33)
Among the factors of prison life which seemed most objectionable 
was enforced sexual abstinence. The law might deprive prisoners of 
their freedom of movement, but further restrictions were uncalled-for. 
More important than legalistic considerations was Tucholsky"s under­
standing that enforced abstinence subjected the prisoners to unnecessary 
physical and mental torture. Another practice which stirred his 
disapproval was that convicts were compelled to attend religious 
ceremonies and pay at least lip-service to Christian doctrines. The 
threat to punish those who refused to take part amounted to a moral 
blackmail, which he rejected:
„Es ist eine Dreistigkeit und eine Unverfrorenheit, 
in Strafgefangenen Objekte zu religiosen Experimental 
zu sehen".(34)
(31) WB 2/6/25, GW II, p.135.
(32) Im Gefangnis begreift man, WB 15/12/31, GW III, p.975.
(33) Per RechtSstaat, WB 12/7/27, GW II, p.824.
(34) Das schwarze KTeUZ auf grunem Grunde, WB 21/4/41, GW III, p.837.
The relationship between jailer and prisoner was important 
in Tucholsky's. later writings. He saw them as the opposite poles of 
the eternal human conflict between oppressor and oppressed. Whatever 
the prisoners has done to deserve their sentences, Tucholsky considered 
that they had not forfeited the elenentary right to be treated as human 
beings. The efforts of the authorities to break the convicts' resistance 
were psychologically indefensible, for the refusal to cooperate with 
the fixed order of the institution represented the prisoners' last 
reserve of human dignity. The authorities had no right to sit in moral 
judgment over their charges, to talk glibly of the deterrent effects of 
strict confinement, or to justify harsh treatment as a means tcwards 
rehabilitation (35); Tucholsky believed that they thonselves were 
enjoying a legal outlet for their sadistic impulses, and that they were 
often as vicious by nature as the criminals.
„Man sollte aber vor alien einmal Menschen 
aus dem Strafvollzug ausroden, die ihrerseits 
Verbrecher an Seelen sind, dumpfe Rohlinge,
Caligula-Naturen und Pharisaer, die jener 
Christus gegeiBelt hat, dessen Namen sie 
miBbrauchen. Denn nie erpfindet ein normaler 
Mensch so viel Lust im Bett wie jene an ihrem 
Schreibtisch. Fluch ihnen" .(36)
Tucholsky' s criticism of the German legal system stemmed 
originally frcm idealism. It provided a yardstick by which the country's 
moral standards could be measured.
„Was not tut, ist, daB das RechtsbewuBtsein 
des Volkes wieder erwacht". (37)
he declared in January 1920. But those SPD Realpolitiker who considered
his approach impractical were the last men entitled to attack him. They
(35) ibid., p.838.
(36) GW III, p.840.
(37) Militaria, WB 22/1/20, Qfl I, p.591.
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had been given the one real opportunity to make basic changes in 
the legal system in November 1918, but had instead taken the line of 
least resistance by confirming the conservative judges and prosecutors 
in their posts. Any miscarriages of justice could therefore be traced 
back to the SPD's misplaced belief in the independence of the judiciary. 
The latter was indeed independent of political control, but not of 
social prejudice. Their origins and training contributed to a narrow, 
middle-class outlook, which combined respect for authority with contempt 
for those lcwer down the social ladder. This attitude was visible in 
their conduct of trials, and in the sentences inflicted on working-class 
defendants, which contrasted with the treatment of Nationalists guilty 
of similar crimes. Tucholsky’s strictures against the courts for this 
bias were well deserved.
The policy which Tucholsky proposed involved immediate and 
long-term strategy. His short-term suggestions generally could be 
implemented without regard to the attitude of the conservative majority 
within the profession, and therefore possessed seme practical value.
But a large proportion of his writings on the judiciary was designed 
not to persuade its members to change their ways, or to encourage public 
safeguards: he aimed at prevention rather than cure. The reactionary 
judges ought to be removed from office, and since no Republican govern­
ment had the will or the strength to achieve this, the task devolved 
on the class-conscious proletariat. The emission of 1918 could only be 
remedied by a revolution.
To advocate such an extreme solution involved Tucholsky in 
problems of logic and practicality. A judiciary drawn frcm the 
representatives of the workers was likely to be as biased as the exist­
ing reactionary one. But by now Tucholsky believed that the workers 
had suffered enough and had the right to punish their oppressors. His
-278-
remedy, though extreme, seemed the only way to combat an intolerable 
system. Those who advocated tinkering with that system and waiting 
for the position of the workers to improve in the next generation were 
guilty of complacency on two counts: their willingness to compromise 
in the hope of future reform, and their over-optimistic estimate of 
their own influence in numbers and in seniority within the profession.
Only an outright confrontation with the established order held out any 
hope of progress.
However, Tucholsky could not conceal frcm himself indefinitely 
the comparative weakness of the Weimar left, which made a successful 
revolution inpossible. For this reason the last phase of his campaign 
was concerned with the mitigation of individual suffering. He had 
always taken a sympathetic interest in the fate of political prisoners 
and he now extended his concern to include criminals also. However 
serious their offences, they deserved to retain their human rights, and 
their captors should not use than as a convenient outlet for their 
sadistic impulses. Thus Tucholsky may be said to have begun and ended 
his career as a progressive liberal critic of the Weimar judiciary, 
having been forced to renounce his revolutionary Socialist views of 
the late 1920*s as impracticable. "
The educational system
Another reactionary stronghold which drew Tucholsky1 s criticism 
was the educational system. In the nineteenth century the economic 
structure of Germany had made the academic sphere a middle-class preserve, 
and since 1848 school and university teachers had been noted for their 
conservative opinions. In November 1918, like the officers, judges and 
civil servants, they benefited from Ebert's desire for continuity and 
his naive trust that they would automatically transfer their loyalty to
the new state. They accepted his invitation to remain at their 
posts, hoping both for continued remuneration and for the opportunity 
to influence their pupils and students against the Republic.
At the outset of his post-war campaign Tucholsky on several 
occasions demanded a democratic reform of education in Germany. His 
opposition to the existing institutions and their staff was based on a 
characteristic combination of historical insight and moral disapproval. 
The Prussian teachers and professors had given judicial, philosophical 
and theological backing to the Imperial government's annexationist 
schemes. (38) Since such plans had in the course of the war proved 
morally questionable and politically impracticable, their sponsors had 
forfeited the right to educate the young generation. However, those 
concerned not only retained their positions, but were permitted to 
restrict the influx of democratically-minded newcomers. The provincial 
teacher, "der alte Schulrat im alten Kleid" (39), remained a typical 
product of his caste, incurably nationalistic in his views. Tucholsky 
recognised the dangers of their reactionary propaganda after the Kapp 
Putsch and called for their dismissal to save the Republic from overthrow 
and the country frcm another war. (40) Due to the SPD's willingness to 
ocnpranu.se with the Zentrum,which took a conservative line in educational 
affairs, democratic reform of the German schools remained an unattainable 
ideal.
The obstacles to democratisation did not consist solely in 
the conservatism of the teachers, but also in textbooks which preached 
to their pupils a message of chauvinism. Such were the Velhagen and
(38) PreuBische Professoren, WB 22/5/19, GW I, p.420.
(39) Die Schule, WB 24/7/19, ibid., pp.451-2.
(40) Kapp-Liittwitz, WB 25/3/20, ibid., p.621.
Klasing atlases (41), and a geography book, Wuhrer's Staatenkunde, 
which contained numerous inaccuracies calculated to inspire its readers 
with hatred and contempt for the French. (42) Hcwever, no reforms of
the curriculum took place, and in the late 1920’s Tucholsky was still 
proclaiming that the educational system was ."militarised”(43) and the 
Prussian school "ein Hort der Reaktion". (44) During his career as a 
revolutionary Socialist, Tucholsky recognised the impossibility of 
implementing the educational reforms which he had earlier advocated. 
Teaching had a natural tendency to support the values of the ruling 
class, and only the overthrew of those rulers could change the ideals of 
the system:
„Schulreform ohne Gesellschaftsreform 
ist ein Uhding". (45)
But by the early 1930's he had resigned himself to failure in this field
also. Politicians were apathetic and parents supported the system:
„Die Herren Eltern wunschen aber ihre Kinder 
in del Schutzengraben - es sind feine Leute". (46)
The situation at the German universities likewise gave Tuch­
olsky little ground for optimism. Far frcm being the centres of Germany's 
intellectual achievements, they were characterised by a low intellectual 
level and reactionary attitudes. The vast majority of professors and 
students opposed the Republic, and united in protests against the few 
liberal Privatdozenten. Though the Heidelberg mathematics professor 
Gumbel successfully resisted such pressure, many of his less courageous 
colleagues submitted, to avoid the organised student boycott of their
(41) Velhagen und Klasing, WB 11/1/27, GW II, p.711.
(42) Verhetzte Kinder - ohnmachtige Republik, WB 9/10/28, ibid., pp. 1261-5.
(43) Ein Kind aus meiner Klasse, WB 3/3/25, ibid. , p. 56,
(44) Eine Akadamie, WB 11/5/26, ibid., p.437.
(45) Schulkampf, WB 1/10/29.
(46) Krieg gleich Mord, WB 19/4/32, GW III, p.1046.
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lectures which would have had a disastrous effect on their meagre
salaries. (47) Tucholsky regretted such cowardice, but admitted that
it was understandable; he blamed the Ministry of Education and the
university authorities for their failure to protect Republican lecturers.
The initiative remained with the Nationalist professors who looked back
to the glories of the Enpire, or forward to a mystic Third Reich.
The attitude of the students also worried Tucholsky, At 
first he believed that they lacked ideals and youthful enthusiasm, and 
were only interested in a well-paid and influential position:
„Der Student von heute ist ein geistiger Kanmis". (48)
He soon recognised that they came from prosperous families, and shared 
their parents' militarist ideal. Many who had seen service as young 
officers during the war and felt reluctant to return immediately to 
their studies joined the anti-Republican Ereikorps. During the stable 
middle years of the Republic, they returned to the more traditional 
Burscheiisdhaft activities of drinking and duelling. But in spite of their 
temporary abandonment of directly political activity, their hostility 
to democracy remained unaltered, as Tucholsky noted frcm the pamphlet 
Briefe an einen Fuchsmajor. (49) Republican, Socialist and Catholic 
student groups were on the defensive, and failed to make much impact in 
the prevailing Nationalist climate. When the economic crisis of 1929-30 
intensified the social conflict, the only issue to be solved among the 
students was the struggle for power between the backward-looking Nation- 
ists of the Hindenburg school, and those disciples of Moeller van der 
Bruck who longed for the Nazi millenium.
(47) Briefe an einen Fuchsmajor, WB 31/1/28, GW II, pp.1037-45.
(48) PreuBische Studenten, WB 8/5/19, GW I, p.409.
(49) GW II, p. 1043.
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Tucholsky had already foreseen the danger that the 
conservative students of the 1920's, with their anachronistic vision 
of a hierarchical society, would undermine the Republic when they 
reached positions of authority as civil servants, doctors and judges.
In his poem Deutsche Richtergeneration 1940(50), he had alluded 
prophetically to their racialist beliefs, and had forecast the "Recht- 
spruch nach Stand una Rang" which was to be provided by Freisler's 
Vplksgerichtshof. But by the time that the radical right began its
advance, Tucholsky had lost interest in educational matters. He made 
no carment on the striking successes of Schirach's Deutscher Studenten- 
bund at the university elections between 1929 and 1931, but this was 
the development which confirmed the correctness of his warnings: teachers, 
professors and students combined against the Republic which had made no 
serious efforts to win their support. (51)
The Press
During the 19 20' s newspapers provided by far the most 
important medium of information. The failure of the Republicans to 
secure sufficient influence over the press was another reason for the 
lack of resonance of progressive ideas. Tucholsky's response was ideal­
istic. Though he underestimated the problems faced by the Republican 
press in adjusting to the new political circumstances, he could justifiably 
claim that the SPD and DDP editors missed the opportunity to advocate 
reform.
After the Revolution the SPD press faced the same dilemma as 
the party leaders. Now that the Republic had been proclaimed and the 
new government was led by Ebert and Scheidemann instead of Bethmann and
(50) WB 5/5/21, GW I, pp.804-5.
(51) Cf. Karl Dietrich Bracher: Die Auflosung der Weimarer Republik,
Ring >ferlag, Villingen, 1960, p. 148.
Hertling, the first thought of Friedrich Stampfer and his colleagues 
on the staff of, Vorwarts was naturally to support the party's ministers 
through thick and thin. While the political initiative lay with an often 
hostile mob, the temptation to abandon the judicious advocacy of reforms 
must have been great. But by accepting the role of a government organ, 
Vorwarts was compelled to make a case for Ebert's blunders as well as 
his successes. Stampfer printed the official version of hew Liebknecht 
and Luxemburg met their deaths, a description which turned out to be a 
farrago of lies designed to exonerate the officers involved. (52) The 
paper also supported Noske's rehabilitation of the Officer Corps. Mast 
of the party's local organs, as Tucholsky complained, also criticised the 
opponents of the minister as Jeremiahs. The Kapp Putsch took them by 
surprise, but did not alter their blind trust in the wisdom of their 
Parteivors tand.
Tucholsky paid too little attention to the inner-party 
pressures, often of a financial nature, which led the Social Democratic 
press to give unquestioning support to Ebert. However, the balance of the 
argument is in Tucholsky's favour. His record as a prophet was consistent­
ly superior to that of Vorwarts. Mare significantly, his fundamental 
accusation was justified: that the SPD press had missed the opportunity 
to enlighten its readers about the guilt of the old regime. The German 
people, anxiously seeking a scapegoat for the defeat, was permitted to 
ignore the real culprits: the Emperor and his ministers, and to blame 
the Republic. Tucholsky was also disappointed that the SPD press provided 
little scope for young talent. For both editorial and financial reasons, 
the brilliant Russian Reportagen of Larissa ReiSner found no parallel in 
Germany. (53)
(52) Cf. Heinrich Hannover and Elisabeth Hannover-Driick; Per Mord 
an Karl Liebknecht und Rosa Luxemburg, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp,
1967, pp.35-38.
(53) Larissa RCiBrier, WB 22/2/26, GW II, p.728
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Tucholsky ’ s disappointment with the SPD press did not 
destroy his sense of proportion. Even if Vorwarts was timid, unimaginative 
and verkalkt, these deficiencies paled in oonparison with the technical 
shortcomings of the Ccmmnist Rote Fahne. (54) Even as a KPD sympathiser 
in 1928, Tucholsky could not bring himself to contribute to it; instead 
he wrote for the technically superior Arbeiter Illustrierte Zeitung.
None of the left-wing party newspapers therefore provided an adequate 
platform for Tucholsky1 s struggle. (55)
The democratic press was equally unsatisfactory to Tucholsky, 
though for different reasons. Its main failings were a luke-warm attitude 
to the Republic, and an exaggerated tolerance of its opponents. With the 
exception of the Berliner Volks zeitung, to which Tucholsky himself was 
a contributor, the liberal press admired Noske as a strong man, and under­
estimated the militarist danger almost as badly as Vorwarts. This attitude 
was a typical example of the "moderation" of the democratic press empires, 
a quality which Tucholsky loathed. He referred frequently to the 
preference of liberal editors for compromise rather than polemic. (56)
In this controversy neither Tucholsky „nor the DDP was entirely 
in the right. Tucholsky was correct to deny that any journalist could 
write with complete objectivity; even the stand-point of the quasi-neutral 
observer chosen by E.E.Kisch could not produce totally impersonal report­
ing. But this realisation did not in itself provide retrospective 
justification for his failure even to aspire to a balanced view. Tuch­
olsky owed his vindication on this score first to tactical and historical
(54) Journalistischer Nachwuchs, V© 3/1/28, ibid., p.1017.
(55) There is an interesting parallel between Tucholsky and the independent- 
minded politician,Paul Levi. A former leader of the KPD in 1919-20, 
and later the leading spokesman of the SPD's left-wing opposition,,
Levi took refuge frcm the mediocrity and conformity of the left-wing 
press in a periodical of limited circulation, his own Sozialistische 
Politik und Wlrtschaft (later Per Klassonkampf).
(56) Cf. Was ware, wenrt.. WB 20/9/27, GW II, pp.883-87.
reasons, and secondly to the fact that the house of Ullstein at least 
eventually demonstrated that it was less concerned with objectivity 
than with expediency.
Tucholsky's difference of opinion with the DDP press on 
tactical issues was caused by his sense of mission. He did not merely 
wish to present the truth as he saw it, but to influence his readers; 
the role he sought was not that of a "dienender Redakteur" but of a 
"herrschender Volkserzieher11. (57) The conservative press campaign
against the new state seemed to justify aggressive counter-propaganda 
frcm the left. Tucholsky had no love for Erzberger or Rathenau, but 
it was the demagogic right-wing press which incited their murder. (58) 
Tucholsky might not aspire to be a model of objectivity, but in the land 
of Helfferich, Hugenberg and Hitler, his polemical exaggeration seems 
fair and even necessary.
Tucholsky's doubts about the reasons for the ccmprcmises of 
the liberal press were confirmed by the conduct of the Ullsteins in the 
early 1930's. Their failure to provide an effective antidote to the 
conservative Lokalanzeiger and the reactionary Hugenberg press had not 
been due merely to a quest for unattainable objectivity, but also to 
opportunism. When the political situation changed, they altered their 
policy radically. Though the Ullsteins were renowned as liberal Jews, 
they purged their staff in 1932 of Jewish and progressive writers such 
as Stefan GroBmann of Das Tage-Budh and Heinz Pol, Tucholsky's colleague 
on the Weltbuhne. They replaced tham with "aryans" and Nazis. (59)
Even Georg Bernhard, editor Of the Vossische Zeitung, fell victim to the 
publishers' opportunism.
(57) Sozialisierung der Presse, WB 11/12/19, GW I, p.541.
(58) A verse cannon in the Nationalist press in 1922 concluded:
„Knallt ab den Walther Rathenau, 
die gottverfluchte Judensau!"
(59) Cf. Kurt Koszyk, Deutsche Presse 1914-45, p. 256, and Tucholsky's 
pvjn Dreh dich hin. dreh dich her, kleine Wetterfahne-!, WB 16/2/32, 
GW*III, pp.1011-12.
The Ullstein case also demonstrated that, as Tucholsky had
pointed out, the policy of German newspapers was ultimately decided by
the publisher rather than the editor. (60) The editor*s role, contrary
to popular belief, was restricted to that of a loyal employee. Without
being in any sense corrupt, he chose to work in a newspaper with whose
attitudes he sympathised:
„Er weiB von vomherein, was er sagen soil 
und was er nicht sagen darf".(61)
Unofficial press censorship embraced not merely sentiments of which the
proprietors disapproved, but also any expression of opinion likely to
entail financial loss for the concern, whether by encouraging "Muller
und Cohn" to cancel their subscriptions (62), or by antagonising the
advertisers. The great advantage of the Weltbttme was that such
considerations did not apply. Jacobsohn was both publisher and editor,
and valued his editorial freedom more highly than monetary rewards. He
was invulnerable to complaints against his contributors; the public's
only right, he declared, was to give up reading his weekly, and in that
case their loss would be greater than his. Tucholsky*s loyalty to the
Blatbchen stemmed largely frcm this freedom, so rare elsewhere, frcm
proprietorial interference.
In the rest of the German press the "lastiger Dualismus 
zwischen Geist und Okonamie in der Zeitung" (63) was so apparent that 
Tucholsky's critical comments were hardly original. In the months Of 
instability after the Revolution, there was much talk of socialisation, 
and a controversy arose in the publishers' trade journal, Per Zeitungs- 
Verlag, about the value of state intervention in the press. Erich Schairer,
(60) Herausgeber oder Verleger?, WB 14/7/21, GW I, pp.810-13.
(61) ibid., p.811.
(62) An das Publikum, WB 7/7/31, GW III, p. 889.
(63) Koszyk, op.cit., p.46.
who initiated the discussion in Die Hllfe, advocated the separation 
of the news and advertising functions of the press, and proposed a 
return to the former system where the state had enjoyed an advertising 
monopoly. Newspapers would then have to rely solely on their income 
from sales, and consequently Only the best would survive. (64) Both 
diagnosis and remedy were sufficiently radical to impress even Tucholsky. (65) 
Schairer's comments seemed to him "positive Vorschlage", welcome insofar 
as they brought the discussion on to a more advanced plane than the 
platitudinous apologia of the publishers for the status quo. However, 
the talk of socialisation was not followed by action, and so the abuse of 
pcwer by proprietors and advertisers continued. Many newspapers hovering 
on the edge of bankruptcy soon provided fertile ground for a secret 
take-over by rich industrialists. (66)
The other main feature of Tucholsky's criticism of the press, 
the enlightenment of his readers about circumstances inside the industry, 
had therefore a normative as well as an informative function. The public 
had to be warned against conservative press-lords and industrialists if 
it were not to be deceived by the anti-Republican propaganda of a 
Hugenberg. Tucholsky also strove to increase public awareness of the 
subliminal influence of editorial presentation in such papers, where a 
skilful use of headlines and differing type-sizes manipulated the opinions 
of readers off their guard; he wished to train them to read critically.
But he was once again faced by the familiar dilenma. Those who read 
his advice in the WeltbtShne generally did not need it, and he had no 
uncensored access to those who did.
(64) ibid., p.47.
(65) Sozialisierung der Presse, WB 11/12/19, GW I, p.540.
(66) SentimentaleS Lied, WB 13/5/20, GW I, pp.646-7.
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Tucholsky's campaign against the Gentian press involved • 
direct and indirect attack. His polemical shafts were aimed directly 
at those of his colleagues who failed to display adequate enthusiasm 
for the netf order. He deduced that they had widely varying motives 
for this coolness towards democracy. The provincial Goneralanzeiger 
had always been noted for conservatism, the Social Democratic and 
Garniunist press suffered frcm a lack of imagination among the editorial 
staff, and the Democratic newspapers were driven into compromising their 
principles in a misguided or opportunistic search for a non-existent 
objective stand-point. Tucholsky1 s indirect assault on the press was 
also important: he exposed proprietorial interference, craven editors 
surrendering to their subscribers and advertisers, and tendentious 
presentation of news. As a result of his activities he hoped that his 
compatriots would look on the press with appropriate scepticism, but in 
this field too he was finally dis appointed.
The Burger turn
The middle classes have often been the target for criticism 
by European writers. Satirists have ridiculed their egocentric outlook, 
their preoccupation with financial success and their lack of culture and 
taste; the timid conservatism of the German Burgertum added to its 
unattractiveness in the eyes of the progressive intellectuals of the 
Activist Movement. (67) It was therefore only to be expected that Tuch­
olsky, in his dual capacity as a left-wing intellectual and a satirist in 
search of appropriate targets, should have concerned himself with the 
Biirgertum.
Tucholsky's articles immediately after the November Revolution 
abound in references to the middle-class. At that time, he saw it as a
(67) Cf. Doerfel, op.cit., p.64.
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psychological rather than an economic category:
„Der Burger. Das ist... eine geistige 
Klassifizierung, man ist Burger durch 
Anlage, nicht durch Geburt und am 
allerwenigsten durch Beruf". (68)
The chief characteristic of the biirgerlich cast of mind was a nostalgic
longing for the social order and prosperity of the Empire. Middle-class
opinions still held in Germany after the war had originated in the age of
Bismarck and Wilhelm II. The Bilrger of Tucholsky's day retained his
respect for the military, and was hostile to the democratic concepts of
equal rights and individual freedcsm.
Tucholsky adduced several reasons for the middle-class love 
of the Wilhelminian system. The first was that of apparent self-interest. 
The division of rewards which gave political and military power to the 
officers, the Junker and the bureaucrats, and the economic pre-eminence 
to the middle-classes was hailed as a God-given Ordnung. Those who did 
not already hold positions of authority consoled themselves, in Tuch­
olsky's opinion, with the prospect of future promotion. As lcng as the 
German public submitted to the domination of their Beamtentum, no progress 
could be made towards equality. Near the end of his career, Tucholsky 
was compelled to admit that his compatriots' dream was unchanged:
„Das deutsche Ideal: hinter eineam Schalter 
zu sitzen".
The inevitable corollary of this longing was
„Das deutsche Schicksal: vor einem S chal ter 
zu stehen".(69)
This worship of the Beamten seemed a national failing, but Tucholsky 
believed it to be particularly prevalent among the middle classes frcm 
whose ranks most of the officials were recruited. Considerations of self-
(68) Wir NegatiVen, GW I, p.372.
(69) Schnipsel, WB 27/5/30, GW III, p.458.
advantage were reinforced by those of apolitical' indolence. The rigid . 
social hierarchy assigned every maiiber of society his place, and spared 
the relatively privileged BUrgertiim from the necessity of questioning 
the system.
Such outdated attitudes were regarded by Tucholsky .as 
highly dangerous. He attacked in particular the belief that the military 
could do no wrong. However, as long as many Btirger in small provincial 
tcwns had relatives in well-paid army positions, the attempt to enlighten 
them about the sins of the military was bound to prove fruitless. Even 
-when such financial incentives were absent, their affection for the 
monarchy likewise survived its collapse. When Tucholsky claimed that 
the Burgertum would deck their houses with flags to celebrate the return 
of the Hohenzollems (70), he was asserting that the middle classes lacked 
any democratic insight and suffered from an inborn subservience to 
authority.
Both self-interest and respect for authority were evident 
in the response of the typical Burger to the Revolution. The sweeping 
away of established institutions troubled inveterate Untertanen, who had 
associated then with the pre-war world in which they had felt at ease. 
Having ignored the necessity for even mild social and constitutional 
reform, they were horrified by the spectre of unruly mobs bent on 
plunder. The Biirgertum understood the Revolution only as a Lohribewegung, 
led by fanatics who deserved to be shot. This assessment of the middle- 
class view was a typical Tucholsky generalisation, but for large sections 
of the Burgertum it proved correct. Tucholsky was right to contrast the 
widespread middle-class relief at Eisner's murder with the idealism of
(70) PreuBischO Studenten, V© 8/5/19, GW I, p.410.
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the victim:
HUhd die Burger nicken.
Behaglich nicken sie, zufrieden, daB sie leben, 
und froh, die Storenfriede los zu sein, 
die Storenfriede ihrer Kontokasse". (71)
In defence of their privileges, they continually acquiesced in the
use of force, even when it was employed by Nationalist assassins
against politicians of their own class such as Erzberger and Rathenau.
Middle-class feelings towards the workers, on the other hand, 
ware a mixture of scorn, hatred and fear: scorn for the different style 
in which the workers were forced to live by their poverty (72), hatred 
of organised labour for no longer believing in "die Gottgewolltheit 
des Untemehmerprofits" (73) and fear that the violence of January 1919 
might be repeated. Tucholsky considered that the Burger instinctively 
disapproved of the use of force by men in cloth caps rather than 
military uniforms, and that he rationalised this fear by asserting that 
the workers were Bolshevik terrorists. Tucholsky pointed out that this 
belief was misguided, but the middle classes persisted in their opinion 
that the threat to their position came only frcm the left.
An exclusive concern with self-interest, exaggerated respect 
for traditional authority, tacit or open support of anti-democratic 
Nationalists and hatred of the workers: these were in Tucholsky1 s opinion 
the characteristic attitudes of the middle class. But he also singled 
out one section of that class as being especially prone to pettiness and 
triviality: the business-men. In commercial dealings their ruthless 
expertise might be a virtue, but their political attitude was based on
(71) Eisner, WB 27/2/19, ibid., p.379.
(72) Cf. Die beideri Deutschland, Freiheit, 6/8/22, ibid., p. 1028:'"Arm" 
und "schlecht" - das sind fur sie (die Burger) dieselben Begriffe'.
(73) ibid.
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narrow-rninded egotism. They reluctantly accepted the democratic ‘
system, but at heart they remained Nationalists. Their readiness
to trade with the French and their apparent support for Stresemann's
policy of detente stamped them, in Tucholsky1 s opinion, as even more
dangerous to the peace of Europe than the more obvious, and therefore
more easily countered threat frcm the generals or the Junker.
Tucholsky was certain that the business community's moderate facade
would not prevent them frcm giving enthusiastic support to the new war,
as they had done in 1914:
„Diese "Unpolitischen" ('Vissen Se - ich kummer 
mich nicht urn Politik. Ich will Ordnung und Ruhe, 
und jeder soli haben, was ihm zukorrmt und bei mir 
im Geschaft soil alles klappen".) - grade diese 
sind Mitlaufer, Handlanger und Bejaher der 
schliinmsten Untaten, wenn sie nur reglamentsmaBig 
geschehen. Und sie geschehen. Wir werden das, 
zum zweiten Mal^ erleben". (74)
Tucholsky was not content with mere polonic against such 
businessmen; he held them up for public disapproval by creating the 
figure of Vfendriner. (75) His attacks on the business world and 
Wendriner as its representative mark a turning-point in Tucholsky's 
writings on the middle class. Wendriner is satirised nor merely for 
his materialistic conservatism, but also for the misuse of his economic 
power. (76) He is a bourgeois, as well as a Burger; a capitalist 
controlling the means of production.
The two definitions of the middle class, first as a ' 
psychological, then as an economic category, are consecutive rather
(74)Mit Rute urid PeitsChe duTch PreuBen-Deuts chi and, WB 23/8/28, GW II, 
p.858.
(75) Cf. Nittenberg, op.cit., p. 116:"Indem er den Typ zeidhnete, der 
auf den ersten Blick zwar sehr sympathisch wirkte, des sen Denken 
und Handlungen jedoch soviele Mangel aufwiesen, die das Mitfuhlen 
und Identifizieren erschwerten und fast unmoglich machten, hoffte 
Tucholsky seine Leser auf zuriitteln und ihnen das Negative dieser 
Art von Menschen vor Augen zu fuhren". The assessment of Tucholsky's 
general intentions is correct, though whether, even at first sight, 
Wendriner is a "very sympathetic" character is open to doubt.
(76) Cf. Gtf II, pp.314-7.
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than cmtradictory, and illustrate Tucholsky's development fran 
democratic Activism to Marxism. Attacks on the Burgertum for its 
eooncmic exploitation of the workers predominated in Tucholsky's 
writings in the late 1920's, along with encouragement to the latter 
to break the capitalist stranglehold by uniting in the class 
struggle. (77) It had been logical to ask intellectuals to combat 
an attitude of mind, but only the organised Labour Movorient could 
effectively resist the economic rulers of Germany.
Thus far Tucholsky's attitude to the middle classes has 
been revealed as total hostility to their conservatism, distrust of 
democracy and abuse of economic power. When it is recalled that he 
himself came from a middle-class family, and lived comfortably on the 
proceeds of his articles for the liberal press, his views may appear 
to be coloured by the hatred of the apostate. As long as Tucholsky 
' alleged that the Biirger was distinguished only by an attitude of mind, 
he could by definition claim exemption from his own criticism. A more 
serious source of ambiguity was provided by his intermittent recognition 
that the Biirgertiin was by no means a homogeneous community. Instead it 
included such diverse elements as well-educated merchants who took a 
paternalistic interest in their employees (78), professional groups such 
as teachers, clerks and their families, and the so-called Schieber, who 
had made their fortune as any suppliers and speculators during the war. 
Occasionally Tucholsky did distinguish between those examples of the 
Burgertum. In Eindrtcke von einer Reise(79), he noted the rivalry 
between the parvenu, "der Mann im Speck", and the more traditionalist 
Burger, who envied his success and strove in vain to emulate it. But
(77) Cf. GW HI, pp.311-2..
(78) Cf. the first two of the three Kopfe, WB 22/1/29, GW III, 
pp.36-7.
(79) GW I, p.499.
more often Tucholsky used the word Biirger as a general term covering 
all middle-class groups. This practice led to serious problems of 
logic, when wholesale denunciations of the middle class alternated 
with a sympathetic treatment of many of its members, notably the 
cultured but impoverished among the petty bourgeoisie. (80)
Tucholsky's response to the German military defeat had been 
complex. Naturally he was relieved that the fighting had at last ceased, 
but he was concerned about the effect of war and revolution cn his 
country's cultural standards. His early comments on the Burgertum had 
a certain anbivalence, because the changes after the Revolution had 
different effects on the various groups among the Burgertum. Neither 
of -the personifications of middle-class respectability, der deutsche 
Michel with his night-cap,or Wendriner, interested only in the latest 
share quotations, made any significant contribution to national culture, 
which might have partially redeemed them in Tucholsky's opinion: they 
aspired only to social attendance at the Mannergesangverein or the 
theatre. Tucholsky's efforts to rouse them frcxn their apolitical and 
philistine slumbers were half-hearted and of short duration.
Tucholsky recognised both the need to stimulate the democratic 
spirit and the Republican ideal among the middle class and the near­
inpossibility of the task, due to the resistance of the majority of the 
Biirger themselves. However, in early 1919 it seoned that democratic 
middle-class attitudes might indeed exist, among the teachers, clerks 
and professional groups where the liberal cause was making its greatest
1(80) Tucholsky concealed this confusion by substituting the word 
Mittelstand for Burgertum in this context (cf. Ich habe noch, 
Berliner Taaeblatt. 24/11/19, GW I, p.526), or by using both 
terms concurrently, as in Das Gesicht der Stadt, Freiheit,
16/11/20, ibid., p.757.
inpact. Tucholsky's interest in this group was stimulated by 
approval of their well-developed cultural tastes. He also sympathised 
with their eooronic problems, since their social position was being 
undermined by inflation.
Tucholsky's ambivalent attitude to this question emerges
from the article Dammerung. (81) Here Tucholsky was concerned with the
cultural aspects of the middle-class world. (82) He clearly counted
himself as a member of the Burgertum, using the word Wir and expressing
his cwn discomfort at the post-war degeneration of cultural standards:
„lch fuhle nur dumpf, daB da etwas herankriecht, 
das uns alle zu vemichten droht. Uns: das ist 
unser altes Leben, das sind die grunen Inseln, 
die wir uns im Strom des lacherlich lauten 
Getriebes noch zu bauen verstanden haben - uns: 
das ist unsre alte Vfelt, an der wir - trotz allem - 
so gehangen haben". (83)
Ihis was Tucholsky's most striking apologia for the pre-war world. His
view corresponded to the cultural pessimism of Spengler's Per Untergang
' des Abendlandes, though similar views were widely held in German
intellectual circles in the 1920's. (84) Unlike Spengler, however, /
Tucholsky could not remain pessimistic for long. Although readily
admitting bo a fear of the new and' the unknown, and to concern about the
prospects for culture, he pledged his cwn support for the progressive
cause:
„Was wissen wir von dieser Zeit?
Wir sind ihre Instrunente, und 
ich glaube, daB der noch ihr
bestes ist, der sich ihr nicht
entgegensteamit". (85)
(81) WB 11/3/20, GW I, pp.608-11.
(82) Raddatz takes the last sentence of the article "Es dammert, und 
wir wissen nicht, was das ist: eine Abenddarrmerung oder eine 
Morgendanitverung". (ibid., p.6il) out of context and misreads it as 
a prophecy of the Kapp Putsch,which brcke out a few days later. 
(Fritz J. Raddatz, Tucholsky, eine BildblOgraphie, Munich, Kindler, 
1961, pp.61-3.
(83) GW I, p. 609.
(84) Tucholsky's only carment on Spengler was the unccmplimentary 
instruction: "Halts Maul, du Tepp aus Konigsbergl" (Spengler,
WB 17/6/20).
(85) ibid., p.610.
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With these words Tucholsky accepted the need for change/ however 
undesirable its side-effects. His interest in the defenders of cultural 
standards among the petty bourgeoisie received only cursory expression 
in his later career. (86) This change of emphasis was mainly due bo his 
recognition in the summer of 1922 that the workers/ rather than any 
section of the middle class,; were the most reliable protectors of the 
Republic and the strongest force for social reform. (87)
By the mid—1920*s Tucholsky1 s attitude to bourgeois art
and literature had been transformed. He claimed that to the middle
classes in general, art had become a matter of social convention. (88)
Tucholsky admitted that musical evenings and literary discussions in
drawing-rooms modelled on the 18th century French salons did no direct
harm. But Tucholsky felt that they did no good either. Such social
occasions represented a waste of time and energy, and diverted public
attention from more important problems:
„Das biirgerliche Kunstspiel ist die Ablenkung 
van Wesentlichen... Es wird bewuBt uberschatzt, 
weil es schon ungefahrlich ist, weil kein Zins- 
wucher, keine Ungerechtigkeit des Besitzes an 
Grund und Boden, keine Agrarreform damit verbunden 
ist".(89)
As soon as any writer presumed to abandon the field of pure art in 
favour of political Tendenz, the middle-class enthusiasm for his work 
vanished; it was no part of the function of bourgeois art to change 
society. As a carmitted left-wing intellectual, Tucholsky had always 
believed otherwise. In the latter stages of his career even the
(86) Cf. NeujahrsgruB an die Geistigen Deutschlands, WB 5/1/22, 
ibid., pp.893-4.
(87) Cf. Die beiden Deutschland, Freiheit, 6/8/22, ibid., p. 1029:
"Unser Deutschland hat in der Hauptsache nur einen Freund, 
unsere Republik hat fast nur den einen: den Arbeiter".
• (88) Iriteressieren Sie sich fur KUrtst? Zurcher Studentenzeitung,
May 1926, GW II, p.424.
(89) ibid., p.425.
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pretensions of the middle classes to cultural interest gave Tucholsky 
merely another pretext on which bo attack them, and he dismissed 
contemptuously their escapist desire to "flee into a realm of higher 
harmonies" (90) at a safe distance frcm the problems of oontsnporary 
Germany.
Tucholsky's polemical attacks oh the German Burgertum cannot 
be regarded as a high point of his work. His choice of target was 
unoriginal and his treatment of the theme inconsistent. The transition 
frcm Activism to Marxism provides an adequate explanation for his 
re-defining the term Burger in an economic rather than a psychological 
context, but the parallel change of attitude with regard to bourgeois 
art is less acceptable. His fear for the collapse of cultural standards 
in 1919 was as exaggerated as his rejection of all but conmitted left- 
wing literature by 1925: a rejection which did not prevent him frcm 
writing artistically successful but escapist works such as Nadhher and 
Schlofi GripshOlm. In addition to this inconsistency of terminology and 
of literary practice, he again tended to over-generalise. Not all of 
the middle classes were reactionary Nationalists. However, Tucholsky 
deserves praise for creating the figure of Wendriner, whose personality 
was calculated to cure his readers of any enthusiasm for the bourgeoisie. 
Hie satirist Hauser rather than the polemicist Wrobel was the more 
convincing critic of the German Bilrgertun.
(90) Cf. the poem Zuckerbrot und’Peitsche, WB 9/12/30, 
Gd III, p.628.
CHAPTER 10
It may seem paradoxical that Tucholsky's political 
criticism should be regarded as the most important aspect of his 
work. This study does not deny his contribution to German literature, 
but to demonstrate his ability in this field, stylistic analysis 
would be required It was considered advisable to avoid literary 
judgments which would at best be superficial, and to concentrate 
instead on a detailed analysis of Tucholsky's political development.
Tucholsky's political importance stems primarily frcm 
the representative quality of his career. In 1913 he joined 
Jacobsohn's Schaubuhne, which under the new title Weltbuhne was to 
become the most influential left-wing weekly in Weimar Germany. He 
began as a commentator on the Berlin theatre, and, like his mentor, 
developed into a cultural critic of seme standing. He emerged frcm 
the war, frcm Germany's defeat and the November Revolution as an 
idealistic supporter of the progressive cause and a bitter opponent 
of the reactionary forces which had previously dominated German 
society. However, his early idealism was tinged by a certain vague­
ness and Utopianism which was characteristic of the intellectual 
Aktivisten, even if Tucholsky was not formally a member of the group.
In the next stage of his career, Tucholsky, in camion 
with Ossietzky and other left-wing writers, recognised that the 
Republic was in danger frcm the counter-revolutionary right. He 
therefore offered the new system critical but constructive support 
for three years; critical because he recognised its weaknesses and 
insecure foundations, yet constructive because it appeared to 
represent a framework for future improvements which he pressed on 
its governments continually but without success.
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However, by the mid-1920's, the administrations of 
Marx and Luther seemed to be using the Republican form of govern­
ment to preserve the inequalities and injustice of German society. 
Along with other writers in the Weltbiihne, Tucholsky began asking 
if the mere facade of democracy was worth preserving, since it only 
concealed the dictatorship of the prosperous bourgeoisie. His doubts 
were reinforced by the election of the monarchist, Hinderiburg, as 
President of the Republic. However, he soon recovered from his 
disappointment and, along with other members of the Deutsche Lirike, 
welcomed the opportunity of fighting against the openly reactionary 
forces which appeared bent on oppressing the workers and preparing 
a new European war.
Confronted with this threat, Tucholsky was not alone among 
left-wing intellectuals in rejecting the loyal parliamentary opposition 
of the Social Democrats, as amounting not to cranpranise, but to 
surrender to an. irreconcilable enemy. He adopted an increasingly 
tolerant attitude towards the KPD and its Marxist ideology, and 
contributed revolutionary articles to the semi-official Ocnmunist 
press controlled by Munzenberg. However, like most of his colleagues 
in the Weltbuhne, he refused to join the Conmunist Party itself.
When Hitler gained power and Stalin abandoned the KPD to its fate, 
Tucholsky lost all sympathy for the pseudo-revolutionary left, but 
he was unable to find an alternative political stand-point, andr like 
many of Germany's left-wing exiles, he ended his career in a despair 
which led to suicide.
The analysis of Tucholsky's role as a leading figure on 
the intellectual left enables a critic to avoid the danger of a
purely monographic approach dealing only with Tucholsky -himself 
and failing to put his work into its social context. Such short 
works as Raddatz1 s Bildbiographie and Prescher1 s brief biography 
almost inevitably fall into this trap, though the latter does 
mention such Aktivisten as Heinrich Mann and Flake and discusses 
the Deutsche Linke. (1) With more space at his disposal, Schulz 
sketches the political background to Tucholsky’s writings in greater 
detail, but his judgment is occasionally somewhat unsound(2)
Nevertheless, such works rank far above the criticism of 
Tucholsky by Franz Leschnitzer, Hermann Kesten and Lisa Matthias. 
Schulz's dogmatic judgments pale into insignificance before those 
of the Comnunist Leschnitzer, who talks of Tucholsky's "Gesinnungs- 
labilitat" and attributes his final collapse to the "Ausweglosigkeit 
seiner Ideologie". (3) Even in retrospect, the party hack cannot 
comprehend Tucholsky's position as a sympathiser rather than one of 
the faithful. On the other hand, Kesten even refuses to take 
Tucholsky's political views seriously. In Kesten's estimation, the 
campaigner against war and injustice becomes simply a personification 
of every-day Germany; the intellectual aristocrat is seen as a writer 
who thinks in the same 'way as "Hinz Oder Kunz". (4) Lisa Matthias, a 
former mistress of Tucholsky, proves less informative than her literary 
image as Lottchen might lead readers to expect. Her account of life 
with Tucholsky(5) rightly counters any tendency towards hero-worship, 
but suffers from a sensationalism which reveals more about the 
character of the authoress than about her subject.
(1) Prescher, book, pp.20-1 and 45-49. Prescher's thesis, written 
in the mid-1950's, was the first detailed examination of 
Tucholsky's political career, and most of its conclusions 
can still be accepted.
(2) Schulz, op.cit., p.67 and pp. 73-75.
(3) Leschnitzer, op.cit., p.185 and p. 191.
(4) Kesten: Meine Freunde, die Poe ten, Frankfurt, Fischer, 1970, p.83.
(5) Lisa Matthias: Ich war Tucholsky s Lottchen, Hamburg, Mar tom von 
Schroder. 1962.__ . .* ------- ..—  - J  
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This thesis has atterpted to put Tucholsky's 
achievements into clearer perspective by frequent reference 
to similar or contrary opinions in the works of his colleagues.
The obvious comparison is with Ossietzky, not only as a journalist 
whose views developed parallel to Tucholsky's own, but also as a 
gallant yet naive figure, risking his life for a lost cause.
Tucholsky was as skilled a polemicist as Ossietzky, but a realist 
rather than a heroic martyr. Other comparisons suggest themselves, 
for example that betweei Tucholsky and Hiller. The latter, like 
Tucholsky, came frcm a middle class Jewish environment; he was an 
important theorist, with a much greater interest and facility in 
composing manifestos and organising protest committees than had 
Tucholsky. Although Tucholsky involved himself in political affairs 
as a polemicist, satirist and orator, he was never given the opport­
unity for direct activity which Kurt Eisner accepted in Munich.
The latter was for a brief period the most prominent of the left-wing 
intellectuals, though he paid for this fame with his life. Never­
theless, Tucholsky's works are far more widely read today than those 
of Ossietzky, Hiller and Eisner.
The renaissance of Tucholsky's work is certainly due in 
part to the devoted labours of his widow, Mary Tucholsky. However, 
Tucholsky's writings also have qualities lacking in those of his 
oontenporaries. Most important is the wide range of his artistic 
expression. He was equally at heme in lyric poetry and political 
verses, in idyll and polemic, in metaphysical speculations and in 
humorous reflections on the holes in Emmenthaler cheese. Secondly, 
Tucholsky played a significant role as the Cassandra of Weimar 
Germany. His ability to analyse underlying trends allowed him, as
a direct consequence of the Treaty of Versailles, to forecast the 
date of the outbreak of the Second World War, and he later enumerated 
the diplomatic and military steps which led up to the conflict. In 
the short term he foresaw that Noske's plan to tame the old officers 
by giving them responsibility for the new army would bring disaster. 
Ten years later, he recognised bitterly that the weakness of the 
Republic would ensure the triumph of its right-wing opponents. In 
spite of his underestimation of the National Socialists, Tucholsky's 
overall record as a forecaster of events was remarkably good.
Tucholsky was therefore a representative figure on the 
intellectual left for two reasons: his development was comparatively 
typical, and his work has survived the years better than that of his 
colleagues. The first full-length study of Tucholsky's role as a 
left-wing intellectual was by H.L.Foor. (6) In spite of various 
differences of opinion, for example on the subject of Tucholsky's 
attitude to Marxism, the present writer regards Poor's book as the 
best available suntnary of Tucholsky's development. 'PoQr's main 
virtue as a critic is his detailed knowledge not only of Tucholsky's 
writings but of German politics in general between 1914 and 1935.
He thereby succeeds in placing Tucholsky's work in its historical 
context.
Two schools of thought exist with regard to the 
significance of Tucholsky's political work. The former, represented 
by Prescher, Poor, Raddatz and, with some reservations, Schulz, 
sees Tucholsky as a progressive humanitarian, who for yea^ s bravely 
resisted the forces of reaction, only to be frustrated when his
(6) Poor, thesis: Kurt Tucholsky: A leftist intellectual Views 
the Weimar Republic, Comurrbia University, New York, 1965, 
later expanded and published as Tucholsky and the Ordeal. 
of Germany, 1914-35, New York, Scribners 1968.
criticism was continually ignored by those in power. This
positive view of Tucholsky was summed up in the description
by his friend and colleague, Erich Kastner:
„Ein kleiner dicker Berliner, 
der eine Katastrophe mit seiner 
Schreihmaschine aufhalten wollte". (7)
The failure to avert disaster frcm Germany is seen by such critics
as the fault not of Tucholsky, but of the governments which
rejected his advice.
A second body of criticism, led by Golo Mann and Doerfel, 
sees Tucholsky's work in a less positive light. Doerfel regards 
Tucholsky and his colleagues in the Weltbuhne as impractical 
intellectuals. (8) In her opinion they measured Germany's 
politicians according to an absolute standard, and then blamed them 
unjustly when they failed to live up to it. There is seme truth 
in the accusation, since Tucholsky's stand-point was undeniably 
idealistic. However, such a criticism is superficial. It implies 
that idealistic standards in politics by their very nature represent 
a weakness, and that only a pragmatic approach is acceptable. As 
Tucholsky pointed out early in his career (9), ideals cannot be 
fulfilled in practice, but they do provide a yard-stick by which to 
assess what has been achieved, and what remains to be done. Tucholsky 
himself thereby recognised that a balance between idealism and 
pragmatism was required.
Golo Mann, on the other hand, avoids condemning idealism 
as such; he attacks Tucholsky on different grounds. Mann examines
(7) Erich KSstner, in the Nachwort to GrUB nach vom, Stuttgart 
and Berlin, Rowohlt, 1947.
(8) Doerfel, op. cit., p. 33.
(9) Wir Negativen, GW I , p.376.
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Tucholsky's polemic against Germany, but he pays little heed
to its underlying causes or the circumstances in which it
developed. As may be seen from his unflattering comparison of
Tucholsky with Heine, Mann fails to recognise Tucholsky's "love-
hate relationship" with his native land:
„Die hellsichtige Bosheit, mit der Kurt Tucholaky 
die Republik verspottete, alle ihre Lahmheiten 
und Falschheiten, erinnerte von feme an Heinrich 
Heine. Vcm Witz und HaB des groBen Dichters 
war' ein Stiick in ihm, nur leider wenig von seiner 
Liebe". (10)
Such an assessment takes no account of Tucholsky's restrained, 
constructive criticism in the early years of the Republic, and 
concentrates exclusively on the second half of his career, when 
the Republic had disappointed his expectations. Mann's judgment 
is therefore at best incomplete.
However, Golo Mann makes another point against Tucholsky 
and his colleagues. He claims that they struck a double blew 
against the democratic system: directly, by exposing the shortoanings 
of the Republic, but also indirectly, since their activities were 
associated by the Nationalist right with the democracy in which 
they flourished. (11) Although Mann has misjudged Tucholsky's 
intentions in attacking the Republic, he might reply that, in any 
case, these intentions were irrelevant. Did not Tucholsky himself 
assert that what mattered most was the effect of his work? If 
that effect was to weaken the progressive cause and to strengthen 
the right, then Tucholsky did undermine democracy, whatever his 
intentions.
(10) Golo Mann, op.cit., p.707.
(11) Mann, ibid.
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This criticism would be more logical than the previous 
objection, since it measures Tucholsky's work by his own standards. 
However, to claim that Tucholsky had an important effect on the 
German right is to stretch credibility too far. This section of 
public opinion was already hostile to all forms of Republican 
democracy, and such views required no external stimulus. If any 
propagandists can be blamed for confirming the right-wingers in their 
ideas, the dubious distinction should go to such conservative 
theorists as Moeller van der Bruck, or frustrated advocates of 
empire like Hans G riirm , and not to the staff of the Weltbuhne.
The charge that the latter helped to undermine democracy is equally 
unfair, since those responsible were Hugenberg and the Junker 
camarilla advising the aged Hindenburg. In comparison, any indirect 
responsibility of Tucholsky and his colleagues for the collapse of 
democracy is infinitesimal.
The main purpose of this thesis has been to bring 
research on Tucholsky up to date, a task which has involved the 
evaluation of previous studies and an assessment of critical 
controversies. A more original contribution has been the analysis 
of Tucholsky's attacks on leading Social Democratic politicians such 
as Ebert and Noske. The SPD leaders contended that they had entered 
an alliance with the forces of reaction in November 1918 because the 
only alternative was chaos and Bolshevism. Tucholsky came to - 
disagree violently with this vietf, and claimed that Ebert and his 
colleagues had been guided not by the necessity of events but by 
personal timidity and fear of change.
Previous critics of Tucholsky have adopted one or other 
of these standpoints, without examining in any detail the historical 
issues involved. It appears to the present writer that the contro­
versy among historians of the Revolution, begun in the mid-1950's, 
has still not been resolved. However, those such as Kolb and Rtirup 
who agree with Tucholsky’s view of Ebert, seem to have the stronger 
arguments. For sane years before 1918 the SPD had been making 
concessions to the right, advocating the pursuit of revolution but 
in practice seeking the gradual reform of German society. When the 
Revolution did cone, in spite of Ebert's efforts to prevent it, the 
SPD leader saw it not as an opportunity to implement Socialist 
measures or even to establish and stabilise a new democratic regime, 
but instead as* a threat of anarchy. Tucholsky later admitted that 
anarchist elements had been active on the extreme left, but he 
pointed, justifiably, to the enthusiasm for reform among large 
sections of the populace, an attitude which Ebert had feared and 
opposed. Noske appears to have missed the opportunity to create a 
loyal Republican army because of -similar distrust of the left and a 
blind confidence in the traditionalist officers. It would be an 
exaggeration to assert that recent historians have finally vindicated 
Tucholsky's opinion of the SPD leaders, but the left-^ wing polemicist 
rather than the pragmatic President and Army Minister has the weight 
of expert opinion on his side.
This thesis also attempts to bring research on Tucholsky 
up to date by analysing material not available to previous critics. 
Such material includes Tucholsky's pre-war articles in Iforwarts, 
which are discussed in Chapter 1, Other articles not included in 
Tucholsky's Gesaitmelte Werke are quoted at intervals throughout 
the thesis.
Another claim to originality may be made for the 
analysis of Tucholsky's changing attitude to Marxism. Here the 
technique of examining the development of Tucholsky's political 
views proves its worth, especially since other critics have been 
content with the arbitrary selection of quotations which support 
a preconceived opinion. (12) It is not sufficient to point out, 
as sane critics have done (13), that Tucholsky never joined the 
KPD: many convinced Marxists have refused to join the Communist 
Party, preferring like Tucholsky to offer advice frcm outside.
The only way to assess whether or not a public figure such as a 
journalist is a Marxist is to examine his published work for 
signs that he accepts or rejects that doctrine.
Between 1925 and 1930 Tucholsky endorsed almost all of 
the fundamental tenets of Marxist theory. Most important was the 
support which he gave to the class struggle of the proletariat 
against the bourgeoisie, and his frequent encouragement of the 
former to unite and carry out a revolution. He hoped that the 
overthrow of the capitalist state would lead to government by the 
workers, the expropriation of the exploiters and state ownership 
of the means of production. Other Marxist theories with which 
Tucholsky expressed agreement were the necessity for the workers 
to unite across the frontiers of Europe against their exploiters, 
and the role of the capitalist state as an instrument in the hands 
of the bourgeoisie.
(12) Cf. Poor, op.cit., pp.144-5.
(13) Cf. Schulz, op.cit., p.120.
He also publicly supported such underlying Marxist concepts as • 
the doctrine of materialism and the primacy of the economic factor 
in society, though his interest in such abstractions was limited. 
After 1930 he grew more critical of Marxism, partly as a result of 
reading the works of Freud, and partly on account of the manifest 
failure of the German working-class movement. He even privately 
denied that he had ever been a Marxist. Yet such reservations 
about Marxist theory do not cancel out his earlier support for it.
A survey of Tucholsky's political writings should carbine 
the chronological with the thematic approach. The most important 
themes selected for analysis have been his campaigns against 
militarism and war, and against the reactionary bias of the 
judiciary, the educational system and the press. This aspect of 
Tucholsky's work earned him the hatred not only of the openly 
Nationalist right, but also of the Burgertum, a hatred which Tuch­
olsky reciprocated. These topics have been analysed in detail;, by 
other critics (14), and this thesis supplements such work by referring 
to the conclusions of recent historical works. (15)
The picture of Kurt Tucholsky which emerges frcm this 
survey is not as caiplex as it at first appears. His campaigns, 
however disparate their individual targets, all provide evidence 
of a concern for human suffering and hatred of injustice. As an 
intellectual, writing for a small band of devotees, Tucholsky had 
the opportunity to express his opinions without fear of editorial 
censorship. Nevertheless he recognised that such isolation was 
not "splendid" but sterile and lacking any effect, and- he therefore
(14) Cf. Helga Janicke; Tucholsky als Gegner des Rrieges und des 
Militarismus, East Berlin, 1951; Friedrich Breitling: Tucholsky 
Urid die politisdie Justlz, Altingen 1967; and Ingeborg 
Pistohl: Die Gestalt dee Biirgers im Werk TuchOlskys ,Bonn, 1969.
(15) These include the works of Cars ten on the Reichswehr and 
Hannover on the judiciary.
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made several efforts to escape from it.
First he allied himself with the Independent Socialists, 
the party which tried in vain to establish itself in the middle 
ground between the Majority Socialists, who had introduced the 
ocxtprcmise system of Weimar democracy, and the Communists, who 
were increasingly subject to the tutelage of Moscow. In spite of 
the uncertainty over policy which characterised the 13SPD, Tucholsky 
remained a loyal member until its dissolution in 1922.
The failure of the Independents persuaded Tucholsky 
that maribership of a pressure group father than a party might 
provide the better outlet for political commitment. Throughout the 
1920's he was active in the German Pacifist Movement. He supported 
its demand for ths abolition of the Peichswehr and for reconciliation 
with France, on the basis of proletarian solidarity rather than 
the inter-state diplomacy of Stresemann and Briand. However, the 
Pacifist Movement, weakened by discord over policy and by personal 
bickering, lost its influence in the late 1920's, leaving Tucholsky 
once again wdthout a political home.
Tucholsky's activities as a revolutionary pacifist and 
Marxist, along with his increasing interest in the dcwn-trodden 
German workers, led him to seek an alliance with the German 
Communist Party. If the Pacifist Movement had suffered from a lack 
of discipline and organisation, the Communists had an excess of 
these qualities. The bureaucrats of the KPD were only too glad to 
obey Stalin's decree, and treat intellectual sympathisers outside 
the party, the so-called fellow-travellers, as enemies. Such 
synpathisers were accepted only on the party's conditions, and 
Tucholsky's efforts to mediate were well-meant but hopeless. It
was probably fortunate for Tucholsky that he refused to 
sacrifice his political integrity on the altar of alleged 
revolutionary purity. In the crisis of 1932-33 the KPD leaders 
and their Soviet mentors proved unable either to take power 
themselves or to prevent the advent of Hitler and the descent 
of Germany into barbarism.
Three times Tucholsky faced the dilemma of whether - 
to commit himself to supporting a political group; three times 
. he accepted the challenge, though with diminishing enthusiasm, 
since he never joined a political party after 1922. On each 
occasion he was disappointed. It is therefore unfair to ask why 
Tucholsky abandoned the progressive cause in 1932, when it was 
obviously lost; what is remarkable is that, in spite of successive 
failures and rebuffs, he kept up the struggle so long and so 
bravely.
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